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Abstract 
The US has been involved in the majority of transitional justice measures established 
since the 1990s. This study explores this phenomenon by examining the forces that 
shape US foreign policy on transitional justice. It first investigates US influence on 
the evolution of the field, and then traces US involvement in three illustrative cases 
in order to establish what US involvement entails, why the US gets involved and how 
the US has impacted individual measures and the field as a whole. The cases include: 
the Khmer Rouge Tribunal in Cambodia; the trial of Liberian President Charles 
Taylor and the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission; and the Justice and 
Peace Process in Colombia. These cases represent different transitional justice 
measures, transition types and geographic regions – all key dimensions in the field. 
These measures were also all established in the 2000s, a period which reflects a 
different historical moment in the field’s evolution. The cases shed light on the actors 
who play a key role in the field – from presidential administrations to Congress to the 
State Department and others. The study is based on nearly 200 interviews and 
archival research undertaken in the US, The Hague, Cambodia, Liberia and 
Colombia, providing a strong basis on which to draw conclusions about US foreign 
policy on transitional justice.  
.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
Although transitional justice (TJ) is a contested concept since understandings of 
transition and justice remain disputed, the term rapidly came to represent a field of 
practice and has received increasing attention over the past two decades. 1  
Policymakers and activists began to rely on a set of transitional justice measures, 
including criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations and institutional 
reforms, which were thought to address past human rights violations. It was argued 
that one or a combination of these measures could help a society deal with the past 
and move forward.2  
The classical formula of TJ was how to balance ethical imperatives and 
political constraints and settle a past account without upsetting a transition. 3 
However, by the 2000s, the term covered a much broader terrain than transitions to 
democracy, addressing transitions and non-transitions in a range of societies. The 
concept thus evolved to involve not only past-focused transitions, but to include 
situations where violations continue as well. In addition, the range of mechanisms 
expanded, intersecting with those working in and writing about security, 
peacebuilding, development, gender, reconciliation and memory, in addition to 
human rights.4 This shift involved a more explicit recognition of transitional justice 
as a tool for a range of political and social goals beyond accountability. Despite the 
                                                
1 On the contested conception of ‘transition’ and ‘justice’, see, for example, Bell, Campbell and Ní 
Aoláin, 2004/2007a; Bell, 2009: 22-24; Roht-Arriaza, 2006. For the debate about whether transitional 
justice constitutes a ‘field’, see, Bell, 2009; and Arthur, 2009.  
2 See for example, Annan, 2004; Boraine, 1994; De Greiff, 2008; Elster, 2004; Hayner, 2001; 
International Center for Transitional Justice, 2001; Kritz, 1995; McAdams, 1997; Orentlicher, 1991; 
Teitel, 2000; Zalaquett; 1989. 
3 Zalaquett, 1995 in Kritz; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 28.  
4 On the intersection between transitional justice and security sector reform, see Bryden and Hanggi, 
2005, and Patel, De Greiff and Waldorf, 2010, as well as Sriram, 2009; and McEvoy and Shirlow, 
2009 for their work on TJ and DDR. On TJ and peacebuilding, see Lambourne, 2009. On TJ and 
development, see Arbour, 2006; Alexander, 2003; De Greiff and Duthie, 2009; Mani, 2008. On TJ 
and gender, see Askin, 2003; Buckley-Zistel, 2012; Campbell, 2007; Hamber, 2007; and Nesiah, 2006. 
On TJ and reconciliation, see Chapman, 2009; Fletcher and Weinstein, 2002; Mamdani, 1996. On TJ 
and memory, see Bickford, 1999/2000; Hamber, Ševcenko, and Naidu, 2010). 
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conceptual stretching of the field, its initial boundaries explain how certain measures 
became ‘the legitimate justice initiatives during a time of political change.’5  
 Several authors have written about how the establishment of the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR), the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) and other measures provide evidence of the 
global trend toward greater accountability for human rights violations. The 
establishment of TJ measures has been cited as evidence of transitional justice 
‘globalized’, the ‘justice cascade’, the ‘internationalization of justice’, the 
‘international legalist paradigm’, the ‘judicialization of international relations’ or 
what I call the ‘transitional justice trend’.6 What underpins each of these concepts is 
an acknowledgement that a paradigm shift has taken place within local, national, 
international and global relations in which discourses on justice and accountability 
are now prevalent.  
 These accounts raise important issues, but skew understandings of international 
involvement in transitional justice. Edward Newman explains how the 
internationalization of justice can advance the prospects for justice since it can 
provide a more impartial view than purely local solutions, which are more likely to 
be conditioned by local power balances rather than concerns of justice (Newman, 
2002: 41). He acknowledges that transitional justice will continue to be as much a 
political as a legal and moral process, but the politics he focuses on are local, not 
international.  
                                                
5 See, Arthur, 2009. I understand TJ as a ‘transition’ from a situation where human rights violations 
are ignored to one where there is an attempt to provide some form of accountability. My 
understanding is based on the conception of the field as developed in the 1990s, which focuses on 
certain accountability measures, but entails a wider conception of transition. For more detail on my 
understanding of transition, see Bird, 2011.  
6  See, Teitel, 2008. Sikkink, 2011. Newman, 2002, Oomen, 2005. On the influence of the 
‘international legalist paradigm’ on transitional justice, see Nagy, 2008: 278-279. Also see Snyder and 
Vinjamuri, 2004. 
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 Barbara Oomen is more critical of international activity in transitional justice 
that is ‘often deemed neutral, universal and above all a-political’. She argues that the 
costs of investing in justice seem much lower, be it politically, physically or 
financially, than military or other interventions and finds that justice efforts are 
perceived as one of the safest ways in which to engage with other countries. She then 
argues, however, that the legal has been made ‘subservient’ to local politics (Oomen, 
2005, 893, 906). She thus critiques international involvement, but then focuses on 
local, not international politics.   
 Other scholars focus on politics at the international level, but do so by making 
claims about Western hegemony without adequate empirical backing. They argue 
that hegemonic international approaches to transitional justice are represented as 
politically and economically neutral, but are instead directed at reconstituting post-
conflict societies in the image of Western liberal democracies (i.e., McGovern and 
Lundy, 2008: 276-277). ‘Steeped in Western liberalism’, Rosemary Nagy argues that 
transitional justice is a discourse and practice imbued with power, which calls into 
question ‘the very legitimacy of a globalized transitional justice’ as well as the 
efficacy and legitimacy of mechanisms designed to help those who must live 
together after atrocity (Nagy, 2008: 287). Chandra Sriram argues that TJ is externally 
imposed since it is largely formulated by external actors (Sriram, 2007).  
 The transitional justice literature lacks empirical examination of international 
involvement that considers the significant role that many foreign state governments, 
international organizations and NGOs play in the field. To address this gap, this 
study focuses on one particularly important actor in international relations and 
transitional justice – the US.  
 For the past two decades, transitional justice has become an integral part of US 
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foreign policy. The US has been significantly involved in the majority of measures 
established since the 1990s, including international, hybrid and domestic criminal 
tribunals, truth commissions, reparation programmes and other institutional reforms. 
For this fact alone, US involvement merits attention within the transitional justice 
literature. Failing to take into account the US role limits understandings of the field. 
 The scholarship that does address the role of the US has focused on criticisms 
of US opposition to the ICC or its role in the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST). Scholars 
argue that the Bush administration’s decision to ‘unsign’ the Rome Statute and 
subsequent policies aimed at safeguarding US nationals from ICC prosecution 
represent deep-seated American hostility toward international law and justice.7 
Others argue that the IST was a puppet court of the US, where the US was seen to 
use transitional justice discourse as a tool to pursue its war on terror.8 Adding 
significant damage to the US reputation was its backing of the notion of ‘unlawful 
combatants’, evidence of torture of Guantánamo detainees after 9/11 and since, its 
failure to close this prison (i.e., Center for Constitutional Rights, 2006; Amnesty 
International, 2011). 
 These issues justifiably raised alarm within the US and around the world, and 
                                                
7 See, for example, Amann and Sellers, 2002; Brown, 1999/2002; Broomhall, 2003; Goldsmith, 2003; 
Hafner, Boon, Rübesame and Huston, 1999; King and Theofrastous, 1999; Mundis, 2004; Leigh, 2001; 
Lietzau, 2001; Orentilicher, 2003-2004; Sadat and Carden 2000; Schabas, 2004; Scharf, 2001; Sewall 
and Kaysen, 2000; Vicuna, 2004; Wald, 2004; and Wedgwood, 1998. 
8 Bell, Campbell and Ní Aoláin state: ‘In Iraq, the US has used past-focused transitional justice 
discourse to justify and underwrite the ‘de-Baathicisation’ process, attempting at a subtle level to 
justify its own role as ‘democratiser’ rather than ‘occupier’. ‘The’ conflict (or the undemocratic era 
for which accountability is required) is thereby defined as the one that preceded and was ‘ended’ by 
its use of force. Prisoner ill-treatment in Abu-Ghraib, and other alleged abuses in Iraq fall outside this 
frame; to that extent, there is an attempt to employ ‘transitional justice’ both as a framing narrative 
that doubles as an instrument of hegemonic power. Whether the US will succeed or nor in this attempt 
is an open question, one given particular salience by identifying Iraq as merely one site in a never-
ending (and to that extent ‘ordinary’) ‘war on terror’. The complexity here is evident from the inter-
connectedness of transitional justice with multiple and overlapping spheres of international law, as 
well as from its becoming knitted into the unsettled sphere of local law (which itself is reconfigured 
by external legal interface to ‘fit’ the transitional justice narrative being advanced) (Bell, Campbell 
and Ní Aoláin, 2007). For more on the US role in the Iraqi Special Tribunal, see: Alvarez, 2004; Bali, 
2005; Bassiouni, 2005; Bell, Campbell and Ní Aoláin, 2007; Dermody, 2006-2007; Gersh 2004-2005; 
Ni Aolain, Bell and Campbell, 2007b Parker, 2005; Scharf, 2004; Scharf and Kang, 2005; and Zolo, 
2004. 
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appeared to represent a considerable reversal from previous leadership on human 
rights and transitional justice activity. Nevertheless, there is more to US foreign 
policy on transitional justice than its position toward the ICC or role in the IST. A 
narrow focus on the most controversial TJ measures fails to provide an accurate 
portrayal of US engagement in the field. US involvement in other measures warrants 
investigation, which leads us to the aim of this study.  
 US involvement in transitional justice, as in many areas, is multifaceted and 
complex. By examining the forces that shape US foreign policy on transitional 
justice, this study uncovers some of this complexity and helps explain how and why 
the US is involved in this field. Four questions guide the study and are briefly 
explored here.  
 The first question that guides the study is: How is the US involved in 
transitional justice? I address this question by considering four phases in a measure’s 
lifespan: the decision to establish a transitional justice measure; negotiations and 
establishment; operations; and follow-up. Some phases may receive greater attention 
than others, but tracing US involvement throughout these phases will uncover the 
diverse roles the US plays during a measure’s existence. The US may, for example, 
provide financial or technical assistance to measures, advocate for or against them 
and cooperate to differing degrees with other actors involved. Answering this 
question will reveal what US foreign policy on transitional justice actually entails.    
 The second question that guides the study is: Who is involved in transitional 
justice?  Foreign policy is made and implemented by several government actors, 
especially in a state like the US.9 A useful starting point is consideration of the actors 
responsible for US foreign policy decision making (i.e., the President and Congress) 
                                                
9 For a general discussion of US foreign policy, see, i.e., Cox and Stokes, 2008, Jentleson, 2000, 
Henriksen, 2001; Hastedt, 2003; Ikenberry, 2005; Kegley, 1996; Parmar and Cox, 2010. 
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and those responsible for its implementation (i.e., State Department and USAID).10 
Since each of these actors represents a large segment of government, it is also 
necessary to investigate within each institution in order to identify who is involved. 
The following table illustrates some US government actors that may be involved in 
transitional justice.   
Figure 1: US actors involved in transitional justice 
President Congress State Department USAID 
White House 
staff, National 
Security 
Council 
Congressional 
committees (i.e., 
Appropriations, 
Foreign Relations) 
Regional bureaus, Office 
of War Crimes Issues, 
Office of the Legal 
Advisor, US embassies 
Country 
offices, Office 
of Transition 
Initiatives  
 
Presidential involvement may include responses to transitional justice, proposals for 
legislation, negotiation, policy statements and implementation. 11  A presidential 
administration sets the tone on an issue like transitional justice, regardless of whether 
or not it takes a specific stance on a particular measure. Presidential involvement 
may shift from President to President and also from measure to measure, but any 
presidential involvement is an important factor to take into account.  
 Congressional involvement may include resolutions and policy statements, 
legislative directives, pressure, funding restrictions or denials, informal advice and 
congressional oversight.12 This involvement may be divided along partisan lines and 
vary depending on the specific measure in question.13 Transitional justice measures 
                                                
10  Christopher Hill distinguishes between actors responsible for decision making and agents 
responsible for implementation (Hill, 2003). However, scholars tend to focus on the actors responsible 
for decision making, instead of those responsible for implementation. Lindblom argues that study of 
implementing agents is important since they attribute meaning to foreign policy, which affects the 
manner in which directives are actually operationalized (Lindblom, 1959). This study looks at both 
groups – those responsible for decision making and those responsible for implementation.    
11 See, Grimmett, 1999. For more on presidential involvement in US foreign policy making, see, i.e., 
Hodge and Nolan, 2007; Briggs, 1994; Hersman, 2000.     
12 See, Grimmett, 1999. For more on congressional involvement in US foreign policy making, see, i.e., 
Lindsay, 1992-93; Zoelick, 1999-2000.   
13 Alden and Aran argue that the role of political parties have been overlooked in foreign policy 
analysis (Alden and Aran, 2012).  
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may be likely to involve certain congressional committees (i.e., Appropriations, 
Foreign Relations).  
 The State Department may also be involved considering its mandate to carry 
out the foreign policy agenda of the President.14 Several offices or bureaus within the 
agency may be involved in transitional justice, including, for example, the regional 
bureaus, Office of War Crimes Issues, Office of the Legal Advisor and the US 
embassies.15 USAID may also be involved in transitional justice considering its 
responsibility for providing assistance in support of US foreign policy goals. Offices 
that may be involved include country offices or the Office of Transition Initiatives.16 
Although other actors may be involved, considering these four actors offers a starting 
point for identifying who is involved in transitional justice.  
The third question guiding this study is: Why is the US involved? Here, the 
foreign policy literature, which investigates the actors, structures and broader context 
of foreign policy, offers several theoretical approaches that may help explain US 
foreign policy on transitional justice. Potential explanations are depicted in the 
following table and then described briefly below.   
 
                                                
14 For more on State Department involvement in US foreign policy making, see, i.e., Wilson, Diiulio 
and Bose, 2012;  
15 Regional bureaus advise and guide the operation of the US diplomatic missions within their 
regional jurisdiction. The Office of War Crimes Issues formulates US policy responses to atrocities 
committed in areas of conflict and elsewhere throughout the world. It coordinates US government 
support for war crimes accountability in regions where crimes have been committed against civilian 
populations on a massive scale. The office monitors, advises and helps administer or report on 
international tribunals. The Office of the Legal Adviser furnishes advice on all legal issues, domestic 
and international, arising in the course of the State Department's work. This includes assisting 
Department principals and policy officers in formulating and implementing US foreign policies, and 
promoting the development of international law and its institutions as a fundamental element of those 
policies. The Office is organized to provide direct legal support to the State Department’s various 
bureaus, including both regional, geographic and functional offices. US embassies work to improve 
political, economic, and cultural relations between almost every country worldwide and the US. 
16 The USAID Office of Transition Initiatives supports US foreign policy objectives by helping local 
partners advance peace and democracy in priority countries in crisis. Seizing critical windows of 
opportunity, OTI works on the ground to provide fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key 
political transition and stabilization needs. 
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Figure 2: Explanations for US involvement in transitional justice 
National 
interest 
Individuals Bureaucratic 
politics  
Domestic 
influences 
External 
influences 
Norms Change 
over time  
Impact of 
TJ on 
political, 
economic, 
or security 
interests  
Individual 
interest in TJ  
Interplay 
wibetween 
agencies  
Impact of TJ 
interest 
groups, 
public 
opinion or 
the media 
Pressure 
from 
external, 
actors or 
events 
Influence 
of TJ 
norms 
and/or 
identity 
issues 
Impact of 
socio-
temporal 
context  
 
One explanation is offered by realist accounts of foreign policy making, which would 
argue that the US, as a unitary and rational actor, is involved in transitional justice 
when it advances the national interest. These scholars find that calculation of the 
national interest is self-evident and can be arrived at rationally through careful 
analysis of the material conditions of states as well as the particulars of a given 
foreign policy dilemma. The pursuit of security and the efforts to enhance material 
wealth place states in competition with each other, limiting the scope for cooperation 
to a series of selective, self-interested strategies.17  
Behaviorists, who would contend that individuals are key to understanding 
US involvement in transitional justice, propose a second explanation. Behavioral 
accounts investigate the role of the individual decision maker – focusing on 
psychological and cognitive factors, beliefs, biases and stereotypes, personality and 
emotions, leadership style and role – as an explanatory source of foreign policy 
choice.18  Behaviorists categorize foreign policy making as a far less organized, 
consistent and rational process than depicted by the realists. Psychology constrains 
rationality and human divisions and disagreements challenge the notion that the state 
is a unitary actor.  
                                                
17 For rational accounts, see, i.e., Snyder and Diesing, 1977; Powell, 1990; Schelling, 1960; Putnam, 
1988; Levy and Razin, 2004. 
18 For behavioural accounts, see, i.e., Sprout and Sprout, 1956; Jervis, 1976; Festinger, 1957; 
Boulding, 1959; Janis and Mann, 1977; Orbovich and Molnar, 1992; Janis, 1982; Hollis and Smith, 
1986.  
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A bureaucratic politics explanation offers a third explanation, which would 
look at the interplay and competition within and among relevant state agencies in 
explaining US foreign policy on transitional justice. This approach highlights the 
fragmented and often institutionally driven nature of foreign policy. Different 
institutional settings mean officials and politicians view foreign policy issues through 
different prisms resulting in distinctly different views. For example, when 
considering a particular issue, the Treasury tends to focus on the budgetary 
implications, the Department of Defense on the repercussions for national security, 
while the State Department focuses on the diplomatic and international political 
ramifications. Foreign policy is thus depicted as the unintended result of a bargaining 
process involving the principal participants.19 
A fourth explanation by those focusing on domestic influences would 
highlight the ability of sub-state and non-state actors within the domestic arena to 
exert influence over US foreign policy on transitional justice. This approach views 
foreign policy as the product of a competitive domestic environment, where the 
interplay between interest group politics, public opinion, the media and state decision 
makers and structures is an important explanatory factor.20  
A fifth explanation is offered by pluralists, who would consider the 
interaction between domestic and external sources as crucial for an understanding of 
US foreign policy on transitional justice. Robert Putnam’s ‘two-level game’, in 
                                                
19 See, Allison, 1971; Halperin, 1971; Allison and Halperin, 1972. For a critique of the bureaucratic 
politics literature, see, i.e., Krasner, 1972; Art, 1973; Freedman, 1976; Caldwell, 1977; Hollis and 
Smith, 1986; Bendor and Hammond, 1992; Rosati, 1981; Hart and Rosenthal, 1998; Weldes, 1999.  
20 For more on interest groups, see, i.e., Hughes, 1978; Payne and Ganaway, 1980; Putnam, 1988; 
Kegley, 1987. For more on public opinion, see, i.e., Hill, 1981; Almond, 1950; Rosenau, 1961; Holsti, 
1992; Foyle, 1997. For more on the media, see, i.e., Robinson, 2001; Herman and Chomsky, 2002. 
Some scholars have focused on the structure and nature of state political institutions, the features of 
society and the institutional arrangements linking state and society and channelling societal demands 
into the political system (i.e., Katzenstein, 1976; Risse-Kappen, 1991; Rosenau, 1967). Others view 
foreign policy making as driven by the nature of the economic system within states and, concurrently, 
in the interests of a narrow elite that traditionally has acted in what it perceives to be the national 
interest (i.e., Marx, 1967; Moon, 1995; Cox, 2001; Clapham, 1996; Mills, 1956).   
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which foreign policy makers try to balance the logic and demands of the domestic 
and international arenas, attempts to capture the challenges imposed by the complex 
interdependency between these two levels.21 
Constructivists offer a sixth explanation, with their focus on the role of norms 
and ideational factors as a way to explain US foreign policy on transitional justice. 
For constructivists, the ‘national interest’ is not objectively given or based solely on 
material interests, but instead must be interpreted through the prism of ideas, which 
are seen to construct both identities and interests.22 Jeff Checkel argues that the 
moral force of commonly held values and norms and increasing exposure to a 
globalized social environment exerts pressure on policy makers to act in a certain 
way (Checkel, 2008: 74-75). In addition, liberal notions of progress, which underlie 
much of constructivism’s focus on norms, may also help explain US foreign policy 
on transitional justice, considering its promotion of certain ideals (such as human 
rights, liberty and democracy), social forces (capitalism, markets) and political 
institutions (democracy, representation).23 
Lastly, a historical sociologist would consider the socio-temporal context as 
an important explanation for US foreign policy on transitional justice. 24  This 
perspective intersects with discussion about foreign policy change, where scholars 
                                                
21 See, Putnam, 1988. For more on complex interdependency, see Keohane and Nye, 1977. Even 
though scholars have overlooked the intersection between foreign policy and globalization, Alden and 
Aran argue that foreign policy offers a site where states might seize the opportunities and meet the 
challenges posed by globalization. They also argue that globalization reinforces the foreign policy 
stance of political-military integration within the west and the expansion of liberal spaces (Alden and 
Aran, 2012: 89-90). For hyperglobalist perspectives, see, i.e., Friedman, 2005; Fukuyama, 1993. For 
transformationalist theses, see, i.e., Held, 1999; Nye and Keohane, 2000; Giddens, 1991/1999; 
Rosenau, 1997; Scholte, 2005. 
22 For more on constructivism, see, i.e., Houghton, 2007; Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001; Adler, 2002; 
Barnett and Duvall, 2005; Checkel, 2007; Gheciu, 2005; Hansen, 2006; Johnston, 2007; Klotz and 
Lynch, 2007; Guzzini and Leander, 2006.  
23 See, Weldes, 1999. For more on liberalism, see, i.e., Doyle, 2008; Brown and Miller 1996; Doyle, 
1997; Kant, 1970; Mill, 1973; Rousseau, 2005. On the intersection between liberalism and 
constructivism, see Alden and Aran, 2012: 116; Arthur, 1994; David, 1985.   
24 See, Hobson and Hobden, 2002. Path-dependent explanations may also be useful, see, i.e., 
Goldstone, 1998; Mahoney, 2000 Meierhenrich, 2010; David, 1985; Arthur, 1994.   
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consider how state actors reinterpret changes in international society over time. 
Understanding and integrating change into analyses of foreign policy requires 
accounting for its impact in relation to individual decision makers, institutions and 
structures of decision making as well as the wider socio-political and external 
context within which such change occurs.25 
Although other explanations may exist, these approaches offer a way to 
initiate thinking about why the US is involved in transitional justice. Though there is 
no consensus amongst these approaches, the literature on foreign policy is helpful 
since it explores several ways of understanding the conduct and significance of states 
in foreign policy making.  
The fourth and final question guiding the study is: What is the impact of US 
involvement on transitional justice? Although not a major focus of this study, the 
previous three questions enable some assessment of the impact of US involvement. It 
will be possible to consider the extent to which US goals have been reached; how US 
involvement impacted transitional justice aims of the country that established a 
measure; and, more broadly, how US involvement has impacted the field in general. 
Although a complete impact assessment is not within the scope of this research, 
some comment will be possible.   
The study is designed in a way to answer these questions. It first traces US 
influence on the evolution of transitional justice, and then undertakes three 
comparative case studies, which examine US involvement in the establishment and 
operations of illustrative transitional justice measures. The cases include: 1) the 
Khmer Rouge Tribunal in Cambodia; 2) the trial of Liberian President Charles 
                                                
25 See, Alden and Aran, 2012: 11. The literature on ‘learning’ is also helpful in this regard. See, i.e., 
Vertzberger, 1986; Khong, 1992; Barnett, 1999. Also, see discussion of epistemic communities, i.e., 
Haas, 1989; Haas, 1992; Adler and Haas, 1992.    
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Taylor and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Liberia; and 3) the Justice 
and Peace Process in Colombia.  
The cases vary on key dimensions to the field, but operate during a similar 
time frame. They represent different transitional justice measures, different transition 
types (past conflict, post-conflict and ongoing conflict) and different geographic 
regions. Variation along these dimensions is often relied on in the transitional justice 
literature. Many studies have focused on one measure, similar measures (i.e., 
international criminal tribunals), measures in a particular region, or measures in 
contexts that have experienced a similar type of transition.26 The variation among the 
cases selected represents some of the diversity within the field of transitional justice. 
It also aims to shed light on a range of US government actors involved in the field.  
Much of the literature has explored measures established in the 1990s. In this 
study, the cases selected were all established in the 2000s, a period which reflects a 
different historical moment in the field’s evolution with the establishment of new 
measures and models of transitional justice. For example, the Cambodia case 
provides an example of a ‘hybrid’ court – after ad-hoc tribunal fatigue had set in; the 
                                                
26 Certain measures have received significant scholarly attention, particularly the ICTY and ICTR (i.e., 
Arbour and Neier, 1998; Bassiouni and Manikas, 1996; Goldstone, 1997; Scharf, 1997), as well as the 
South African TRC (Boraine and Levy, 1995; Gibson, 2002/2004; Hamber and Kibble, 1998). 
Legal scholars and practitioners have written extensively about the development of international 
criminal law with a focus on genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (Bassiouni, 
1986/1992/1998/2008; Cassese, 2003/2008/2011; Goldstone, 1996; Schabas, 2000/2006). Priscilla 
Hayner wrote the definitive text on truth commissions in 2001, where she assessed the experience of 
20 different commissions.26 Pablo de Greiff edited The Handbook on Reparations, which examines in 
detail reparations programs in different parts of the world and addresses key thematic issues that have 
come about in the design and implementation of reparations programs (De Greiff, 2008). The 
institutional reform literature has focused on lustration (Boed, 1998; Cohen 1995; David, 
2003/2004/2006) and vetting (Mayer-Rieckh and De Greiff, 2007). Amnesty has also been a focus 
within the literature (Chigara, 2002; Freeman, 2009; Mallinder, 2007/2008; Snyder and Vinjamuri, 
2004). Some have debated the extent to which these mechanisms were complementary, i.e., truth and 
justice (Rotberg, 2000; Schabas, 2004) and amnesties and justice (Mallinder, 2007/2008). Many have 
focused on transitional justice in particular regions, i.e., in Africa (Bosire, 2006; Crane, 2005; Huyse 
and Salter, 2008; Waddell and Clark, 2008); in Europe and the former Soviet Union (Akhavan, 1998; 
Nalepa, 2010; Stan, 2009); in Latin America (Lutz and Sikkink, 2001; Roht-Arriaza, 1999; Sikkink, 
2006; Zalaquett, 1999); and in Asia (i.e., Cohen, 2007; Linton, 2010).Scholars have focused on 
transitional justice measures in post-authoritarian settings, i.e., Huyse, 1995; Kritz, 1995; post-conflict 
settings, i.e., Sieff and Vinjamuri, 1999; Van Zyl, 2005; and in situations of on-going conflict, i.e., 
Campbell, 2010; Campbell and Ni Aolain, 2005; Laplante and Theison, 2006-2007.  
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Liberian case explores the prosecution of a head of state as well as a truth 
commission (both more controversial in the 1990s); and the Colombian case 
represents a new model of transitional justice, which attempts to combine amnesty, 
prosecutions and reparations. This time frame also corresponds with three 
presidential administrations (Clinton, Bush and Obama), which enables comment on 
the development of US foreign policy on transitional justice over the past two 
decades.  
Although this research focuses on TJ measures, it does not overlook factors 
important to any research that examines US foreign policy. US foreign policy in each 
case is taken into account in order to base subsequent discussion of TJ within the 
wider historical and geopolitical context. For example, US actions in Cambodia 
during the Vietnam War are discussed, as is the long, historical relationship between 
the US and Liberia since Liberia’s founding, as is the US drug war in Colombia. 
Each of the case study countries has a specific history with the US that impacts US 
involvement in transitional justice. Geopolitical considerations are also taken into 
account, but do not necessarily determine the level of US involvement in a measure. 
For example, it is not the case that countries with high geopolitical import receive 
more US attention on transitional justice, nor is it the opposite, where high 
geopolitical importance results in insignificant US attention. Nevertheless, an 
understanding of historical relations and geopolitical considerations provides 
important contextual factors that need to be considered.   
Process-tracing guided the way in which data was collected, and provided a 
way to establish the facts of each case by drawing on multiple sources of information. 
Similar questions were asked of each case so that comparable data could be obtained, 
compared and systematically analyzed in order to infer answers about US foreign 
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policy on transitional justice. This form of analysis offered a way in which to make 
sense out of the material, analyse qualitative information, and systematically observe 
US involvement in the three cases (See Appendix 1 for more information on 
methodology).  
Data was collected through extensive interviews and archival research of key 
stakeholder groups in Washington DC, The Hague and the three case study countries. 
Four months of field research in DC, five weeks in each case study country and a trip 
to The Hague provided an excellent opportunity to conduct nearly 200 interviews 
with officials from the US government, international organizations, local and 
international NGOs, media, academics and staff of transitional justice measures (See 
Appendix 2 for interview list). Within each of these stakeholder groups, interviews 
were conducted with high-level and lower-level officials. For example, all of the US 
War Crimes Ambassadors were interviewed, as were local civil society groups that 
represented victims. The sheer number of interviews and diversity of input sought 
ensured a level of triangulation was achieved.27 Case study experts were shown the 
results of the study and asked for their reflections on the research. Interviews, along 
with a wide review of documents, reports and studies from these same groups 
provide a strong empirical grounding for this research (See Appendix 1 for more 
information on interviewing method).   
Most concretely, the study discovers something about US involvement in 
three TJ cases. However, the research design and method also provide a robust 
foundation on which to draw broader conclusions about US foreign policy on 
                                                
27 The quality of the sources including their authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning 
was taken into account. The research aims to be transparent by being clear about what was done, 
ensuring a fit between methods and research questions, establishing the relationship between my work 
and pre-existing literature, and accounting for and acknowledging any influences I may have had on 
the findings.  
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transitional justice. The study also has implications for those interested in exploring 
the role of other international actors involved in transitional justice, and other related 
research. An empirically grounded, systematic study of US involvement in three 
cases of transitional justice offers a significant contribution to the transitional justice 
literature by filling a gap on the role of the US in the field. The study also contributes 
to the foreign policy literature by drawing on its theoretical approaches, which help 
to explain actual state conduct in the international system and the sources of foreign 
policy formulation and implementation.  
The study is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides a historical overview 
of US influence on the evolution of transitional justice over the last century. It 
explores the US role through three stages in the field’s evolution: the precursors to 
transitional justice from WW1 through the 1970s; the emergence of the field in the 
1980s and early 1990s; and its institutionalization in the 1990s and 2000s. This 
background provides useful context for the three case studies explored in chapters 3-
5. These chapters investigate US foreign policy in the Cambodian, Liberian and 
Colombian cases of transitional justice. Each case study chapter begins with a 
discussion of US foreign policy in the country. It then examines US involvement in 
the establishment and operations of the transitional justice measures, and concludes 
with an explanation and assessment of US involvement. Chapter 6 undertakes a 
systematic comparison of the data collected from the three cases in order to draw 
conclusions about US foreign policy on transitional justice. Chapter 7 concludes the 
study by reflecting on its broader implications, and considers possibilities for future 
research. We now turn to chapter 2, which considers US influence on the evolution 
of transitional justice.  
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Chapter 2 US Influence on the Evolution of Transitional Justice  
 
The last chapter made the case for an examination of US foreign policy on 
transitional justice. This chapter documents US influence throughout three stages of 
the field’s evolution, which are depicted in the following table.  
Figure 3: The evolution of transitional justice: three stages 
Stage Time period Examples 
Precursors to transitional justice WW1 through 
1970s 
International Military 
Tribunals at Nuremberg 
and Tokyo 
Emergence of the field  1980s through 
early 1990s 
Latin American truth 
commissions and 
Eastern European 
lustration 
Institutionalization  1990s through 
2011 
ICTY, ICTR, ICC 
 
The first stage explores the precursors to transitional justice, which includes a 
proposal for an international criminal tribunal after WW1 and the international 
military tribunals established after WW2. The second stage explores the emergence 
of the field between the 1980s and early 1990s, paying specific attention to the role 
of the human rights movement, the ‘transition’ paradigm and the creation of an 
epistemic community, which all helped to clarify and solidify the measures 
commonly associated with transitional justice. The third stage explores the 
institutionalization of the field, and focuses on the establishment of the ICTY, ICTR 
and ICC. This chapter explores each stage with attention to US influence, and argues 
that one cannot fully understand the evolution of transitional justice without taking 
the role of the US into account.  
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2.1 Precursors to Transitional Justice 
Jon Elster has written about trials and purges more than 2,000 years ago during 
political upheavals in ancient Athens (Elster, 2004). Gary Bass recounts a history of 
war crimes tribunals that extends at least 200 years into the past (Bass, 2000). 
Establishment of an international criminal tribunal, however, ﬁrst appeared on the 
international agenda in a serious manner following the conclusion of WW1.   
Although there had been some support for the idea of individual criminal 
liability,28 when a commission at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 proposed the 
establishment of a tribunal to prosecute German combatants and officials for 
‘violations of the laws and customs of war and the laws of humanity’, the US issued 
a dissenting report, explaining its opposition to the idea. It urged that the nations  
use the machinery at hand, which had been tried and found competent, 
with a law and a procedure framed and therefore known in advance, 
rather than to create an international tribunal with a criminal jurisdiction 
for which there is no precedent, precept, practice, or procedure (AJIL, 
1920: 95, 142). 
 
The recommendations of the commission were not followed because of American 
dissent. However, President Woodrow Wilson eventually reached a compromise with 
British Prime Minister Lloyd George, who was determined to hold trials (Willis, 
1982: 80). The result – article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles – called for the former 
German Emperor Kaiser Wilhelm II to stand trial before an international tribunal ‘for 
a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.’ 
President Wilson drafted the provision, but must have known he would undermine 
the proposed prosecution since, shortly after, the Dutch gave asylum to the German 
emperor and refused to extradite him (Ibid). Accountability for war crimes did not 
rank high on President Wilson’s list of priorities. He was more concerned with a 
                                                
28 At the 1915 annual meeting of the American Society of International Law, a former Yale University 
law professor, Theodore S. Woolsey, proposed that war criminals be tried before ‘an international 
court . . . previously agreed to in treaty form’ (Woolsey, 1915: 68).  
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‘moderate peace, a viable democratic government for Germany, and, most of all, a 
League of Nations to secure future peace’ (Taylor, 1992: 15). 
 Early in its existence, the Council of the League of Nations had before it a 
proposal to create a ‘High Court of International Justice’, which would be competent 
to criminally prosecute individuals for violations of the ‘universal law of nations’ 
(Alfaro, 1950). However, the proposal was rejected for similar reasons as those given 
by the US delegation at the Paris Peace Conference (Cerone, 2007: 282).  
 During the interwar years, there was little activity within international 
organizations concerning the establishment of international criminal tribunals. 
European academics and policymakers kept the idea alive, but American 
international lawyers watched the process from the sidelines’ (Schabas, 2011: 771). 
 This all changed after WW2. On 1 November 1943, the US, the UK and the 
Soviet Union issued the ‘Moscow Declaration’, which stated that perpetrators of 
‘atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions’ would be judged and 
punished after the war (Smith, 1982: 13-14). By the end of the year, the US, UK and 
other allied powers set up the UN War Crimes Commission to lay the legal and 
evidentiary groundwork for postwar trials (UN War Crimes Commission, 1948). In 
August 1944, the Commission proposed establishment of an international tribunal. 
The idea was opposed by Britain, which asked the US to join with it and block the 
concept. US Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. said that, with respect 
to the major criminals, he did not favor trials and proposed, instead, that the Nazi 
leaders be subject to summary execution, an idea that President Franklin Roosevelt 
himself entertained (Smith, 1982: 27-29). Soon, however, the execution plan, and the 
harsh proposal for de-industrialization of postwar Germany with which it was linked, 
lost their momentum. Within the US administration, the views of those who insisted 
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upon trials, like Secretary of War Henry Stimson, who had the support of the military, 
came to prevail and a proposal for the trial of Nazi leaders was developed (Kochavi, 
1998).  
 The US government’s preference for a ‘judicial’ solution to the problem of war 
criminals was ultimately made clear in the Yalta Memorandum, which had been 
prepared to guide President Roosevelt when he attended the Yalta conference:  
We think that the just and effective solution lies in the use of the judicial 
method. Condemnation of these criminals after a trial, moreover, would 
command maximum public support in our own times and receive the 
respect of history. The use of the judicial method will, in addition, make 
available for all mankind to study in future years an authentic record of 
Nazi crimes and criminality (Yalta Memorandum, 1945).  
 
This same Memorandum envisions the creation of an International Military Tribunal 
(IMT), to be established by Executive Agreement, and formed the groundwork of the 
later drafts submitted by the US for international agreement. Secretary Stimson, 
Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius Jr. and Attorney General Francis Biddle 
initialled the Memorandum. Support for the tribunal came from the highest levels of 
the US administration, including President Harry Truman. Taylor notes that Truman, 
soon after taking office, made clear that he opposed summary execution and 
supported the establishment of a tribunal (Cerone, 2007: 284).  
 The IMT at Nuremberg was established on the basis of the London Agreement, 
a treaty concluded among the four allies, and the IMT for the Far East (Tokyo) was 
created by a special proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur, acting as Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Forces. Both tribunals were given jurisdiction to prosecute 
crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Their jurisdiction was 
limited to prosecuting those fighting on behalf of enemy states with no possibility of 
prosecuting those who fought on behalf of the Allies. Although France, Britain and 
the Soviet Union were equal players in theory, from the start, the initiative lay with 
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the Americans, led by Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson (Schabas, 2011: 772).  
  Goering, Hess, Speer and others were convicted on 30 September and 1 
October 1946. The plan at the London Conference had been to hold at least one 
additional trial, but there was declining enthusiasm for the idea except for in the US 
(Earl, 2009). Instead, the Americans organized a series of additional trials before 
their own military tribunals. Built around groups of defendants who were identified 
thematically – the Nazi judges, the SS, the military leaders, and so on – these were 
held in the same Nuremberg courtroom as the trial of the International Military 
Tribunal. Judges were drawn from US courts (Schabas, 2011: 772).  
 US interest in drafting a code of ‘international criminal law’ continued in 1946 
when US Attorney General Francis Biddle, who served as a judge at the Nuremberg 
tribunal, urged President Truman to support the development of permanent 
procedures and institutions in order to effectively enforce international law and 
utilize the experience of Nuremberg. President Truman was strongly supportive:  
That tendency will be fostered if the nations can establish a code of 
international criminal law to deal with all who wage aggressive war. The 
setting up of such a code as that which you recommend is indeed an 
enormous undertaking but deserves to be studied and weighed by the best 
legal minds the world over. It is a fitting task to be undertaken by the 
governments of the United Nations. I hope that the United Nations, in 
line with your proposal, will reaffirm the principles of the Nürnberg 
Charter in the context of a general codification of offences against the 
peace and security of mankind (Spiropoulos, 1950: para. 10).  
 
Some days later, the US submitted a proposal to the first session of the UN General 
Assembly directing that the International Law Commission (ILC) begin work on ‘a 
general codification of offences against the peace and security of mankind or in an 
International Criminal Code’ (UN General Assembly Resolution 177, 1947).  
 The following year saw the negotiation of the Genocide Convention. An early 
draft prepared by the Secretariat included alternative proposals for a permanent, ad-
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hoc international criminal court to try and punish acts of genocide. However, the US 
proposed that this issue be considered separately. This proposal was formalized in 
article VI of the Genocide Convention, which established that genocide would be 
punished by the territorial state or by the international criminal court, yet to be 
created (Genocide Convention, 1948).  
 Exacerbated by the nascent Cold War, enthusiasm in the US for the Genocide 
Convention and for multilateral commitments in the field of international justice and 
human rights soon met with fierce opposition in the Senate (LeBlanc, 1991). At the 
UN, work on the code of offenses was halted in 1954 and did not revive until the 
early 1980s. Ruti Teitel argues that the incomplete internationalization of justice 
represented by the Nuremberg tribunal was foreclosed by the emergence of the Cold 
War. Despite the development of human rights law after WW2, the incorporation of 
human rights criteria into national foreign aid and the selective linkage between 
human rights promotion and military sales and trade policies by Western 
governments in the 1970s profoundly politicized human rights, and violations often 
went unaddressed during this period (Teitel, 2000: 21). 
 
2.2 Emergence of the Field  
It was not until the 1980s and early 1990s that transitional justice emerged in the 
form that it did. During this period, a shift took place within the human rights 
movement that signalled the need for a response to concrete political dilemmas 
human rights activists faced in what they understood to be ‘transitional’ contexts. At 
the same time, the ‘transition’ paradigm shaped understandings of the kinds of justice 
claims that were considered legitimate or illegitimate in a period of transition to 
democracy. Also during this time, a series of foundational conferences helped create 
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an epistemic community, which played a critical role in clarifying and solidifying the 
concept of transitional justice. The first mention of the phrase ‘transitional justice’ 
came in a Boston Herald article about one of these conferences. The reporter 
covering the conference noted in passing that this was to be ‘the first in a year-long 
series of meetings on transitional justice’ (Palumbo, 1992: 16).  
This section examines the role of the human rights movement, the transition 
paradigm and an epistemic community, which brought about the emergence of 
transitional justice. These groups had support within the US. In addition, the US 
democracy promotion agenda developed during this time frame and was clearly 
linked to discussions about transitions to democracy.  
 
The human rights movement  
Up to the mid-1980s, the central aim of the international human rights movement had 
been to shame repressive governments into treating their citizens more justly and to 
seek international sanctions where abusive regimes did not comply. Organizations 
like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, therefore, had not focused on 
the issue of accountability for violations. The response by Latin American countries 
to the end of repressive regimes in the region, however, forced a shift in the thinking 
of human rights activists.  
The end of the dictatorship in Argentina and its establishment of the first, so-
called ‘truth commission’ in 1984 was followed by similar events in several Latin 
American countries. Investigations into human rights violations were undertaken in 
Bolivia (1982–3), Uruguay (1985), and Paraguay (1992) by parliamentary 
commissions. NGOs also undertook investigations in Brazil (1979–85), Paraguay 
(1984–90), Uruguay (1986–9) and Bolivia (1990–3), each producing unofficial truth 
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reports. An emphasis on truth-seeking over criminal prosecutions in the region was 
illustrated through the significant use of amnesty laws, which either excluded or 
limited the scope of prosecutions. Amnesty laws were used in Brazil (1979), Chile 
(1978), Uruguay (1989), Nicaragua (1990 and 1991) and El Salvador (1992 and 
1993). 
The aftermath of these authoritarian regimes forced a shift in strategy and 
thinking on the human rights issues related to democratic political transitions 
(Zalaquett, 1995: 24). In José Zalaquett’s article, ‘Confronting Human Rights 
Violations Committed by Former Governments,’ he spelled out the dilemma human 
rights advocates found themselves in by the early 1980s. He noted that  
the focus of human rights activism was on current abuses and only 
seldom on past abuses or on preventing the recurrence of human rights 
violations … Starting in the 1980s, however, human rights organizations 
have had to focus much more centrally on the human rights issues related 
to political transitions … The fragile character of the gains [in new 
democracies] made human rights organizations aware of the fact that 
measures which are straightforward from the standpoint of human rights 
norms could have undesired political implications, which in turn would 
affect human rights adversely. Human rights organizations were thus 
unavoidably drawn into the ambiguities of transitional situations (Ibid, 
1989: 24-25).  
 
Thus, the decision of human rights activists to begin to address abuses by former 
regimes without endangering political transformations was intimately connected to 
the Latin American transitions then under way. 
 
The transition paradigm 
The notion of a ‘transition to democracy’ emerged as the principal paradigm by 
which to interpret the reform or overthrow of authoritarian regimes. Several factors 
may be offered to explain why the new focus on transitions came about. First, and 
most obvious, is the fact that democratic reform was a stated goal of important 
32 
 
segments of the population in countries undergoing political change at the time. 
Second, earlier theories of democratization associated with structural determinants 
(encapsulated in modernization theory) had been steadily transcended in the late 
1970s and 1980s by an emphasis on the role of political contingency and actors. It 
was thought that transitions could happen through a shortened sequence of elite 
bargaining and legal-institutional reforms rather than through long-term 
socioeconomic stages (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). Third, the transitions 
concept was transformed from a tool of socioeconomic transformation to one of 
legal-institutional reform. Finally, a global decline of the radical Left during the 
1970s and a concomitant ideological shift in favour of human rights helped the shift 
in favour of the concept of liberalisation, opening (‘apertura’), elite pacts, and 
transitions to democracy (Guilhot, 2005).  
The emergence of the ‘transitologists’ in the late 1970s and 1980s were 
crucial to the development of this paradigm. In 1978, Argentine political scientist 
Guillermo O’Donnell, Swiss political scientist Philippe Schmitter, and Brazilian 
sociologist (and later president of Brazil) Fernando Henrique Cardoso focused on 
‘transitions’ as a crucial area for exploration. The three were part of a newly formed 
advisory council for the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center for 
Scholars in the US (along with US policymakers and members of the Inter-American 
Dialogue), and with the help of the program’s director, Abraham Lowenthal, they put 
together a groundbreaking new project on transitions (Paige Arthur, interview, 22 
February 2010). The Transitions project resulted in the publication of the book 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (1986), which offers a rigorous and influential 
window into the processes, risks and challenges of democratic transitions – 
particularly in many of the cases, such as Spain, Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil – 
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that were important to the development of the field of transitional justice. The 
authors acknowledged that the normative impulse guiding their work was that a 
transition to democracy was a desirable outcome, and they wanted to offer a useable 
instrument for those trying to effect a transition to democracy.  
One of the reasons why the project was so influential was because it 
decisively shifted focus away from an analysis of the structural conditions for 
democracy that had been the mainstay of earlier social science and policy concerns. 
These included issues such as the behavioural, institutional, social or economic 
conditions of democracy – issues that tended toward structural rather than causal 
explanations of democracy (Arthur, 2009: 28). Drawing on the case studies they had 
commissioned for the project, O’Donnell and Schmitter emphasized the inherent 
uncertainty of transitional outcomes, rejecting the contention that approaches 
applicable to stable periods were appropriate to transitional ones. They emphasized 
the significance of bargaining on political outcomes, particularly in the form of pacts 
among elite groups, which they saw as the best method of maintaining the stability 
necessary to establish a democracy (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 37-39). 
O’Donnell and Schmitter also placed a strong accent on the resurrection of 
civil society and the necessity of ‘restructuring public space’ during a transition and 
addressed the problem of ‘settling a past account,’ as they put it, ‘without upsetting a 
present transition.’ Focusing solely on prosecutions and purges of the state security 
forces, they asserted, ‘Transitional actors must satisfy not only vital interests but also 
vital ideals—standards of what is decent and just,’ and ‘the worst of bad solutions 
would be to try to ignore the issue [of past violations].’ Confronting past abuse, 
especially gross violations of human rights, were important in their view in order to 
transform the military’s ‘messianic self-image’ as the institution representing the 
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interests of the nation, to combat impunity, and to reinforce the ethical values 
necessary to social health (Ibid: 28, 30-31). Legal-institutional reforms that led to a 
set of elections and the installation of party politics was seen as the ideal outcome of 
a transition to democracy (Ibid: 11-12). 
The ‘transition’ idea was indeed influential and made its way into policy 
circles and domestic public spheres around the globe. Given the constraints and 
normative aims of transitions in the 1980s, a normative agenda on issues relating to 
the transformation of an abusive state security apparatus and the restoration of 
democratic citizenship helped to shape the emerging field of transitional justice. This 
agenda strongly colored perceptions of what justice entailed, or could become, 
during a time of transition.  
While this idea was gaining momentum, US democracy assistance was taking 
root in the first Reagan administration. Early efforts involved support for transitional 
elections and the administration of justice in Central America, which were part of the 
Reagan administration's effort in that region of supporting transitions to 
democracy—or, more accurately, elected civilian rule—which in turn was a part of 
the larger policy of resisting the spread of what the Reagan administration believed 
to be Soviet-sponsored leftist subversion of the region (Carothers, 2000: 183). They 
quickly gained momentum of their own, however, and USAID began to sponsor 
elections assistance, rule-of-law aid, and other types of aid directly aimed at fostering 
democracy in various parts of Latin America and the Caribbean (Trubek, 2006). As 
countries in other parts of the world began to democratize in the second half of the 
1980s, US democracy assistance followed. Democracy assistance mushroomed in the 
1990s with support for elections, parties, rule of law, and civil society in Eastern 
Europe, Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.   
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The transitional justice epistemic community 
By the end of the 1980s, a particular group of individuals began to focus more 
directly on challenges to justice in times of transition. This group played a decisive 
role in clarifying and solidifying the concept of transitional justice. Three 
conferences offered the venue in which the beginnings of a transitional justice 
‘epistemic community’ could be created: the 1988 Aspen Institute conference, ‘State 
Crimes: Punishment or Pardon (funded by the Ford Foundation); the 1992 Charter 77 
Foundation conference in Salzburg, Austria, ‘Justice in Times of Transition’; and the 
1994 Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) conference, ‘Dealing with 
the Past’.29 These conferences brought together experts in the fields of human rights, 
law and comparative politics from Latin America, Uganda, Haiti, and South Korea in 
an effort to compare experiences on the pursuit of justice initiatives in varying 
transitional contexts. The Open Society Institute and the Ford Foundation helped 
forge South-South links and transmission of these ideas, for example, between Chile 
and South Africa (Arthur, 2009). 
Some of the participants had been actors in transitional justice efforts; some 
would become actors in such efforts; and others were observers with varying degrees 
of interest in the outcome of any particular national situation. Each of the 
conferences not only featured the same kinds of participants (in terms of professional 
competencies), but they also had many overlapping participants, including José 
Zalaquett (Chilean human rights lawyer), Jaime Malamud-Goti (Argentine human 
rights lawyer), Aryeh Neier (American human rights activist), Juan E. Méndez 
(Argentine human rights lawyer and activist), Diane Orentlicher (American 
                                                
29 An ‘epistemic community’ is a network of knowledge-based experts, who share a common outlook, 
methodology and set of normative commitments. The ability of these communities to manage the 
highly technical requirements of a particular subject area provides them with a potentially high level 
of influence over key foreign policy decisions (i.e., Haas, 1989; Haas, 1992; Adler and Haas, 1992; 
Haas, 1997).    
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international lawyer), Lawrence Weschler (American journalist), Alice Henkin 
(American human rights lawyer and activist) and Adam Michnik (Polish member of 
parliament) (See Appendix 8 for Arthur’s list of participants at each conference, 
including overlap of participants). This network of professionals would go on to 
develop authoritative claim to knowledge about transitional justice, and may 
therefore be considered an epistemic community.  
While these conferences account for the formal setting of the epistemic 
community’s activity, there are also numerous informal channels of communication, 
including long-lasting personal friendships. When following the career paths of some 
community members, one finds that they often crosscut each other’s past (for 
example, working at one point for the UN or being affiliated with the law schools of 
Harvard and New York universities) (Hirsch, 2007: 189). These conferences also 
served as inspiration for the creation of a number of organizations, namely the US-
based Project on Justice in Times of Transition (1993), the South Africa–based 
Justice in Transition (1994), and an international NGO called the International 
Center for Transitional Justice (2001), as well as pockets within other NGOs, 
universities and international institutions (Arthur, 2009). 
 
Transitional justice measures and their aims  
Significantly, each of the conferences was structured in a similar way: they dealt 
with a distinct set of measures – prosecutions, truth-seeking, reparations and 
institutional reforms. These conferences, as well as the US Institute of Peace (USIP) 
publication of Neil Kritz’s widely cited, four-volume compendium Transitional 
Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes in 1995, all 
consistently referred to these measures as necessary efforts in dealing with past 
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violations.30 This is how these four measures – and not some other measures of 
justice – came to be recognized as the legitimate justice initiatives during a time of 
political change (Arthur, 2009). These measures are still commonly advocated for in 
transitional societies, as illustrated in the following figure, along with their aims and 
a few examples.   
Figure 4: Measures commonly associated with transitional justice 
Measure Aim  Examples 
Criminal prosecutions To prosecute perpetrators of human 
rights violations 
ICTY, ICC, SCSL 
Truth-seeking To investigate past violations and 
provide an official account of what 
happened 
South African TRC; 
Moroccan Equity 
and Reconciliation 
Commission 
Reparations To repair the material and moral 
damages of past abuse 
Reparation policies 
in Brazil and 
Malawi 
Institutional reforms To reform public institutions that 
abused human rights into 
institutions that protect them 
Lustration in 
Eastern Europe  
 
These measures are seen to provide justice for victims and to facilitate the transition 
in question. Prosecutions are seen to play a leading role in addressing the 
commission of human rights violations by helping to ‘transform the state’ from the 
illegitimate rule of a ‘lawless’ regime into a more liberal, legitimate, law-abiding 
political order (Teitel, 2000: 7, 28). They are thought to provide ‘a unique means by 
which to assert democratic values’ through their five consequences: establishing 
tangible facts about past crimes; offering disapproval of official policies; promoting 
confidence in the new political arrangements; restoring to citizens full membership in 
society; and improving chances for a transformation of military/civilian relations 
(Malamud-Goti, 1989: 81). 
                                                
30 When asked about the motivation behind his volumes on transitional justice, Neil Kritz said that no 
one had undertaken a comparative study of post-communist cases and that the study was linked to 
discussions in the 1990s about democratization (Neil Kritz, interview, 16 March 2010).    
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 International criminal tribunals were established by the UN Security Council 
under its Chapter VII authority in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda with a mandate 
to try individuals accused of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. In 
response to criticisms that these ad-hoc tribunals were too expensive and lengthy, the 
UN supported the establishment of ‘hybrid’ tribunals in Sierra Leone, Cambodia and 
Bosnia, which involve a mix of domestic and international involvement. In cases 
where domestic capacity was lacking, such as in East Timor and Kosovo, the UN 
administration placed an internationalized criminal capacity within the domestic 
legal system. The ICC was established as the first permanent, treaty-based, 
international criminal court established to help end impunity for the perpetrators of 
the most serious crimes of concern to the international community. 
Truth-seeking, often in the form of a truth commission, is seen as a way to 
establish an official account of past violations. Priscilla Hayner defines truth 
commissions as temporary bodies that are officially sanctioned, authorized or 
empowered by the state which investigate a pattern of abuses over a period of time 
and complete their work with the submission of a report (Hayner, 2001: 14). The 
1995 South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) popularized the 
idea of truth commissions, but there have been over thirty official truth commissions 
established since 1974, though they have gone by many different names.31 While 
there has been much in common between these various bodies, their specific 
investigatory mandates and powers have differed considerably to reflect the needs 
and political realities of each country (Ibid: 15).  
                                                
31 For example, commissions were established in Zambia (1998), Nigeria (1999), Burundi (1998), 
Ethiopia (1994), Sierra Leone (2002), Liberia (2006), Guatemala (1994), El Salvador (1992), 
Honduras (1990), Haiti (1994), Peru (2001), Colombia (2005), Sri Lanka (1995 and 1998), East Timor 
(2001), and Morocco (2004). 
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Numerous goals have been attached to these truth bodies, including national 
reconciliation, advancing healing for individual victims, ending impunity and putting 
in place protections to prevent the repetition of abuses in the future (Ibid: 16). Truth 
commissions are not judicial bodies and they hold fewer powers than courts. 
However, some claim their broader mandate to focus on a pattern of events, 
including the causes and consequences of political violence, allows them to go 
further in their investigations and conclusions than is generally possible in any trial 
of individual perpetrators (Ibid). Hayner finds that truth commissions may have any 
or all of the following five basis aims: to discover, clarify and formally acknowledge 
past abuses; to respond to specific needs of victims; to contribute to justice and 
accountability; to outline institutional responsibility and recommend reforms; and to 
promote reconciliation and reduce conflict over the past (Ibid: 24).  
Reparation programmes are state-sponsored initiatives meant to help repair 
the material and moral damages of past abuse, which may include financial 
compensation, official apologies or memorialisation efforts (Kritz, 1995, xxxi).32 
Some claim that reparations can contribute to individual and societal aims of 
rehabilitation, reconciliation, consolidation of democracy and restoration of law 
(Redress, 2007: 6). In transitional contexts, they often seek to compensate in some 
way a large universe of victims of human rights violations (De Greiff, 2006: 2). 
Reparation policies and programmes have been carried out in several countries, 
including Argentina, Chile, Brazil, South Africa and Malawi. Many truth 
commission reports recommend reparations programmes, although their 
implementation record varies (i.e., El Salvador, Haiti).  
                                                
32 International law recognizes the obligation to provide reparations for international wrongful acts 
(Chorzow Factory Case, 1928; Geneva Conventions III and IV, 1949; Additional Protocol I, 1977). 
The right to reparation can take on different forms, including restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, 
satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition (Basic Principles, 2005). 
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Reforms of public institutions that have abused human rights have included, 
for example, the creation of oversight; complaint and disciplinary procedures; the 
reform or establishment of legal frameworks; the development or revision of ethical 
guidelines and codes of conduct; changing symbols that are associated with abusive 
practices; and the provision of adequate salaries, equipment and infrastructure 
(OHCHR, 2006: 4). Reform efforts have reviewed the functioning of an entire public 
sector and considered merging, disbanding or creating public institutions (Ibid). 
Vetting of personnel, as well as exclusion from public service, is another form of 
non-criminal accountability seen to help fill the immunity gap (Ibid).  
Examples of lustration in Eastern Europe characterized transitional justice 
policy after the collapse of the Soviet Union.33 In contemporary practice, security 
sector reform of the police and military, which aims to train personnel and reform 
institutions, has been seen as necessary in a sector potentially complicit in 
committing violations. Justice sector reform, including the training of judges, has 
also been undertaken. Additionally, transitional justice has had direct effects upon 
activities such as the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-
combatants and their inclusion in new security structures (Sriram, 2007: 584). Efforts 
traditionally seen as ‘peacebuilding’ activities that address restoration of the rule of 
law and security have also been discussed within the framework of transitional 
justice (Ibid: 585). 
                                                
33 De-communization or purge laws were passed in Albania (1992), Bulgaria (1992, 1997, 1998), the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia (1991), Poland (1992, 1997, 1998), Romania (1998), and Hungary 
(1994, 1996), although these led to actual widespread purges only in Albania, the Czech Republic, and 
Germany. In Germany, after opening the political police records and creating a truth commission for 
their review in 1992, thousands of civil servants, including judges and police officers, were dismissed 
from service for collaboration. Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria also set up offices to permit 
the reviewing of secret police files, but with different levels of accessibility for the general public. 
There were a few trials in the region but many sentences were annulled along with other problems 
about fairness. With the exception of some Baltic states, there has been no comparable process in the 
new republics of the former Soviet Union (Aguilar Fernández, 2001: 6, 8). 
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Considerable debate took place about each of these measures, and many 
issues raised during the 1980s and early 1990s remain as central challenges to the 
field. For example, some critics have argued that transitional justice emerged out of 
an explicit democratization framework, which cannot be replicated by other types of 
transitions and where transitional justice measures may not be the most appropriate 
response, i.e., socialist transitions or transitions to peace (Arthur, 2009: 46). Others 
raised the difficulties of transposing the regional diagnoses of Latin American 
observers to other parts of the world (Ibid: 47). In the mid-1990s, for example, a 
group of Central and Eastern European regional specialists argued that ethnic, 
religious or national identities were more likely to be mobilized than class structures 
as in Latin America (Schmitter and Karl, 1994/1995; Bunce, 1995; Terry, 1993). 
Similarly, African transitions from neo-patrimonial states were more likely to begin 
with mass protest, rather than elite pacts (Arthur, 2009: 48).  
A third critique has been offered by those working in the field of historical 
justice who view transitional justice as overly narrow with measures specifically 
designed for the brief duration of a political transition. They emphasize the 
importance of long-term efforts at transformation that involve some element of social 
restructuring, such as affirmative action or land reform, which they see as 
fundamentally different from the limited aims of prosecutions, reparations and the 
like (Ibid: 49).  
A fourth critique is based on the observation that a number of countries that 
were supposed to be making a transition to democracy had ultimately failed to do so 
(Zakaria, 1997; Kaplan, 1997; Carothers, 2002). For these observers, the transition 
paradigm raised false hopes, perhaps mostly among democracy promoters, of an 
easily identifiable, sequential path toward a new political regime. Finally, others 
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reject transitional justice altogether, on the grounds that it is too tainted by a specific 
political project (democratization) and by the support of specific institutional actors 
(US democracy-promoting organizations) (Arthur, 2009: 50). Some are tempted to 
change the term to ‘mass atrocity’ justice instead.  
Despite these critiques, the field continued to grow throughout the 1990s and 
2000s. The measures and the conceptual framework of the field as a whole remain 
very similar to that developed by the epistemic community, human rights movement, 
and transitologists in the 1980s and early 1990s. Transitional justice was justified 
through appeals to universal human rights norms; seen as legitimate only when 
undertaken by a democratic polity; and seen as having an underlying, determined 
connection related to the normative goal of promoting democracy (Arthur, 2009: 22). 
The creation of the epistemic community during the three conferences, as well as the 
USIP volumes on TJ, solidified the framework for the emerging field.  
Although the US was not directly involved in this stage of the field’s 
development, the US democracy promotion agenda was clearly linked to the 
transition paradigm. In addition, the US-based human rights NGOs, foundations and 
think tanks formed a basis of support for US influence in the next stage of the field’s 
evolution.   
 
2.3 Institutionalizing Transitional Justice 
During the 1990s and 2000s transitional justice measures were established around the 
globe, and garnered increasing attention from states, international organizations and 
NGOs, universities, and local civil society groups. ICTY Prosecutor Richard 
Goldstone spoke about an ‘industry’ that developed around the field (Hirsch, 2007: 
191). The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) was established in 
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2001 to assist measures, carry out research and provide guidance to policymakers on 
the growing field. The organization grew from a staff of 12 with one office in New 
York to a staff of over 100 with ten offices around the world by 2008. Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch, and the Open Society Justice Initiative have also 
been heavily involved in the field, as have the Ford and MacArthur foundations.  
Several universities have courses on transitional justice (i.e., UC Berkeley, 
NYU), specific institutes dedicated to the topic (i.e., Ulster) and research networks 
(i.e., Oxford, Essex and London TJ networks). In 2007, the International Journal of 
Transitional Justice began publishing TJ-specific research. A web search of the term 
‘transitional justice’ identified a significant increase in reference to the term in 
Google Books, Google Scholar and major world publications between 1993 and 
2008.34  
Figure 5: Web search results for ‘transitional justice’ 
 
Within the UN system, former Secretary-General Kofi Annan drew attention to TJ in 
a 2004 report where he urged the strengthening of UN support for criminal 
prosecutions, truth commissions, vetting processes and reparations programs in the 
                                                
34 Search completed on 16 February 2009.  
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interests of justice, peace and democracy (Annan, 2004). Since this report, the Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) have 
actively promoted transitional justice measures in their work. In 2005, the UN 
Economic and Social Council published the Updated Set of Principles for the 
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity, 
which lays out the framework for the status of transitional justice as an international 
norm (Principle 2: the inalienable right to the truth; Principle 19: the right to justice; 
Principle 31: the right to reparation). In 2012, the UN appointed ICTJ Research 
Director Pablo de Greiff as the first Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, 
justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence of serious crimes and gross 
violations of human rights. 
The US was also heavily influential during this period, with significant 
involvement in the field’s institutionalization through support of several transitional 
justice measures. In a study on international assistance to internationalized tribunals 
and truth commissions, Muck and Wiebelhaus-Brahm identified the US as a 
‘dedicated supporter’ of transitional justice since it financially assisted the majority 
of measures examined in their study.35 They found that the top five TJ donors, who 
account for three-quarters of TJ total state assistance, are Canada, Japan, Netherlands, 
UK and the US. Of these five, the US contributes almost one-third of the total 
financial assistance, far surpassing other donor governments’ contributions, as shown 
below.36 
 
 
                                                
35 Muck and Wiebelhaus-Brahm examined the following seven measures in their study: the ICTY, 
ICTR, SCSL, ECCC, SLTRC, LTRC and the CAVR (Muck and Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2011).  
36 Data obtained from Muck and Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2011: 31. 
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Figure 6: International assistance to transitional justice 
Donor Amount  
(in USD) 
Percentage 
 
Canada 19,888,000 7 
Japan 23,099,000 9 
Netherlands  33,110,000 12 
UK  43,025,000 16 
US 79,192,000 30 
Total  270,908,273 100 
 
Their study also made a direct comparison of foreign aid and TJ aid in order to 
explore the similarities and differences in state donation patterns. For many states, 
there is a level of uniformity in the proportion of their TJ assistance to total foreign 
aid donation. In other words, their foreign aid donation, relative to other state 
contributions, is very similar to their TJ donation. However, as depicted in the chart 
below, the TJ assistance of the same five states listed above (Canada, Japan, 
Netherlands, UK and the US) dramatically exceeds their foreign aid (official 
development assistance - ODA).37   
Figure 7: Foreign aid versus TJ assistance 
 
                                                
37 Foreign Aid totals measured in billions from OECD Net Official Development Assistance 2010; 
also see Muck and Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2011: 35).  
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This suggests that although an ever-increasing number of states are supporting TJ 
measures, the field is dominated by a handful of key states. TJ assistance from the 
US is strikingly high compared to its overall development assistance, which again 
signals the importance of examining the US role in TJ. 
The remainder of this chapter examines the US role in the establishment of 
the ICTY, ICTR and ICC in the 1990s – courts that were all key to the 
institutionalization of transitional justice. The emphasis on criminal prosecutions was 
not only a result of US influence, but also heavily advocated for by human rights 
organizations, that were more wary of other transitional justice measures like truth 
commissions (Neil Kritz, interview, 16 March 2010).  
 
The International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
In October 1992, the Security Council requested that the Secretary-General establish 
a Commission of Experts to examine and analyze information about violations being 
committed in the former Yugoslavia (UN, 1992). The US, which was behind the 
initiative, had wanted to create a body similar to the 1943 war crimes commission 
that prepared the ground for the Nuremberg trials. However, the UK, France and 
China watered down the American draft and argued that it be named a committee, 
with no reference to war crimes.38   
 To get around this resistance, the US circulated a letter at the UN 
Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) from the president of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina calling for the creation of a Nuremberg-like international criminal court 
(UNCHR, 1992). The Commission called on ‘all States to consider the extent to 
which the acts committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia constitute 
                                                
38 Tran and Foot, 1992; Morris and Scharf, 1995: 26.  
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genocide,’ in accordance with the Genocide Convention (UNCHR, 1992b). In 
December 1992, US Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger ‘named names’ of 
persons suspected of crimes against humanity, saying the US had provided details to 
the Commission of Experts ‘whose decision it will be to prosecute or not.’ 
Eagleburger had previously served as US Ambassador to Belgrade, and had been 
considered sympathetic to the Serbs, but by August 1992, his views had evolved, and 
he began calling for a war crimes tribunal. At a conference on the Balkan conflict, 
Eagleburger said:  
We know that crimes against humanity have occurred, and we know 
when and where they occurred. We know, moreover, which forces 
committed those crimes, and under whose command they operated. And 
we know, finally, who the political leaders are and to whom those 
military commanders were — and still are — responsible (Sciolino, 1992: 
1).  
 
The names included the Bosnian Serb leaders Karadžic´ and Mladic´, who figured in 
early ICTY indictments,39 and Serbian President Slobodan Miloševic´, who would 
subsequently travel to the US for the Dayton negotiations.40 Eagleburger warned that 
‘a second Nuremberg awaits the practitioners of ethnic cleansing’ (Ibid).   
 In one of his first policy initiatives as Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, 
who was sworn in as Eagleburger’s replacement in January 1993, instructed senior 
advisers in the State Department to investigate how best to organize an international 
war crimes tribunal. He said they could take place either under the jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice in The Hague or in a specially created tribunal in the 
US (Sciolino, 1993; Tisdall and Stephen, 1993). Christopher submitted a report to the 
UN on human rights violations during the Balkan conflict based on material 
collected by US intelligence agencies (Schabas, 2011: 776). During debate of 
                                                
39 Karadžic´ Indictment, 1995. 
40 Miloševic´ was not indicted for alleged crimes committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina until 
November 2001 (Miloševic´ Indictment, 2001).  
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Security Council Resolution 808, which established the ICTY, then US Ambassador 
to the UN Madeleine Albright said that President Clinton ‘has long supported the 
establishment of a war crimes tribunal at the UN to bring justice and deter further 
atrocities in the former Yugoslavia’ (UN, 1993). In preparing his report and the draft 
statute, the secretary-general drew upon a substantial submission from the US (US 
Letter to UN, 1993; Morris and Scharf, 1994: 451-457).     
 Many observers credit Albright with the creation of the ad-hoc tribunals. Part 
of her legacy as USUN Ambassador and then Secretary of State was the promotion 
of justice and accountability for human rights violations – an issue she took a 
personal interest in and decided to prioritise (See, i.e., David Scheffer, interview, 12 
March 2012; Tom Malinowski, interview, 15 March 2010). According to her advisor 
David Scheffer, Albright often construed herself as the ‘mother of the war crimes 
tribunals’ (Scheffer, 2011: 8). Upon the establishment of the ICTY, Albright stated, 
‘There is an echo in this chamber today. The Nuremberg principles have been 
reaffirmed. The lesson that we are all accountable to international law may finally 
have taken hold in our collective memory’ (Albright, 1993). However, America’s 
chief Balkans negotiator at the time, Richard Holbrooke, acknowledged that the 
tribunal was widely perceived within the government as little more than a public 
relations device and a potentially useful policy tool (Scharf, 1999: B01). 
Nevertheless, the US was the ‘driving force’ behind the establishment of the tribunal, 
contributing the greatest share of political and financial muscle. John Cerone said: ‘It 
is clear that without the support of the US, the ICTs would never have come into 
being…The establishment of the ICTY was a US idea and it was the US that pushed 
it through the Security Council’ (Cerone, 2007: 288). 
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On 15 June 1994, Albright initiated State Department discussions about 
prosecution of those responsible for atrocity crimes in Rwanda, which received the 
support of Secretary of State Christoper (USUN, 1994; Scheffer, 2011: 71). In early 
August, senior State Department human rights official John Shattuck visited Kigali 
and convinced Rwanda’s new regime to go along with the idea.41 David Rawson, 
who was the US Ambassador to Rwanda at the time, said that the Rwandan request 
was prepared in the US Embassy in Kigali and taken for signature to the Rwandan 
Minister of Justice by Shattuck (Rawson, 2001: 125-134). On 28 September 1994, 
Rwanda formally requested the UN to establish a tribunal (Rwanda Letter to UN, 
1994).  
 President Clinton expressed strong support for the ICTY and ICTR in a 1995 
speech at the University of Connecticut:  
With our purpose and with our position comes the responsibility to help 
shine the light of justice on those who would deny to others their most 
basic human rights. We have an obligation to carry forward the lessons of 
Nuremberg. That is why we strongly support the United Nations War 
Crimes Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda (Clinton, 
1995). 
 
Clinton reiterated his support in a 1997 address before the UN General Assembly, 
and also endorsed the creation of a permanent international criminal court, saying:  
[W]e must maintain our strong support for the United Nations war crime 
tribunals and truth commissions. And before the century ends, we should 
establish a permanent international court to prosecute the most serious 
violations of humanitarian law (Clinton, 1997).   
 
The ad-hoc tribunals also enjoyed broad, bipartisan support in Congress. 
Congressional pressure on the Clinton and then Bush administrations helped ensure 
US support, particularly on the issue of conditioning economic infrastructure aid on 
                                                
41 Lewis, 1994: 6; Gray, 1994: 1. After losing power in mid-July, the remnants of the Rwandan regime 
that presided over the genocide issued a call for the creation of an international tribunal, adding that 
its jurisdiction should cover human rights violations in Rwanda since October 1990, when the civil 
war had begun. 
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the arrest and transfer of indicted suspects to the tribunals (Cerone, 2007: 289).  
US support to the tribunals took several forms. In his personal history of the 
war crimes tribunals, All the Missing Souls, David Scheffer discusses his lead role in 
building the ICTY, ICTR and other tribunals as senior adviser and counsel to 
Albright while she served as the US Ambassador to the UN from 1993-1996 and as 
the first US Ambassador-at-large for War Crimes Issues from 1997-2001 (Scheffer, 
2011: 3). Scheffer said that he fielded ‘endless requests’ throughout the 1990s for 
support from international prosecutors and judges, persuaded federal agencies to 
provide personnel to the tribunals, garnered evidence for the tribunals, helped secure 
the apprehension or surrender of the indicted fugitives, 42  lobbied Congress to 
appropriate the necessary funds to make voluntary contributions, and intervened with 
other governments to increase their support for tribunals. The US contributed 25 
percent of the budgets for the ICTY and ICTR (Scheffer, 2011: 28, 107).  
ICTY Prosecutor Richard Goldstone said an American deployment of 
seasoned investigators and attorneys from the Justice Department (DOJ) enabled the 
tribunal to launch its work and was instrumental in preparing early indictments and 
trial work (Goldstone, 2000: 82). Some stayed on at the ICTY for many years and 
joined the tribunal payroll.43 ICTY Special Advisor to the Prosecutor Frederick 
Swinnen said some accused the court as being ‘pro-US’, but the personnel that came 
from DOJ are ‘some of the most senior trial attorneys at the court that have stayed on 
because of their commitment to the court. This is why the ICTY is successful.’44   
                                                
42 The US launched a Rewards for Justice program, which offered up to $5 million for information 
leading to the arrest or conviction of ICTY and ICTR indictees.  
43 More critically, one off-the-record comment with a former ICTY official suggested that the US 
manipulated the ICTY by providing gratis staff, which was a practice later suspended. He also said 
that the US was selective in the evidence it provided the court in order to support its interests.  
44 Mark Harmon, Alan Tieger, Peter McCloskey and Dermot Groome are some of the US attorneys 
that stayed on at the ICTY (Frederick Swinnen, interview, 13 January 2012).  
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During the Dayton Peace Accords, US officials worked to protect the ICTY 
from being undermined. Weeks before the signing of the agreement, Clinton said:  
Some people are concerned that pursuing peace in Bosnia and 
prosecuting war criminals are incompatible goals. But I believe they are 
wrong. There must be peace for justice to prevail, but there must be 
justice when peace prevails (Clinton, 1995). 
 
According to Scheffer, no other government so strongly opposed amnesty as part of a 
peace agreement (Scheffer, 2011: 131).  
Despite challenges in coordinating US intelligence-sharing with the tribunal, 
he claims that much of the American-generated evidence ultimately made its way, 
directly or indirectly, into trials (Ibid: 44). In addition, he writes, ‘although other 
governments pitched in, the US often became the one-stop shopping ally of the war 
crimes tribunals’ (Ibid: 29). 
The creation of an ambassadorship for war crimes issues was a result of 
Scheffer’s early experiences with the ICTY and ICTR, which, he said, demonstrated 
to Albright and others the critical utility of having someone coordinate intelligence-
sharing and other matters with the war crimes tribunals (Ibid: 44). It illustrated that 
support for the investigation and prosecution of atrocity crimes had become an 
official diplomatic function (Ibid: 10). Scheffer said:  
On the one hand, this initiative marked a sad commentary on the state of 
the world at the close of the twentieth century … On the other hand, my 
ambasadorship demonstrated that the United States recognized the 
gravity of the situation and rose to the challenge. No other nation had 
seen fit to designate anyone as an ambassador to cover atrocity crimes 
(Ibid: 3).  
 
The office was responsible for ‘formulat[ing] US policy responses to atrocities 
committed in areas of conflict and elsewhere throughout the world’ and 
‘coordinat[ing] US government support for war crimes accountability in regions 
where crimes have been committed against civilian populations on a massive scale.’ 
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The office also monitored, advised and helped administer or report on international 
tribunals.45  
In addition to the war crimes office, the ICTY and ICTR have interacted with 
a range of US actors, including legal and political advisors in US embassies, State 
Department European and African bureaus (for political knowledge of the regions), 
the National Security Council, the US Mission to the UN, members of Congress (on 
financial issues) and DOJ (on capacity-building). An ICTY adviser said that US 
support for the ICTY declined in the 2000s when the European Union took on a more 
significant role. He noted that ICTY officials never meet with US Secretaries of State, 
but always meet Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Europe perhaps, he said, because the 
court is not as political an issue for the US as it is for Europe (Frederick Swinnen, 
interview, 13 January 2012). 
 
The International Criminal Court  
After a campaign of several decades, US Senator William Proxmire managed to steer 
the Genocide Convention through congressional approval in 1988. That same year, 
the US Congress passed legislation urging the President to 
begin discussions with foreign governments to investigate the feasibility 
and advisability of establishing an international criminal court to expedite 
cases regarding the prosecution of persons accused of having engaged in 
international drug trafficking or having committed international crimes 
(US PL 100-690, 1988). 
 
However, this same piece of legislation was careful to preserve the possibility of an 
exemption for US nationals. It stipulated, ‘[s]uch discussions shall not include any 
commitment that such court shall have jurisdiction over the extradition of United 
States citizens’ (Ibid).  
                                                
45 This description was formerly posted on the State Department’s website before a recent change in 
the office’s description. See http://www.state.gov/j/gcj/.  
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 In 1989, Trinidad and Tobago placed the question of an ICC back on the 
agenda of the UN General Assembly, which reignited discussions for a court. The 
GA requested the ILC to prepare a draft statute.  President Clinton supported the idea:   
nations all around the world who value freedom and tolerance [should] 
establish a permanent international criminal court to prosecute, with the 
support of the United Nations Security Council, serious violations of 
humanitarian law (Clinton, 1995).   
 
In July 1997, Congress reminded Clinton of his earlier expressions of support for the 
creation of a court, urging him ‘to continue to support and fully participate in 
negotiations at the UN to conclude an international agreement to establish an 
international criminal court’ (US House Joint Resolution 89, 1997). Nonetheless, 
there was a broad spectrum of views within the US, and each agency had its own 
concerns. While the State Department, as a whole, was in favour of establishing a 
court, there was resistance from the intelligence community and the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff.  Through inter-agency dialogue, some of the rough edges were smoothed, and 
inter-agency consensus in favour of establishing a court was ultimately achieved 
(Cerone, 2007: 291).  
 Led by War Crimes Ambassador David Scheffer, the US delegation to the 
Rome Conference, where the court’s statute was negotiated, was the largest of any 
government. A number of US agencies, including the Departments of Justice, State, 
Defense, Treasury, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the intelligence community, had all 
been involved in developing the US position at Rome (US Congress, 1998). The 
delegation arrived with a number of concerns that it sought to have addressed during 
the conference. Broadly these concerns fell into three categories: the crimes that 
would fall within the subject matter jurisdiction of the court; the way in which cases 
would be triggered; and the exposure of US personnel. In general, the delegation 
engaged in what it considered to be a constructive approach – to influence the 
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Conference to accede to US demands in the hope of establishing a court acceptable 
to the US (Cerone, 2007: 291).  
 However, US support waned after it was unsuccessful in having its concerns 
addressed at the Rome Conference.46 Despite US efforts to block support for the 
court, the Rome Statute was passed by a large majority.47 Scheffer explained that the 
US voted against the statute primarily because it objected to the breadth of the 
court’s jurisdiction, in particular, its jurisdiction over nationals of non-states parties, 
absent a Security Council referral (US Congress, 1998). Although he tried, Scheffer 
says he ‘could not break the logjam’ between Security Council control, which 
satisfied the Justice Department, and the precondition requiring consent of the state 
of nationality, which Justice rejected and the Pentagon strongly preferred (Scheffer, 
2011: 181). 
 The Rome Statute was open for signature until the end of December 2000. 
There was a split view within the US over whether or not to sign. The Department of 
Defense (DoD), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in particular, did not want to sign; 
however, there was division even within DoD (Cerone, 2007: 293). On the last day 
that it was open for signature, the Clinton administration signed the treaty. Upon 
signature, Clinton made clear that the US was not prepared to ratify the treaty in its 
present form, citing ‘significant flaws’ in the statute – language that was heavily 
                                                
46 In the drafting of the Rome Statute, a coalition of middle and small powers, including allies of the 
US like Germany and Canada, coalesced into a group known as the ‘like-minded’, which agreed on 
the following issues: inherent jurisdiction of the court over the ‘core crimes’ of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes (and, perhaps, aggression); the elimination of a Security Council 
veto on prosecutions; an independent prosecutor with the power to initiate proceedings on his or her 
own initiative (proprio motu); and the prohibition of reservations to the statute (Kirsch and Robinson,  
2002: 70-71). The US found itself at odds with all of these propositions. But it was outmaneuvered at 
the Rome Conference by the ‘like-minded’, which managed to dominate much of the debate and the 
organization. Their program was incorporated into the ﬁnal draft (Schabas, 2011: 778).  
47 In the ﬁnal sessions of the Rome Conference, the US tried desperately to block the groundswell of 
support for a court that was largely independent of the Security Council, unsuccessfully proposing 
some last-minute amendments and then calling for an unrecorded vote on the ﬁnal version of the 
Statute, thereby preventing adoption of the draft statute by consensus. The result was 120 in favor to 
seven against with twenty-one abstentions, a comfortable majority (UN Diplomatic Conference, 1998). 
55 
 
negotiated in order to satisfy DoD (Ibid). Clinton stated, ‘I will not, and do not 
recommend that my successor, submit the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent 
until our fundamental concerns are satisfied’ (Clinton, 2000). Scheffer offered 
several reasons for US signature, including maintaining influence within the ongoing 
negotiations, influencing national judges and prosecutors to take a positive view of 
the Court and enhancing the country’s ‘leadership on international justice issues’ 
(Scheffer, 2002: 47).  
  The new Bush administration was more hostile toward the Court, evidenced in 
statements from officials like Under Secretary John Bolton.48 Democrats were at best 
tepid in their support,49 and key Republican legislators, such as Tom DeLay and 
Jesse Helms, shared the administration’s hostility toward the ICC. A number of 
events that occurred after the change in administration seemed to augment this initial 
hostility. After the 9/11 attacks, the ICC was seen as a possible restraint on the use of 
force by the US in its war on terror (Cerone, 2007: 294). In addition, by early 2002, 
the Rome Statute had obtained the requisite number of ratifications, which meant it 
would enter into force in July 2002. The Bush administration had already indicated 
that it would not proceed with ratification, and in May, the US ‘unsigned’ the statute, 
stating, the US ‘does not intend to become a party to the treaty. Accordingly, the US 
has no legal obligations arising from its signature on 31 December 2000’ (US Letter 
to UN, 2002). The purpose of this statement was presumably twofold: to make clear 
US opposition to ICC jurisdiction over US nationals, and to relieve itself of any legal 
                                                
48 A wariness about international law and institutions was evident on the part of Bush, Vice-President 
Dick Cheney, and a number of their appointees, including Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, 
and John Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. Bolton, whose 
anti-ICC position was clearly set forth in a 1998 Senate hearing had an influence greater than his title 
would ordinarily imply because he was perceived to have helped Bush win the 2000 presidential 
election (Cerone, 2007: 293).  
49 Very few Democrat legislators have gone on record as supporting US adherence to the ICC Statute. 
Even Chris Dodd, who was the chief opponent of the anti-ICC provisions of the ASPA stated that he 
would not support US ratification of the ICC Statute (Cerone, 2007: footnote 110). 
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obligation it may have undertaken upon signing the treaty (Vienna Convention, 1969: 
Art. 18).  
 On the same day, Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political 
Affairs, said ‘after years of working to fix this flawed statute, and having our 
constructive proposals rebuffed, it [was] our only alternative.’ Grossman stated that 
the principles that the US stands for – including state responsibility for ensuring 
justice in the international system and the strengthening of domestic judicial systems 
– are not consistent with the Rome Statute. Reflecting US concerns expressed at 
Rome, Grossman listed four critiques of the ICC, stating that it undermined the role 
of the UN Security Council in maintaining international peace and security; created a 
prosecutorial system that is an unchecked power; asserted jurisdiction over citizens 
of states that have not ratified the treaty, which threatens US sovereignty; and was 
built on a flawed foundation that left it open for exploitation and politically 
motivated prosecutions (US Grossman Press Release, 2002). In an interview about 
US opposition to the ICC, the second war crimes ambassador, Pierre Prosper, 
reiterated Grossman’s concerns about a politically motivated prosecutor that might 
unfairly target Americans: 
We are in a unique position internationally. We have the unique 
responsibility to preserve international peace and security. Whenever 
there is a conflict, whenever there is a hot spot, the first nation that 
people look to is the United States. Currently we have service members 
deployed in over 100 countries at a given time. We feel that this is a 
process that exposes us to politicization. We believe that a prosecutor 
with this unbridled authority to pursue any case that he or she feels is 
appropriate is a dangerous one and will expose us (PBS, 2002). 
 
Despite these concerns, it appeared that the US would refrain from interfering in ICC 
operations in relation to the states parties to the Rome Statute. Both Grossman and 
Prosper stated that the US ‘respects the decision of those nations who have chosen to 
join the ICC’ (US Grossman Press Release, 2002) and that it did not intend to ‘take 
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aggressive action or wage war’ against the ICC or its supporters (US Prosper Press 
Release, 2002).  
 Shortly after, however, the US began to pursue an aggressive strategy for 
limiting the exposure of all US citizens to the jurisdiction of the ICC. By June 2005, 
the US, at times applying tremendous political and financial pressure, had persuaded 
100 states to sign ‘Article 98 agreements’ (a provision of the ICC statute), whereby 
those states would undertake not to surrender US citizens to the ICC (US Fact Sheet, 
2002). The US also worked through the Security Council to obtain an exemption for 
peacekeepers from non-states parties. Congress prepared legislation to support these 
efforts. In August 2002, Bush signed into law the American Service-members’ 
Protection Act (ASPA). This legislation, dubbed the ‘Hague Invasion Act’ by critics, 
contained provisions restricting US cooperation with the ICC, making US support of 
peacekeeping missions largely contingent on achieving ICC exemption for all US 
personnel, cutting off military assistance to states that refused to sign Article 98 
agreements and granting the President permission to use ‘all means necessary and 
appropriate’ to free US citizens and allies from ICC-ordered detention or 
imprisonment (ASPA, 2002).  
Despite this position on the ICC, the US surprisingly remained involved in a 
number of other transitional justice measures, including the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (SCSL). Several court officials said that the US supported the Special Court 
because, as a hybrid court model, it offered an alternative to the ICC (interviews with 
SCSL, STL50 and ICTR officials, 12-13 January 2012). For example, peacekeepers 
were exempt from this court’s jurisdiction, an exemption that the US had sought at 
                                                
50 Special Tribunal for Lebanon. 
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the Rome Conference (Cerone, 2007: 308). The extent to which US support for the 
SCSL was meant to serve as an ICC-alternative is unclear.  
 Increased US support for national and hybrid processes, however, was not 
only about the ICC. It was also a product of the evolution of the field. By the early 
2000s, ‘tribunal fatigue’ had begun to set in, not only within the US but among 
NGOs as well, who were concerned about the high costs and lengthy time frame of 
the ad-hoc tribunals.51 As early as 2001, Prosper stated, ‘international tribunals are 
not and should not be the courts of first redress, but of last resort’ (Prosper, 2001a). 
He said that ‘international practice should be to support sovereign states seeking 
justice domestically when it is feasible and would be credible’ (Prosper, 2004). He 
felt that initial enthusiasm for the international tribunals had essentially neglected 
domestic processes (Pierre Prosper, interview, 22 April 2010). 
Where there was no possibility for credible justice at the national level, Prosper 
indicated a preference for regional solutions. This policy line was manifested in US 
proposals to find a regional solution to the situation in Darfur, despite the 
recommendation by a UN commission of inquiry that the Security Council refer the 
situation to the ICC. The US instead proposed a ‘Sudan Tribunal’ as an alternative to 
the ICC, though this proposal did not gain support (Alta, 2005; Rice, 2005; Crook, 
2005; US State Department, 2005). After months of negotiations, the US allowed the 
referral to go through by abstaining on the UNSC referral to the ICC (UNSC 1593, 
2005). State Department Legal Adviser John Bellinger stated:  
While the United States continues to maintain fundamental objections to 
the ICC, we did not veto [the referral] because we recognized the need 
for the international community to work together to end the atrocities in 
Sudan and speak with one voice to bring to account the perpetrators of 
those crimes (US Bellinger Press Release, 2005). 
                                                
51 Scheffer claims that he coined the term ‘tribunal fatigue’ to describe the Security Council’s 
weariness of building more ad hoc tribunals or expanding the two that existed (Scheffer, 2011: 118).  
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Later that year, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer 
indicated a willingness on the part of the US to assist the ICC in Darfur prosecutions. 
She told the House International Relations Committee ‘that if the ICC requires 
assistance, the United States stands ready to assist … we don’t want to see impunity 
for any of these actors’ (US House Subcommittee on Africa, 2005). An ICC Adviser 
said that the US abstention on Darfur was seen as its tacit acceptance of the ICC 
(ICC Adviser, interview, 13 January 2012). 
In addition to the Darfur abstention, in September 2006, Congress approved 
legislation eliminating some of the aid restrictions imposed by the ASPA on states 
parties to the ICC Statute. In November 2006, President Bush also waived the 
penalties imposed upon countries that refused to reach Article 98 agreements, 
because it was interfering with other US foreign policy objectives, such as 
counterterrorism and counterdrug policy (Schabas, 2011: 783). In June 2006, the 
Wall Street Journal reported on an interview with Bellinger:  
US officials concede they can’t delegitimize a court that now counts 100 
member countries, including such allies as Australia, Britain and Canada. 
While insisting the Bush administration will never allow Americans to be 
tried by the court, ‘we do acknowledge that it has a role to play in the 
overall system of international justice,’ John Bellinger, the State 
Department’s chief lawyer, said in an interview … In a May speech, Mr. 
Bellinger said ‘divisiveness over the ICC distracts from our ability to 
pursue these common goals’ of fighting genocide and crimes against 
humanity (Bravin, 2006). 
 
A statement by the third war crimes ambassador, Clint Williamson, reflected further 
support of the ICC:  
We look at all the tools available to us, starting with the international 
support for local courts and non-judicial mechanisms, when these 
institutions are robust enough and may simply need a small amount of 
training and additional resources. If this is not a possible solution to the 
problem of accountability, we examine options for a hybrid-type of 
accountability mechanism. Finally, if domestic or hybrid courts would 
not be a viable option, we look at a purely international process, which 
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now, with the new Administration, presumably would be through the 
International Criminal Court (ASIL, 2009). 
 
The shift in US policy on the ICC ripened with the election of President Barack 
Obama, followed by the appointment of Harold Koh as legal adviser to the State 
Department and Stephen Rapp as the fourth war crimes ambassador.  An ICC 
Adviser called it a ‘180 degree turnaround with Obama’ with positive engagement, 
active communication and a good relationship with the US. He said that Ambassador 
Rapp ‘visits the ICC several times a year – more than states that are party to the court’ 
(ICC Adviser, interview 13 January 2012).   
In March 2010, Harold Koh delivered an important address to the American 
Society of International Law:  
Significantly, although during the last decade the US was largely absent 
from the ICC, our historic commitment to the cause of international 
justice has remained strong. As you all know, we have not been silent in 
the face of war crimes and crimes against humanity. As one of the 
vigorous supporters of the work of the ad hoc tribunals regarding the 
former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Cambodia, Sierra Leone, and Lebanon, the 
United States has worked for decades, and we will continue to work, with 
other States to ensure accountability on behalf of victims of such crimes. 
But as some of those ad hoc war crimes tribunals enter their final years, 
the eyes of the world are increasingly turned toward the ICC … Even as 
a non-State party, the United States believes that it can be a valuable 
partner and ally in the cause of advancing international justice. The 
Obama Administration has been actively looking at ways that the US can, 
consistent with US law, assist the ICC in fulfilling its historic charge of 
providing justice to those who have endured crimes of epic savagery and 
scope. And as Ambassador Rapp announced in New York, we would like 
to meet with the Prosecutor at the ICC to examine whether there are 
specific ways that the United States might be able to support particular 
prosecutions already underway in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Sudan, Central African Republic, and Uganda (ASIL, 2010). 
 
Since Koh’s statement, the US took the position as an observer in ICC bodies and 
developed a policy of supportive engagement (Rapp, 2011). The US first attended 
the ICC’s Assembly of States Parties in 2009, where Rapp confirmed that the US 
was back where it had been a decade earlier in terms of a positive, if critical, 
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approach to the court (Schabas, 2011: 784). In early 2010, he participated in the 
preparations for the Review Conference of the Rome Statute, at which such matters 
as the definition of the crime of aggression were discussed. In February 2011, the US 
and other members of the Security Council unanimously referred the Libya case to 
the ICC (UNSCR 1970, 2011).  
The ICC asked Ambassador Rapp to clarify the US position on the court since 
many countries were concerned about joining in case of US objection (ICC Adviser, 
interview 13 January 2012). Rapp did so: ‘Even while the US has not made the 
decision itself to join, we are content to see other countries join and we wanted to 
make that very clear here’ (Rapp, 2011). Rapp also stated that the ICC is the venue 
where atrocities will be dealt:  
We are now coming to the end of the era of the Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda Tribunals and Sierra Leone Special Court; institutions with 
narrow jurisdictions and ad hoc mandates. In the future, for crimes 
committed after 2002, there will not be the will to establish temporary 
international courts for single situations. If international justice is 
required, it will be delivered at the International Criminal Court. That 
is where these trials will be conducted. That is where the mass 
butchers and rapists will face justice, and that is where the United 
States needs to provide support to ensure success (Rapp, 2010a). 
 
According to Rapp, the US wants to help the ICC succeed in the cases that it has 
undertaken, serving as a ‘non-party partner’ to make it possible to make these arrests. 
Rapp noted that when the US is focused on specific cases, ‘there is broad support for 
international justice in our Congress’, and mentioned legislation passed to support 
the arrest and trial of LRA leader Joseph Kony. In addition, President Obama issued 
a statement expressing disappointment that Kenya failed to honor its commitment to 
the ICC to arrest Sudanese President Bashir (Ibid).  
When asked about US ratification of the ICC Statute, Rapp relied on 
arguments based on American exceptionalism: the fact that the US takes a ‘very long 
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time’ to decide whether to ratify international treaties and conventions; ‘a tradition of 
self-reliance, an aspiration to do what is right in our own way, and a pride in the 
protections provided by our constitution and laws’; ‘a well-developed system of 
military justice’ which already fulfils military obligations; and concerns about a 
‘politically-motivated prosecutor’ (Rapp, 2010a/2011). Rapp said that it will take the 
development of case standards in actual practice by a succession of prosecutors and 
judges to relieve the US concern. ‘Meanwhile’, he said, ‘our engagement policy 
allows us to get closer to the ICC and to work to resolve these issues’ (Rapp, 2011). 
Although the US has warned about politicization of the court, William 
Schabas finds that a politicized ICC is not a problem for the US ‘as long as the 
politics of the institution are compatible with its own national interests’ (Schabas, 
2011: 785). He argues that the gradual warming of the US to the ICC, which began 
early in the second term of the Bush administration, is the result of ‘a growing level 
of comfort with the policy choices and the political orientations of the prosecutor’ 
(Schabas, 2011: 785). The Prosecutor has pursued cases in Uganda, Sudan and 
Kenya, but not against British forces in Iraq. If he proceeds in Colombia, it is likely 
to be against the rebel FARC and not the pro-government militias. Investigations in 
Afghanistan will probably target the Taliban, not North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) forces.  
All of this is reassuring to the US, which feared a radical prosecutor who 
would complicate American foreign policy. Instead, it has a tame 
institution that focuses its energies where the US would prefer, helping 
pursue perceived American interests in the same way as the Nuremberg, 
Yugoslavia, and Rwanda tribunals ... While the US would be happier 
with an ICC whose subservience to the Security Council was clearly 
established, its anxiety level with the institution has declined to the extent 
that the prosecutor seems to respect American interests and spheres of 
influence (Ibid: 786).  
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Similarly, ICC Legal Advisor Rod Rastan said: ‘So far, all cases have converged 
with US interests (i.e., in Libya, Darfur, Uganda), but it is unclear what will happen 
when a case comes up which is more sensitive for the US’ (Rod Rastan, ICC visit, 13 
January 2012).  
 
2.4 Explaining US Influence 
This chapter has examined US influence on the evolution of transitional justice from 
WW1 to the present. It has explored this influence over three stages: precursors to 
transitional justice; the emergence of the field; and its institutionalization. The US 
initially resisted the idea of international prosecutions proposed by Britain and 
France after WW1. By the time of WW2, however, the prevailing view had changed, 
‘and the US became a keen supporter, indeed the keenest supporter, of individual 
criminal accountability for perpetrators of war crimes and other atrocities’ (Schabas, 
2011: 785). It provided the backbone to the Nuremberg tribunal, and then continued 
with major prosecutions long after the interest of its allies had waned. 
US interest declined during the Cold War, which is linked to slow 
developments in the field during this period. The US was not directly involved in the 
field’s emergence in the 1980s in Latin America and Eastern Europe, however, 
Reagan’s democracy promotion policies ran in parallel to transitional justice activity. 
In addition, human rights NGOs, transitologists and the epistemic community all had 
support within the US, which contributed to significant US influence in the field’s 
institutionalization during the 1990s and 2000s.  
 When transitional justice took off in the early 1990s, ‘no other nation showed 
such enthusiasm’ for the ad-hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and 
a range of similar efforts in Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Kosovo, East Timor and 
Lebanon. The Clinton administration, and specifically Madeleine Albright, was 
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responsible for this support and the creation of a new ambassadorship to develop and 
coordinate war crimes policy. Scheffer said that Albright saw early on that this issue 
was not only ‘a clear opportunity to do the right thing’, but also a way ‘to put herself 
on the map very quickly’ (David Scheffer, interview, 12 March 2012).   
  The Bush administration was less interested in international courts than its 
predecessor, focusing more on national and hybrid processes. With regard to the ICC, 
the US was overtly hostile, ‘unsigning’ the Rome Statute and passing legislation to 
undercut the court’s effectiveness. US involvement in the Iraqi Special Tribunal 
garnered negative attention, and allegations of torture in the war on terrorism further 
damaged the US reputation. Scheffer deemed this period as the end of ‘the era of 
American leadership in the arena of international justice’ (Scheffer, 2011: 247). 
Despite the setback in the perception of its leadership role in transitional 
justice, the US remained active in the tribunals already under way and was key to the 
establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. In addition, by Bush’s second 
term, officials scaled back on the anti-ICC rhetoric and began reversing some of the 
policies they found to be problematic. The Bush administration may have been 
affected by other states, international NGOs and domestic pressure groups, however 
the shift was driven internally with high-level officials instituting policy reversals. 
For example, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that the war crimes 
ambassador should no longer work on Guantánamo detainee issues; the US abstained 
on the Darfur referral to the ICC and supported efforts to arrest and prosecute 
Sudanese President al-Bashir. This shift is important to note. Despite the backward 
nature of some policies in Bush’s first term, even his administration walked back 
from its more extreme positions just a few years after their creation, and began to 
return to the status quo (Clint Williamson, interview, 21 April 2010). This shift 
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cannot be completely attributed, as Schabas and others maintain, to US comfort with 
ICC case selection (Schabas, 2011: 785). This view overlooks American recognition, 
at high levels, that a shift on US policy in this area was necessary for a broad range 
of reasons.  
 Many assumed US foreign policy would change dramatically with the 
election of President Obama. Some change did take place, particularly with regard to 
the appointment of high-level officials with expertise on accountability issues (i.e., 
Samantha Power at the NSC, Susan Rice at the USUN, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Eric 
Posner, Harold Koh, Stephen Rapp and Diane Orentlicher at the State Department. 
Orentlicher was even present at the early conferences on transitional justice in the 
1980s). However, there is also a level of continuity with the Bush administration. For 
example, the emphasis on national processes has continued as the first line of defense 
in addressing serious human rights violations. The Obama administration has also 
continued the shift in policy on the ICC, which began during Bush’s second term, 
toward one of active support and engagement.  
 This discussion illustrates the important influence of the US on the evolution 
of transitional justice. A range of US government actors provided significant 
financial, technical and political support to the ICTY, ICTR and ICC – war crimes 
tribunals that have been key to the development of the field. This overview should 
serve as a useful entry point into the three case studies that follow.  
 The next three chapters undertake a close examination of US foreign policy on 
transitional justice after the initial intrigue with ad-hoc tribunals had subsided and 
where the ICC was not a major factor of influence. The Cambodia, Liberia and 
Colombia cases offer an opportunity to more deeply understand the US approach to a 
wider set of transitional justice measures in the 2000s – a period which reflects a 
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different historical moment in the field’s evolution with the establishment of new 
measures and models of transitional justice. The Cambodia case is explored first, 
with an examination of US involvement in the Khmer Rouge Tribunal.   
 
 
  
67 
 
Chapter 3 US Involvement in the Khmer Rouge Tribunal 
 
The last chapter presented an overview of US influence on the evolution of 
transitional justice from WW1 to the present. This chapter narrows the focus to a 
specific case, that of US involvement in the Khmer Rouge Tribunal in Cambodia. 
Examining the role of the US in the negotiations and operations of this transitional 
justice measure will offer an empirical basis for the claims made in this study.   
People don’t realize that the number of dead in Cambodia exceeded the 
total number of dead in Bosnia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Darfur 
combined - about 1.2 million to 1.7 million, so this should be of interest 
(Scheffer in Bernstein, 2009). 
 
From 1975 to 1979, an estimated 1.7 million of Cambodia’s seven million people 
died through disease, overwork, starvation or execution under the Khmer Rouge (KR) 
regime of Democratic Kampuchea.52 In an attempt to revolutionize Cambodian 
society into one without class or ethnic differences, the urban population was forced 
into the rural parts of the country to carry out forced labor. Approximately two-thirds 
of the deaths during this era are attributed to starvation and disease, and almost two 
million Cambodians were made homeless by the war.  
Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia in late 1978 and installed the People’s 
Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), a communist government made up mostly of former 
Khmer Rouge cadres who had defected to Vietnam, including current Prime Minister 
Hun Sen. Fighting continued between the government and Khmer Rouge between 
1979 and 1991. Millions of Cambodians remained in refugee camps during the unrest. 
The 1991 Paris Accords established the UN Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC), which led to the elections in 1993, where a power-sharing 
arrangement was made for a two-headed administration led by Hun Sen and Prince 
                                                
52 1.7 million deaths is Ben Kiernan’s estimate (Kiernan, 1994: 193; Kiernan, 1996: 458; Kiernan, 
2003). Craig Etcheson’s estimate is between 2.2 and 2.5 million deaths (Etcheson, 2000: 171).  
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Ranariddh. In 1997, the Co-Prime Ministers requested UN assistance to set up a 
tribunal to try those responsible for the genocide and crimes against humanity during 
the rule of the Khmer Rouge from 1975-79. Negotiations took years, but the 2001 
Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(ECCC) and the 2004 Agreement between the UN and the Royal Government of 
Cambodia together established the ECCC. The Cambodia tribunal has a mixed 
structure, with Cambodian judges and staff in the majority, assisted by international 
judges and staff recruited through the UN. The court has a statutory mandate to bring 
to justice surviving senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were 
most responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, serious war crimes, and 
certain other Cambodian crimes during the Pol Pot era.  
The basic rules of the court were agreed in 2007. Case 001, which tried Kaing 
Guek Eav, alias Duch, began in 2009, and resulted in his conviction in July 2010 of 
crimes against humanity and war crimes committed while he ran Tuol Sleng (S-21) 
prison camp. Case 002, which is investigating three senior Khmer Rouge cadres, 
began in November 2011.53 The defendants have been indicted on charges of crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and genocide, as well as homicide, torture, and 
religious persecution within Cambodian law. Senior Cambodian government officials, 
including the prime minister, have publicly opposed extending prosecutions beyond 
the present defendants (OSJI, 2011: 3). Several international court officials, 
including one of the judges, resigned in 2011 due to Cambodian government 
opposition to progress of Cases 003 and 004 (UN Press Statement, 2011). Future 
trials are therefore uncertain.  
                                                
53 A fourth accused, Ieng Thirith, a former Khmer Rouge minister and the wife of accused Ieng Sary, 
was declared unfit to stand trial, predicated on her diagnosis of dementia caused by Alzheimer’s 
disease. Ieng Thirith has been ordered unconditionally released by the Trial Chamber and the Supreme 
Court Chamber is currently seized of the Prosecution’s appeal against the lack of conditions required 
by the order. 
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The US government played a critical role in this process. Since no studies 
have focused exclusively on US involvement in the establishment and operations of 
the ECCC from the late 1980s to 2011, this chapter provides insight into how and 
why the US was involved in this process. It concludes with some ideas about the 
impact of US involvement. This case study represents some of the diversity of 
transitional justice measures since it concerns a hybrid court established in Asia 
many years after violations were committed. It draws on archival research 
undertaken in Washington DC and Phnom Penh, and 40 Cambodia-specific 
interviews with officials from the US government, ECCC, international organizations, 
NGOs, academia and the media (See Appendix 2 for interview list). It also relies on 
accounts by US and UN officials directly involved in the negotiations (particularly 
UN Special Representative for human rights in Cambodia Thomas Hammarberg and 
US War Crimes Ambassador David Scheffer), as well as other Cambodia experts. 
Before turning to tribunal negotiations, a review of US foreign policy in Cambodia 
helps frame the topic of study within its historical context. 
 
3.1 US Foreign Policy in Cambodia 
Cambodia won independence from France in 1953 and was ruled by King Norodom 
Sihanouk until 1970. In 1966-69, South Vietnamese and American forces mounted 
frequent small raids across the Cambodian border, despite protests by the Cambodian 
government. In 1970, Sihanouk was overthrown by a coup and Lon Nol seized power. 
US attacks against communist bases continued with Nixon’s support (Shawcross, 
1979: Chronology). The January 1973 Paris Agreement, which ended the Vietnam 
War, included a provision on the withdrawal of foreign troops from Cambodia. 
However, massive B-52 and F-111 bombings of Cambodia resumed after the 
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ceasefire. Congress opposed the bombing but agreed that the attacks could continue 
until 15 August 1973. On 7 August, an off-target B-52 plane bombed the 
government-held town of Neak Luong, killing over 125 people and injuring more 
than 250. The US bombing of Cambodia between 1969-73 killed 50,000 to 150,000 
people.54 Many have discussed how this bombing contributed to the circumstances 
that enabled Pol Pot to seize power in 1975 (i.e., Bernstein, 2009).  
The Khmer Rouge was the name given to the followers of the Communist 
Party of Kampuchea, who were the ruling party in Cambodia from 1975 to 1979, led 
by Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Son Sen and Khieu Samphan. After taking power, 
the Khmer Rouge leadership renamed the country Democratic Kampuchea. The 
Khmer Rouge subjected Cambodia to a revolution that was aimed at creating a 
purely agrarian-based Communist society. Those living in cities were deported to the 
countryside, and subjected to forced labour. Nearly 2 million Cambodians are 
estimated to have died in waves of murder, torture and starvation, aimed particularly 
at the educated and intellectual elite.  
The US (along with many other governments) withdrew its embassy staff 
from Cambodia in April 1975 and did not re-establish a diplomatic mission until 
1991. Although there was little information about what was happening inside 
Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge years, US Rep. Stephen Solarz held a 
subcommittee hearing on human rights abuses in Cambodia in 1977 (US House of 
Representatives, 1977). Senator George McGovern tried to get support for an 
international force to stop the Khmer Rouge violations, but this was not approved 
(New York Times, 1978). In 1979, a State Department spokesman said ‘while the US 
takes great exception to the human rights record of the government of Kampuchea, 
                                                
54 The estimate of 50,000 to 150,000 bombing deaths is cited in Kiernan, 1989.  
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we as a matter of principle do not feel that unilateral intervention against the regime 
of any third power is justified’ (Washington Post, 1979: 22).  
In December 1978, Vietnamese troops took Phnom Penh and established the 
People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), which was later called the State of 
Cambodia (SOC). Hun Sen was appointed as Foreign Minister of the PRK/SOC in 
1979 and in 1985 he was made Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Prime 
Minister until 1990. The Khmer Rouge retreated to camps on the Thai border, allied 
with two smaller non-communist parties, and called themselves the Coalition 
Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). Since the US and other nations did 
not want to recognize a Cambodian government dominated by Vietnam, they 
recognized the CGDK as the legitimate government of Cambodia until 1992 
(Kiernan, 1999; Picken, 2011).  
President Carter’s National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski’s objective 
during this time was to enhance US-China strategic relations in the common anti-
Soviet effort (Brown, 1989: 43). Brzezinski recalls that in 1979, ‘I encouraged the 
Chinese to support Pol Pot. I encouraged the Thai to help Democratic 
Kampuchea…Pol Pot was an abomination. We could never support him but China 
could’ (Becker, 1986: 440). According to Brzezinski, the US therefore ‘winked, 
semi-publicly’ at Chinese and Thai aid to the Khmer Rouge forces, while US 
officials pushed through additional UN and other international aid to their camps on 
the Thai border (Becker, 1986: 440). Official US policy during this time was that all 
covert aid was non-lethal and that none of it went to the Khmer Rouge, except for the 
border relief programs. However, there is evidence of unreported American 
assistance to the Khmer Rouge.55 In a widely seen documentary in 1990, Peter 
                                                
55 Kiernan, 1993: footnote 48. Cambodian historian Kenton Clymer finds that the most persuasive 
indication was US Public Law 99-83, which made it illegal to spend any funds to bolster Khmer 
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Jennings argued that the US was covertly supporting the return to power in 
Cambodia of the Khmer Rouge.56  
Without the support of the Soviet Union after it collapsed, it became more 
difficult for Vietnam to occupy Cambodia. Vietnamese troops withdrew from the 
country in 1989, and a political settlement, as opposed to a military settlement, was 
finally possible. The Paris Peace Conference brought together representatives of 18 
countries, the four Cambodian parties (KPLF, FUNCINPEC, KR and CPP) and the 
UN Secretary-General in an effort to negotiate the withdrawal of the remaining 
Vietnamese occupation troops and self-determination for the Cambodian people. The 
US helped negotiate a Security Council agreement for a UN-managed peace process 
that was formally adopted by the General Assembly. Cambodian historian Ben 
Kiernan said that, initially, the US goal was to find a settlement that China would 
approve, which meant including the Khmer Rouge in the settlement and rejecting a 
tribunal to judge them (Ben Kiernan, personal communication, 14 April 2011). 
However, this goal conflicted with congressional concerns about preventing another 
genocide and the political imperative of being seen to be doing so. The Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the time, Richard Solomon, 
said that support from Rep. Solarz and a number of senatorial Vietnam War veterans 
was critical in preventing a split between Congress and the administration (Solomon, 
2000: 102-103).  
In July 1991, Secretary of State James Baker announced that the US would 
no longer recognize the CGDK, and would open negotiations with Vietnam and 
                                                                                                                                     
Rouge military capacity (US Public Law 99-83, 2004:141). This was part of the legislation that 
ultimately allowed lethal assistance to the noncommunist resistance, introduced in the House by Rep. 
Solarz (US House of Representatives, 1990). Clymer asks: ‘Why was such a law needed if aid had not 
been getting to the Khmer Rouge?’ (Clymer, 2004: 142).  
56 Clymer believes the Jennings documentary was a major factor in changing American policy toward 
Cambodia in the 1990s (Clymer, 2004: 142). 
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provide humanitarian aid to Cambodia (Clymer, 2004: 155). The primary goal 
became to keep the Khmer Rouge from taking power, a goal which, Baker 
acknowledged, the US had not been able to achieve with the former policy. The US 
would no longer defer to ASEAN countries and China on Cambodian matters (Ibid). 
The US agreed to pay 30% of UN operations and, at least on the surface, warmed to 
Hun Sen’s government (Ibid: 162).  
The Paris Peace Accords were signed in October 1991, establishing the UN 
Transitional Authority for Cambodia (UNTAC), the largest peacekeeping operation 
the UN had ever mounted and the first occasion on which the UN had taken over the 
administration of an independent state. UNTAC oversaw the 1993 elections, which 
led to the creation of a constitutional monarchy led by King Norodom Sihanouk 
(followed by his son, Prince Norodom Sihamoni in 2004). Although the royalist 
FUNCINPEC party won a plurality in the elections, a power-sharing arrangement 
was made for a two-headed administration led by Co-Prime Ministers Hun Sen (CPP) 
and Prince Ranariddh (FUNCINPEC).  
After UNTAC’s dissolution in September 1993, the Clinton administration 
restored diplomatic relations with Cambodia and ended a long-standing trade 
embargo. Between 1994 and 1997, the US put in place a variety of economic, 
diplomatic and military support programs for the new Cambodian government. In 
1994, the Clinton administration threatened Thailand, a long-standing US ally, with 
military sanctions over the issue of continuing relations between the Thai military 
and the Khmer Rouge (Etcheson, 2005: 43). The Pentagon also dispatched military 
advisers and trainers to assist in the reorganization of the Royal Cambodian Forces. 
The US provided nearly $1 million in nonlethal military assistance in 1994, and sent 
a succession of military delegations in subsequent years to study lethal aid 
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requirements (Ibid: 44). USAID initiated a rural development and democratization 
program on the scale of $25-30 million per year, including projects to assist with the 
reintegration of defecting KR soldiers into society. The National Democratic Institute 
(NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), both funded by US Congress, 
increased their number of projects in Cambodia.  
The US cut off aid, however, after a coup by Hun Sen in 1997. Hun Sen and 
the CPP were re-elected in 1998 and used their control of the National Assembly as 
well as the military, courts and police to remove and outmaneuver opposition groups 
(Freedom House, 2008). Nevertheless, in 2008, the US resumed direct government 
aid, with assistance to the Cambodian military to train soldiers in fighting terrorism, 
information sharing, training in surveillance techniques and tracking the flow of 
terrorist finances around the world (Mathaba News, 2007). According to Human 
Rights Watch, the US provided more than $4.5 million worth of military equipment 
and training to Cambodia since 2006, some of which has gone to military units and 
officials with records of serious human rights violations.57 
Despite concerns about weak governance, widespread poverty and corruption 
(the World Bank designated Cambodia as a fragile state in 2006), roughly half of 
Cambodia’s national budget is provided by foreign governments and development 
agencies (Picken, 2011). China is the largest contributor and does much to keep the 
ruling party in power (Hauter, 2007). Japan is next, vying with China for influence, 
and also largely supportive of the regime. France, the former colonial power, is 
pragmatic and influential in the European Commission, a significant contributor. In 
                                                
57 In a statement of July 8, 2010, HRW called for a halt to US military aid pending thorough vetting of 
Cambodia's armed forces to screen out individuals and units with records of human rights violations. 
Its call was prompted by Angkor Sentinel, a regional military exercise held in Cambodia in July as 
part of the US Defense and State Departments' 2010 Global Peace Operations Initiative to train 
peacekeepers, and the selection of the ACO Tank Unit, which has been involved in illegal land 
seizures, to host part of the exercise (Picken, 2011: footnote 14). 
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June 2010, donor nations including Japan, the US and members of the EU pledged a 
record $1.1 billion in foreign aid (Picken, 2011). Hun Sen, now one of the world’s 
longest-serving prime ministers, maintains good relations with China, Japan, 
Australia, France and the US.  
This section sped through 60 years of US foreign policy in Cambodia in order 
to provide a cursory understanding of key events during this period. The bombing of 
Cambodia during the Nixon administration contributed to circumstances that enabled 
Pol Pot to seize power in 1975. Despite limited information about KR crimes taking 
place, the Carter administration failed to respond. While Vietnam was in control of 
the country during the 1980s, the Reagan administration, along with the UN, 
recognized the CGDK (of which the Khmer Rouge was part) as the legitimate 
Cambodian government, which helped the Khmer Rouge maintain control. In the 
1990s, the Clinton administration supported the establishment of the first UN 
transitional administration and contributed aid to the new government after the 1993 
elections. Aid was cut off in 1997, but resumed in the 2000s during the Bush 
administration with a focus on military and counterterrorism assistance. This brief 
background should help to frame the following discussion of US involvement in the 
establishment of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal.  
 
3.2 The Tribunal  
Accountability for human rights violations committed by the Khmer Rouge did not 
receive significant attention until the 1990s, with some exceptions. In 1979, Vietnam 
sponsored a trial that convicted Pol Pot of genocide in absentia.58 In the 1980s, the 
PRK called for an international tribunal to try other Khmer Rouge leaders (FBIS, 
                                                
58 On 15 July 1979, the PRK promulgated a decree-law establishing a Revolutionary People's Tribunal 
for the Trial of the Genocide Crime of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary Clique. 
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1981: H4). In 1986, Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden endorsed this call at an 
ASEAN conference in Manila.59 In 1988, two thousand Cambodians living abroad 
signed a petition to Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke and leaders of other 
governments asking for action against the Pol Pot regime in the International Court 
of Justice (Kiernan, 1993: footnote 22)  
However, it was not until after the Cambodian peace process and elections 
that Cambodian Co-Prime Ministers Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh requested UN 
assistance in setting up an international tribunal. This request began a long period of 
negotiations between the UN and Cambodia, which eventually resulted in the 
establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC, 
also known as the Khmer Rouge Tribunal).  
This section first looks at early US opposition to a tribunal and the 
subsequent passage of legislation to support accountability efforts in Cambodia. It 
then examines US technical and political involvement in detailed aspects of the UN-
Cambodia negotiations. It lastly explores congressional funding restrictions to the 
court, and re-engagement with the process in recent years.  
 
Early opposition to a tribunal   
US interest in Cambodian trials initially came from a small group of advocates in the 
1980s. As a Yale law student, Gregory Stanton started the Cambodian Genocide 
Project in order to document the charge of genocide after visiting the excavations of 
the Choeung Ek ‘killing fields’ site with Australian historian Ben Kiernan. Shortly 
                                                
59 Kiernan, 1993: 196. Ben Kiernan suggested that the Australia-Kampuchea Support Committee 
invite Gregory Stanton to address its meeting in Sydney in May 1986. An ex-officio representative 
from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs present at the meeting invited Stanton to Canberra 
to meet with Department of Foreign Affairs officials, which led to Hayden’s call for an international 
tribunal at the ASEAN conference in Manila in June 1986 (Ben Kiernan, personal communication, 14 
April 2011). Also see, FBIS, 1986a: H1; FBIS, 1986b: H2; FBIS, 1986c: H1.  
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after, David Hawk, former executive director of Amnesty International USA started 
the Cambodia Documentation Commission (CDC), which documented abuses and 
advocated for a war crimes tribunal. The film, The Killing Fields, helped increase 
public attention to human rights violations committed by the Khmer Rouge.  
However, because the Khmer Rouge was viewed as a counterbalance to 
Vietnam, US officials were unwilling to support their prosecution. President 
Reagan’s Secretary of State George Shultz opposed efforts to indict the Khmer 
Rouge for genocide or other crimes against humanity and, in 1986, declined to 
support Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden’s proposal for an international 
tribunal to judge KR crimes (Stanton, ND; Kiernan, 1993: 196). Calls by Reps. Jim 
Leach and Robert Kastenmeier for an international tribunal also went unheeded 
(Haas, 1991: 225).   
Advocacy efforts continued and intersected with those concerned about the 
return to power of the Khmer Rouge. In 1988, a joint resolution adopted by Congress 
asked the Reagan administration to prevent a return to power of Pol Pot and the 
Khmer Rouge (US House of Representatives Joint Resolution 602 and US Senate 
Joint Resolution 347, 1988).60 Yet, the US was still not ready to take up the issue. 
One example was Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon’s refusal to describe 
Pol Pot's crimes as genocidal (US House of Representatives, 1991). Jeremy Stone, 
the founder of the Campaign to Oppose the Return of the Khmer Rouge (CORKR), 
explained that the State Department  
would not accuse the Khmer Rouge of genocide because it might give the 
Vietnamese justification for their invasion; it would force the United 
States to take action under the genocide convention to bring them to 
justice; and it would make it hard for [the US] to support Prince 
Sihanouk in his desire to deal with the Khmer Rouge as part of a new 
Cambodian government (Stone, 1999: 270).  
                                                
60 Although nonbinding, Reagan signed the bill into law (US Public Law No. 100-502, 1988). 
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CORKR, formed in 1989,61  with nearly fifty endorsing and sponsoring organizations, 
urged the Bush administration to open direct contacts with the Hun Sen 
government.62 This group felt that power-sharing was impossible and there was no 
choice but to back Hun Sen and help the Thais disengage from the forces of Pol Pot 
(Colby and Stone, 1989). Congressional Democrats became increasingly concerned 
about the return of the Khmer Rouge and 203 members signed a petition requesting 
that Secretary Baker identify a policy that would deny a role for Pol Pot and the 
Khmer Rouge in Cambodia (Greenberg, 2000: 151). CORKR and others were also 
concerned about the leaking of US aid for the noncommunist resistance to the Khmer 
Rouge (Stone, 1989).  
During the peace talks, the SOC (earlier known as the PRK) had attempted 
but failed to get specific reference to trials or the issue of genocide written into the 
texts of the agreements (FBIS, 1991a: 26; Bangkok Post, 1991: 4; Le Monde, 1991: 
9; FBIS, 1991b: 32; AFP, 1991: 42). However, these omissions were partially 
compensated for by the inclusion in the Paris Agreements of allusions to atrocities 
under Khmer Rouge rule and to the SOC demand for judicial accountability.63 These 
formulations reflected a compromise between the SOC and the US delegation to 
                                                
61 According to Ben Kiernan, CORKR was founded in January 1990 at a meeting in Washington DC 
that was convened by a group of former antiwar activists, including Anne Gallivan, Paul Shannon, 
Kathy Knight, Sally Benson, Walter Teague, Chan Bun Han and others. CORKR then asked Kiernan 
to join their board. Kiernan involved Gregory Stanton in the project. Chan Bun Han and Kiernan 
invited a number of key Cambodians to join the CORKR Board, including former Cambodian Prime 
Minister In Tam, and former Information Minister Chhang Song and Kim Eng Chantarit. Executive 
Director Ruth Cadwallader (1990-1992) and Craig Etcheson (1992-1994), Anne Gallivan, and Kathy 
Knight undertook CORKR’s lobbying and other Washington work with the support of Jeremy Stone 
and others (Ben Kiernan, personal communication, 14 April 2011). 
62 Stone identified the main actors he felt were responsible for pushing US policy on the Khmer 
Rouge, including the Indochina Project, a group run by William Herod that spread information about 
Indochina problems to Washington policy analysts; Chang Song, a former minister of the Lon Nol 
government and a Cambodian who was respected on Capitol Hill; William E. Colby, former Director 
of Central Intelligence from 1973 to 1976; Edmund Muskie, former Secretary of State; Michael 
Horowitz, a Reagan administration official; and those involved with CORKR (Stone, 1999: 270).  
63 Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, 1991: Preamble and 
Article 15.  
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make a specific reference to the Genocide Convention and opposition to this by the 
PDK, among others.  This signified a change in US policy. In his speech to the 
conference, US Secretary of State James Baker highlighted the shift when he 
declared:   
What makes the case of Cambodia so extraordinary - and its claim for 
international support so compelling - is the magnitude of the suffering its 
people have endured.  The Khmer Rouge were no ordinary oppressors.  
In the name of revolution, they used violence against their own people in 
a way that has few parallels in history.  We condemn these policies and 
practices of the Khmer Rouge as an abomination to humanity that must 
never be allowed to recur. To prevent such a recurrence, we have 
encouraged the incorporation of strong human rights guarantees into this 
settlement agreement. And I can assure ... that we will steadfastly sustain 
our efforts to ensure that the human rights of the Cambodian people are 
supported by the international community. Cambodia and the US are 
both signatories to the Genocide Convention, and we will support efforts 
to bring to justice those responsible for the mass murders of the 1970s if 
the new Cambodian government chooses to pursue this path (Heder, 
2011: 6-7).  
 
This statement signalled a shift, but the US was still not prepared to support a 
tribunal. Australia and Japan suggested a court, but China and the US opposed and it 
was not included in the peace accords (Kiernan, 1993: 207, 231, 246).  
 
Legislation to support accountability  
Peter Cleveland, congressional aide to Senator Chuck Robb (Democrat from 
Virginia), proposed the idea of a Cambodia tribunal to the Senator, after attending 
several conferences run by the Aspen Institute’s Indochina Program where he had 
met Ben Kiernan and others (Ben Kiernan, personal communication, 14 April 2011). 
Cleveland drafted a bill initially entitled ‘The Khmer Rouge Prosecution and 
Exclusion Act’, which was introduced by Senator Robb to Congress in May 1992, 
but was not adopted. CORKR continued to lobby Washington officials, and the 
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Cambodia Genocide Justice Act (CGJA) was passed by Congress on 1 April 1994 
and signed by President Clinton in May.  
CGJA made it ‘policy of the US to support efforts to bring to justice members 
of the Khmer Rouge for their crimes against humanity committed in Cambodia 
between April 17, 1975, and January 7, 1979.’64  The legislation required the 
establishment of a new office in the State Department that would be responsible for 
supporting investigations of crimes against humanity as well as ‘develop[ing] the US 
proposal for the establishment of an international criminal tribunal for the 
prosecution of those accused of genocide in Cambodia.’ 
CGJA initiated what would be a long period of US involvement in the 
establishment of a tribunal for Cambodia. Early on, the State Department 
commissioned attorneys Jason Abrams and Stephen Ratner to prepare a legal 
analysis of the potential culpability of members of the Khmer Rouge on charges of 
war crimes, genocide and other crimes against humanity. Their study found 
culpability for all three, and weighed various avenues for prosecution that might be 
followed (Abrams and Ratner, 1995).  
                                                
64 See US Cambodian Genocide Justice Act (1994) 22 U.S.C. 2656, Part D, Section 571-574: The law 
urged the President to: 1) to collect, or assist appropriate organizations and individuals to collect 
relevant data on crimes of genocide committed in Cambodia; 2) in circumstances which the President 
deems appropriate, to encourage the establishment of a national or international criminal tribunal for 
the prosecution of those accused of genocide in Cambodia; and 3) as necessary, to provide such 
national or international tribunal with information collected pursuant to paragraph (1). The legislation 
also directed the creation of an ‘Office of Cambodian Genocide Investigations’ within the State 
Department. The office was meant to support, through organizations and individuals, efforts to bring 
to justice member of the Khmer Rouge, including the following: 1) to investigate crimes against 
humanity; 2) to provide Cambodians with access to documents and records as a result of investigation; 
3) to submit relevant data to a national or international penal tribunal that may be convened to 
formally hear and judge the genocidal acts committed by the Khmer Rouge; and 4) to develop the US 
proposal for the establishment of an international criminal tribunal for the prosecution of those 
accused of genocide in Cambodia. The President was to report to the Senate and House Committees 
on Foreign Relations/Affairs every six months on the activities of the new State Department office; 
new facts learned about past Khmer Rouge practices; and the steps the President had taken ‘to 
promote human rights, to support efforts to bring to justice the national political and military 
leadership of the Khmer Rouge, and to prevent the recurrence of human rights abuses in Cambodia 
through actions which are not related to UN activities in Cambodia’ (emphasis added). 
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Within the State Department’s East Asian Bureau, a small ‘Office of 
Cambodian Genocide Investigations’ was created and headed by Alfonse La Porta. 
This job was not sought after since a tribunal was not a popular idea within the State 
Department (Fred Z. Brown, interview, 6 November 2009). Officials ‘didn’t want to 
rock the boat’ on these issues with Thailand and China (Ibid). State Department 
lawyers also cautioned that the first priority (before a tribunal was established) had to 
be the apprehension of the Khmer Rouge leadership. The requirement for prior 
apprehension meant that concrete thinking about a tribunal did not progress until the 
arrest of Pol Pot became plausible (Scheffer, 2011: 344).  
La Porta’s work continued at State, where he oversaw a competitive bidding 
process in 1994, which awarded Yale University with a $500,000 grant for two years 
to document Khmer Rouge violations. This grant provided funds to establish the 
Cambodian Genocide Program (CGP) at Yale, which was (and continues to be) 
directed by Professor Ben Kiernan. Stanton, who had begun working at the State 
Department, helped convince the State Department to provide a second grant of $1 
million to the CGP (Power, 2007: 487). A third grant of $150,000 was provided in 
1998, and some additional funding was provided by State through 2001.  
Craig Etcheson was appointed as CGP’s Program Manager; Helen Jarvis was 
Consultant for Documentation; and Youk Chhang headed CGP’s field office in 
Phnom Penh, known as the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam). Kiernan 
determined that after the expiration of this first CGP grant, DC-Cam would become 
an independent NGO, which it did in January 1997. DC-Cam received CGP/Yale 
funding, totalling approximately $1 million (CGP, ND). DC-Cam has also received 
direct US government assistance, in addition to CGP assistance, for nearly two 
decades.  
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By early 1997, CGP and DC-Cam had amassed a wealth of primary source 
documents and began to make them publicly available. The work of the two 
organizations presented a mass of potential evidence, available to be used by a 
prosecutor. This work contributed to the recommendations proposed in Abrams and 
Ratner’s legal study commissioned by the State Department (Fawthrop and Jarvis, 
2005: 113). Meanwhile, the Cambodian government and UN were exploring the 
possibility of criminal trials.  
 
Technical and political involvement in the negotiations  
With the urging and guidance of the UN special representative for human rights in 
Cambodia, Thomas Hammarberg,65 the Cambodian Co-Prime Ministers sent a letter 
to the UN Secretary General in June 1997, which requested  
the assistance of the United Nations and the international community in 
bringing to justice those persons responsible for the genocide and crimes 
against humanity during the rule of the Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 
1979 … Cambodia does not have the resources or expertise to conduct 
this very important procedure. Thus, we believe it is necessary to ask for 
the assistance of the United Nations. We are aware of similar efforts to 
respond to the genocide and crimes against humanity in Rwanda and the 
former Yugoslavia, and ask that similar assistance be given to 
Cambodia…We believe that crimes of this magnitude are of concern to 
all persons in the world, as they greatly diminish respect for the most 
basic human rights, the right to life. We hope that the United Nations and 
the international community can assist the Cambodian people in 
establishing the truth about this period and bringing those responsible to 
justice. Only in this way can this tragedy be brought to a full and final 
conclusion (Hammarberg, 2001). 
 
Shortly after the request had been sent, however, tensions between the two coalition 
parties escalated and in early July, Hun Sen staged a coup, ousting Prince Ranariddh. 
                                                
65 In June 1996, Thomas Hammarberg was appointed as the Special Representative of the UN 
Secretary General for human rights in Cambodia. During the UN Commission on Human Rights 
session in April 1997, Hammarberg suggested that a resolution on Cambodia mention the possibility 
of international assistance to enable Cambodia to address past serious violations of human rights. On 
initiative of the US, the Commission said that any request by Cambodia for international assistance in 
responding to past serious violations should be examined (UNCHR, 1998; Fawthrop and Jarvis, 2005: 
117).  
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At the same time, the disintegration of the Khmer Rouge movement sped up. Khmer 
Rouge Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs Ieng Sary had defected with a 
couple of thousand soldiers the year before, and more defections were expected. Pol 
Pot was tried by a ‘people's court’ close to the Thai border in late July and sentenced 
to lifelong detention. 
The plausible arrest of Pol Pot drew the attention of US officials who worked 
on a scheme to capture him at the Thai-Cambodian border and bring him to another 
country for trial. Canada, Denmark, Sweden and Israel, among others, had been 
approached by US representatives about hosting such a trial. The UN was not 
formally informed about these diplomatic activities and Hammarberg was critical of 
the way the plan was pursued, stating, ‘no country was prepared to host this type of 
trial’ (Hammarberg, 2001). According to then-War Crimes Ambassador David 
Scheffer, the White House believed that US efforts to prepare for Pol Pot’s capture 
would boost President Clinton’s credibility as he embarked on his long-awaited trip 
to Rwanda to confront the memory of genocide there (Scheffer, 2011: 352). 
During this time, Hun Sen sent a letter to President Clinton requesting US 
assistance ‘to set up an international criminal tribunal [according to US laws] and to 
bring to trial the Khmer Rouge leadership while they are still alive’ (Letter dated 27 
November 1997 in Scheffer, 2008: 3). The death of Pol Pot in April 1998 reaffirmed 
US resolve to bring senior Khmer Rouge leaders to justice. Clinton stated:  
Although the opportunity to hold Pol Pot accountable for his monstrous 
crimes appears to have passed, senior Khmer Rouge, who exercised 
leadership from 1975 to 1979, are still at large and share responsibility 
for the monstrous human rights abuses committed during this period. We 
must not permit the death of the most notorious of the Khmer Rouge 
leaders to deter us from the equally important task of bringing these 
others to justice (Associated Press, 1998).  
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At the end of April, the US Mission to the UN circulated a draft UNSC Chapter VII 
resolution (drafted by Scheffer) to establish an International Criminal Tribunal for 
Cambodia (ICTC), which would share much of the infrastructure and resources of 
the ICTY, and would prosecute ‘senior members of the Khmer Rouge leadership 
who planned or directed serious violations of international and humanitarian 
law’ committed in Cambodia between April 1975 and January 1979 (USUN, 1998; 
Scheffer, 2011: 364-366).  However, the proposal failed to attract support; China was 
opposed to the idea and it was reported that Russia and France also had problems 
with the US initiative.  
These events continued alongside further moves by the UN to bring about a 
judicial process of accountability. Because Hun Sen had told Hammarberg that the 
request to the UN for assistance was still valid, Hammarberg recommended that a 
‘Group of Experts’ evaluate the existing evidence of responsibility for the Khmer 
Rouge human rights violations and propose further measures (UNGA resolution 
52/135, 1998). The UN Group of Experts included Stephen Ratner, who had 
undertaken a similar study for the US State Department in 1994-1995. The group 
found that serious crimes had been committed under both international and 
Cambodian law and that sufficient evidence existed to justify legal proceedings 
against Khmer Rouge leaders for these crimes (UN Report of the Group of Experts 
for Cambodia, 1999). The experts analysed several legal options for bringing to 
justice Khmer Rouge leaders, but ultimately recommended that the UN, in response 
to the request of the Cambodian Government, should establish an ad-hoc 
international tribunal to try Khmer Rouge officials for crimes against humanity and 
genocide committed from 17 April 1975 to 7 January 1979. They did not recommend 
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a tribunal established under Cambodian law because it was found that the judiciary 
would not be fair or effective.66 
By the time the experts’ report was released, further defections had been 
announced, including from senior KR leaders. Hun Sen’s views appeared to shift, 
stating there might be a conflict between a trial and peace, rejecting the experts’ 
recommendations for an international criminal tribunal and asserting his preference 
for trials in Cambodian courts or a South African-style truth commission which 
would investigate crimes committed from 1970 to 1998. Madeleine Albright rejected 
the truth commission idea and remained in support of an international criminal 
tribunal (Scheffer, 2011: 382). Scheffer noted US concern, however, about the 
possibility of a longer timeframe, which would have implicated US involvement in 
Cambodia in the early 1970s. He said the US continued to press for an international 
criminal tribunal in part because it ‘had to keep the matter out of the control of the 
General Assembly, which could, by majority vote, create a tribunal with wide-
ranging jurisdiction’ (Ibid).  
When UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan submitted the experts’ report to the 
General Assembly and the Security Council, he said that although the tribunal should 
be international in character, this did not mean other models could not be explored 
(Hammarberg, 2001).  
                                                
66 Para. 126 of the report stated: ‘It is the opinion of the Group that the Cambodian judiciary presently 
lacks three key criteria for a fair and effective judiciary: a trained cadre of judges, lawyers, and 
investigators; adequate infrastructure; and a culture of respect for due process.’ Para. 133 stated: ‘First, 
in the light of what we heard during our mission to Cambodia, even from some high official sources, 
the level of corruption in the court system and the routine subjection of judicial decisions to political 
influence would make it nearly impossible for prosecutors, investigators and judges to be immune 
from such pressure in the course of what would undoubtedly be very politically charged trials. The 
decisions on whom to investigate and indict, and to convict or acquit, must be based on the evidence 
and not serve to advance the political agenda of one or another political group. This is necessary in 
order to respect the integrity of the proceedings and to accord fundamental fairness to defendants (UN 
Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia, 1999: para. 126). 
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In response to the lack of support by UNSC members and the Cambodian 
government for an international criminal tribunal, Scheffer began to explore other 
options. He wrote: ‘As is often the case in negotiations, my task in this situation was 
to push the envelope to find an acceptable means to a desired end’ (Ibid: 381). One 
idea being discussed was a ‘mixed’ tribunal that would guarantee international 
standards and be based in Cambodia. Senator John Kerry, a Vietnam veteran and 
chairman of the East Asian Foreign Relations Subcommittee supported the idea and 
proposed it to Hun Sen in April 1999. Hun Sen expressed interest and requested 
technical assistance from the UN in creating the Cambodian draft law. The US 
officially shifted its position to support a mixed tribunal, and the UN Office of Legal 
Affairs (OLA) began discussions with the Cambodian government on the task of its 
establishment.  
When UN Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs Ralph Zacklin and 
Cambodian Senior Minister Sok An met in August 1999 to discuss their respective 
drafts of the enabling law, there were major differences between the two. They 
differed on several issues, including the issue of personal jurisdiction, i.e. who could 
be charged. The Group of Experts had used the notion that only ‘the most responsible 
for the most serious crimes’ be tried, an approach that had been echoed in General 
Assembly and Human Rights Commission resolutions. There was a need to find a 
legal formulation that would limit the number of prosecutions without giving an 
implicit amnesty to those outside that limited group (Hammarberg, 2001). Other 
issues included the method of appointing judges and prosecutors, and the numbers of 
foreigners and Cambodians among them (Ibid). 
In late 1999, Scheffer prepared a draft law that addressed some of the 
differences between the UN and Cambodia drafts. He proposed the establishment of 
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‘Extraordinary Chambers’ – a special trial chamber and special appeals chamber in 
the Cambodian courts with participation by an international prosecutor and judges. 
He also suggested the Cambodians be in the majority but that a ‘supermajority’ vote 
would be needed, requiring one international judge behind decisions. He wrote:  
I introduced the supermajority vote rule because I was convinced that 
some formula had to be developed to ensure the participation of 
Cambodian judges in the court, but in a way that preserved international 
influence and oversight … There was no magical historical reflection or 
precedent that brought it to mind. I simply tried to figure out how to 
manage a Cambodian majority on the bench (if that proved to be the 
endgame) and determined that requiring the vote of at least one 
international judge could establish the minimum threshold of 
international oversight in the decision-making process of the judges … 
The supermajority would be a lower threshold than required in the US 
and yet an appropriately higher bar to surmount than that found in civil-
law jurisdictions (Scheffer, 2011: 387).  
 
Regarding personal jurisdiction, Scheffer foresaw two groups of suspects: DK senior 
leaders and all persons responsible for the most serious violations of Cambodian law 
(Scheffer, 2011: 4). This issue was (and continues to be) contentious. For example, a 
2000 UN Non-Paper stated that Kofi Annan gave into US and Cambodian demands 
to limit prosecution only to senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge who committed 
serious violations, which excluded both lower-level officials regardless of the 
seriousness of their crimes, and the highest leaders if their crimes were not serious 
(UN Non-Paper, 2000: 38). According to former ECCC official and Cambodia expert 
Stephen Heder, in order to assuage Cambodian government fears that the court might 
indict a large number of persons, US Ambassador Kent Wiedemann suggested 
limiting the personal jurisdiction to six or seven persons, ‘that is, the senior most 
leaders of the KR most responsible for crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
genocide, etc.’ According to Heder, this limitation drew criticism and the US 
clarified that the possible list of suspects should be flexible (Heder, 2011: 30). 
According to Scheffer, however, it was the UN that proposed to limit the scope to 
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senior leaders and those ‘most responsible’ for crimes, which the US then agreed to 
(Scheffer, 2011: 7). Who was ultimately responsible for the ‘most responsible’ 
formulation remains unclear, but this notion was ultimately retained in the final 
version of the law.  
Lastly, Scheffer’s proposal suggested that the UN monitor the process to 
ensure that international standards were met. If they were not, the international 
community could withdraw from the process.  
US Ambassador Wiedemann formally delivered Scheffer’s proposal to the 
Cambodian government. Shortly after the US visit, Hun Sen said: ‘At this hour, we 
and the UN, especially considering the US position towards us, can reach a deal. I 
have agreed to this proposal, there is no more doubt left’ (Hammarberg, 2001).  
Hammarberg said: ‘Hun Sen, and others, obviously believed that with US 
support any trial would not be much criticized abroad.’ He added:  
Though the US intervention in some respect was helpful, it would have 
been more useful if there had been better co-ordination with the UN 
efforts or with other governments. I was not consulted on Ambassador 
Wiedemann’s initiative, nor was anyone else on the UN side. This gap 
was partly remedied in mid-October when I and Ambassador David 
Scheffer were in Phnom Penh at the same time (Hammarberg, 2001).  
 
The Cambodian government sent the revised draft, which bore clear traces of the US 
proposals, to the UN in December. Although the draft law proposal was not 
acceptable to the UN, the Cambodian cabinet adopted the draft ECCC Law in 
January 2000.  
In February 2000, Kofi Annan raised four concerns: 1) that there be 
guarantees that those indicted be arrested; 2) that there would be no amnesties or 
pardons; 3) that the prosecutor be foreign in order that independence be guaranteed; 
and 4) that the majority of the judges be foreign and appointed by the Secretary-
General (Hammarberg, 2001; UN Secretary-General Briefing, 2000).  
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Hun Sen found himself faced with continued UN insistence on a fair trial and 
the possibility that some elements of FUNCINPEC, the public and even the CPP might 
actively ally with the UN against him. He also had the US pushing him to talk to the 
UN even as it pressured the UN to accommodate him, but he could still take advantage 
of French67 and Chinese68 opposition to UN involvement. Moreover, as his minister of 
commerce explained, Hun Sen believed that the government could not simply walk 
away from talks with the UN because economic assistance was linked to the trial. To 
maintain the aid flow, Hun Sen had at least to appear serious about trying some former 
CPK leaders (Far Eastern Economic Review, 2000). 
Japan became increasingly involved beginning in 2000 and pledged new aid 
to Cambodia if Hun Sen would ‘go just one step further in efforts with the UN’ 
(Reuters, 2000b). In return, Hun Sen allowed for a second foreign co-investigating 
judge, which he broadly hinted should come from Japan (Associated Press, 2000a). 
Hun Sen used the announcement of his compromise to garner diplomatic support for 
pressuring the UN to send a delegation to Phnom Penh on his terms (South China 
Morning Post, 2000b). In this, he had the support of the US, whose diplomats criticized 
the UN for lacking enthusiasm for making a deal, and also for ‘bungling’ negotiations 
so far by being reluctant to engage Hun Sen (South China Morning Post, 2000c). 
The US remained convinced that the way forward was for the UN to make 
concessions. It suggested that the UN team going to Cambodia should include legal 
                                                
67 Hun Sen had the backing of the French Foreign Ministry, which condemned the US (and thus even 
more so the UN) for pushing too hard for an international element to the trials. It expressed support for 
Hun Sen's desire not to be ‘dispossessed’ by any trial process and sympathy for the position that political 
stability and economic development should be Cambodia's overriding priorities (AFP, 2000a; Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2000). 
68 China encouraged Hun Sen to resist, threatening to withdraw aid to the government if it allowed UN 
participation in a tribunal (UN Non-Paper, 2000: 30). China was already providing the government with 
low-interest loans worth about $200 million and some military assistance and encouraging Chinese state-
owned enterprises looking to invest there (Asian Wall Street Journal, 2000). 
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experts, but should be guided by ‘someone with a good feel for political realities,’ 
because, according to the US, the main stakes in the negotiations were ‘political, not 
legal’ (Phnom Penh Post, 2000b). The UN conceded to this request sending Shashi 
Tharoor, a personal representative of Annan, who, as one UN official put it, ‘was there 
to ensure that political considerations overrode legal considerations, and that the 
‘tremendous ... pressure’ from the US and other governments to make a deal was 
translated into concessions (UN Non-Paper, 2000: 17; Associated Press, 2000c). 
Limited US pressure was applied on the Cambodian government. Before the 
UN visit, a senior US State Department official   
was despatched to persuade Hun Sen to be more accommodating, enough 
at least to give the deal an appearance of a mutual compromise arising 
from a willingness on the part of Hun Sen and the UN ‘to work flexibly 
together’.  The sweetener, as it had been with the Japanese, was aid, 
although the payoff had to be put in the future.  The official made it clear 
to Hun Sen that if he would move sufficiently to find common ground 
with a UN already forced into a climb down by the US, Japan, France, 
Russia and India, any resulting agreement with Corell [the UN OLA 
official] would be a ‘hugely positive thing’ that would ‘encourage the 
climate in Washington and elsewhere,’ and could bring about a lifting of 
US congressional restrictions on aid to Cambodia (UN Non-Paper, 2000: 
18; See also, Associated Press, 2000b; Reuters, 2000c). 
 
Despite these efforts, little progress was made at the March meeting between Hun 
Sen and UN Legal Counsel Hans Corell. A sticking point in the negotiations during 
this period centered on how disagreements between the Cambodian and international 
prosecutors, on the one hand, and disagreements between the Cambodian and 
international investigating judges, on the other hand, would be resolved.69 This led to 
                                                
69 David Scheffer discussed the dispute mechanism in an article on 8 August 2011 posted on the 
Cambodia Tribunal Monitor. He states: ‘The prospect of disputes was driven primarily by the concern 
of key negotiators that the Cambodian Co-Prosecutor or the Cambodian Co-Investigating Judge, or 
both, might balk at investigating and indicting certain individuals who objectively fall within the 
personal jurisdiction of the court.  Their international counterparts presumably would be less 
susceptible to political influence in the identification of two groups of individuals, 1) senior Khmer 
Rouge leaders and 2) those individuals most responsible for the crimes falling within the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the ECCC.  If everyone thought that the only likely suspects would be a small 
number of long and prominently identified individuals (limited now to the surviving Khieu Samphan, 
Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith, and Kaing Guek Eav (“Duch”)), the likelihood of disputes would 
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another US-crafted proposal (during another visit by Senator Kerry) that a separate 
panel of judges (three Cambodians and two international) would resolve disputes, 
requiring a supermajority vote of at least four judges to block a proposal from one of 
the two prosecutors for an indictment (AFP, 2000d).  
Hammarberg said: ‘Though this approach seemed unconventional and even 
unprincipled, it was described in some media as a major compromise on the side of 
the Cambodian government’ (Hammarberg, 2001). Others familiar with international 
judicial standards decried the fact that it would create a ‘problem of multiple judges 
performing a task that should not be theirs’, ruling on prosecution decisions and then 
being involved in further adjudicating the same case (UN Non-Paper, 2000: 28). 
Together with the supermajority formula for decisions on verdicts, it set up a 
‘horrendously complicated’ and ‘unworkable system’ that was insufficient to ensure 
that ‘evidence - and not politics - ... determines who is indicted, arrested and convicted’ 
(Bangkok Post, 2000; Adams, 2000). 
Non-US diplomats and the UN remained sceptical about whether Hun Sen 
would agree to a credible tribunal or travel the route prescribed by the US. Corell was 
sent back to Phnom Penh in June. Upon his departure, he warned that Kofi Annan had 
established a time limit beyond which the UN would no longer wish to proceed, and 
                                                                                                                                     
have been seen as so minimal as to discourage such protracted negotiations over a dispute 
mechanism.  It was precisely because negotiators foresaw a possible rift between the Co-Prosecutors, 
in particular, over additional individuals to bring to trial that the dispute mechanism was 
developed.  We did not anticipate that the International Co-Investigating Judge might take a radically 
different view of the evidence from that held by the International Co-Prosecutor, but that is 
technically possible under the ECCC Law and may yet occur with respect to Case 003 and/or Case 
004.  We did not build into the constitutional framework how to resolve a dispute between one of the 
Co-Prosecutors and any joint determination of both Co-Investigating Judges to dismiss a 
case.  However, the Internal Rules offer some possibility of appeal to the Pre-Trial Chamber (Rule 
74(2)) provided the International Co-Prosecutor can prevail in lodging an appeal without the support 
of his Cambodian Co-Prosecutor’ (Scheffer, 2011).  
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although he did not name a date, he said that the UN would not tolerate further 
procrastination. 
The Cambodian Assembly and Senate approved in January 2001 the proposal 
of a special court within the existing Cambodian judicial system, with participation 
of UN-nominated judges and one UN-nominated co-prosecutor. The majority of the 
judges would be Cambodian and appointed by the Supreme Council of Magistracy 
while the Secretary-General would suggest the foreign judges and co-prosecutor, also 
to be approved by the Supreme Council. The law did not state that previous 
amnesties would be ignored for the crime of genocide, war crimes and other crimes 
against humanity.  
The Cambodia proposal did not meet the UN requirement that the majority of 
judges be foreign and appointed by the Secretary-General. Instead, Cambodians 
would be in majority at all three levels; the two groups of judges would be nominated 
through different procedures; and all would be approved by the Cambodian Supreme 
Council of Magistracy. Decisions would be settled by a supermajority voting 
requirement. 
After more disagreement throughout 2001, Kofi Annan withdrew his good 
offices in February 2002 and the UN Secretariat announced that it would no longer 
continue negotiations with the Cambodian government on establishing the ECCC. 
Corell stated: 
[T]he United Nations has come to the conclusion that the Extraordinary 
Chambers, as currently envisaged, would not guarantee the independence, 
impartiality and objectivity that a court established with the support of 
the United Nations must have….Therefore…the United Nations has 
concluded…to end its participation in this process (UN Press Statement, 
2002).  
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He said that the greatest matter of contention was the Cambodian position that the 
ECCC Law would prevail over the agreement between the UN and Cambodia 
(Cambodia Tribunal Monitor, ND: 17).  
One problem with this decision was that UN officials did not inform key 
governments about their decision to withdraw from negotiations, and so it was a 
surprise to them (Margo Picken, interview, 18 June 2011). Australia spearheaded a 
GA resolution calling for the resumption of negotiations. The Cambodian 
government backed out of co-sponsoring the resolution, which resulted in Australia 
backing out as well. At this point, Japan and France, who were more willing to 
compromise, took up the task and the resolution was passed in December 2002 
(UNGA resolution 57/228, 2003).    
The UN was thus forced to resume negotiations with Cambodia despite 
significant misgivings about the process (UN Report of the Secretary General, 2003). 
Nevertheless, in June 2003, the text was finalized and the ‘Agreement between the 
UN and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under 
Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea’ 
was signed by both parties (Agreement, 2003). It took another year for the 
Agreement to be ratified by Cambodia’s National Assembly and it was officially 
promulgated on 19 October 2004 following amendment of the ECCC Law to ensure 
that the two documents were consistent.   
 
Funding restrictions and re-engagement with the court 
The US was less involved in the later phases of the negotiations and as the ECCC 
was established. The shift in administration was one reason for the decline in US 
attention. The Bush administration was focused on counterterrorism efforts after 9/11, 
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and the second war crimes ambassador, Pierre Prosper, was responsible for other 
activities, and not as involved as Scheffer had been (although Scheffer continued to 
provide technical support to the tribunal after leaving his post as Ambassador).70 In 
addition, Japan and France had taken up a leadership role on tribunal issues and 
became co-coordinators of the ‘Friends of the ECCC’ – a group of donors to the 
court. However, the main reason for declining US involvement stemmed from a 
refusal within Congress to fund the court.  
The following table shows the amount pledged to the court by international donors in 
2005, with the notable exception of the US (Data obtained from Muck and 
Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2011).  
Figure 8: International assistance to the ECCC 
Donor Amount  
(in USD) 
Percentage 
Japan 21,600,000 52 
France  4,800,000 12 
UK 2,873,563 7 
Australia 2,351,097 5.5 
Netherlands  1,981,506 4.5 
Canada 1,612,903 4 
Others71 6,239,121 15 
Total  41,458,190 100 
 
After Hun Sen staged an armed takeover of the government in 1997, Congress cut off 
bilateral assistance to Cambodia for over a decade, until 2008 (Lum, 2007: 4). 
Congress could have still supported the ‘UN side’ of the tribunal, but it also blocked 
funding to the court for the first few years of its operations.  
One justification for the funding refusal was the tribunal’s failure to meet 
‘internationally recognized standards of justice.’72 Another justification was that the 
                                                
70 In May 2006 Scheffer briefed the press and the Cambodian national judges on international 
standards of due process applicable to the ECCC. He also helped resolve a dispute between the 
Cambodian and international judges over the court’s internal rules. He also set up the Cambodia 
Tribunal Monitor website which follows ECCC activities.  
71 Germany, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Austria, Sweden, Korea, Belgium, New Zealand, 
Ireland, Armenia and Namibia each gave $1,000,000 USD or less. 
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US had already paid $7 million toward documentation and research costs for the 
crimes committed in Cambodia, referring to the funds contributed to Yale’s 
Cambodian Genocide Program and the Documentation Center of Cambodia.73 The 
US contributed an additional $2 million for DC-Cam’s endowment fund in August 
2006.  
However, Senator Mitch McConnell (Republican from Kentucky) and his 
Chief of Staff Paul Grove were principally responsible for the funding restrictions. 
While Grove worked for IRI in Cambodia and DC, his colleague, Ron Abney, had 
been injured during a grenade attack of a rally of an opposition party in 1997, where 
13 Cambodians were killed. A number of sources found that Hun Sen was 
responsible for the attack and Grove was convinced of the need for regime change in 
Cambodia (i.e., Wells-Dang, 2004).  He persuaded McConnell, then Chair of the 
Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, to block funding to the court.74  
McConnell had the support of some key Democratic senators for this position, 
including Senator Patrick Leahy. In 2003, the two senators wrote a letter to Kofi 
Annan, arguing that the mixed tribunal was ‘doomed to failure’ (Etcheson, 2005: 
157). They also co-sponsored the Cambodia Democracy and Accountability Act, 
which although it never became law, would have provided additional foreign 
assistance to Cambodia if Hun Sen was no longer in power. It also would have 
                                                                                                                                     
72 US State Department press release, 2005. Nevertheless, US Ambassador to Cambodia, Kent 
Wiedemann, said the ECCC should be seen as a ‘customized model … to fit’ the Cambodian ‘national 
situation’ (Phnom Penh Post, 2000c).  
73 Kyriakou, 2005. State Department grants totalling approximately $1.7 million were contributed to 
CGP between 1995-2001. CGP disbursed around $1 million of this funding to DC-Cam. The State 
Department also funded approximately $300,000 for the international legal research and activities 
pertaining to the Khmer Rouge crimes conducted in 1995 and 1996 by Steven Ratner and Jason 
Abrams, (Ben Kiernan, personal communication, 25 January 2012). If the figures above are correct, 
the bulk of US funding has been contributed directly to DC-Cam. 
74 In one series of op-ed articles published in 2002 and early 2003, McConnell and Grove wrote, ‘It is 
in America's interests that the opposition win ... it is time for the State Department to take sides.’ This 
was followed by calls for ‘regime change’ and attempts to link the ‘paranoid evil dictator’ Hun Sen to 
the ‘war on terrorism’ (Wells-Dang, 2004).  
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allowed assistance for a Khmer Rouge tribunal under the following conditions: 1) it 
is not under the control or influence of the CPP; 2) includes the participation of 
judges of high moral character; 3) is supported by democratic Cambodian political 
parties; and 4) meets international standards of justice. The Act also directed the FBI 
to resume its investigation into the March 1997 grenade attack in Cambodia and to 
regularly report to the Committee on Foreign Relations (US Cambodia Democracy 
and Accountability Act, 2003). 
Although the Cambodia Democracy and Accountability Act did not become 
law, for several years, appropriations legislation precluded the US from providing 
ﬁnancial assistance to the central government of Cambodia, and, in particular, ‘to any 
tribunal established by the Government of Cambodia’ unless the Secretary of State  
determine[d] and reporte[d] to the Committee on Appropriations that: (1) 
Cambodia’s judiciary is competent, independent, free from widespread 
corruption, and its decisions are free from interference by the executive 
branch; and (2) the proposed tribunal is capable of delivering justice, that 
meets internationally recognized standards, for crimes against humanity 
and genocide in an impartial and credible manner (Foreign Operations 
Appropriations Act, 2005).  
 
Several officials indicated that it was highly unlikely the Secretary of State could 
have made such a determination, particularly with respect to the first requirement of 
the provision regarding Cambodia’s judiciary (Cerone, 2007: footnote 228). In the 
Committee Report accompanying the 2005 Appropriations Act, the Committee 
noted:  
The Committee again restricts assistance to the Cambodian Government, 
with few exceptions, and notes that the budget request does not contain 
funding for a United States contribution to the Khmer Rouge tribunal. 
The Committee directs that no funds be made available for a contribution 
to the tribunal unless the Secretary of State reports to the Committee that 
the tribunal is capable of delivering justice that meets internationally 
recognized standards of justice for crimes against humanity and genocide 
in an impartial and credible manner.  
   
The tribunal-speciﬁc provision, however, was removed in the 2006 Appropriations 
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Act, perhaps signaling a moderation of the US position. 
Meanwhile, funding and corruption challenges plagued the court. David 
Tolbert, former deputy prosecutor at the ICTY, was appointed in March 2008 by the 
UN as a short-term expert to revise the ECCC budget, streamline administrative 
operations and institute anti-corruption measures. He also worked to break the 
gridlock on US funding. ‘I lobbied the Hill really hard,’ Tolbert said, ‘I think I 
convinced them that we were undertaking serious reforms’ (David Tolbert, interview, 
10 May 2010). He continued:   
What I argued is that the Duch case is going to be historic and important. 
I said we were addressing the issues and it was becoming a serious court. 
We removed the head of administration. We put in someone that is more 
serious. We brought in someone for witness protection, someone for 
court management and court structure. And I went through everything I 
did with [the US staffers]. I said, ‘I understand and I agree with 
you…But this is our one chance. If we don’t address it now, we’re going 
to lose this opportunity.’ We had support from the democratic side. 
Senator Kerry was very supportive. His office was very supportive. So it 
was just a matter of convincing the Republicans (Ibid).  
 
Tolbert thought that US support for the ECCC was important for three reasons. First, 
in his efforts to raise funds generally, ‘the US was the only major country with 
interest in the country that wasn’t paying.’ Second, he felt that the US would help on 
the corruption issue. ‘I had the UK in my corner, but some of the other countries 
were not strong on corruption, so I thought the US would be tough on that issue.’ 
Third, Tolbert felt that the US should be engaged considering its past responsibility 
for events in Cambodia – although he did not rely on this argument in discussions 
with US policymakers (Ibid). 
Tolbert had the support of the third war crimes ambassador, Clint Williamson, 
who undertook a constructive role in transforming the way US officials understood 
the corruption issue. According to a UN official, Williamson felt that if the US 
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contributed, the US ‘could have a seat at the table’ (UN official, interview, 17 June 
2010).  
In May, Joseph Mellot, an advisor to Ambassador Williamson, conducted a 
review of the ECCC, fueling rumors that the US was considering funding the ECCC. 
‘If we were to consider funding the ECCC,’ US Embassy spokesman Jeff Daigle 
wrote, ‘we must be convinced that it is capable of meeting international standards of 
justice’ (Phnom Penh Post, 2008b).  
Senator Kerry also called for direct US funding of the tribunal: ‘The court 
faces a looming financial crisis … there is a real danger that the ECCC will collapse 
before it even gets off the ground.’ Though Kerry admitted that there were legitimate 
concerns about the court’s independence and alleged financial improprieties, he 
proposed the US contribute $2 million to support victims’ rights and witness 
protection programs (Phnom Penh Post, 2008a). 
In August 2008, the US announced that it would fund the tribunal upon 
resolution of the corruption investigation. The following month, at the end of his 
visit to Cambodia, Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte announced that the 
US would give $1.8 million to the tribunal (US Embassy Phnom Penh, 2008).  
Despite the funding block, US officials remained involved in the process in a 
number of ways. For example, the US Embassy in Cambodia was concerned about 
the lack of French and Japanese leadership in the ‘Friends of the ECCC’ (the main 
donor coordinating body for the court) to discuss contentious issues surrounding 
court management, the rules debate, funding inadequacies and the allegations of 
corruption hanging over the court. A leaked cable titled ‘Friends of the ECCC or 
RGC?’ states:  
we are concerned that the two countries [France and Japan] are focusing 
exclusively on the preservation of their bilateral relationship with the 
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RGC in their discussions about the ECCC, and are not taking a more 
nuanced approach as co-chairs of the Friends. The Japanese position is 
particularly sensitive due to the balancing act the GOJ plays with China 
in Cambodia. The Chinese, Sean Vissoth believes, are placing pressure 
on the government with respect to moving forward with the Tribunal. 
The Japanese want the Tribunal to succeed at virtually any cost, and 
therefore will be loathe to put any pressure on the government that might 
make the RGC accord more sympathy to Chinese views … As co-chair 
of the Friends, we believe Japan and France have some measure of 
responsibility to engage with the government or the ECCC if exceptional 
circumstances warrant the waving of a red flag. Absent a push from their 
respective capitals, the French or Japanese embassies in Phnom Penh will 
not be receptive to changing their views on the Friends mechanism and 
their roles as co-chairs. We would welcome Washington views on the 
possibility of demarching both capitals, and would be willing to send 
suggested talking points to that end (US Embassy in Cambodia, 2007b). 
 
This cable shows that US embassy officials felt that France and Japan were not 
willing to raise controversial issues about the court with the Cambodian government. 
It also indicates that the US was following court issues, and willing to play a behind-
the-scenes role in order to enhance court effectiveness.  
Another example of US involvement was concerning controversy over a 
press release issued by Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI), one of the few 
international NGOs following the ECCC in Phnom Penh. OSJI was the first 
organization to call for an investigation of corruption allegations by Cambodian 
judges and staff of the ECCC.75 In response, the Cambodian government considered 
evicting OSJI from Cambodia and ending its monitoring role of the court. Scheffer 
was informed of this by Cambodian government official Sean Visoth, who requested 
that Scheffer alert the US embassy ‘so that a pre-emptive intervention with DPM Sok 
An might be made to turn off the RGC's plan’ (US Embassy to Cambodia, 2007a). 
                                                
75 In February 2007 OSJI issued a press release alleging that Cambodian judges and other Cambodian 
personnel of the ECCC were compelled to kickback part of their wages to Cambodian government 
officials in exchange for their position (OSJI, 2007). OSJI called for donors and the international 
community to investigate thoroughly the corruption allegations. In October, a UN Development 
Program (UNDP) commissioned report exposed widespread malpractice in hiring local staff members 
for the ECCC and handing out lucrative salaries to unqualified people. Cambodian officials objected 
to the recommendations that all staffing contracts on the Cambodian side of the ECCC be nullified 
and salaries cut and that the UNDP take a more direct oversight role. In March 2007 Scheffer visited 
Sok An and other ECCC officials to discuss proposals for resolving these disputes. 
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Scheffer did so and expressed his concern that OSJI’s departure would be interpreted 
by the UN legal office as a breach of the UN/RGC agreement (Article 12, 
subparagraph 2). He also made clear that he personally believed OSJI had made a 
mistake in their handling of the UNDP audit by going public so quickly. On 13 
March, Scheffer and US Ambassador to Cambodia Joseph Mussomeli met with 
representatives of several embassies about the possibility of a joint demarche with 
the RGC. However, Scheffer was able to resolve the issue by seeking assurance from 
OSJI Director James Goldston that future disclosures of information potentially 
damaging to the ECCC would be provided to the court with adequate notice and 
advance consultation before going to press. This intervention was successful in 
stopping OSJI’s eviction from Cambodia (US Embassy to Cambodia, 2007a).  
The State Department cable also showed that US officials were aware of 
international concerns about the Cambodian government. For example, the cable 
noted a meeting with the head of the UN human rights office, Margo Picken, who 
said that the RGC ‘plays these issues very skilfully’ and the OSJI matter followed a 
familiar pattern where the government sidesteps the real issue and heaps blame upon 
the organization/individual highlighting the problem (Ibid). The cable also 
acknowledged that kickbacks were common in the Cambodian public sector; and that 
these allegations at the court ‘surprised no one … No whistleblower culture exists, 
and people have legitimate fears when it comes to making public information that 
could be embarrassing to senior officials’ (Ibid). Lastly, the cable said the 
Cambodian government’s reaction to the OSJI press release revealed ‘again’ RGC 
officials’ unease with a high-profile judicial process designed to limit political 
influence. While OSJI ‘could have handled this matter better’ – especially by 
anticipating that Hun Sen would take the OSJI letter very personally – ‘RGC 
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sensitivities cannot be allowed to derail what must be a non-political tribunal’ (Ibid).
 The US intervention on behalf of OSJI illustrates that US officials remained 
engaged with the court. It also shows US cooperation with the Cambodian 
government, donor governments and a key international NGO. In a more public 
show of support for the court, the US agreed to fund a second UN special expert to 
assist the ECCC as long as the position was given to former war crimes ambassador 
Clint Williamson (UN official, interview, 17 June 2010). Williamson served in this 
position from August 2010 until September 2011.  
In July 2010, the fourth war crimes ambassador, Stephen Rapp, attended the 
Case 001 verdict of the Duch trial. His staff also participated in meetings discussing 
the court’s legacy. Case 002 began in November 2011, but the future of cases 003 
and 004 remains uncertain. International court officials resigned in 2011 over 
political pressure from the Cambodian government to stop investigations for these 
cases. Scheffer, appointed UN special expert to the court in January 2012, said the 
US is more aggressive in seeing the cases go forward than other governments (David 
Scheffer, interview, 12 March 2012).   
 
3.3 Explaining US Involvement   
This chapter focused on US involvement in the establishment and operations of the 
ECCC from the late 1980s to 2011. In the 1980s, accountability for Khmer Rouge 
violations was not a priority for the US. This changed in the 1990s with the passage 
of legislation that made it US policy to support investigations and the establishment 
of a court. The US played a critical role in the negotiations of the Khmer Rouge 
Tribunal. Although its role declined after the court was established, US support 
continued throughout the 2000s. This section provides an overview of findings, 
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offers some explanation for US involvement and briefly assesses its impact on the 
court. 
  Part of the reason the US was initially unwilling to support initiatives for a 
tribunal in Cambodia was because it would 
dredge up no little amount of embarrassment about the American role in 
recent Cambodian history…. [w]e were indeed there at the creation of 
Cambodia’s troubles. For purely prudential reasons, then, a US initiative 
aimed at exhuming our own policy ancestor, so to speak, seems very ill-
advised (Garfinkle, 1999). 
 
However, after the end of the Cold War and the Cambodian peace process, US 
history in Cambodia had not been forgotten, but was used as a justification by some 
for US support of a tribunal. For example, War Crimes Ambassador Scheffer said:  
The Cambodian tribunal is a reminder that a titanic explosion occurred in 
Indochina after we left there. That’s one of the lessons of the Vietnam 
War, that the aftermath was just as important as the event itself … For 
Americans in particular, the secret bombing of Cambodia during the 
Nixon presidency, which helped to destabilize that country as the Khmer 
Rouge were gaining power, leaves us no moral choice but to make every 
possible effort to achieve some measure of credible accountability for the 
slaughter that ensued (Bernstein, 2009).  
 
The US policy shift in favour of accountability in Cambodia was possible in part 
because of high-level support within the US government for these types of efforts. 
Neil Kritz said that US involvement in the Cambodia case was about ‘a few key 
people on the Hill’ (Neil Kritz, interview, 16 March 2010). Aside from long-term 
interest in the subject from members of Congress like Rep. Stephen Solarz, Senator 
Chuck Robb and others, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was highly interested 
in these cases and created the War Crimes Office with David Scheffer in mind. 
Scheffer was convinced of the cause: ‘We have a supreme responsibility to those 
who perished in Cambodia to bring the leading perpetrators to justice’ (Scheffer, 
ND). He also spoke about the importance of the international context:  
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I could not in good conscience negotiate the creation of tribunals for the 
Balkans conflict of the early 1990s, the Rwandan genocide of 1994, the 
Sierra Leone atrocities of the late 1990s, or the permanent International 
Criminal Court and at the same time ignore what happened in Cambodia 
in the late 1970s (Scheffer, ND). 
 
In addition, the Cambodian context impacted reasons for US involvement. One US 
official stressed the importance of the defection of Khmer Rouge leaders and 
particularly the amnesty of Ieng Sary, since it resulted in the return to Cambodia of 
close to 40,000 refugees. ‘There was a small window of opportunity’ for 
involvement, he said (US official 1, interview, 4 August 2010).  
Of course not everyone was enthusiastic about the new mandate, fearing that 
it might also turn up incriminating evidence concerning US bombings and other acts 
of warfare against the countries of Indochina (Fawthrop and Jarvis, 2005: 110). 
Scheffer acknowledged that limiting the court’s focus to senior Khmer Rouge leaders 
most responsible for crimes of the Pol Pot regime from 1975-79 was at least in part 
due to the Nixon administration’s secret aerial bombings of Cambodia during the 
Vietnam War (Scheffer, 2002). Scheffer also focused on limiting the examination of 
the tribunal to KR actions from 1975-79 in conversations with China:  
I noted that the US had bombed Cambodia in the early 1970s and while 
the US acknowledged that reality, we wanted to avoid giving any 
individuals an excuse for using the bombing to justify their own action in 
Cambodia. However, if we did not maintain such a condition, China’s 
actions in Cambodia after 1979 would be fair game as well (Scheffer, 
2011: 378).  
 
DC-Cam Legal Advisor Beth van Schack said: ‘There’s no way [the US] would have 
supported the trial if that date [1975-79] had not been very clear from the start’ (Beth 
van Schack, interview, 31 October 2009). 
Nevertheless, with the passage of the 1994 Cambodia Genocide Justice Act 
(CGJA), the US resolved to bring Khmer Rouge leaders to trial. Despite the lack of 
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political payoffs, US officials decided they were in ‘a new era of history’ and would 
‘use its muscle’ to support the effort (John Ciorciari, interview, 10 March 2010).  
Thus, the combination of the end of the Cold War, the Cambodia peace 
process, the establishment of international criminal tribunals elsewhere, high-level 
US support and interest in limiting the jurisdiction of any court established offered a 
context amenable to the US policy shift in favour of accountability efforts in 
Cambodia. 
Before Cambodia had even requested UN assistance for a court, the US had 
already made it policy (through the CGJA) to support investigations into Khmer 
Rouge violations and the establishment of a court. Youk Chhang said: ‘The ECCC 
was [established] because of the CGJA’ (Youk Chhang, interview, 15 July 2010). As 
part of this effort, the US contributed significant funds to Yale University, which 
enabled the creation of the Cambodia Genocide Program and the Documentation 
Center of Cambodia. Once negotiations for a court began, it is striking to see the high 
level involvement of US officials in detailed aspects of the negotiations. Three US 
officials (two from the State Department and one member of Congress) were heavily 
involved in decisions for the court to have a ‘mixed’ structure; a supermajority 
voting requirement for court decisions and disputes; and a limited personal 
jurisdiction.  
A pivotal figure in the negotiations was the first war crimes ambassador, 
David Scheffer. Scheffer was personally committed to the creation of an 
accountability mechanism. Although he initially promoted a Chapter VII UNSC 
tribunal, upon seeing that this proposal lacked support, he shifted gears and 
advocated for a mixed structure for the court. Scheffer drafted several versions of the 
ECCC Law and proposed the supermajority voting requirement and language 
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regarding personal jurisdiction. In his recent book about the tribunals, Scheffer 
discussed the creation of the ECCC as his ‘personal mission’: 
I am often asked why the US took such a focused and sustained interest 
in creating the Cambodia tribunal. No other government was so 
determined to launch a tribunal-building initiative, and no other 
government became so deeply involved for four years (1997-2000) in 
negotiations leading to the constitutional documents of the Cambodia 
Tribunal. I honestly would like to write that there was a coherent policy, 
fully backed by the top officials in Washington, to accomplish this 
particular task in Cambodia. However, that was not the case. Albright 
inspired and supported my efforts; Tom Pickering, the under secretary of 
state for political affairs, was always there when I needed him; Senator 
John Kerry brilliantly intervened on several occasions to move the 
negotiations forward; and the American ambassadors to Cambodia on my 
watch, Kenneth Quinn and Kent Wiedemann, courageously pressed 
Cambodian officials to achieve the objective of a tribunal.  
 
But this was a personal mission that I translated into an American 
mission once I became the war crimes ambassador. I was determined to 
negotiate, against all odds at times, judicial accountability for the major 
perpetrators of atrocity crimes during the Pol Pot era. So I prodded 
everyone. I kept searching for a methodology that would achieve enough 
support both within the Cambodian government and at the UN, to build a 
court that could deliver credible justice respectful of international 
standards of due process. I could not rationalize building the other war 
crimes tribunals and then ignore a reckoning for the KR and their 
decimation of the Cambodian people. This sometimes did not sit well 
with major civil society groups and UN lawyers who were seeking a 
near-perfect model of justice and were prepared to abandon the endeavor, 
which both sometimes did. The building of the Cambodia tribunal is a 
story of innovation, risk taking and perseverance in which some of my 
colleagues deserve enormous credit, while others in Washington or at the 
UN played the role of spoiler time and time again (Scheffer, 2011: 343-
344).  
 
When asked about whether his personal commitment to seeing the establishment of 
the ECCC may have hindered his involvement, Scheffer responded:  
No. I know I’m being defensive here, but I’m very justifiably being 
defensive. You have to stick with these things. If you have a personal 
stake in getting it done, as I did, then by god I’m going to stick with it. I 
was advised many times to walk away from this project. Just walk away. 
And I refused to do so. If that opens me up to criticism that we built an 
imperfect tribunal that does not deliver perfect justice to as many people 
as possible, then so be it. I will live with that imperfection (David 
Scheffer, interview, 12 March 2012).  
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Part of the reason for Scheffer’s interest in the Cambodia case stems from early work 
at an international law firm in Singapore where he worked pro bono for a charity 
shipping rice to Phnom Penh. When his term as ambassador came to an end, he 
continued to engage with the court, travelling to Cambodia often to offer advice and 
training and resolve disputes. Scheffer also created the Cambodia Tribunal Monitor 
website, a key source for accessing information about the ECCC.  
Senator John Kerry’s role in the negotiations can be attributed to his personal 
interest in Cambodia as a Vietnam veteran. He had a good rapport with Hun Sen and 
chose to serve as a mediator at various points in the negotiations.76  
US Ambassador to Cambodia Kent Wiedemann (1999-2002) also played a 
substantial role in the negotiations. In an interview, Wiedemann explained that he 
first had to get support for the court from the executive branch and then Congress. 
He said that President Clinton had told Wiedemann that the court was ‘a top priority’ 
for the US. Wiedemann said, ‘Once the embassy had the green light, we worked hard, 
at very high levels, to get the court. Everyone wanted an international tribunal, but 
the supermajority was an airtight idea’ (Kent Wiedemann, interview, 21 July 2010). 
Although US officials believed the mixed structure, supermajority voting 
requirement and limited personal jurisdiction to be acceptable compromises, many 
legal experts disagreed. For example, the UN Groups of Experts and the UN special 
representative for human rights in Cambodia Thomas Hammarberg recommended 
that an ad-hoc international tribunal was best suited to the Cambodian context. A 
Cambodia expert said: ‘Scheffer made standards worse and misjudged Hun Sen. If 
the US had put more pressure to make the court international, this option may have 
been possible’ (Cambodia expert, interview, 28 April 2010). Since an international 
                                                
76 Kerry’s Senior Foreign Policy Adviser, Nancy Stetson was also an important advocate of the court 
in Congress.  
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tribunal was not politically possible, Hammarberg said that a mixed tribunal would 
require guarantees for the integrity of the process, including water-tight protection 
against the risk of direct or indirect political pressure. The fact that Hun Sen 
‘dominated every bit’ of the process ‘and most often made no secret of that fact’ was 
a problem (Hammarberg, 2001). Hammarberg added that the supermajority notion 
was clearly a compromise and not without problems. ‘It carries an implicit notion of 
there being two categories of judges - which would be an unfortunate perception 
even in more normal circumstances,’ he said (Hammarberg, 2001).  
Regarding the issue of personal jurisdiction, Cambodia expert Brad Adams 
explained that the UN Group of Experts and other human rights lawyers had cautioned 
that certain top governmental leaders in Cambodia may have been removed from 
knowledge and decision-making power, while others not in the chart of senior leaders 
may have played a significant role in the atrocities (Adams, 1999). This meant that 
senior leaders might not correspond to those most responsible for human rights 
violations. Steve Heder, former ECCC official and Cambodia expert, found that the 
US played a key role in pushing the UN to accept personal jurisdiction clauses that 
were intended to limit prosecutions of those responsible exclusively to CPK senior 
leaders and one other CPK official. He said:  
This was part of a larger pattern of pressure on the UN by the US and 
other governments with diplomatic interests to pursue vis-à-vis the Royal 
Government of Cambodia (RGC). Most importantly, after obtaining UN 
acquiescence to a severely limited personal jurisdiction, they also forced 
it to agree to involve itself in assisting with what the UN was certain 
would be much less than fair trials, as the CPP’s control over the 
Cambodian court system via its domination of the RGC was sufficient to 
ensure that the extraordinary chambers would not adhere to international 
standards of judicial independence and impartiality. They have further 
limited the court’s prosecutorial reach by insisting that the budget for 
investigations, trials and defense be kept low (Heder, 2009: 191).  
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Some experts expressed regret about what they saw as politics taking priority over legal 
standards. A UN official said: 
The ECCC is not a model at all. It should never have been structured as it 
has been…Scheffer did a lot of work on it. If you didn’t accept what 
Cambodians wanted, you would have had no court at all. Scheffer took a 
more political approach while the UN took a more legal position (UN 
official, interview, 17 June 2010). 
 
Hammarberg concluded his personal remarks on the negotiations by stating:  
[There] is no good reason to accept an unsatisfactory model, which might 
cause procedural infighting in the tribunal and thereby weaken its moral 
stature. Also, it is important to realise that the Cambodia tribunal may 
potentially be an example for the future in other situations. Also for that 
reason it would have been important to build its construction on 
principles, rather than on political compromises (Hammarberg, 2001). 
 
The US perspective was different. A US official said the ‘the US pushed the UN 
along. The ICTY and ICTR were seen as perfect back then. Models discussed in 
Cambodia were more messy – not as clean or predictable – but it is a workable 
model’ (US official 1, interview, 4 August 2010). Wiedemann said that he was 
heavily involved in getting the UN on board as well as convincing Khmer Rouge 
members, Prince Ranariddh and FUNCINPEC to let the ECCC move forward. ‘No 
one trusted a court with Hun Sen’s involvement,’ the Ambassador said, ‘the US did 
most of the legwork’ (Kent Wiedemann, interview, 21 July 2010). Scheffer defends 
the Cambodia model in his recent book on the tribunals, but does offer some 
reflection on possible missteps in US policy. He wrote:  
Washington could have acted even faster than it did to track and capture 
Pol Pot before he met his fate. The long-standing policy focus on a 
Security Council-created tribunal delayed more realistic concepts from 
emerging sooner. My best efforts simply were not good enough, and as a 
result the Cambodia tribunal did not start its real work until 2007. 
Perhaps there really was no other path to take in Cambodia than the one 
that emerged year after year, but I wonder to this day where there could 
have been a more expeditious outcome (Scheffer, 2011: 413).  
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Once the court was established, Congress restricted funding. This was linked to 
Senator McConnell’s and others’ distrust of Hun Sen and their desire to see regime 
change in the country. Although Hun Sen remained in power, UN expert David 
Tolbert, with the support of then War Crimes Ambassador Clint Williamson, 
effectively lobbied key officials in Congress in order to lift the funding block.  
The US had a less visible role during the court’s initial operations, with Japan 
and France taking leadership roles. One US official said that this is a typical US 
approach – to initiate support and provide leadership at the beginning of a measure, 
and then to take a backseat role as other states take responsibility (US official 2, 
interview, 4 April 2010). However, the US remained active on a number of court-
related issues. For example, when Cambodian government officials considered 
evicting OSJI for their press release about corruption allegations in the court, the US 
played a key role in stopping this from taking place. The US also applied pressure on 
Japan and France to play a more active role as co-coordinators of the Friends of the 
ECCC. In addition, the US continued its assistance to DC-Cam with a contribution of 
nearly $10 million since 1994. When US officials travel to Phnom Penh, they 
typically meet with DC-Cam’s Director Youk Chhang who is a strong supporter of 
US involvement in Cambodia. Chhang said: ‘The US government was the only 
government that believed in the court and consistently supported the whole effort. 
The Japanese came very late and China tried to block it...People overlook the US role 
(Youk Chhang, interview, 15 July 2010). 
Two former war crimes ambassadors (Williamson and Scheffer) were 
appointed as UN Special Experts to advise on assistance to the ECCC.77 The fourth 
War Crimes Ambassador Stephen Rapp has travelled to Phnom Penh and is engaged 
                                                
77 Some said that Ambassador Williamson was effective because of his good rapport with Hun Sen.  
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with the court. According to Scheffer, the US is supportive of cases 003 and 004 
despite Cambodian government wishes.  
The Cambodian case study provides an illustrative example of US 
involvement in transitional justice. The US first opposed the idea of a tribunal, but 
then became a firm advocate for the establishment of a court. Interest declined with a 
change in administration and a congressional block on funding the court. The US 
continued following the process, however, and eventually lifted funding restrictions. 
This analysis highlighted fluctuations in the US approach over time, which oscillated 
between opposition in the 1980s and early 2000s, and various forms of support in the 
1990s and late 2000s. 
US aims were achieved with regard to transitional justice in Cambodia. The 
US can claim that its involvement in supporting the establishment of the tribunal was 
an important and symbolic effort that promoted accountability in Cambodia. It can 
also defend its refusal to fund the court based on corruption allegations and other 
concerns. Its involvement more recently suggests that the US will remain engaged 
until proceedings come to an end.  
Through its involvement, the US exported its ideas about justice to Cambodia. 
One US official said, ‘There was a need in Cambodia for education about 
accountability and rehabilitation. Cambodians had esoteric notions of justice that 
were foreign to Northern Europe and the US’ (US official 1, interview, 4 August 
2010). Jaya Ramji-Nogales, a member of the Board of Advisors to DC-Cam, said, 
‘the ECCC was a very American response’ (Jaya Ramji-Nogales, interview, 2 
November 2009). Similarly, Thun Saray, the director of the Cambodian Human 
Rights Action Committee (CHRAC), said, ‘the idea for the ECCC came from the 
West’ (Thun Saray, interview, 19 July 2010).  
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Within Cambodia, Cambodian government aims have been achieved, but 
civil society goals have not. The US often supported government positions 
throughout the establishment phase. France and Japan maintained financial support 
while the US refused to fund the court. The government’s desire to see the court 
close down after the second trial may converge with the interests of some donor 
governments to see trials come to an end. Civil society views on the court, however, 
are typically negative. They point to issues of corruption, a lack of victim 
participation and the small number of trials considering the level of violations 
committed. Several civil society groups also mentioned that most US funding for 
transitional justice is contributed to the Documentation Center of Cambodia and is 
unavailable for other groups.  
US involvement has both helped and hindered transitional justice aims in 
Cambodia. US efforts to facilitate discussion between the Cambodian government 
and the UN were useful at times, but also contributed to confusion. Its willingness to 
yield to Cambodian government demands and the compromises devised to appease 
Hun Sen are part of the reason for continued problems throughout court operations. 
Tunnel vision and unreflective pragmatism hindered the possibility of a more 
effective transitional justice measure in Cambodia. Nevertheless, US backing of a 
tribunal for Cambodia in the 1990s did support an acknowledgement of the gravity of 
Khmer Rouge violations, a fact ignored by the US and others for several decades. 
The next chapter undertakes a second case study, which examines US 
involvement in the trial of Liberian President Charles Taylor and the Liberian Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission. This chapter will provide another opportunity to 
explore the forces that shape US foreign policy on transitional justice.
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Chapter 4 US Involvement in the Taylor Trial and Liberian Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission 
 
The last chapter examined the forces that shaped US foreign policy on the first case 
study of this project, that of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal in Cambodia. This chapter 
explores a second case study, specifically looking at US involvement in the trial of 
Liberian President Charles Taylor by the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the 
Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
From 1989 to 2003, Liberia’s two civil wars claimed the lives of 250,000 
Liberians and displaced a million others into refugee camps in neighbouring 
countries. The conflicts were particularly vicious with factions committing atrocities, 
including rape, torture and civilian murders. Large numbers of children were forcibly 
enlisted as fighters. The country’s unemployment rate hovers at 85 percent and four 
out of five Liberians live below the poverty line.  
After nearly 14 years in power, President Charles Taylor resigned and 
accepted asylum in Nigeria in August 2003. Shortly after, a peace agreement was 
signed between representatives from the belligerent groups, Liberians United for 
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia 
(MODEL), the Government of Liberia, major political parties and civil society in 
Accra, Ghana. A transitional government was in place until Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf 
won the presidential election in October 2005, becoming the first female head of 
state in Africa.  
This case study examines two transitional justice measures established to 
address serious human rights and humanitarian law violations: the trial of Charles 
Taylor by the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Liberian Truth and 
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Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Although Taylor was not tried for crimes taking 
place in Liberia, his trial may be seen as a transitional justice measure for Liberia, as 
well as Sierra Leone.78 The TRC was mandated by the Accra peace agreement to 
investigate and report on gross human rights violations that occurred in Liberia 
between January 1979 and October 2003. These measures represent some of the 
diversity of transitional justice measures and developments in the field since they 
concern the first trial of a head of state and a truth commission, in Africa/The Hague, 
after a peace agreement that ended the conflict. 
This chapter examines the role of the US in the establishment and operations 
of these two measures and provides an explanation and assessment of US 
involvement. It draws on archival research undertaken in Washington DC and 
Liberia, as well as 52 Liberia-specific interviews with officials from the US 
government, SCSL, TRC, international organizations, international NGOs and local 
civil society groups (See Appendix 2 for interview list). Before turning to the Taylor 
trial and TRC, a review of US foreign policy in Liberia provides useful background 
information.  
 
4.1 US Foreign Policy in Liberia 
US involvement in Liberia dates back to 1821 when groups of African Americans 
established settlements in Liberia with the assistance of the American Colonization 
Society (ACS). African American settlers became known as Americo-Liberians, 
while persons from the Caribbean and slaves liberated from slave ships and resettled 
in Liberia became known as Congos. In 1847, following a settler referendum, the 
                                                
78 Security Council resolution 1315 recommended the establishment of a court in order to expedite the 
process of bringing justice and reconciliation to the region, not just to Sierra Leone (UNSCR 1315, 
2000, emphasis added). 
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colony’s legislature declared the territory an independent, free republic, the first on 
the African continent. Liberia modelled its constitution after that of the US, named 
its capital Monrovia, after the fifth US President, and chose a flag similar to that of 
the US. American companies, like Firestone, received special rights to Liberian 
natural resources, particularly rubber.   
US-Liberian relations deepened during WW2, and were further strengthened 
in the 1950s through mid-1970s, as Liberia hosted major US security and 
communication facilities during the Cold War. A brief period of tensions 
characterized the mid to late 1970s during William Tolbert’s administration, but 
relations warmed again after a coup led by Samuel Doe toppled and killed President 
Tolbert in April 1980. In August 1982, President Reagan met with Doe at the White 
House and paid tribute to 120 years of US-Liberian diplomatic relations, praising the 
two countries’ ‘special friendship,’ ‘firm bond,’ and ‘long history of cooperation,’ 
which he said would be further strengthened in the years to come (US Public Papers 
of the Presidents, 1982). From 1980 to 1985, Liberia was the largest sub-Saharan 
Africa per-capita recipient of US aid despite the regime’s record of serious human 
rights violations and widespread corruption.79 In 1985, Doe won a rigged election, 
but his victory was not viewed critically by the Reagan administration.80 In response 
to a question about US friendship to ‘one dismal regime after another in Liberia,’ 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker said: ‘I would never 
                                                
79 Brooke, 1988. The US contributed $402 million in aid between the 1980 coup and 1985 elections, 
accounting for more than one-third of the country’s operating budget (Advocates for Human Rights, 
2009: 288; Kramer, July 1995). For data on US assistance to Liberia from 1945 to 2001, see, USAID 
Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations July 1, 1945 - September 30, 2001 
(USAID, ND). 
80 Herman Cohen, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 1989-1993, stated that ‘[Doe] 
should have lost, but he rigged the election. But at that time all West African elections were rigged. It 
was a very normal thing to do, for the government to win the election even though they had less than 
the majority of the vote. So it did not trouble us at all’ (Bright, 2002; see also Ottaway, 1987). 
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in a million years tell you I was seeking what was in the best interests of Liberia…I 
was protecting the interests of Washington’ (Fisher, 2001).  
The end of the Cold War and US disillusionment with increasing corruption 
and dictatorial tendencies under Doe in the mid- to late 1980s led to a gradual decline 
in US assistance. In 1985, following US remarks critical of the Doe government’s 
human rights record, Doe began to open lines of communication with Libya, where 
he travelled in 1988. In 1986 and 1987, the US suspended bilateral aid. 
In December 1989, Charles Taylor and a small group of Libyan-trained rebels 
– called the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) – entered Nimba County from 
neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire, making gains on the capital throughout the early 1990s 
and committing widespread atrocities in Krahn and Mandingo areas. There was 
insignificant pressure on the Bush administration from the media, foreign states or 
Congress to respond to the violence taking place. Without external pressure, the 
principle input for the Liberian decision-making process was the State Department-
NSC-Defense Department-CIA machinery. In 1990, an interagency group, chaired 
by Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Hank Cohen, was convened to review the 
situation. Cohen wrote that he and other State Department and other agency Africa 
specialists supported US engagement, while the CIA, Defense Department and NSC 
saw little need for involvement.81 Those in favor of engagement believed   
that the historically close relationship between the US and Liberia 
obligates the US to take special responsibility in answering Liberia’s 
humanitarian needs. According to this view, Americans should not only 
provide relief when it is needed, but should help promote a democratic 
system and work to stop human rights abuses as well. They criticize the 
US response to the Liberian conflict as inadequate, and compare it to the 
US intervention in the Middle East on behalf of Kuwait. Some in this 
camp believe it would not be inappropriate for the US to send in troops to 
                                                
81 At one point there were discussions that Taylor might be the lesser of two evils and the US could 
quietly cooperate with him. Opponents of this approach within the administration ‘quickly reminded 
everyone that Taylor was actually an escaped convict from a Massachusetts prison,’ and wanted in the 
US for embezzlement (Kansteiner, 1996). 
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help restore order and protect noncombatants in Liberia, or at least to 
establish a zone of safety in Monrovia. They point to Haiti and Bosnia as 
recent examples of successful humanitarian intervention, and ask why the 
same is not done for a country with historic US ties (Ek, 1996).  
 
Other policymakers believed that US interests in Africa were peripheral, and that the 
US therefore had no special responsibility toward Liberia in particular and should not 
become involved in the country’s internal affairs.  
Although opponents to intervention may support humanitarian and 
developmental assistance, they argue that since Liberia is no longer of 
major strategic importance for US foreign policy interests, direct US 
military intervention is out of the question. They emphasize the 
difficulties that may be encountered when outside powers intervene in 
civil wars, and note that, as a result of US casualties in Somalia in 1993, 
there would likely be scant support among the public or in Congress for 
humanitarian military intervention in Liberia (Ibid).  
 
National security adviser Robert Gates described the historical relationship as 
‘meaningless; it doesn’t govern us anymore; we treat Liberia like any other country, 
we have no real interest there’ (Advocates for Human Rights, 2009: 289).  
As the situation in Monrovia deteriorated and foreign embassies came under 
threat, the Bush administration decided in late May 1990 to deploy a task force of 
four US Navy ships to assist in the evacuation of the embassies. The US cut direct 
financial and military aid to the Liberian government, withdrew Peace Corps 
operations and imposed a travel ban on senior Liberian Government officials. 
US policy ‘quietly became one of letting the Liberians work out their 
conflicts themselves’ – a position the US maintained during the Bush and Clinton 
administrations (Kansteiner, 1996). From 1991 to 2003, no military aid was provided 
to Liberia; US assistance consisted predominantly of food aid and support for 
ECOMOG and the UN Observer Mission in Liberia. 
Following Taylor’s election in 1997, new opposition groups emerged which 
renewed fighting throughout Liberia. Human rights violations were being committed 
117 
 
by all actors in the conflict. Taylor was also supporting the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF), a rebel group fighting in Sierra Leone. As political and economic 
conditions degenerated, US views of the Taylor administration became increasingly 
negative, and assistance levels reflected such concern (See Appendix 5 for data on 
US Assistance to Liberia, FY1990 - FY2001). 
The Clinton administration threatened to take punitive actions against the 
Taylor government in response to Liberian intervention in Sierra Leone’s civil war, 
which also resulted in congressional calls for tough, activist US policy measures to 
counter such alleged actions. In a May 2000 editorial in the Washington Post, 
Republican Senator Judd Gregg of New Hampshire stated that ‘Taylor and his 
criminal gang must go; every feasible effort ought to be made to undermine his 
rule.’82  
According to former SCSL official Chris Mahony, Senator Gregg made the 
case to then-US Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke and the two discussed a 
shift in policy against Taylor, directed at the removal of his regime using a diversity 
of instruments. These included sponsoring an armed rebellion against Taylor’s 
government, establishing a tribunal that would indict him, placing sanctions on his 
government that would weaken his ability to repel a rebel force, and providing 
support to local political opponents. Holbrooke and Gregg intended that one or a 
combination of these methods would force Taylor from power (Mahony, 2012: 10-
11).  
                                                
82 Gregg, 2000. The position of Gregg and others likely emerged from the confluence of three factors: 
it provided an opportunity to: make Congress seem pro-accountability; criticize the UN, by citing the 
failure of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone; gain media attention (i.e., the ‘sensationalism’ of Sierra 
Leonean amputees ‘appealed to the camera-chasing members of Congress’); promote anti-Clinton 
sentiment by publicizing the failure of the Lomé Accords (Cerone, 2007: 306). For more on 
congressional discussion of amputee issue, see, Congressional Record, 2000: 21850-21851. For more 
on US policymaking in Sierra Leone in 1999-2000, see Cook, 2008.   
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Within a month of the meeting between Holbrooke and Gregg, developments 
on a tribunal moved forward, and an armed militia called LURD attacked Liberia 
from Guinea. Guinea received increased US military training and ammunition for 
their offensive against Taylor (HRW, 2003). In October 2000, President Clinton 
denied entry into the US to President Taylor, senior members of the Liberian 
government, and their supporters and families for their failure to end trafficking in 
arms and illicit diamonds with the RUF (US State Department, 2000; US White 
House, 2000). 
 The Bush administration maintained support for UN and US bilateral sanctions 
against the Taylor government and members of Congress continued to view the 
Taylor regime negatively. During a March 2001 hearing, members of Congress and 
witnesses criticized the Taylor government, calling his government a regional 
menace, a source of destabilization, an abuser of human rights and anti-democratic 
(US House of Representatives, 2001).  
 With increasing levels of violence, State Department officials began discussing 
greater US engagement. Michael Arietti, then-Director of the Office of West African 
Affairs, said that he and US Ambassador to Liberia John Blaney ‘felt it was worth 
giving Liberia another shot.’ They had the support of National Security Advisor 
Condoleezza Rice and NSC’s Senior Director for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer.83 
‘There was a sense that with a little bit of effort, we could make a difference…It was 
hardest to sell to DoD,’ Arietti said. Increased interest in Liberia motivated US 
support for the creation of the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL), a 
coalition of donor and West African regional governments formed in September 
2002 to coordinate a comprehensive, regionally focused resolution to the second civil 
                                                
83 Frazer went on to serve as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 2005-2009. 
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war. Arietti mentioned ‘constant discussions’ between ECOWAS and the US on 
Liberia, but also said that the US viewed its role as secondary to African 
leadership.84   
 By June 2003, rebel forces had made significant inroads to the capital and 
threatened Taylor’s stronghold on power. ECOWAS suggested peace talks to be held 
in Ghana and a peacekeeping mission, which were both supported by the US. Arietti, 
who was present at the talks, said that the historic relationship with Liberia meant 
that US recommendations carried a lot of weight (Michael Arietti, interview, 9 May 
2011). On 18 August 2003, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed 
in Accra, which laid the framework for constructing a two-year National Transitional 
Government of Liberia (NTGL).  
Two months after the peace agreement was signed, a US-drafted UN Security 
Council resolution established the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which would 
reach a total of 15,000 peacekeepers – the largest peacekeeping force to be 
established at that time.85 The US Congress allocated close to half a billion dollars 
towards the implementation of the peace accord and UNMIL. 86  At the State 
Department, Liberia meetings grew from the four people who had been tracking the 
country over the previous years to a room full of interested people (Hayner, 2007: 
28). Some observers said that the US supported a peacekeeping mission in part to 
gain UN support with US operations in Iraq. Others said Liberia was seen as the 
                                                
84 Michael Arietti, interview, 9 May 2011. Arietti later served as US Ambassador to Rwanda from 
2005-2008. 
85 The US seconded 9 officers to UNMIL (two headquarters staff officers, seven military observers), 
worked to restructure and train a new Liberian army and provide development assistance (US House 
of Representatives, 2003: 27). US support of a robust peacekeeping mission represented a policy shift 
as US officials had typically been critical of these missions and were concerned about the risk of 
prosecution by the International Criminal Court for any actions committed by US armed forces. 
President Bush addressed this issue through a presidential determination certifying that the military 
would be under no such risk (Federal Register, 2003: 63973). 
86 Koppel, 2003. Support was particularly strong from members of the Congressional Black Caucus, 
i.e., Reps. Donald Payne and Maxine Waters. 
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‘responsibility’ of the US, since Britain and France had sent troops to former West 
African colonies in Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast (Feldmann, 2003). 
Liberia’s transitional government received extensive US post-war 
reconstruction and security sector reform assistance. The US led the reconstruction 
of the Armed Forces of Liberia, which included the training of a newly recruited and 
vetted 2,000-person military. Security sector reform efforts led to the disarmament of 
over 100,000 ex-combatants by October 2004.87  
The Bush administration was a strong supporter of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf’s 
election as president in 2005, and the Obama administration maintained this 
support.88 In an official visit to Liberia in 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
stated:  
We are working to train the police force, which is something that the 
Government of Liberia places a very high priority on. We are working to 
help train the military. We are working in just about every sector of 
society.89  
 
From 2003 to 2010, the US contributed over $1 billion in bilateral assistance and 
another $1 billion in assessed contributions to UNMIL (See Appendix 5 for US 
Bilateral and Related Assistance to Liberia, FY2004-FY2011; US State Department, 
2011). One US official commented: ‘the US does things in Liberia we don’t do 
                                                
87 See, Cook, 2005: Summary; US State Department, March 2011. As of late April 2010, US 
personnel deployed with UNMIL included 10 individual police, 3 military observers, and 5 contingent 
troops (Cook, 2010). A gradual, phased drawdown of the UNMIL force began in 2006 and was meant 
to be complete after the 2011 presidential election. However, the Security Council extended UNMIL’s 
mandate for another year, until 30 September 2012 (UNMIL, 2011). 
88 President Bush held four one-on-one meetings with Sirleaf between her inauguration in January 
2006 and 2008. 
89 US State Department, 2009. During this visit, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs 
Jendayi Frazer wrote an article about the importance of moving the headquarters of the US African 
Command (AFRICOM)89 from Germany to Liberia: ‘This needs to be done to promote US strategic 
interests in the region, which include maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, countering terrorism and 
drug trafficking, and promoting regional development and stability’. The Liberian government 
repeatedly offered to host AFRICOM headquarters, understanding that the US presence ‘will create 
jobs and help stabilize the country and region.’ Frazer added, ‘The command needs to be in the region 
its operations are charged with shaping’ (Frazer, 2009). However, a 2011 Congressional Research 
Service report said that DoD’s intention to locate AFRICOM’s headquarters on the continent were 
early in the planning process, but that such a move is unlikely to take place for several years, if at all 
(Ploch, 2011: Summary).  
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anywhere else.’ Unlike many countries, she added, ‘Liberia is one country where the 
State Department always gets more [funding] than what they ask’ (US official, 
interview, 16 March 2010).  
US foreign policy in Liberia has a long history dating back to the 1820s. 
Bilateral relations were generally positive, except for periods during the Doe and 
Taylor administrations. Despite debates about US intervention in the 1990s to stop 
the first civil war, a policy of non-interference was taken. This changed in the early 
2000s, however, with a shift toward one of greater involvement driven by the Bush 
administration’s interest in the situation. This engagement included involvement in 
transitional justice, the focus of the remainder of this chapter.   
 
4.2 The Taylor Trial 
The diplomacy to build a court in Sierra Leone began on 11 May 2000, when War 
Crimes Ambassador David Scheffer met with Hans Corell, the UN’s top legal 
counsel. The UK soon arrested RUF leader Foday Sankoh, and Scheffer began 
exploring options for accountability. On 3 June 2000, USUN Ambassador Richard 
Holbrooke recommended that Scheffer work on a proposal for a Security Council-
backed international criminal tribunal, 90  which Scheffer and his adviser Pierre 
Prosper undertook and shared with Sierra Leonean President Kabbah. Kabbah sent a 
letter to Kofi Annan requesting a court, which was very similar to the American 
proposal. However, aside from the US and UK, Security Council members were 
unwilling to establish another tribunal. In response, Scheffer suggested establishing 
an international criminal court with a treaty between the UN and the government 
(Scheffer, 2011: 329-330). This hybrid model would be less expensive than the ad-
                                                
90 Scheffer writes: ‘Holbrooke’s bottom line was to maintain the international jurisdiction of the 
Security Council over whatever was built’ (Scheffer, 2011: 326). 
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hoc tribunals, funded by voluntary contributions, instead of mandatory contributions 
from UN member states.  
 In August 2000, the Security Council passed Resolution 1315 to create the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone. It was mandated to try those who bear the greatest 
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra 
Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996. 
Shortly after, the White House asked Department of Defence (DoD) lawyer David 
Crane to ‘help set up an experiment in West Africa’ (Mahony, 2012: 14). Crane 
began utilising DoD intelligence information to formulate who he believed was most 
responsible for crimes committed during the conflict (Ibid: 17). 
 Several high administration officials, including Pierre Prosper, the second 
war crimes ambassador, as well as members of Congress, applied pressure on UN 
Secretary-General Koﬁ Annan to get David Crane appointed as the Special Court’s 
first Chief Prosecutor. DoD, which had been a source of opposition to international 
criminal courts, did not express opposition to the creation of the SCSL and at times 
seemed affirmatively supportive. The agency’s support was largely due to Crane’s 
DoD experience (Cerone, 2007: 306). Prosper’s office reportedly liked the fact that 
Crane had management experience (he had been a senior executive in DoD), and that 
he was a former Judge Advocate (having retired from the Army in 1996), which 
mirrored the Nuremberg model. His Africa background was another factor, as was 
the fact that Crane was a former teacher of Prosper’s then-deputy (Ibid).   
As the court was set up, Crane visited the State Department approximately 
four times annually where he sought the war crimes office view as to who was to be 
prosecuted (Mahony, 2012: 19). According to Scheffer, the decision to investigate 
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Taylor was made in summer 2000 when the structure of the court was being 
negotiated. He said: 
Taylor was front and center in our minds as negotiators. There was no 
ambiguity that this court would investigate Taylor. None. We couldn’t 
actually say that in the statute of course, but that was a clear mandate in 
the negotiating of this court (David Scheffer, interview, 12 March 2012).  
 
However, Scheffer also made clear that his work on the court was not premised 
around an agenda about Taylor. He said he had not heard of the earlier Gregg-
Holbrooke meeting (Ibid).   
 Whether or not Senator Gregg and others viewed the court as a way to 
remove Taylor or the structure of the court was negotiated in a way that would 
guarantee his prosecution, Taylor’s transfer and trial to the Special Court were not 
inevitable. This section examines the role of the US from the time of his indictment, 
asylum in Nigeria, transfer to the court, move to The Hague, to present day – with 
the court’s verdict released in April 2012.  
 
Taylor’s indictment, resignation and asylum in Nigeria    
By the middle of 2003, LURD forces (initially supported by the US, Guinea and 
Burkina Faso) were regularly threatening the capital. Taking advantage of Taylor’s 
weakened position, ECOWAS and the US negotiated a new round of peace talks 
involving all the major parties to the conflict. They undertook a concerted campaign 
to convince Taylor to participate personally in the talks, which would be held in 
Accra, Ghana. Taylor yielded, and all parties to the conflict were guaranteed their 
security while attending the conference. Some diplomats considered the Accra talks 
the best chance in years to create a peaceful, durable solution for Liberia that would 
also remove Taylor by allowing him to exit the presidency as part of a negotiated 
settlement (Tejan-Cole, 2009: 213).  
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On 4 June 2003, while Taylor was in Ghana attending the opening day of the 
talks, the Special Court Prosecutor David Crane unsealed an indictment against 
Taylor and appealed to Ghanaian authorities to arrest him for war crimes and transfer 
him to Sierra Leone.91 The Ghanaians refused to enforce the warrant and gave Taylor 
a presidential plane to return quickly to Liberia. They said that arresting Taylor 
would be a violation of the commitment they had made to guarantee the security and 
freedom of participants in the talks (Hayner, 2007: 8).  
Although it was apparent to most observers that Crane was planning to indict 
Taylor, and given the SCSL’s numbering of indictments, it was clear there had been 
a sealed indictment, the State Department found major fault with Crane’s timing. The 
timing of the indictment was not coincidental. Indeed, the Prosecutor’s strategy was 
to demonstrate ‘the power of the rule of law by stripping Taylor of his political 
power in front of his peers.’ Crane gave 24-hours’ notice to concerned parties, 
including the US, of his intent to unseal the indictment. State Department officials 
tried unsuccessfully to persuade him to refrain from doing so (Cerone, 2007: 309).  
State Department officials and members of the National Security Council 
were infuriated by Crane’s decision. Ambassador Blaney said that ‘hundreds if not 
thousands of people would have died’ in retribution if Taylor had been arrested in 
Ghana. ‘It would have ended the peace process and the war would have continued’ 
he said (Hayner, 2007: 10). US citizens and the embassy were apparently directly 
threatened as a result of the indictment, given the belief widely held in Liberia that 
the US was the real power behind the Special Court (Ibid). Arietti said this was 
                                                
91 Taylor was indicted under seal by the Special Court for Sierra Leone on 7 March 2003 on a 17-
count indictment for crimes against humanity, violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II (commonly known as war crimes) and other serious 
violations of international humanitarian law. On 16 March 2006 a Judge of the Special Court 
approved an amended indictment reducing the number of counts to 11. The indictment was ordered to 
be kept under seal.  
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farthest from the truth. After the indictment, he said that the State Department came 
up with a phrase used in official statements that indicated US support of 
accountability for Taylor, but did not expressly call for his prosecution (Michael 
Arietti, interview, 9 May 2011). Crane described the relationship between the court 
and the US as ‘love-hate’ (David Crane, interview, 19 April 2010). For months after 
the indictment was unsealed, the State Department cut off all communication with 
Crane’s office and the US Ambassador to Sierra Leone refused access to all court 
personnel (Cerone, 2007: 309). Nonetheless, many observers credit the unsealing of 
the indictment with the hastening of Taylor’s departure from Monrovia.  
Meanwhile, the Bush administration was focused on Taylor’s resignation – 
not his prosecution. During a speech on his administration's Africa policy, President 
Bush called on Taylor to resign: ‘President Taylor needs to step down so that his 
country can be spared further bloodshed’ (Semple and Sengupta, 2003). The Bush 
administration was working on a deal to provide Taylor with asylum in Nigeria, 
which Nigeria eventually agreed to in order to ‘aid the Liberian peace process.’ 
Taylor accepted the offer with a promise from Nigeria that he would not later be 
prosecuted provided he withdrew from political activity (Cook, 2005: 14).  
Some members of Congress faulted Nigeria for its asylum offer, called for 
Taylor’s immediate transfer to the Special Court and authorized a $2 million reward 
for his capture (US House of Representatives, 2003: 12; Kramer, 2003). In testimony 
before a House Committee hearing entitled ‘Confronting War Crimes in Africa’, 
Howard F. Jeter, then US Ambassador to Nigeria, said:  
When I returned to Washington in August 2003, I was stunned to learn 
that some members of the US Senate were planning to sanction Nigeria 
for taking in Charles Taylor. I was incredulous. Instead of sanctioning 
Nigeria, I thought we should have been praising [Nigerian President 
Olusegun] Obasanjo for his political courage (US House of 
Representatives, 2004: 19).  
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Ambassador Jeter went on to speak about how US officials knew and supported 
President Obasanjo’s decision to take in Taylor:  
Obasanjo did not take the decision on Charles Taylor lightly or alone. He 
consulted broadly and often with all key players in and outside the 
region…President Obasanjo acted with our full knowledge and 
concurrence…Before he made his final decision, the President called me 
and the British High Commissioner to his office to inform our respective 
governments that he had completed his consultations and planned to offer 
asylum to Mr. Taylor. He said he would not move forward, however, if 
the American or British governments objected…what followed was a 
succession of phone calls from Washington telling the Embassy to urge 
President Obasanjo to move forward on getting Taylor out. We wanted 
Taylor out of Liberia and we wanted him out quickly, was the refrain I 
heard many times. This message was echoed by State Department and 
National Security Council officials who accompanied President Bush to 
Abuja during his State Visit to Nigeria in mid-July. Even President Bush 
at that time publicly was saying that the US would not consider sending 
military forces to Liberia as long as Charles Taylor remained in the 
country. The President called for his immediate departure. I can only 
presume that President Obasanjo felt that America was fully supportive 
of what he was doing and that by taking Taylor out of Liberia, he was 
also responding to the wishes of the US. There could be no other 
conclusion…The decision to grant political asylum to Taylor prevented a 
humanitarian disaster and saved thousands, perhaps tens of thousands of 
lives. The 14-year civil war in Liberia was ended and the dreaded spill-
over into neighboring countries was prevented. Liberia now has a chance 
and a future, and I am certain that the issue of justice for Charles Taylor 
will not go away (Ibid).  
 
Over time, however, it became apparent that Taylor still communicated with groups 
in Liberia, and discussions about a trial continued for the next three years.   
 
Taylor’s transfer to the Special Court for Sierra Leone  
Although a condition for asylum in Nigeria was that Taylor disengage from Liberian 
politics, he reportedly broke these conditions extensively.92 Members of Congress 
                                                
92 By mid-2005, persistent claims were emerging that Taylor was violating the terms of his Nigerian 
asylum deal to refrain from political interference in West Africa, including that he had been involved 
in an attempt to assassinate Guinean president Lansana Conteh in January 2005, that he continued to  
back armed groups, and that he was attempted to inﬂuence the forthcoming post transition Liberian 
elections. Special Court investigators accused him of backing a coup plot in Ivory Coast (Timberg, 
2005: A22; Farah, 2005: A19).   
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felt that the administration was not doing enough to press Nigeria to transfer Taylor 
to the Special Court. Administration officials, however, believed that Taylor’s 
transfer could be a potential source of instability for Sierra Leone and Liberia. They 
were also reticent to renege on the commitment to Nigeria to honor its conditions for 
accepting Taylor and deference to Nigeria’s views on the matter, given its central 
role as a regional peacekeeping and political mediating power. 93  This debate 
continued until 2006.  
Members of Congress were consistent in their calls for Taylor’s transfer to 
the Special Court. Just after Taylor left for Nigeria, Republican Rep. Ed Royce, 
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa, called for Nigeria to hand over 
Taylor to the court (US House of Representatives, 2003: 12). In the Appropriations 
Act for fiscal year 2004, Congress reaffirmed its support for the SCSL and made 
funds available for ‘assistance to the central government of a country in which 
individuals indicted by the SCSL are credibly alleged to be living’ if that government 
cooperated with the court, ‘including the surrender and transfer of indictees in a 
timely manner’ (US Public Law 108-199, 2004: 206).  
By June 2004, members of Congress and at least one State Department 
official explicitly stated that Taylor’s prosecution was US policy. War Crimes 
Ambassador Pierre Prosper made the following statement:  
Justice will not be complete until Charles Taylor finds his way to the 
[Special] Court [for Sierra Leone]. The US policy is that Mr. Taylor must 
be held accountable and must appear before the Court. I personally have 
shared this policy with President Obasanjo and Chairman Bryant and 
have asked them for action on this matter. While we understand the need 
to maintain stability in Liberia, the goal of the US is to work with Nigeria 
and Liberia to pursue a strategy that will see Charles Taylor face justice 
before the Special Court for Sierra Leone. We want to work toward this 
end, and today our Ambassador to Nigeria, John Campbell, is again 
                                                
93 See, for example, Ambassador Jeter’s comments (US House of Representatives, 2004); White 
House spokesman’s comments (US White House, 2005); and State Department spokesman’s 
comments (US State Department, 2005).  
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communicating this message to the Nigerian President (US House of 
Representatives, 2004). 
 
In response to a question about what the State Department was doing to convince 
Nigeria to transfer Taylor, Ambassador Prosper said that the Nigerian President had 
told Prosper that he ‘needs to keep his word’ of making Nigeria a temporary 
sanctuary, but that he would defer to the Liberian government after elections had 
taken place (US House of Representatives, 2004: 13). Prosper had asked the Nigerian 
President ‘to speed up the timetable’ and was also working on a joint strategy with 
the head of the Liberian transitional government (Ibid). Rep. Royce felt that Nigeria 
should feel justified in turning over Taylor since he had broken the conditions of his 
asylum by maintaining financial interests and cell phone contacts (Ibid: 29). 
Republican Rep. Frank Wolf told Prosper: ‘Taylor needs to be apprehended and 
brought to justice before this Administration leaves office, or else you will have 
failed in your effort (US House of Representatives, 2004: 18). 
A year passed, but there was growing recognition that the best solution to the 
Taylor problem was prosecution before the Special Court. In May 2005, Presidents 
Bush and Obasanjo discussed Taylor’s status. Though few details of their exchange 
were reported, prior to the meeting, a White House spokesman said that Taylor 
should ‘be held to account for the crimes he has committed,’ and stated that the US 
and Nigeria were ‘engaged’ in the question of how to address the matter (US White 
House, 2005). He also expressed appreciation to Nigeria for facilitating Taylor’s 
departure from Liberia in 2003, which had helped bring peace in Liberia. Obasanjo 
also met with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on this trip. In a press conference 
about the meeting, a State Department spokesman said:  
They discussed the situation of Mr. Taylor right now and I think we and 
the Nigerians both agree that he should not be interfering in any way in 
Liberia's internal affairs; and shouldn't undermine democracy there; and 
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that he should face justice.  So we're in touch with the Nigerians on those 
topics.  We'll stay in touch with them, as well as others, as we proceed 
forward (US State Department, 2005). 
 
After these meetings, Obasanjo announced that he would turn Taylor over to a newly 
elected Liberian government if the new administration asked him to do so. However, 
it was generally agreed that it would be politically difficult for Nigeria to revoke the 
asylum it had extended to Taylor, and the Liberian elections were still some months 
away.  
In an overwhelming show of support for the SCSL, Congress adopted a 
resolution on the same day as Obasanjo’s talks with the Bush administration, which 
urged Nigeria to ‘expeditiously transfer’ Taylor to the Special Court. 94  The 
resolution, which passed the House by a vote of 421 to 1, and was unanimously 
endorsed by the Senate, noted that ‘the Special Court for Sierra Leone has 
contributed to developing the rule of law in Sierra Leone and is deserving of support’ 
(Ibid).  Two months later, Rep. Diane Watson (California Democrat and member of 
the Congressional Black Caucus) sponsored an amendment to the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act for fiscal years 2006 and 2007 which restated that it was US 
policy ‘to seek the expeditious transfer’ of Taylor to the SCSL.95 
Later that year, Congress increased pressure on Nigeria by conditioning 
future assistance on the surrender of Taylor to the SCSL. The Foreign Operations 
Appropriations bill for fiscal year 2006 stated:  
assistance may be made available for the central Government of Nigeria 
after 120 days following enactment of this Act only if the President 
submits a report to the Committees on Appropriations, in classified form 
                                                
94 US H.Con.Res. 127, 2005. On 24 February 2005 the European Parliament unanimously passed a 
resolution calling for Nigeria to transfer Taylor to the Special Court.  
95 US H.Amdt. 480, 2005. Meanwhile, Court officials hoped that the congressional resolutions would 
bolster their efforts to win a Security Council Chapter VII resolution that would legally require 
Nigeria to transfer Taylor to Freetown for trial (Peskin, 2008: 249-250). In November 2005, the 
Security Council expanded UNMIL’s mandate to include the ability to apprehend and detain Taylor in 
the event of a return to Liberia and to transfer him to the SCSL (UNSCR 1638, 2005).  
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if necessary, on: (1) the steps taken in fiscal years 2003, 2004 and 2005 
to obtain the cooperation of the Government of Nigeria in surrendering 
Charles Taylor to the SCSL; and (2) a strategy, including a timeline, for 
bringing Charles Taylor before the SCSL (US P.L. 109-102, 2005: 67, 
emphasis added).  
 
Congress also pressed the Bush administration to act more urgently on the issue. Rep. 
Watson said that the US had a ‘duty’ to ensure Taylor’s transfer (US House of 
Representatives, 2006: 33). House Africa Subcommittee Chairman Chris Smith said 
that Taylor's extradition to the Special Court ‘remains high on the agenda of the US 
Government’ (Ibid: 9). In addition, a bipartisan group of 13 House and Senate 
Members wrote Secretary of State Rice noting: ‘Should Mr. Taylor continue to evade 
justice, the international community may show reluctance to continue with its strong 
support for the reconstruction of Liberia and Sierra Leone’ (Ibid: 30). 
Upon taking office in January 2006, President Sirleaf said that the Taylor 
issue was not a priority (BBC, 2006). Her government was gripped by security 
concerns. Taylor loyalists were still armed and his close associates controlled key 
positions in the legislature. In a bid to win the second round of the presidential 
elections, she had sought and received the support of many of Taylor’s allies. 
Newspapers alleged that Sirleaf had promised not to request Taylor’s surrender in 
return for their support (Tejan-Cole, 2009: 217).  
However, the Bush administration increased pressure on the Taylor issue, and 
Secretary of State Rice told Sirleaf that the US felt the right time had come for 
Taylor to be sent to Freetown to face justice (Ibid; US State Department, 2005; Cook, 
2005: 13). Assistant Secretary Frazer said Taylor’s prosecution would ‘bring closure 
to a tragic chapter in Liberia's history’ (US House of Representatives, 2006: 47). 
When it became clear to Sirleaf that the grant of much-needed development 
assistance from the US and others was linked to bringing Taylor to justice, she said, 
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‘We also are facing . . . pressure – I must use that word – from the UN, from the US, 
from the European Union, who are all our major partners in development, on the 
need to do something about the Charles Taylor issue’ (Lehrer, 2006).   
Despite concerns that Taylor’s return would foster unrest, Sirleaf stated that 
‘the fate of one Liberian should not hold a nation of three million people hostage’, 
and, on 5 March 2006, formally called on Nigeria to transfer Taylor to the custody of 
the Liberian government (Ibid). On 26 March 2006, Obasanjo informed Sirleaf that 
Liberia was free to take Taylor into its custody. Within 48 hours, however, Taylor 
allegedly tried to flee across the Cameroon border. A meeting had been planned in 
Washington between Presidents Bush and Obasanjo for the next day. Obasanjo was 
told that the meeting with Bush would be cancelled if Taylor remained at large 
(Tejan-Cole, 2009: 218). Taylor was soon caught by Nigerian authorities on 29 
March 2006 and flown to Monrovia where he was arrested by UNMIL and 
transferred to the Special Court in Freetown.   
 
Moving the trial to The Hague  
The same day Taylor was surrendered, the Special Court president submitted 
requests to the Netherlands and the International Criminal Court (ICC) for the trial to 
be relocated to The Hague on the basis of stability concerns. However, some 
speculated a political deal involving Liberia, the US, the AU, and ECOWAS was the 
primary reason for transferring the trial to The Hague (Cruvellier, 2006). Allegations 
that President Sirleaf had handed Taylor over to the court with the precondition that 
his trial be held out of the region were subsequently confirmed by senior staff within 
the Special Court (Timberg, 2006: A15). The Netherlands and the ICC agreed to host 
the trial, and the UK agreed to provide detention facilities if Taylor was convicted. 
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Despite the concerns of several international NGOs and others that moving the trial 
from Sierra Leone would make the justice process less accessible to the communities 
most affected by the crimes, Taylor was transferred to The Hague on 30 June 2006 
(ICTJ, 2006; HRW, 2006: 2). 
US support for the move contrasted with its support for ‘local’ justice in 
Sierra Leone. War Crimes Ambassador Prosper had previously worked at the Special 
Court and had placed a heavy emphasis on location. In a prior interview, he had said:  
We wanted it in Freetown. We wanted it in a place where the atrocities 
occurred. We wanted it in a place where the population could actually go 
feel it, smell it, touch it, be part of the process (Keleman, 2006).  
 
SCSL attorney Abdul Tejan-Cole said that the continued reference to so-called 
security threats blurred together political and legal considerations: ‘The Special 
Court had indicted others who arguably posed a security threat equal to, if not more 
serious than, Taylor in terms of the likelihood of causing potential attacks on the 
court’s Freetown premises’ (Tejan-Cole, 2009: 219). 
The move of venues also raised discussion about the US position on the ICC, 
and it was thought by some to signal a change in attitude. Human Rights Watch 
counsel Elise Keppler thought it was ‘a more pragmatic approach that could reflect 
the US prioritizing justice and accountability, and also recognizing the blowback and 
collateral damage of its policy on the International Criminal Court to date’ (Keleman, 
2006). However, State Department legal advisor John Bellinger said people should 
not read too much into it:   
The ICC would not be trying Charles Taylor, they would simply be 
providing their facilities--their bricks and mortar--to the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone to try Charles Taylor. So we have no problem with 
that…We don't have a general allergy to the ICC. We are concerned 
about the ICC's potential coverage of the US government. But we see a 
role for the ICC and international criminal justice in the world; that’s the 
reason that we did not object to the Security Council Resolution that 
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referred the human rights violations and atrocities in Darfur, Sudan to the 
ICC (Ibid).  
 
NPR reporter Michele Keleman said that the tentative embrace of the ICC may just 
have been a matter of convenience because the US wanted to find a place to house 
the Taylor trial (Ibid). Regarding funding, US officials said they expected other 
countries to help pay for the move, since the court relied on international donations 
and it would be costly to bring court officials, witnesses and Taylor to The Hague 
(Ibid). In 2009, the trial was moved from the ICC premises to the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon, also based in The Hague.96 
 
The trial  
Taylor made his initial appearance at the Special Court in Freetown in April 2006, 
where he pled not guilty to all charges. He was then transferred to The Hague in June. 
A year later, Prosecutor Stephen Rapp (who subsequently was appointed as the 
fourth US war crimes ambassador in September 2009) made his opening statement. 
However, the trial was delayed until January 2008 because Taylor boycotted the 
proceedings and dismissed his legal team. The Prosecution formally closed their case 
in February 2009 after having presented testimony from 91 witnesses. In May 2009, 
the Trial Chamber dismissed in its entirety a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal 
brought by the Defence. The Defence opened their case in July 2009, and concluded 
in November 2010 after calling 20 witnesses, including Taylor himself.  
                                                
96 Later that year, in September 2006, Taylor’s Boston-born son, Roy M. Belfast Jr. (aka Charles 
McArthur Emmanuel and Charles ‘Chuckie’ Taylor, Jr.) pled guilty to a federal passport fraud relating 
to his official submission of false data regarding his father’s identity. He had been arrested at Miami 
International Airport by US customs agents while attempting to enter the US from Trinidad on 30 
March 2006, one day after his father was apprehended in Nigeria. Belfast, who reportedly had an 
extensive US juvenile criminal record, was sentenced on 7 December 2006, to 11 months in prison for 
fraud (Weaver, 2006; US Department of Justice, 2006; Anderson, 2006).  
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Between 2002 and 2009, the US has contributed over $60 million – a third of 
the court’s budget, far surpassing the near 50 donors who have provided assistance. 
The following table lists these figures (Data obtained from Muck and Wiebelhaus-
Brahm, 2011).  
 
Figure 9: International assistance to the SCSL 
Donor Amount 
(in USD) 
Percentage 
Germany  5,687,760 3 
Canada 14,652,246 8 
Netherlands  24,499,843 13 
UK 33,435,940 18 
US 60,399,000 33 
UN Subvention  16,700,000 9 
Others 29,281,949 16 
Total  183,012,181 100 
 
Since then, the US has provided an additional $20 million, which has meant it has 
funded nearly half of the court’s budget (Scheffer, 2011: 28; US State Department, 
2010; See Appendix 5 for more data on US assistance to the court by year). A State 
Department official spoke about the significance of the court:  
The trial of Charles Taylor is of enormous historical and legal 
significance as he is the first African head of state to be brought before 
an international tribunal to face charges for mass atrocities and gross 
violations of international humanitarian law. The Taylor prosecution 
delivers a strong message to all perpetrators of atrocities, including those 
in positions of power that they will be held accountable. It is imperative 
the international community prevents the Taylor trial from being 
suspended due to lack of financial resources, which is why the US rushed 
its FY2011 contribution to the Court. We hope other donor states will 
follow our lead and find ways to financially support the Court until it has 
finished its mandate and justice has been served (US State Department, 
2010). 
 
The US is a key member of the Court’s Management Committee, a group that 
oversees the tribunal’s efficiency. A special advisor in the war crimes office, Mark 
Stamilio, explained that despite the financial backing it committed, the US ‘is merely 
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part’ of the committee. 97  While he noted the committee can only make 
recommendations and is not a ruling body of the court, Stamilio did assert that ‘the 
court is very well-aware of donor fatigue,’ and ‘if they do not stick to a timeline, they 
know the court will hurt financially.’ He added that the US contributed to the tribunal 
‘without strings attached,’ although there were concerns over how efficiently the 
money would be spent. In June 2007, the US requested the court to provide a 
completion strategy for all ongoing cases, including the Taylor case, to be carried out 
in 18-24 months (Frank, 2007).  
Although the Canadian Embassy in The Hague chaired the Management 
Committee between 2008-2010, former SCSL official Gregory Townsend said that 
they were ‘disengaged’ with the process. He continued:   
The legal staff at the US embassy in The Hague as well as War Crimes 
Ambassador Stephen Rapp, however, gave fantastic support. The US 
actively monitored all the courts based in The Hague and elsewhere on a 
frequent basis. They asked specific questions, like why decisions were 
taking so long, etc. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs also played a 
very strong supporting role, especially for the courts based in The Hague 
(Gregory Townsend, interview, 12 January 2012). 
 
A leaked State Department cable revealed concerns about the Taylor trial. Allegedly, 
Special Court Judge Julia Sebutinde slowed proceedings while she waited for her 
turn at the court’s rotating presidency so that she could personally give the verdict in 
the case. A high-ranking US official stated, ‘The best we can do for Liberia is to see 
Taylor is put away for a long time and we cannot delay for the results of the present 
trial to consider next steps.’ The cable adds:   
                                                
97 Article 7 of the Agreement for and Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2002 states: ‘It is 
the understanding of the Parties that interested States will establish a management committee to assist 
the Secretary-General in obtaining adequate funding, and provide advice and policy direction on all 
non-judicial aspects of the operation of the Court, including questions of efficiency, and to perform 
other functions as agreed by interested States. The management committee shall consist of important 
contributors to the Special Court. The Government of Sierra Leone and the Secretary-General will 
also participate in the management committee.’ The Management Committee consists of the four 
major donors (US, UK, the Netherlands and Canada), two regional donors (Sierra Leone and Liberia), 
and the Office of the Legal Adviser at the UN.  
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All legal options should be studied to ensure Taylor cannot return to 
destabilize Liberia. Building a case in the US against Taylor for financial 
crime such as wire fraud would probably be the best route. There may be 
other options, such as applying the new law criminalising the use of child 
soldiers or terrorism statutes (Hirsch, 2010). 
 
However, this view may change in light of the court’s release of the verdict on 26 
April 2012, which found Taylor guilty of aiding and abetting, as well as planning 
war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by Sierra Leonean rebel groups 
during Sierra Leone’s 11-year armed conflict.98 Taylor was cleared of charges of 
ordering war crimes, and of joint conspiracy in them. 
In conclusion, the Special Court’s decision to indict Taylor on the first day of 
the peace talks frustrated State Department officials, but was supported by members 
of Congress. The Bush administration was heavily involved in brokering the 
agreement for Nigeria to provide asylum for Taylor. Concerns about stability and 
diplomacy kept the Bush administration from pursuing Taylor’s transfer to the Court, 
but this position eventually shifted under continual pressure from a bipartisan group 
in Congress and concerns about Taylor’s continued destabilizing influence in Liberia. 
Once the Bush administration focused on the issue (although other actors were also 
involved), Taylor’s transfer to the Special Court occurred quickly. The State 
Department was then involved in moving Taylor’s trial to The Hague and remained 
the largest contributor to the Special Court throughout Taylor’s trial, despite 
concerns about the process.  
 
                                                
98 The Special Court found Taylor guilty of the war crimes of terrorizing civilians, murder, outrages 
on personal dignity, cruel treatment, looting, and recruiting and using child soldiers; and the crimes 
against humanity of murder, rape, sexual slavery, mutilating and beating, and enslavement (SCSL 
Judgement, 2012). 
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4.3 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission   
During the peace talks, justice for human rights violations committed during the 
conflict was one, albeit minor, aspect of the negotiations. Establishing a war crimes 
tribunal in Liberia failed to garner sufficient Liberian or international support so the 
decision to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was made as a 
compromise. The US participated as a member of the International Contact Group on 
Liberia (ICGL), as opposed to acting bilaterally, in this process. Once established, 
the TRC did not elicit the same kind of high-level involvement that the Taylor issue 
received, however, embassy officials provided considerable technical support to the 
commission’s operations. At the end of its mandate, the US pressured the 
commission to submit its final report, but then evaded providing additional support 
for the implementation of TRC recommendations. This section explores the role of 
the US on the justice issue in the peace talks, TRC operations and its final report.  
 
Justice in the peace talks 
The issue of accountability emerged early in the peace negotiations, shortly after the 
ceasefire agreement was signed. Truth commission and Liberia expert Priscilla 
Hayner said that it first arose as a proposal for a war crimes tribunal, pushed by civil 
society representatives. Representatives of the rebel factions were also initially 
demanding justice for the Taylor government, however, after the Nigerian mediator, 
General Abubakar, reminded them that they could also be accused of war crimes, 
‘they were much more careful about their call for justice.’ Some present at the talks 
remember the factions proposing an amnesty, but this was not pushed hard (Hayner, 
2007: 15). West African Affairs Director Michael Arietti said that justice was an 
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important issue in the negotiations, ‘but not the most important’ (Michael Arietti, 
interview, 9 May 2011). 
Several key international delegates, including from the US, insisted that an 
amnesty for serious crimes was not allowed under international law (Ibid). Hayner 
found that this position was based on an oversimplified understanding of the amnesty 
issue, but she remained unclear about the ultimate role international voices played in 
the conversation about amnesty.99 The final language in the accord left the subject 
for future consideration by the transitional government (CPA, 2003: Article 34).  
The general agreement to leave an amnesty aside (as well as the proposal for 
a special tribunal) in exchange for a truth commission without prosecutorial powers 
was made early in the talks and was not returned to in detail later. According to 
Hayner, civil society groups present at the talks proposed the establishment of a truth 
and reconciliation commission.100 However, an ICGL member said that international 
actors present were responsible for the inclusion of a TRC in the Agreement:  
It was really, primarily put in by the international community. I don’t 
think any of the parties to the fighting really wanted [a TRC]. So it was 
almost forced onto them. But they accepted it and it was part of the peace 
agreement (ICGL member, interview, 28 November 2009). 
 
After the success of the South African TRC, the same ICGL member said that truth 
commissions had become ‘quite fashionable around that time.’ She said that 
international actors believed that a TRC would help address the fundamental 
problems that led to the turmoil in Liberia. Furthermore, prosecutions were seen as 
untenable due to the presence of rebel groups at the talks in Accra and ‘tribunal 
fatigue’ on the part of the international community (as the ICTY and ICTR proved to 
be much slower and more expensive than expected). Arietti said: ‘We were not 
                                                
99 Hayner, 2007: 17. For a description of the current state of the law on amnesties and other aspects of 
accountability, see Orentlicher, 2004/2005. 
100 Representatives of civil society and political parties also put forward a proposal for a TRC in 2002 
(Position Statement, 2002: 3). 
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pushing for a tribunal…a TRC was seen as an acceptable alternative’ (Michael 
Arietti, interview, 9 May 2011). 
According to Hayner, the truth commission proposal was accepted fairly 
quickly, with discussion taking less than a week in the plenary session (Hayner, 2007: 
15). Article 13 of the CPA established the TRC in order ‘to respond to the ardent 
desire of the people of Liberia for genuine lasting peace, national unity and 
reconciliation’ (CPA, 2003: Preamble). The provision states: 
1. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission shall be established to 
provide a forum that will address issues of impunity, as well as an 
opportunity for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights 
violations to share their experiences, in order to get a clear picture of the 
past to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation;  
 
2. In the spirit of national reconciliation, the Commission shall deal with 
the root causes of the crises in Liberia, including human rights violations;  
 
3. This Commission shall, among other things, recommend measures to 
be taken for the rehabilitation of victims of human rights violations;  
 
4. Membership of the Commission shall be drawn from a cross-section of 
Liberian society. The Parties request that the International Community 
provide the necessary financial and technical support for the operations 
of the Commission. 
 
The role of the US on the justice issue in the peace talks was minimal, yet still 
important. Due to their support of the Special Court in Sierra Leone and their focus 
on Taylor, the US was not interested in supporting another tribunal in Liberia. 
However, some form of accountability in the peace agreement was still desired. US 
officials opposed the inclusion of an amnesty in the accord, but saw a truth 
commission as an acceptable compromise.  
 
Technical support to the TRC  
To execute the dictates of the CPA, the head of the transitional government, Charles 
Gyude Bryant, constituted a nine-member panel of TRC Commissioners in January 
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2004. Civil society groups opposed the process because they felt it lacked clear 
objectives, a mandate, jurisdiction and legal status outside the CPA. They held a 
conference of Liberian stakeholders in April 2004 to consolidate perspectives on the 
TRC process and draft a TRC Act to submit as a proposal to the Legislature (TRC, 
2009: 175).  
Prior to this conference, USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) 
began working with the Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG), a consortium 
of Liberian human rights groups that had been created to press the government to 
carry out the terms of the peace accord. One grant managed by Creative Associates 
(OTI’s implementing partner) provided for a nationwide survey to collect citizen 
views on transitional justice.101  
The civil society proposal for a TRC Act became law in June 2005. An 
international observer closely engaged with the process felt that the powers of the 
TRC Act ‘far superseded’ the ability to implement it and that it had become a way 
for civil society groups to ‘get back’ at the warlords who crafted the CPA with ‘an 
obvious bias to accepting impunity’ (International observer 1, interview, 30 
November 2009). International actors had encouraged civil society groups to draft a 
more realistic Act, however, the same observer stated:  
No law here in Liberia is more a product of the people of Liberia than 
that particular Act. No internationals tampered with the content and 
therefore it is very originally Liberian (Ibid). 
 
The Act gave a two-year mandate to the Commissioners to investigate human rights 
violations from 1979 to 2003; provide a forum to address impunity and allow victims 
                                                
101 Creative Associates, 2004. TJWG and Greenberg Quinlan Rosner (a research and strategic 
consulting firm) led focus groups and the survey to gauge Liberian attitudes about justice and 
reconciliation. The study found, amongst other things, that Liberians wanted faction leaders and 
commanders to be prosecuted for war crimes and human rights abuses, and supported the creation of a 
special court made up of Liberian and international jurists to prosecute the combatants and 
commanders accused of war crimes (Feierstein and Moreira, 2004: 2). 
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and perpetrators to share their experiences; investigate the antecedents of the crises; 
conduct a critical review of Liberia’s historical past; and compile a report of its 
findings (TRC Act, 2005: Article 4).  
The TRC was officially launched in June 2006, but did not begin operating 
until October. Limitations of infrastructure, human resources, funding and other 
basic structural and organisational demands compounded what was already a large 
task of investigations, statement-taking and public hearings. Criticism of the 
Commissioners did not help public perceptions of the TRC.  
TRC Commissioners and staff pointed to delays in funding as a principal 
explanation for its difficulties. A US official said that the funding constraints in 
Liberia were real, but that part of the problem was that donors had to wait for the 
TRC to complete basic financial reporting so that funds could be released (US 
official 2, interview, 25 January 2010). A more critical perspective was voiced from 
a staff member of an international NGO who felt that the TRC’s challenges were ‘a 
question of focus, unity of purpose and an ambitious mandate’ (International NGO 
staff member, interview, 9 December 2010). By the beginning of 2007, international 
actors felt they needed to step in or the TRC would fail. 
As the ‘moral guarantors of the CPA’, ECOWAS, the UN, the African Union 
and the ICGL (Nigeria, Ghana, US and UK) began to more actively support the 
TRC.102 An ICGL member said:   
After a year, it became evident that little progress was going to be 
made…There was no proper administration, no permanent staff, no 
budget, nothing. So the ICGL, which was meant to meet monthly, 
decided to establish a joint working group with the TRC (ICGL member, 
interview, 28 November 2009). 
 
                                                
102 Article XXXIII of the CPA called on ECOWAS, the UN, the African Union and the ICGL (Nigeria, 
Ghana, US and UK) ‘to ensure that the spirit and content of this Peace Agreement are implemented in 
good faith and with integrity by the Parties.’ 
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The TRC/ICGL working group was created in February 2007 and met intensely for 
several months. During this time, committees were set up to discuss the TRC’s work 
plan and budget, interpreting their mandate, organizational structure, and planning 
for statement taking and public hearings. Eventually, a new budget was adopted, 
renewed outreach took place, new statement-takers were hired, and international 
donors eventually began to contribute funds.  
The ICGL intervention was a turning point, and the work of the TRC 
essentially began again. According to a member of the ICGL, the working 
relationship between the TRC and the ICGL was positive in part because they 
‘scrupulously did not get involved in the content. This was their process’ (ICGL 
member, interview, 28 November 2009). A US official said, however, that there was 
‘a lot of handholding from the international community’ (US official 2, interview, 25 
January 2010). A senior member of the TRC staff said that although ‘donors were 
overbearing,’ he acknowledged that the working group helped to source funding and 
that ICGL technical assistance was effective (Senior TRC staff member, interview, 3 
December 2009). Despite significant international involvement, however, the 
Liberian government provided nearly 60% of the commission’s resources. 
Contributing just 8% made Sweden the largest individual country donor, closely 
followed by the US with 6%. These figures are illustrated in the table below (TRC, 
2009: 40). 
Figure 10: International assistance to the TRC 
Donor Amount 
(in USD) 
Percentage 
Liberia 4,427,466 59 
UNDP 796,544 11 
Sweden 576,213 8 
US 439,148 6 
Others 1,209, 702 16 
Total 7,560,635 100 
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By 2008, the TRC collected more than 17,000 statements and conducted public 
hearings throughout the fifteen counties of Liberia, as well as from Liberians living 
in the US, UK and Ghana. The US was not a major donor of the TRC, but the State 
Department contributed a small amount of funding to the US-based social venture 
organization, Benetech, which assisted the TRC in coding the majority of 
statements.103 The Minnesota-based NGO, Advocates for Human Rights (AHR), 
along with Northwestern University’s Center for Human Rights Law, coordinated the 
work of the TRC in the diaspora. AHR published a report based on an analysis of 
more than 1600 statements, fact-finding interviews, and witness testimony at public 
hearings held in the US (AHR, 2009). Other US-based NGOs, such as the Carter 
Center, supported certain aspects of the TRC, such as statement-taking with religious 
leaders, thematic hearings on the role of the media, and diaspora work, including 
statement-taking in Atlanta (Sean MacLeay, interview, 8 December 2009). The US 
embassy followed the TRC process closely throughout its operations, and there was 
at least one official whose main function was to report on the Commission.  
 
The final report 
The TRC was required to compile a report that included a comprehensive account of 
the activities of the Commission and its findings. The report examined the root 
causes and social effects of armed conflict in Liberia, and presented findings 
regarding violations of international human rights and humanitarian law and 
egregious domestic law violations. It laid out recommendations for public sanctions, 
including lists of alleged perpetrators of human rights violations and economic 
crimes whom the TRC recommended for prosecution or further investigation, and for 
                                                
103 In FY2006, USAID provided $.5 million in support to the TRC (Cook, 2010: 57).  
 
144 
 
non-judicial public sanctions, such as a prohibition on holding public office for a 
period of thirty years (TRC, 2009). The latter included a list of 49 persons named for 
their role in ‘supporting, financially and otherwise, various warring factions.’ Other 
recommendations in the report related to diverse issues, including public integrity, 
corruption, human rights, economic empowerment, good governance, national 
identity, reparation, amongst others ‘intended to resolve past conflicts as part of a 
national progression towards lasting peace and reconciliation’ (TRC press release, 
2009). Certain issues caused considerable debate among US, Liberian and other 
international actors following the process, particularly the way in which the report 
was released, the recommendation to sanction President Sirleaf and the ICGL 
statement about the report.  
The final report was written and released in several stages. A preliminary 
report was submitted to the National Legislature in December 2008 (Volume I); an 
unedited version of Volume II was released in July 2009; and the edited version was 
released in December 2009. Since TRC operations extended into 2009, all versions 
of the report were written in a short time period.  
The TRC mandate was supposed to expire in September 2008, but the TRC 
Act allowed for four, three-month extensions. Instead, however, the Legislature gave 
the TRC one, nine-month extension ending in July 2009. The US was concerned that 
anything submitted after the first three months might face legal challenges, so they 
pressured the TRC to submit a report by December 2008 (US official 1, interview, 10 
December 2009). A staff member of the ICTJ said:  
I didn’t really ever get a sense of what those legal challenges were, 
especially when the report only offered recommendations and a 
prosecutor could pursue prosecutions with or without a set of TRC 
recommendations. From a technical, though admittedly not political, 
standpoint, there was little chance that a report that came out at that time 
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was going to be of any value to the process (ICTJ staff member, 
interview, 2 December 2009).  
 
Consensus among Commissioners to release Volume I of the report was not reached, 
yet the Chairman decided to do so anyway in December as suggested by the ICGL. 
One Commissioner said that this decision further divided the Commissioners (TRC 
Commissioner, interview, 10 December 2009). A US official said that the ICGL 
ultimately wanted to ensure that the TRC submitted a report and was unsure if 
delaying its release would have made a difference in the report’s contents (US 
official 1, interview, 10 December 2009). 
The TRC decision to recommend certain individuals for prosecution and 
public sanctions was surprising for many Liberians and international actors alike, and 
stimulated significant debate. The decision to include President Sirleaf’s name on the 
list to be banned from public office for thirty years, however, was seen as ‘the single 
greatest thing [to] influence how the report [was] handled’ (ICTJ staff member, 
interview, 2 December 2009). The basis for the recommendation was not explained 
in detail in the report, but appears to have been rooted in the President’s support for 
Taylor at the start of his effort to oust Doe.104  
A US official said that the recommendation came ‘out of the blue’ and felt 
that the TRC did not have the mandate to tell people they could not run for public 
office (US official 1, interview, 10 December 2009). Another US official said: ‘It 
was unfortunate that Sirleaf was named in such a public way because it took away 
                                                
104 In early 2009, President Sirleaf testified to the TRC that she had not been party to any armed group 
during Liberia’s civil wars. She said that while she was an early supporter of Taylor and provided 
funds to him in light of his role in opposing Doe, she later became disillusioned with Taylor and the 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia and had never joined it as a member. President Sirleaf attributed 
her initial support for the NPFL to being ‘fooled by’ Taylor, which she implied was a lapse in 
judgment for which she had ‘to apologize to this nation’ (TRC, 2009; Fofana, 2009). The TRC 
Chairman felt that naming the President in the report proved that the Commission had not been 
politically compromised. ‘We didn’t see Ellen as President and discuss what extra privileges should 
be accorded [to her]. The same way we invited everyone to appear, we invited the President’ (TRC 
Chairman, interview, 9 December 2009).  
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from the real issues. The report named names, but didn’t achieve reconciliation.’ 
Nevertheless, ‘the US didn’t feel overly close to the process,’ the official added, ‘the 
US just doesn’t want the report to be a destabilizing factor. There was so much 
progress since 2003. We don’t want to move backwards’ (US official, interview, 16 
March 2010). 
Some interviewees felt that the recommendation to sanction the President 
made it more difficult for the US and others to support the report and its 
recommendations:   
Everybody that’s in a position to support the recommendations is 
supporting this country because of her [Sirleaf’s] Administration…If 
they [the US] come out in support of the report, it will be understood as 
coming out against her, something they just cannot do. On the other hand, 
if they condemn the report, then they are seen as coming out against 
impunity, something they also cannot do…they just can’t touch it’ (ICTJ 
staff member, interview, 2 December 2009).  
 
Similarly, former Liberia Country Director of the American Bar Association Rule of 
Law Initiative Anthony Valcke said: 
The TRC shot itself in the foot by mentioning Ellen. They equated 
alleged perpetrators with the President. The TRC Chairman felt they had 
to do it – and I agree – yet the TRC should have made a clearer 
distinction between personal and financial involvement. They could have 
done it more subtly (Anthony Valcke, interview, 7 December 2009). 
 
President Sirleaf appeared to reject the recommendation when she questioned its 
constitutionality based on the TRC’s failure to take into account the due process 
rights of those to whom the recommendation pertained. In addition, during her 
annual message to the Legislature in January 2010, she announced that she would 
seek re-election to a second term in 2011, as many observers had expected. In the 
same message, she proposed amendments to the Independent National Human Rights 
Commission Act of 2005 to enable it to work in collaboration with the Ministry of 
Justice in order to determine which of the recommendations that had been the 
147 
 
‘subject of great debate since the TRC Report was made public’ were 
‘implementable or enforceable.’ She specifically mentioned the recommendations for 
a criminal tribunal, criminal and public sanctions and investigations into economic 
crimes (President Sirleaf, 2010). 
Some interviewees felt that other recommendations fundamental to building a 
sustainable peace were being ignored because of the controversial ones. For example, 
one ICGL member talked about the importance in changing the Constitution and 
developing a ‘national vision’ (ICGL member, interview, 28 November 2009). A US 
official mentioned his support of the reparations fund for victims, alternative justice 
processes and the idea that perpetrators could ‘pay their way off the prosecutions list’ 
by giving money to the general budget (US official 1, interview, 10 December 2009). 
The TRC Act states that ‘civil society organizations and moral guarantors of 
the CPA [i.e., the ICGL] shall have the responsibility to monitor, and campaign for 
the scrupulous implementation of all recommendations contained in the report’ (TRC 
Act, 2005: Article X). A member of the Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG) 
said: ‘If the US speaks on the report, this will send a strong signal. They are the 
moral guarantors, along with other ICGL members’ (TJWG member, interview, 7 
December 2009).  
  After the release of the unedited version of the final report in June 2009, the 
US embassy took the lead in drafting an ICGL statement that commended the work 
of the TRC and said, ‘It is now up to the Liberian people to decide how to implement 
the recommendations of the TRC, in accordance with Liberian law’ (ICGL, 2009; 
US official 1, interview, 10 December 2009). Civil society groups, including TJWG 
members and the Women NGO Secretariat of Liberia felt that international actors 
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should have taken a stronger position on the TRC report since they had been actively 
involved in the process since the CPA was signed in 2003.  
ICGL members responded to the criticism in different ways. Some felt it was 
not their place to make a pronouncement on the report and that it was a sovereignty 
issue (i.e., US official 1, interview, 10 December 2009; International rule of law 
advisor, interview, 8 December 2009). Others acknowledged civil society concerns. 
One ICGL member said: ‘if we [the international community] don’t believe in the 
rule of law, then who is going to believe in it?’ (ICGL member, interview, 28 
November 2009). Another international observer said that the ICGL would have to 
analyze all of the TRC recommendations in order to know how to proceed. He 
doubted, however, that there would be consensus among all the international donors 
on the recommendations (International observer 2, interview, 28 November 2009).  
Shortly after the ICGL statement was released, Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton made an official visit to Liberia where she reiterated US support and 
deference to the Liberian government:    
I am very supportive of actions that will lead to the peace, reconciliation, 
and unity of Liberia. And I believe that President Sirleaf has been a very 
effective leader on behalf of…Liberia, and the US officially supports 
what this government is doing (US State Department, 2009). 
 
Several members of Liberian civil society groups expressed disappointment about 
Clinton’s visit and felt that it was contradictory to the high levels of US involvement 
throughout the process. A community leader from Buchanan said: ‘Hillary Clinton 
should have said that the recommendations should be implemented’ (Civil society 
leader 1, focus group, 4 December 2009). A youth leader from Kakata spoke about 
his frustration with the role of the international community in Liberia:  
I feel terrible about the role of the international community…[They] 
invested a lot of money into it…UNMIL, Europe and the US guid[ed] 
and monitor[ed] the whole process. No Liberian is neutral when it comes 
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to a Liberian process…[The international community] should implement 
it no matter how it goes. But UNMIL said, ‘we will go by what the 
Liberians say.’ And Secretary of State Clinton said, ‘America will go by 
what the Liberian people say.’ But who are the Liberian people? The 
majority of Liberian people do not have a voice. Our voices are not being 
heard (Youth leader 1, focus group, 26 November 2009).  
 
Similarly, another youth leader said that the international community did not want to 
do anything to undermine the government after investing so heavily in it (Youth 
leader 2, focus group, 26 November 2009). There was also comparison between 
Liberia and Sierra Leone. Some felt that the international community should invest 
the same way in Liberia as it did in Sierra Leone with the Special Court, and not 
leave it ‘up to Liberians’ (i.e., Ibid). Several also raised the historic relationship 
between the US and Liberia as justification for greater involvement. One civil society 
leader said: ‘The US must be a peacemaker for Liberia. Liberia is their brainchild’ 
(i.e., Civil society leader 2, focus group, 4 December 2009).  
  Although some ICGL members felt that it was not their place to take a 
stronger stance on the report and its recommendations, others acknowledged a 
conflict between politics and human rights within Liberia and internationally:  
You have two groups: those that are more political and see prosecution as 
having a negative impact on political and security dimensions; and those 
that are more supportive of the human rights principles and strongly 
believe that justice is part of reconciliation…What has made the decision 
more difficult, even on a personal level, is probably because you have the 
President on the list of those who should be sanctioned and banned from 
public office. Formally or informally, you cannot avoid taking into 
consideration these kinds of aspects. Which gives more reason why the 
international group is trying to be more neutral. That is why the position 
is up to Liberia…you have to look at the TRC process within the 
Liberian context of 2009 and looking to the future. That’s why it’s a bit 
difficult to know what to do (International observer 2, interview, 28 
November 2009). 
 
There was also an acknowledgement of resource constraints and the need to 
prioritize. ‘It’s all about choices,’ a US official said, ‘funds contributed to the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone ‘could have gone to development’ (US official 1, interview, 
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10 December 2009). Another international observer added that with limited resources 
and immense economic, social, political and justice challenges, ‘They are expecting 
too much from the donors’ (International observer 2, interview, 28 November 2009). 
ABA country director Anthony Valcke did not think there would be any US funding 
for the implementation of recommendations because ‘the US wants to put forth the 
idea that Liberia is on the road to recovery’ (Anthony Valcke, interview, 7 December 
2009). The Liberian Government has done little to address the recommendations thus 
far. However, President Sirleaf did say the government would support one of the 
recommendations to set up ‘palava huts’ for less serious crimes, a traditional 
reconciliation measure where individuals can admit their wrongful acts and seek 
pardon from the people of Liberia (President Sirleaf, 2011).  
This section explored the role of the US in the discussion about transitional 
justice in the peace talks, the establishment and operations of the TRC and the final 
report. During the talks, US delegates and others opposed an amnesty and a war 
crimes tribunal, but supported a TRC. USAID supported civil society groups in their 
effort to pass a TRC Act. Once the TRC was established, US embassy officials, 
alongside other ICGL members, provided technical support to the Commissioners on 
a wide range of operational issues, including their budget and work plan. As the two-
year mandate came to an end, the US pressured the Commissioners to submit their 
final report by a certain date. Once all versions of the report were released, the US 
embassy took the lead in drafting the ICGL statement that said it was ‘up to the 
Liberian people’ to implement TRC recommendations. Secretary of State Clinton 
echoed this sentiment during her visit to Monrovia in 2009. These actions implied 
that the US would not assist with TRC follow-up or implementation of 
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recommendations, which has remained true for several years after the submission of 
the TRC report.  
 
4.4 Explaining US Involvement   
This chapter focused on US involvement in two transitional justice measures related 
to Liberia, namely the Taylor trial and the TRC. In the 2000s, US policymakers 
prioritized Liberia, heavily influencing events in the country, including the peace 
talks, UNMIL, Taylor’s asylum and then arrest and transfer to the Special Court, as 
well as a broad range of reconstruction efforts, including a TRC. This section 
provides an overview of findings and offers some explanation and assessment of the 
US role. 
The indictment and eventual trial of Charles Taylor garnered high-level 
interest in the US. This interest can be explained by concerns about stability and the 
symbolic nature of supporting the prosecution of the first African president to face 
trial for war crimes. The Bush administration’s focus on Africa meant that Liberian 
regime change and reconstruction grew in importance. High-level interest in the 
Bush administration, including Secretary Rice, Assistant Secretary Frazer and the 
President himself, worked to broker Nigeria’s offer of asylum to Taylor, which 
Taylor accepted based on the stipulation that he would not be extradited.  
This decision was met with opposition by members of Congress who strongly 
supported Taylor’s transfer to the Special Court for Sierra Leone. There was 
bipartisan support coming from members of the Congressional Black Caucus and 
House and Senate Africa Subcommittees. For three years, members of Congress 
pressured the Bush administration and the Nigerian government to transfer Taylor to 
the Court. They made statements in congressional hearings, issued resolutions, wrote 
letters to the State Department and conditioned assistance to Nigeria on surrendering 
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Taylor. Although not discussed, congressional advocacy was in part driven by 
sizable Liberian-American constituencies, evangelical Christians and the historical 
connection between the two countries. 
Taylor’s continued links with his networks in Liberia encouraged eventual 
support within the Bush administration for Taylor’s transfer. Stability concerns also 
motivated US support of the move of Taylor’s trial to The Hague, which overrode 
concerns about ‘local’ justice or opposition to the ICC.  
Supporting Taylor’s prosecution ‘appealed to the moral instincts’ of US 
policymakers and was aided by the perception that there were ‘no good guys’ in 
Liberia (Tom Malinowski, interview, 15 March 2010). President Sirleaf was an 
attractive heroine for high-level officials who prioritized African policy (Ibid). The 
trial of Taylor offered a symbolic opportunity for the US to support the historic 
prosecution of the first African head of state, despite, or perhaps because of, 
Liberia’s deep ties to the US. The US likes an opportunity to ‘be the hero’ and ‘bring 
down a villain’. The opportunity to support Taylor’s prosecution struck an emotional 
chord among US officials, which was illustrated by their singular focus on Taylor for 
several years. 
Although transitional justice was not a focus of the Accra peace talks, the 
issue was raised by civil society and international actors. State Department officials 
present at the talks opposed amnesty for war crimes, but did not push for prosecution. 
The reason given for this decision was that rebel factions at the talks would not sign 
an agreement calling for their prosecution. However, it was also clear that the US 
was unwilling to support another tribunal, especially considering its significant 
support of the Special Court and the Taylor trial. However, there was a sense that 
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some form of accountability should be included in the peace agreement, and for this 
reason, the truth commission proposal was viewed as an acceptable alternative.  
The Liberian transitional government attempted to establish a truth 
commission, as required by the peace agreement, yet calls from civil society for a 
more transparent and inclusive process were effective. These groups (many of which 
formed the Transitional Justice Working Group - TJWG) drafted a TRC Act, which 
became law. TJWG efforts were supported by USAID’s Office of Transition 
Initiatives (OTI). Considering OTI’s mission to provide ‘fast, flexible, short-term 
assistance targeted at key political transition and stabilization needs’, it is apparent 
that this office felt that support of this transitional justice measure was a key need in 
Liberia.  
Once the TRC was established, US embassy officials became the principal 
US government actors following the process. US officials worked with other ICGL 
members (instead of bilaterally) in the TRC/ICGL working group, which assisted the 
TRC on detailed aspects of its operations. The US contributed nowhere near what the 
Special Court or other aspects of Liberian reconstruction received, yet USAID and 
the State Department did provide small amounts of funding to NGOs that were 
supporting the Commission. Toward the end of the TRC’s mandate, US embassy 
officials pressured the Commission to submit its final report, even though some felt 
that this pressure resulted in a substandard output.  
After the TRC submitted its final report and recommendations, the US 
embassy took the lead in drafting the ICGL statement, which said that TRC follow-
up was ‘up to the Liberian people.’ Although argued otherwise, it appears that the 
recommendation to sanction President Sirleaf was a factor in the ICGL response. 
154 
 
Because the US had firmly supported her election and presidency, US officials were 
unwilling to take a stronger stance on the report.  
From the peace talks onward, it was clear that strong support for a transitional 
justice process inside Liberia would not be a priority. The US took a middle ground 
approach, supporting a TRC as a compromise between complete impunity and war 
crimes trials. Since the TRC did not garner particular interest among US officials, the 
embassy worked collaboratively as a member of the ICGL throughout TRC 
operations and after its completion. It is not likely that the US will assist in the 
implementation of TRC recommendations.  
The Liberian case study offers a second illustration of US involvement in 
transitional justice. The indictment and trial of Taylor elicited strong financial and 
political support within Congress, the State Department and the Bush administration 
that saw it as a way to achieve stability and as a symbolic measure. The TRC 
received much less attention or financial support, with embassy officials involved in 
the measure mainly because of the attention it received inside Liberia, not because of 
individual interest. That being said, the US did provide considerable technical 
support to the TRC. This case study shows greater US interest in trials over truth 
commissions, especially if the trials target someone of symbolic importance that also 
coincides with geopolitical interests (i.e., regime change).   
US aims were achieved with regard to transitional justice in Liberia. The US 
can claim that its involvement in supporting Taylor’s trial has been key for increased 
stability in Liberia and the region, and has had significant symbolic value. Although 
the TRC recommendation to sanction President Sirleaf was controversial, by leaving 
the report ‘up to the Liberians’, the US was able to sidestep the issue and continue its 
support for the Sirleaf administration.  
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Within Liberia, the situation is not as clear. Taylor supporters remain in the 
country, and some have positions in government. President Sirleaf has to carry out a 
delicate balancing act to maintain peace. She challenged the constitutionality of the 
TRC recommendation to sanction her and others mentioned in the report, but has 
done little else to advance the implementation of other recommendations. Although 
much of the Liberian population is relieved that violence has decreased in part 
because of Taylor’s removal from power and prosecution, and are generally positive 
about the TRC, competing views about transitional justice remain. Some still want 
war crimes trials inside Liberia; some want all TRC recommendations implemented 
immediately; and some want to ‘let bygones be bygones’ (Bird, 2010a). Many are 
concerned about their standard of living.  
US involvement has both helped and hindered the development of transitional 
justice aims in Liberia. A former senior official at the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
said: ‘An African head of state being tried in Europe is highly offensive on a 
symbolic level’ (Cruvellier, 2006). Nevertheless, the absence of immunity for heads 
of state is an important precedent in international criminal law. Some argue that the 
US has some responsibility for violations in Liberia, and US involvement in 
transitional justice ensured that this responsibility goes unaddressed. Whether or not 
there is a basis for these claims, the US does not bear the greatest responsibility for 
violations committed by Taylor.105  Taylor’s responsibility is clear and warranted a 
trial. Discussion needs to continue about issues raised by the truth commission, 
however, at the very least, the commission initiated debate about the history of 
violence in Liberia.  
                                                
105 For more on third state responsibility for serious human rights violations, see Bird, 2010b.  
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The next chapter undertakes the third and final case study in this research, 
that of US involvement in the Justice and Peace Process in Colombia. This chapter 
will provide another opportunity to explore the forces that shape US foreign policy 
on transitional justice.  
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Chapter 5 US Involvement in the Colombian Justice and Peace Process  
The last chapter examined the forces that shaped US foreign policy on the second 
case study of this project, that of the trial of Liberian President Charles Taylor and 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This chapter undertakes the third and final 
case study of this project, which considers US involvement in the Justice and Peace 
Process (JPP) in Colombia.  
Colombia continues to experience the longest-running armed conflict in the 
world today. There has been a great deal of fluctuation both in the intensity of the 
fighting, and the range and organisation of the actors involved over nearly half a 
century of hostilities. Huge numbers of Colombians, both civilians and fighters, have 
been killed since the violence began in 1963. One exhaustive study claims that nearly 
four million people were the direct victims of armed violence from 1964 to 2004. If 
one also includes those injured and direct family members of victims, the proportion 
of the population affected would be 40 to 50 percent (INDEPAZ, 2007). The conflict 
has internally displaced approximately three million persons in Colombia, and has 
resulted in over 80,000 refugees in Ecuador (UNHCR, 2009).  
When Colombian President Alvaro Uribe entered into office, he made talks 
with the paramilitary umbrella group, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia 
(AUC), the foundation of his government’s peace policy. The Colombian 
government and the AUC signed a peace accord that required paramilitary 
demobilization. It also opened debate about accountability for the violations 
committed by those who demobilized. After two years of negotiations in the 
Colombian Congress, the Justice and Peace Law (Law 975/05) was adopted in 2005, 
the first transitional justice law in Colombia’s history. The law required the 
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establishment of a ‘Justice and Peace Unit’ (JPU), which would be responsible for 
taking the testimony of ex-combatants that perpetrated illicit acts. If a full 
‘confession’ was made, those who participated in the justice and peace process 
would be offered reduced sentences of five to eight years. The law also called for the 
establishment of the National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation 
(CNRR), which would be responsible for ensuring victim participation and 
reparation.   
More than two years into the process, President Uribe extradited 14 AUC 
leaders to the US. This decision was very controversial as many felt it negatively 
impacted the justice and peace process by making access to the leaders much more 
difficult and taking away their incentive to participate in the process.  
This case study focuses on the Justice and Peace Law and the institutions it 
created because they instigated much of the discussion and activism on transitional 
justice. It also represents some of the diversity of transitional justice measures since 
it concerns an alternative judicial unit and a commission on reparations and 
reconciliation, based in Latin America, while conflict continues. Although some 
believe transitional justice cannot take place in a country where no transition has 
occurred (Uprimny, 2007; Laplante and Theidon, 2006; ICTJ, 2011), this study 
views the JPP as a transitional justice measure since the Colombian government and 
civil society actors have adopted transitional justice terminology to describe the 
process.  
The US has played an important, though under-examined, role in the 
Colombian justice and peace process. This chapter first looks at the US role in the 
negotiations of the Justice and Peace Law and then explores US assistance to the 
process, focusing on the Justice Department’s support of the Justice and Peace Unit 
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and USAID’s support of the CNRR. It then examines the extradition of paramilitary 
leaders to the US. It concludes with some ideas about the reasons for US 
involvement, as well as its impact on the process. The chapter draws on archival 
research undertaken in Washington, DC and Colombia, and 58 Colombia-specific 
interviews with officials from the US and Colombian governments, international 
organizations, as well as Colombian and international NGOs (See Appendix 2 for 
interview list). Before turning to the justice and peace process, a review of US 
foreign policy in Colombia provides useful background information.  
 
5.1 US Foreign Policy in Colombia  
The Colombian conflict has its roots in the assassination of the Liberal Party’s 
presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in 1948, which sparked riots in Bogotá. 
The riots gave rise to ‘La Violencia’, a ten-year period of civil conflict in the 
countryside between supporters of the Liberal and Conservative parties, which 
resulted in between 200,000 to 300,000 deaths. La Violencia ended in 1957 with an 
agreement between the Liberals and the Conservatives to take turns to govern the 
country. Nevertheless, the conflict continued in rural areas, where peasant armies 
joined with leftist guerrillas to gain or retain possession of land. The 1960s saw the 
emergence of several non-state armed groups in remote areas of the country, in 
particular the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia (FARC).106  
                                                
106 FARC remains the largest and oldest insurgent group in the Americas. It claims to be a 
revolutionary, agrarian, anti-imperialist Marxist-Leninist organization of Bolivarian inspiration that 
represents the rural poor in a struggle against Colombia’s wealthier classes. ELN was formed in 1963 
by ‘Catholic radicals and left-wing intellectuals’, and ideologically was influenced by the Cuban 
Revolution (Hansom, 2009; Forero, 2005a). 
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This period witnessed close cooperation between the US and Colombia to 
develop the latter’s internal security apparatus, ultimately yielding the most 
successful counterguerrilla operations of that time in the Western Hemisphere 
(Rempe, 2002: 4). The origin of modern US internal security policy in Colombia can 
be traced back to a CIA Special Team survey of 1959. The first tangible effort to 
assist Colombian military forces in their struggle against internal violence was a 
‘special impact shipment’ of approximately $1.5 million worth of military hardware 
in late 1961 to enable orden público (public order) missions. These efforts led to a 
vastly expanded internal security effort under Military Assistance Program support. 
Concerning the nature of the violence problem, a clear distinction emerged between 
criminally motivated violence and the more complex phenomena of violence posed 
by insurgent groups (Ibid: 31).  
By the 1980s, FARC carried out an increasing number of kidnappings with 
the aim of exerting political pressure on the Colombian government, and began 
working with drug barons on drug production in order to finance its political and 
military operations. By the end of the decade, FARC was involved in most phases of 
coca production and trafficking.  
Paramilitary groups initially emerged during this period to provide private 
security for important economic and political sectors in Colombia, who used them to 
protect their interests from non-state armed groups.107 Despite the rise in these 
groups, FARC reached the peak of its military powers in the late 1990s. During this 
time, FARC and ELN expanded operations to such an extent that they influenced or 
controlled local government in over half the country’s 1,000 municipalities (CRS, 
                                                
107 Carrillo-Suarez, 1999: 7. The emergence of paramilitaries was part of the State’s counter-
insurgency strategy, but the involvement of paramilitaries themselves in drug trafficking progressively 
located them outside the orbit of State control (Escobar, 2011).  
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2001: 1). In response, then-Governor Uribe in Antioquia promoted the establishment 
of civilian rural defense groups in 1994 called ‘Convivir’. Over 400 Convivir groups 
were created, until the Constitutional Court declared them unlawful in 1997. By that 
time, the Convivir groups had been accused of committing human rights abuses; 
some were also believed to have served as fronts for, or were otherwise linked to, 
paramilitary groups (CRS, 2002b: 3; US State Department, 1997: 462). 
In addition to Convivir and other ‘self-defence’ groups, a number of 
paramilitary groups began forming. The Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y 
Urabá (ACCU) was formed in 1994 in order to defeat non-state armed groups, 
recruiting new members and expanding its control of territory throughout the 1990s 
(ICG, 2007: 3). These various, scattered paramilitary groups consolidated in 1997 
with the creation of an umbrella body – the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia 
(AUC). The AUC’s foundational document stated that the group was ‘a politico-
military movement. Based upon the right of legitimate defence the AUC had an anti-
subversive character and claimed for transformations within the State but did not 
seek to threaten its integrity’ (Escobar, 2011). The AUC comprised nearly 4,000 
fighters organised into military and vigilante units, death squads, logistic and 
intelligence units (ICG, 2007: 3). From 1998 to 2001, the AUC’s strategy mainly 
comprised of a terror campaign against the alleged ‘social bases’ of FARC and ELN, 
in collusion with the public forces. The focus was thus on civilians, and not on 
attempting to defeat non-state armed groups.108 By 2002, it was estimated there were 
                                                
108 It has been argued that the AUC facilitated the paramilitaries’ transition from private drug-barons’ 
armies to political actors, and represented finding a ‘public objective’ to cover their ‘private goal’ of 
increasing territorial expansion (Cubides, 1995/1998/2005a/2005b). The AUC had access to a variety 
of financial resources, mainly through the cocaine and heroin markets, assisted by complex regional 
and/or local alliances with elites and organized crime. So, although the AUC allied itself with the 
Colombian government against other non-state armed groups, it was simultaneously at loggerheads 
with the State in the fight against drugs (Gutiérrez and Barón, 2006: 272).  
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approximately 12,000 fighters in the AUC,109 which was operating in the majority of 
Colombia’s provinces (Presidencia de la República, 2006: 8). The AUC had become 
increasingly involved in drug trafficking, eventually deriving 70% of its income from 
this activity (ICG, 2007: 3).  
Colombia’s cocaine production became a major source of heroin in the US. 
The Clinton administration declared drug trafficking a threat to national security and 
Colombia became the number one recipient of US military aid in the Americas (CRS, 
2002a). Despite a sharp rise in military aid under his watch, Republicans called 
Clinton soft on ‘narco-terrorists’, and favoured spraying as the best way to fight coca 
cultivation (Jones, 2009: 354). Plan Colombia was announced in September 1999 
and was initially meant to last three years. The plan increased US aid to Colombia 
from $50 million to $1 billion. 80% of the aid went to Colombia’s armed forces, and 
most of that support for aerial spraying. Colombian military personnel received (and 
continues to receive) training in the US, or from US instructors in Colombia (US 
State Department, 2011). In the early 2000s, the US had 1,400 military personnel and 
contractors operating in Colombia (this limit set by Congress) (CorpWatch, 2011). 
However, the US was not authorised to use military force in Colombia, and all its 
activities required authorisation by the Colombian government. 
When President Bush entered office in 2001, and even before 9/11, US policy 
was shifting from counternarcotics to counterinsurgency. Undersecretary of State for 
Political Affairs Marc Grossman said that Bush supported Plan Colombia ‘without 
restrictions’ (El Tiempo, 2001). He said, ‘President Pastrana’s government is 
engaged in a struggle that matters to everyone in this hemisphere’ (Selsky, 2001). 
More directly, a senior Pentagon official said, ‘We no longer view the FARC and 
                                                
109 ICG, 2007: 4. 
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ELN guerrillas as an internal threat to the security of Colombia, but as a threat to the 
security of the US’ (Jones, 2009: 357). Another official agreed, ‘it’s time to drop the 
fiction of antinarcotics aid only. Americans are targets in Colombia’ (Ibid). Under 
the new policy, said another, ‘we are talking about more direct military-to-military 
support’ (Ibid). 
The 9/11 attacks helped justify this shift in security thinking and 
counterterrorism became the new US policy in Colombia. Shortly after 9/11, State 
Department counterterrorism coordinator Francis Taylor told Congress: 
One can argue that modern terrorism originated in our Hemisphere. We 
date its advent from 1968…when revolutionary movements began 
forming throughout the Americas. In those early years, Latin America 
saw more international terrorist attacks than any other region. Today, the 
most dangerous international terrorist group in this hemisphere is the 
Revolutionary Armed Forced of Colombia (US House of Representatives, 
2001). 
 
US Marine commander James Jones explained: ‘Counterterrorism was a more 
palatable mantle than counternarcotics for waging counterinsurgency, which many in 
Washington feared after Vietnam. And it was easy to make the case for drugs as a 
terrorist threat’ (Jones, 2009: 358). With his peace process failing, Pastrana asked 
Bush in November 2001 to include Colombia in the global war on terrorism and 
allow use of US antidrug helicopters for counterinsurgency operations (Forero, 2001).  
President Uribe’s election in 2002 brought US and Colombian foreign 
policies closer together (Pardo, 2009: 38). Uribe came to be considered by the Bush 
administration as ‘an unswerving caretaker for Washington's drug war in Latin 
America’ (Forero, 2006). Uribe called his policy ‘democratic security’ and doubled 
defense spending and the size of the armed forces. He was a strong proponent of Plan 
Colombia and moved the country to the front lines of the global war on terror.110 
                                                
110 Forero, 2002. Colombia was one of the few Latin American countries to support the war in Iraq. 
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That year, a Republican Congress approved what is referred to as expanded authority, 
permitting counter-drug funding to be used in the counter-terror fight. US 
Ambassador William Wood referred to this shift as a ‘real breakthrough’ in US 
policy in Colombia:  
This has allowed our twin-goals - counter-drug, counter-terror - to match 
up with the Colombian government's twin goals - counter-drug, counter-
terror - and has permitted a level of coordination and cooperation that we 
never had before (Wood, 2005). 
 
In addition to counternarcotics and counterterrorism policies, Ambassador Wood 
mentioned a third goal for US policy in Colombia: ‘to assist Colombia to be the sort 
of firm ground for democracy, decency, development, and stability in an increasingly 
troubled region’ (Ibid). The US looked to Colombia to serve as a counterweight to 
Venezuela and to provide a favourable trade environment, especially for oil (Forero, 
2006).  
The focus, however, was clearly on drugs and terrorism, as evidenced by US 
foreign assistance to Colombia. Between fiscal year 2000-2008, the US provided 
over $6 billion to support Plan Colombia, making Colombia a top foreign aid 
recipient with the largest US embassy in the world (2000 employees, 450 of which 
are military; and 32 US agencies) (Bouvier, 2005; Wood, 2005). Nearly $5 billion 
went to the Defense and State Departments to reduce illicit narcotics and improve 
security.111 Just over $1 billion went to USAID and the State Department ‘to promote 
                                                
111 Under the direction of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), the 
Departments of State and Defense oversaw nearly $4.9 billion to the Colombian military and National 
Police for Plan Colombia’s counternarcotics and improved security objectives (US GAO, 2008: 1). 
State provided most of this assistance, focusing on five major aviation programs for the Colombian 
Army, Air Force, and National Police. Most State assistance for Colombia is overseen by its Bureau 
for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (State/INL), though the Bureau for Political 
and Military Affairs is responsible for FMF and IMET funds. State/INL’s Narcotics Affairs Section 
(NAS) in the US Embassy Bogotá oversees daily program operations. State’s Office of Aviation 
supports the NAS with advisors and contract personnel who are involved with the implementation of 
US assistance provided to the Colombian Army’s Plan Colombia Helicopter Program (PCHP) and the 
National Police’s Aerial Eradication Program. The Military Group in the US Embassy Bogotá 
manages both Defense counternarcotics support and State FMF and IMET funding (Ibid: 15).  
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social and economic justice’. The largest share of this nonmilitary assistance went 
toward alternative development, which was considered a key element of 
counternarcotics assistance (US GAO, 2008: 48). Other social programs included 
assistance for Colombia’s demobilization, reparations and reconciliation agenda 
(examined in the following section), and funding contributed to the Department of 
Justice for judicial reform.112  
High levels of military spending eventually drew widespread criticism, 
including from within the US government. A controversial report from the US 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded that Plan Colombia’s drug-
reduction goals were not met, in part, because of a heavy reliance on aerial spraying 
(US GAO, 2008: 71). In response, a Democrat Congress reduced appropriations in 
2008 for Colombian military and police programs and increased appropriations for 
nonmilitary programs.113 In describing the 2008 budget request, a House Report 
stated:  
The Committee continues to have grave concerns with the current aid 
package that emphasizes hard-side assistance over development 
assistance…The Committee’s funding plan emphasizes a more balanced 
strategy shifting aid from the military and strengthening civilian 
governance, humanitarian assistance, and rural development (US House 
Report 110-197, 2008). 
 
Congress realigned the funding from a mix of 76% military/police aid – 24% aid for 
alternative development closer to a 55% (military/police aid) – 45% (alternative 
development) split. They also increased aid to strengthen the justice sector, providing 
more prosecutors and training for the Fiscalía (Attorney General’s Office). Congress 
also initiated a plan to transition more of the military operations from US 
responsibility to the Colombian government, leading toward an eventual 
                                                
112 For the exact figures given to these agencies between 2000-2008, see Appendix 6 and US GAO, 
2008.  
113 US GAO, 2008: 3. This funding shift can be seen in the US State Department, ND. Exact figures 
are included in Appendix 6.  
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`nationalization' or ‘Colombianization’ of the military package. They requested a 
greater emphasis on interdiction, rather than the eradication, of drugs (Ibid). 
The shift in funding from military to nonmiltary spending was accompanied 
by a slight increase in attention to human rights. In 2009, Congress started requiring 
the State Department to determine and certify that the Colombian government and 
Armed Forces were meeting statutory criteria related to human rights in order to 
receive the full balance of funds designated for assistance to the Colombian Armed 
Forces to be obligated.114 Some interviewees stated that although the certification 
was given fairly easily at the start, the process has become more rigorous.115 In 
addition, the ‘Leahy vetting law’ prohibits US military assistance to foreign military 
units that violate human rights with impunity (US Foreign Operations Authorization 
Act, 2001).  
The State Department has assured that the US will ‘remain a reliable partner 
in Colombia’s efforts to accomplish its counternarcotics, counterterrorism, economic 
and social development, human rights and humanitarian assistance goals’ (US State 
Department, ND). As of 2008, State anticipated that billions of dollars in additional 
aid would still be needed through at least 2013 ‘to help achieve a desired end-state 
where drug, security, social and economic welfare, and civil society problems reach 
manageable levels’ (GAO, 2008: 71). Despite shifts in US policy, the GAO remained 
concerned that US efforts were not guided by an integrated plan that fully addressed 
                                                
114 This determination and certification is pursuant to Section 7046(b) of the Department of State, 
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2009. This law requires the State 
Department to certify that the Government of Colombia is prosecuting members of the armed forces 
who have committed human rights violations; severing links with paramilitary organizations or 
successor armed groups; dismantling paramilitary networks and returning illegally acquired land to 
their rightful occupants; and respecting the rights of Colombia's indigenous and Afro-Colombian 
communities. 
115 For example, see State Department official, interview, 12 March 2010; See also US State 
Department, 2009/2010). 
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the complex mix of agency programs, differing agency goals and varying timetables 
for nationalization (Ibid).   
To conclude, the Clinton administration adopted Plan Colombia, a program 
that dramatically increased assistance to the Colombian military to eradicate drugs 
primarily by aerial spraying. US policy shifted from a focus on counternarcotics to 
counterterrorism following 9/11, fostering a close relationship between the Bush and 
Uribe administrations. By 2008, with the Democrats in control of Congress and 
evidence that US drug eradication policy had been ineffective, the US realigned its 
funding allocation in order to provide a more equal split between military and 
nonmilitary spending. Nonmilitary spending went primarily to alternative 
development but also to human rights. Part of the human rights work involved 
attention and assistance to the justice and peace process, which emerged in the 2000s. 
The following section examines the role of the US in this process.   
 
5.2 The Justice and Peace Process 
On the day Alvaro Uribe was inaugurated as President of Colombia, FARC launched 
an attack on the presidential palace, killing 20 civilians. As a result, President Uribe 
began a vigorous campaign to defeat FARC and other non-state armed groups, 
receiving generous US support for his offensive.116 Due to this approach with the 
FARC, Uribe made talks with the AUC the foundation of his government’s peace 
policy (Carrillo, 2009: 134). Considering the links between the AUC and the 
Colombian government, some were skeptical of Uribe’s and AUC motives for 
engaging in the talks (Adam Isacson, interview, 2 March 2010). Nevertheless, in July 
                                                
116 In 2004, President Uribe received generous US support for Plan Patriota, which created mobile 
military units to launch an offensive against FARC in its southern Colombian strongholds (Isacson, 
2010; ICG, 2009).   
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2003, the Colombian government and the AUC signed a framework peace accord at 
Santa Fé de Ralito committing the paramilitaries to full demobilization by the end of 
2005 (a deadline that was subsequently extended) (ICG, 2004).117  
Due to the high level of human rights violations that had been committed by 
the AUC,118 it was apparent that some form of legal framework was needed to define 
the kind of judicial treatment that would be accorded to demobilized AUC members. 
Defining this legal framework took nearly two years and captivated the attention of 
the government, civil society and international actors. This section focuses on the 
role of the US in the negotiations. The majority of Colombian interviewees said the 
US was not involved in the negotiations, however, this section shows that although it 
was not as prominent as in other measures, the US role – particularly the threat of 
extradition of paramilitary leaders to the US – was crucial to debates of the law.  
President Bush warmed to Uribe’s talks with the AUC, even though the AUC, 
along with FARC and ELN, were on US terrorist lists.119 Although this complicated 
contributing funds for the demobilization process, one US official said: ‘This is the 
first semi-serious show of intent on the part of one of these armed groups. I don’t 
think it matters [that they are on the terrorist list]’ (Jones, 2009: 362). The State 
Department’s narcotics chief Robert Charles said: ‘A window of opportunity has 
                                                
117 In addition to whatever deals were offered by the Colombian government, the threat of extradition 
to the US was also viewed as an important motive for the AUC’s sudden desire to negotiate its 
demobilization and reintegration (Carrillo, 2009: 150). 
118 According to Colombia’s Defensoría del Pueblo (Human Rights Ombudsman) and the Vice 
President’s Human Rights Observatory, paramilitaries were responsible for the majority of 1,969 
massacres, resulting in 10,174 deaths, recorded in the country between January 1994 and December 
2003. By mid-2002, violations by paramilitary groups had declined and those attributed to the 
FARC—especially massacres—rose sharply (El Tiempo, 2004h). 
119 President Bush designated the FARC and the AUC organizations as ‘Significant Foreign Narcotics 
Traffickers’ in May 2003 and as ‘Specially Designated Global Terrorists’ in October 2001. Eighteen 
AUC members were also added to a list of foreign narcotics trafficking ‘kingpins’, which applied 
economic sanctions under the Kingpin Act. A US Treasury press release stated: ‘These Kingpin Act 
designations reinforce the reality that the FARC and the AUC are not simply terrorist/guerrilla 
organizations fighting within Colombia to achieve political agendas.  They are part and parcel of the 
narcotics production and export threat to the United States, as well as Europe and other countries of 
Latin America’ (US Department of Treasury, 2004).   
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opened that will not always remain open. President Uribe has taken a huge risk, and 
we must do everything in our power to facilitate these peace efforts’ (Maseri, 2004).  
The Bush administration got around terrorism-financing laws by providing 
support to the OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process (MAPP-OEA), an 
organization which the US said could receive funds without infringing on US 
laws.120 The US supported the collective demobilization of over 32,000 AUC 
members. In addition, more than 20,000 members of the FARC, AUC, ELN and 
other illegal armed groups individually surrendered their arms. By April 2006, the 
High Commissioner for Peace announced that the demobilisation process was 
complete (ICG, 2011); however, it was not completely effective.121  
As part of its obligations under the demobilization agreement, the Uribe 
administration introduced the draft Alternative Penalty Law in August 2003, which, 
under certain conditions, pardoned members of illegal armed groups already 
convicted of crimes who demobilized and agreed to a set of minimal conditions. This 
draft was heavily criticized in domestic and international arenas, including in the US, 
for being too lax and not dealing adequately with victims’ rights to justice, truth and 
reparations (Carrillo, 2009: 135).  
Just a month after the Colombian government presented the draft law, 57 
members of the US Congress sent a letter to Uribe, urging him to sever all links with 
paramilitaries. The letter also raised concerns about possible impunity for human 
rights violations committed by the AUC:  
                                                
120 Center for International Policy, 2004. This announcement did not indicate resolution of the 
question whether the US could provide direct funding to the Colombian government or even NGOs if 
this were to benefit the AUC or its members (ICG, 2004). 
121 Some paramilitaries did not demobilise; others demobilised, only to re-emerge some time later to 
take up arms once more, claiming that the Colombian government had broken its promises to them. 
Other demobilised paramilitaries later became involved with drug-trafficking organizations (ICG, 
2007).  
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We have doubts about your government’s willingness to prosecute AUC 
members, including Carlos Castaño and Salvatore Mancuso, for their 
gross violations of human rights and drug trafficking in Colombia. 
Recent public statements made by Colombia’s High Commissioner for 
Peace Luis Carlos Restrepo indicate that your government may consider 
allowing these criminals to receive suspended sentences and pay 
reparations in lieu of jail time. We believe that such an exchange would 
amount to impunity for serious human rights violations and would erode 
the rule of law in Colombia, encourage further violence, and establish an 
undesirable template for future negotiations with the guerrillas. Instead, 
we encourage you to ensure that an eventual peace agreement with the 
AUC includes accountability for human rights violations, excludes the 
possibility of cash-for-justice swaps, provides for the rapid disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration of the AUC combatants, and requires 
that your government control disarmament and demobilization zones (US 
Letter to President Uribe, 2003).  
 
While members of the US Congress were concerned about impunity for serious 
human rights violations, the US State and Justice Departments were primarily 
concerned that the law would exclude the possibility of extraditing top drug 
traffickers to the US. A letter was sent to the Peace Commissioner, asking that the 
draft Alternative Penalty Law not affect the extradition of paramilitary leaders 
accused of narcotrafficking (El Tiempo, 2003a). US Ambassador William Wood met 
with proponents of the draft law and ‘insisted’ that the benefits being debated not 
allow narcotraffickers ‘to use the façade of the armed conflict in order to evade 
justice’ (El Tiempo, 2003b).  
AUC leaders were resolute about their patriotic service to the nation, and 
pledged never to serve jail time in Colombia or accept a peace deal allowing for their 
possible extradition to the US (Arnson, 2005: 5). The second in command of the 
AUC, Salvatore Mancuso, invited the US ‘to participate directly’ in the peace 
negotiations in an attempt to trade a promise not to extradite for information on the 
drug trade (El Tiempo, 2004b). Both Ambassador Wood and Assistant Secretary of 
State Roger Noriega rejected this request and reiterated US insistence on the 
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extradition of Colombians indicted in the US and on the need to bring gross violators 
of human rights and major drug traffickers to trial (Semana, 2004; Wood, 2004).  
The Colombian government was divided on the issue. Some members of the 
Colombian Congress felt that a promise not to extradite was essential in order for the 
process to move forward. In a press release, however, President Uribe said, 
‘Extradition is not negotiable,’ noting that ‘if extradition was prohibited, Colombia 
would suffer international discredit.’ But his statement also left open the possibility 
that extradition could be suspended in exchange for an individual’s cooperation with 
the process: ‘He who wants to avoid [extradition] has to show to the international 
community his good will and readiness to rectify’ (Comunicado Casa de Nariño, 
2004). 
In May 2004, it was decided that AUC paramilitary commanders would not 
be detained or extradited if they moved to a zone subject to OAS verification in the 
northern province of Cordoba and complied with agreements within the peace 
process (BBC, 2004; El Tiempo, 2004e). Four days later, US Deputy Attorney 
General Mary Lee Warren submitted an extradition request to Colombian authorities 
for six paramilitary leaders based on DOJ information about their alleged 
narcotrafficking activity (BBC, 2004; El Tiempo, 2004f). Ambassador Wood said 
that there were not clear signs the AUC wanted to break its connections with drug 
trafficking. He said they were waiting for the AUC to comply with the government’s 
requirements (El Tiempo, 2004g). Uribe suspended these requests as long as AUC 
leaders agreed to cooperate, and US pressure about extradition decreased.  
Meanwhile, debate continued for another year within the Colombian 
Congress, which had rejected a 2004 modified version of the Alternative Penalty 
Law. USAID contributed some funding to Fundación Social, an organization that 
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advised the drafting of legislation by Senator Rafael Pardo and a multi-party group of 
Congress. Fundación Social provided members of Congress with tools and 
documents about transitional justice, victims’ rights and international standards. 
Paula Gaviria, Director of Fundación Social, felt their impact was sizable in 
changing the discussion in the Colombian Congress about the law (Paula Gaviria, 
interview, 8 September 2010). The Pardo draft legislation was widely viewed as the 
most rigorous in terms of international standards and victims’ rights (Carrillo, 2009: 
143). 
The Director of USAID’s DDR program said that every provision of the law 
was discussed in USAID (Ileana Baca, interview, 31 August 2010). Gaviria 
mentioned that the relationship with USAID was positive and noted that during 
intense negotiations of the law from January to June 2005, USAID followed the 
process closely. Due to the detail of the requests for information being made, Gaviria 
had the sense that there must have been calls for information from the Ambassador 
or State Department (Paula Gaviria, interview, 8 September 2010). 
Just before the final version of a modified law was presented by President 
Uribe in 2005, members of the US Congress continued to express their concerns. 
Republican Senator Richard G. Lugar said he was concerned that the law ‘would 
leave intact the complex mafia-like structures’ by failing to require commanders to 
disclose knowledge of the organization’s operations or financing (Forero, 2005). The 
letter also said that paramilitary leaders requested for extradition in the US would 
receive extremely short sentences compared to the crimes committed (US Letter to 
President Uribe, 2005a). In another letter to Uribe, six Democratic Senators 
expressed similar concerns. They felt the terms agreed thus far could have an 
extremely negative impact on peace, justice and the rule of law in Colombia, in 
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addition to the fight against drug trafficking and terrorism (US Letter to President 
Uribe, 2005b). The House International Relations Committee said that State 
Department funding would be rejected unless a legal framework in accordance with 
human rights, truth, reparations and justice, as well as the extradition of paramilitary 
leaders, was adopted (El Tiempo, 2005a). Congress also eventually required the State 
Department to certify that the Colombian government severed links with paramilitary 
organizations and dismantled their networks before provision of financial 
assistance.122 
In June 2005, Law 975/05 was adopted and came to be known as the ‘Justice 
and Peace Law’ (JPL). The law mandated punishment for those individuals who 
committed war crimes or serious human rights violations, but offered reduced 
sentences of five to eight years if the ex-combatant gave testimony about his illicit 
acts. The law also required victims to be informed of judicial findings and allowed 
them to claim reparations from the perpetrator.  
Adam Isacson, former Director at the Center for International Policy, found it 
‘wasn’t easy’ to characterize the US approach to the talks with the AUC, but 
concluded that the approach was ‘ambivalent’ since the US had been the talks’ 
biggest foreign detractor at the same time that it was its biggest foreign financial 
supporter:  
Washington adopted a tricky position of modest support and strong 
criticism, of moving toward helping to demobilize paramilitary fighters 
while simultaneously seeking to extradite their leaders on drug charges 
(Center for International Policy, 2004).  
 
                                                
122 This determination and certification is pursuant to Section 7046(b) of the Department of State, 
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2009. This law requires the State 
Department to certify that the Government of Colombia is prosecuting members of the armed forces 
who have committed human rights violations; severing links with paramilitary organizations or 
successor armed groups; dismantling paramilitary networks and returning illegally acquired land to 
their rightful occupants; and respecting the rights of Colombia's indigenous and Afro-Colombian 
communities. 
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Publicly, US officials repeatedly expressed their support for the justice and peace 
process of the Uribe government. However, US skepticism of the law was visible in 
letters from Congress and statements from the State and Justice Departments, 
although for different reasons. Congress was concerned with the human rights 
implications of the law, while the State and Justice Departments were concerned 
about maintaining the possibility to extradite.  
These two approaches significantly impacted the negotiations. Congressional 
pressure and USAID support helped strengthen the final version of the Justice and 
Peace Law. The US was credited with lengthening the investigation time frame of 
AUC members, and ensuring a wider investigation and the loss of benefits if the 
member did not give all information known about the group structure (El Tiempo, 
2005b). Meanwhile, the State and Justice Departments remained adamant that 
extradition agreements between the two countries be upheld. Even though the law 
passed without a promise not to extradite, AUC leaders were under the impression 
that this would not take place, even with DOJ’s extradition requests during the 
negotiations. US pressure about extradition lessened, however, and the process 
moved forward.  
Upon passage, the Justice and Peace Law was hailed by Colombian 
government officials as a way to lay the groundwork for removing one of the three 
illegal armed groups battling in Colombia. ‘We are proud of this instrument,’ said 
Luis Carlos Restrepo, the country's peace commissioner (Forero, 2005). Government 
officials felt the law reflected a potentially viable balance between victims’ rights 
and political necessity (Carrillo, 2009: 135). However, the law continued to be 
heavily criticised. ‘This law tries to simulate truth, justice and reparations, but what it 
really offers is impunity,’ said Iván Cepeda, whose father, Senator Manuel Cepeda, 
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was killed by paramilitary gunmen in 1994 (Forero, 2005). Human rights groups 
condemned the law, stating it favoured the perpetrators of human rights violations 
over their victims. A New York Times opinion piece called it the ‘Impunity for Mass 
Murderers, Terrorists and Major Cocaine Traffickers Law’ (New York Times, 2005). 
Some concerns were addressed by Colombia’s Constitutional Court, which, 
immediately after ratification, reviewed and strengthened components of the law, 
increasing the criteria paramilitaries needed to meet to obtain reduced prison 
sentences and inserting language ensuring the rights of victims to participate in all 
stages of the criminal process (Triviño, 2006).  
Although little thought had gone into the law’s implementation, institutions 
were being created. The Justice and Peace Unit (JPU) established within the Fiscalía 
(Attorney General’s Office) and the National Commission for Reparation and 
Reconciliation (CNRR) were two key bodies created to implement the Justice and 
Peace Law. In response to Uribe’s requests for international assistance, the US was 
one of the first foreign governments to support the law’s implementation. US support 
came primarily from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and USAID. The remainder of 
this section describes and assesses the involvement of these two agencies in the 
transitional justice measures created by the Justice and Peace Law.   
 
Justice Department support of the Justice and Peace Unit  
The US Justice Department has a long history of involvement in Colombia. Since the 
1990s, the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training 
(OPDAT) and International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program 
(ICITAP) have worked in Bogotá, helping to shift Colombia’s legal system from an 
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inquisitorial to an adversarial one.123 Some referred to this shift as the US ‘exporting’ 
its legal system, while others more critically called it the ‘colonization’ of the justice 
system (Crandall, 2002). When asked why the DOJ got involved in the justice and 
peace process, one official said it was ‘fundamental to the development of the 
Colombian justice system.’ But he also placed DOJ’s involvement within the broader 
goals of US foreign policy:  
Colombia is very strategic to the USG in terms of where it sits 
geographically but also politically, historically as a close ally of the US 
and from a law enforcement perspective given the criminal and terrorist 
organizations and years of being a central focus of cocaine trafficking 
(DOJ official 1, email communication, 8 September 2010).     
 
More specifically, he spoke about DOJ’s longstanding relationship with the Fiscalía, 
and with the newly appointed director of the unit, Luis Gonzales Leon, whom the 
DOJ had worked closely with before his appointment as head of the Justice and 
Peace Unit (JPU). Failure to support the newly created unit within the Fiscalía, the 
official added, would have been ‘irresponsible’ considering it would be responsible 
for much of the law’s requirements. For example, in order to receive the reduced 
sentence offered by the Justice and Peace Law, special prosecutors in the JPU were 
mandated to take the testimony of ex-combatants about the illicit acts they 
perpetrated as a member of an illegal armed group.  
Initially, DOJ was the only international actor working with the Justice and 
Peace Unit. DOJ’s approach was to look at the law from the optics of the accusatory 
system and to focus on obtaining information. DOJ therefore focused its assistance 
on helping build JPU capacity to aid in the investigation and prosecution of crimes 
committed by former paramilitary members (US State Department, 2009: 39). A 
                                                
123 USAID’s Justice Program in Colombia was also involved in this work from 1995-2005. The 
USAID Justice Reform and Modernization Program (2006-2010) was established to train judicial 
operators in the new accusatory system and create ‘justice houses’, virtual hearing rooms in remote, 
conflict prone areas, Public Defender Offices and support civil society organizations to promote 
justice reform and expand justice services (USAID, 2008).  
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DOJ official explained how paramilitaries ‘ran’ initial sessions with JPU prosecutors. 
To respond to this problem, DOJ arranged proffer sessions with prosecutors and 
investigators in order to help them to ‘think’ like prosecutors (DOJ official 1, 
interview, 6 September 2010). DOJ was also involved in training exhumation units, 
and arranged closed-circuit sessions with paramilitaries.  
The greatest bilateral contribution to JPU came from the US. For fiscal years 
2006-2010, Congress allocated about half of State Department INL funds (approx. 
$45 million) to the Fiscalía, and $7 million was specifically earmarked for JPU. DOJ 
donations contributed to JPU training, equipment and operational support (See 
Appendix 6 for exact figures).  
The Justice Department influenced interpretations of the Justice and Peace 
Law and its implementation. DOJ’s emphasis on the judicial aspect of the law meant 
that issues relating to victims’ rights and truth-telling did not receive as much 
attention, despite provisions for these components in the law. A DOJ official felt that 
the law, by including judicial and truth components, had two aims that were in 
conflict with each other. He admitted that DOJ’s focus was on prosecutorial and 
investigative capacities, adding ‘if that happens to mean the prosecution of human 
rights abuses and the inclusion of victims, that’s not a problem.’ Although research 
has shown that judicial and truth-telling aims may be complementary (Hayner, 2001), 
the official said that ‘DOJ sees its role as different from a human rights agenda’ 
(DOJ official 1, interview, 6 September 2010).  
According to the same DOJ official, the justice and peace process in 
Colombia is the first transitional justice mechanism the DOJ has been involved in, 
which may explain its unfamiliarity or unwillingness to consider the ways in which a 
legal process may also benefit victims. A DOJ official explained that DOJ’s role in 
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Colombia is unique, in part because JPL is ‘so unique’. He said that DOJ colleagues 
in Eastern Europe and Africa have asked DOJ-Colombia for advice on assistance, 
specifically about their work on plea bargaining and exhumations. He noted:  
DOJ is underutilized in foreign assistance efforts and has a significant 
contribution to make given DOJ’s expertise and unique perspective in the 
area of criminal justice development. Our efforts in Colombia have 
clearly demonstrated that. The Department of State has traditionally 
looked to contractors rather than working with DOJ and using existing 
USG resources. What we have done in Colombia demonstrates a more 
effective foreign assistance approach with respect to justice development 
including your focus: transitional justice. As we discussed development 
of effective criminal investigation and prosecution capabilities are 
essential to any transitional justice effort (DOJ official 1, email 
communication, 7 September 2010). 
 
He felt that DOJ’s relationship with Colombian prosecutors is an example of US 
foreign policy working right – since the two have worked ‘hand in hand’ for many 
years. JPU Director Luis Gonzales Leon confirmed that the relationship with the 
DOJ had been positive (Luis Gonzales Leon, interview, 3 September 2010).  
 
USAID support of the National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation 
Like the Justice Department, USAID has also been active in Colombia for many 
years. It has supported government agencies and civil society groups, and views 
itself as a facilitator between the two (USAID official 1, interview, 18 August 2010). 
USAID created the Demobilization and Reintegration program within its Office for 
Vulnerable Populations in 2005. The program’s initial focus was on supporting the 
reintegration of demobilized ex-combatants (helping to implement Colombia’s 
Demobilization and Reintegration Law 782/2002) and to support conflict victims’ 
guarantees of truth, justice, judicial reparations and guarantees of no repetition, as 
part of the justice and peace process (helping to implement the Justice and Peace 
Law 975/2005). This section focuses on USAID support to the CNRR, since this was 
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the main institution created by the Justice and Peace Law to address the needs of 
victims.  
The Justice and Peace Law created the CNRR to ensure victim participation 
in the judicial process, recommend criteria for reparations and advance reconciliation 
projects, along with a range of other tasks. The CNRR is comprised of government 
officials, as well as representatives of civil society and of the victims themselves. It 
was given an ambitious mandate that includes monitoring and reporting on key 
aspects of DDR and reparations processes.  
USAID was the first international contributor to CNRR. When asked if and 
how USAID assistance had impacted the Commission, CNRR President Eduardo 
Pizarro said it had changed the Commission’s priorities (Eduardo Pizarro, interview, 
7 September 2010). USAID took the lead in supporting the Commission in the 
following ways during its first phase of work in this area from 2006-2010 (USAID, 
2010): 
- Design of a victims reparations fund  
- Design of a victims database and asset identification database in order to 
monitor reparations 
- Support for the regulatory framework for implementing reparations 
- Support to field offices and their outreach activities to build a service network 
for victims  
- Strengthening of judicial counseling and representation for victims  
- Pilot reparations projects  
 
USAID contributed nearly $3 million for these activities with the greatest 
contribution for CNRR regional offices and a pilot project on collective reparations 
(See Appendix 6 for exact figures). Pizarro explained how USAID’s confidence in 
the process generated a snowball effect where other international donors became 
involved (Eduardo Pizarro, interview, 7 September 2010). Nevertheless, in the initial 
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years of the Commission’s operation between 2006-2010, US assistance far 
surpassed that of other donors, as depicted in the following table.124   
Figure 11: International assistance to the CNRR 
Donor Amount 
(in millions of pesos) 
Percentage 
Canada 1.818 7 
Spain 3.111 12 
Netherlands 4.820 19 
UNDP 2.432 10 
Sweden 2.997 12 
Switzerland 983 4 
US 7.247 29 
Others 1.671 7 
 
UNDP coordinates international assistance to the process, except for assistance from 
the US, since USAID chose to meet with Colombian government agencies separately. 
In order to determine its funding priorities, USAID holds consultative meetings 
every two months with a range of Colombian government agencies (Acción Social, 
CNRR, Fiscalía, Procuraduría, Ministry of Interior and Justice, etc.) responsible for 
implementing the justice and peace process. The organizations that implement 
USAID programs, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and 
Management Sciences for Development, Inc. (MSD), also attend these meetings.125  
When asked why USAID does not coordinate its efforts with UNDP, an OAS 
official said it was because USAID knew more about the topic and wanted to 
maintain its autonomy (Daniel Millares, interview, 23 August 2010). USAID does, 
however, take part in an interinstitutional committee on transitional justice (created 
in 2008), led by the Colombian Ministry of the Interior and Justice. 
                                                
124 Data provided by CNRR Executive Director Catalina Martínez Guzman, 4 September 2010.  
125 In an interview with IOM Project Coordinator María Mejía, I asked her why she thought IOM was 
chosen as the primary US operator. Mejia discussed IOM’s long history in Colombia (nearly 60 years), 
their close relationship with the US and Colombian governments and their expertise in the field (i.e., 
experience with DDR in 20 countries and work on reparations) (María Mejía, interview, 9 September 
2010). 
181 
 
A CNRR director said that USAID was the most flexible and comprehensive 
donor with a coherent approach at the political and technical levels (Catalina 
Martínez, interview, 26 August 2010). Acción Social’s Director of International 
Cooperation Viviana Tamayo said that USAID shifted its funding approach based on 
consultative meetings with Colombian government agencies (Viviana Cañon 
Tamayo, interview, 20 September 2010). New initiatives between 2010 and 2013 
were to focus on the following:  
- Reconciliation – continue to support CNRR reconciliation work; assist 
regional, local and community initiatives; contribute to systemization and 
visibility of reconciliation initiatives 
- Reparations (collective, judicial and administrative) – strengthen processes to 
search out and identify the remains of the disappeared (judicial reparations); 
assist Acción Social to accelerate adjudication of victims’ applications 
(administrative reparations); formalize collective reparations measures 
undertaken in pilot sites (collective reparations)  
- Restitution of Goods – support National Land Fund and Regional 
Commissions for Restitution of Goods 
- Historical Memory – assist CNRR Area for Historical Memory  
- Judicial Assistance to Victims – strengthen victims’ defense through the 
National Ombudsman and by direct institutional support to victims’ 
organizations 
- Integrated Assistance to Victims – re-establish socio-economic security for 
victimized populations through income generation, training and psycho-social 
attention.  
 
USAID was also responsive to the requests of international NGOs. For example, 
eight NGOs urged the head of the USAID Colombia office to assist the justice and 
peace process by providing more lawyers for the victims participating in the process 
and logistical support so they could access national and virtual hearings (NGO Letter 
to Susan Reichle, 2009).  
In addition, USAID also funded civil society organizations working on the 
process. For example, MSD has given one-year contracts to organizations that work 
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with victims who are bringing cases before the JPU.126 One grantee said USAID-
MSD was the first donor with interest in the justice and peace process. His 
organization, País Libre, received MSD funding from 2007-2009 for their work 
accompanying victims through the justice and peace process and providing judicial 
representation (Edgar Gomez, interview, 7 September 2010). Sweden is now funding 
the work. Another grantee said that MSD had been an important facilitator between 
civil society and government agencies: ‘MSD presence helps make things happen at 
the Ministry of Interior’ (Angela Ceron, interview, 1 September 2010). The main 
criticism was that one-year grants were not renewed or took a long time to receive, 
which meant that these organizations had to stop services for victims. USAID-MSD 
grants also did not include funds for administrative costs, unlike most other donor 
grants.  
Some NGOs that work on the justice and peace process refuse to accept US 
assistance because of US funding for Plan Colombia. The Colombian Commission of 
Jurists (CCJ), for example, does not accept US funds for reasons of security and 
credibility. CCJ President Gustavo Gallón explained that because US funds go to the 
military, those who accept them can become mixed up with the war and subject to 
guerilla attacks (Gustavo Gallón, interview, 10 September 2010).  
Despite its concerns about the law, the US was one of the first foreign 
governments to support the justice and peace process and provided more funding 
than other international donors. Among US agencies, the Justice Department and 
USAID played the most active roles in the actual implementation of the law – from 
trainings to technical assistance to pilot projects. DOJ’s role in a transitional justice 
                                                
126 For example, MSD works with Fundación País Libre, Fundación Infancia, Corporación Nación, 
Corporación por Pública, Fundación Dos Mundos. These organizations provide psycho-social support 
and legal support for victims bringing cases before the JPU.   
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measure is unique since the agency does not typically carry out similar work 
elsewhere, but may do so in the future.  
US assistance to the Justice and Peace Unit and the National Commission for 
Reparation and Reconciliation was continually discussed by Colombian government 
officials as critical to the development and operation of these institutions. Perhaps 
this is to be expected when international assistance is still needed, but JPU and 
CNRR staff generally found the US contribution to be effective, efficient and 
pragmatic. In addition, they felt that US donors wanted to know what funds were 
necessary to realize projects, but were not so strict that funds could not be moved 
around if necessary.  
US involvement in the justice and peace process has allowed it to shape the 
process in a number of ways. The DOJ focused its assistance on the development of 
prosecutorial and investigative capacities and exhumations as opposed to victim 
participation. USAID emphasized particular programming on reparations, but was 
open to shifting funds based on Colombian government, international NGO and civil 
society recommendations.   
This section also highlighted how the US was the first donor to support the 
institutions created by the Justice and Peace Law and how this influenced other 
donor contributions. CNRR and JPU staff discussed how donors specialized in 
certain areas. For example, a CNRR staff member spoke about how Spain (the 
second highest donor country to Colombia) funds institutions;127 Sweden funds 
NGOs; Holland contributes to strengthening public policy; Switzerland focuses on 
historical memory; and Norway contributes to sexual violence (Catalina Martinez, 
                                                
127 Initially, there were concerns that the Justice and Peace Law constituted a challenge for the 
continuity of Spanish policy, as support for the Bogotá government could put at risk the more global 
objectives of Madrid (i.e. its defence of Human Rights and the respect for International Law) (Freres, 
2005). 
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interview, 26 August 2010). A JPU staff member thought this division was done out 
of practicality, but also reflected each country’s interests (Loreley Oviedo, interview, 
3 September 2010). CNRR President Pizarro said donor specialties are chosen so 
their money is more visible (Eduardo Pizarro, interview, 7 September 2010). We 
now turn to the issue of extradition, which returned to dominate the debate during the 
first years of the Justice and Peace Law’s implementation. 
 
5.3 Paramilitary Extraditions to the US  
Despite US assistance to the justice and peace process, the issue of extradition – so 
contentious during the negotiations of the law – did not disappear upon the law’s 
passage. However, it was set aside for a while by the US and Colombian 
governments. Uribe suspended extradition as long as the leaders cooperated with the 
law, and the US stopped applying pressure about the requests. Suddenly, however, 
more than two years into the justice and peace process, 14 AUC leaders were 
extradited to the US in May 2008.  
The Colombian government argued that the extraditions relieved the justice 
and peace process of the negative influence exercised by the paramilitary leaders, 
who, allegedly, not only continued to commit crimes from jail but had also 
contributed very little to the process of truth and reparations. Even worse, said the 
government, these commanders were trying to control the testimony of other former 
combatants who had taken advantage of the Justice and Peace Law (Woodrow 
Wilson Center and Fundación Ideas Para La Paz, 2009: preface).  
Some believed that Uribe went through with the extraditions because AUC 
leaders were revealing sensitive information about the nexus between the 
paramilitaries and the state. The ‘parapolitics’ scandal had erupted in 2006, where 
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AUC leader Mancuso publicly claimed that the AUC had secured the electoral 
success of 35% of congressional members (Cook, 2007). By April 2008, just a month 
before Uribe announced the extraditions, nearly 100 government officials had either 
been sentenced or were being investigated for colluding with paramilitaries, 
including: 62 members of Congress, President Uribe’s cousin and former President 
of Congress Mario Uribe Escobar, the army chief General Mario Montoya, former 
head of the Colombian Intelligence and Security Service (DAS) Jorge Noguera, and 
former president of the Superior Council of the Judicature José Alfredo Escobar 
Araújo (ICG, 2007: 5; Guardian, 2008). Post-demobilisation investigations and trials 
also found department governors, former and current legislators, and other senior 
government and military figures guilty of collusion with paramilitary groups (ICG, 
2011).  
Isacson said: ‘It became far more convenient for Uribe to get them out of the 
country incommunicado’ (Adam Isacson, interview, 2 March 2010). However, DOJ 
officials felt the argument that leaders had started talking had been distorted in the 
press, and they were actually talking very little (DOJ official 1 and 2, interviews, 6 
September 2010/27 August 2010).  
According to the same DOJ officials, the Justice Department had under 48 
hours advance notice that Uribe was going through with the extraditions, and was not 
prepared to accept them. Nonetheless, US Ambassador William Brownfield pledged 
that the extraditions would not interfere with Colombia’s efforts to hold 
paramilitaries accountable for their crimes in Colombia: The US would try to 
‘facilitate all access, all of the information, and all of the opportunities to the 
[Colombian] victims, the victims’ representatives and to the [Colombian] prosecutors’ 
(Brownfield, 2008).  
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However, some complained that since the extraditions, the paramilitary 
leaders’ cooperation with Colombian investigators had ceased. A UC Berkeley report 
said that logistical difficulties were compounded by the absence of a written 
agreement between US and Colombia to coordinate judicial cooperation. In addition, 
the report discussed the limited access of Colombian prosecutors and judges to 
defendants in US custody and the rejection of efforts of Colombian victims by US 
prosecutors to divulge information about their crimes. The report also talked about 
how plea agreements that DOJ reached with the extradited defendants did not contain 
incentives for defendants to cooperate with Colombian law enforcement or to reveal 
details of their human rights crimes (UC Berkeley, 2010: 3).  
Colombian and international NGOs expressed concern about the impact of the 
extradition on the justice and peace process. Paula Gaviria of Fundación Social said:  
JPL is a domestic process, but it went out of the government’s hands 
when the extraditions took place. JPL had no institutions or processes in 
place. When the leaders didn’t comply with the requirements of the law – 
and the process got out of their hands, the government always had the 
option of extradition. It took this decision late and the result had huge 
consequences for thousands of victims. In addition, the impact on the 
collective imagination of Colombians was very negative. It sent the 
message: We’re not capable of undertaking this process. [The decision to 
extradite] showed deeper problems of incapacity, fear and dependence on 
the US (Paula Gaviria, interview, 8 September 2010).  
 
Gustavo Gallón, President of the Colombian Commission of Jurists, similarly stated: 
‘The US is far from Colombia legally, culturally and geographically’ – now that the 
leaders are there, he said, there is no access to them (Gustavo Gallón, interview, 10 
September 2010). Michael Reed, Colombia Director of the International Center for 
Transitional Justice, agreed: ‘Extraditions have been an obstacle to peace – the 
FARC has slowed down demobilization, now that it has seen how the paramilitaries 
were betrayed’ (Michael Reed, interview, 27 August 2010). They both felt that there 
should have been better sequencing, trying leaders for human rights abuses in 
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Colombia first and then for drug charges in the US. Luis Carlos Restrepo, Colombian 
peace commissioner, said: ‘US interest was always based on the extradition of AUC 
leaders’ (Luis Carlos Restrepo, email communication, 21 September 2010). 
Some felt the extraditions had a positive impact on the justice and peace 
process. For example, CNRR President Eduardo Pizarro said: ‘The justice and peace 
process began the day the paramilitaries were extradited to Washington’ (Eduardo 
Pizarro, interview, 7 September 2010). Those in favour of the extraditions believed 
that the removal of these leaders from the country stopped them from interacting 
with their networks and made Colombia less dangerous.  
In response to the debate, a DOJ official said: ‘On what basis do you say no 
to the biggest drug traffickers in the world?’ He expressed frustration with NGO 
criticism of the extraditions and felt that an ‘honest discussion’ should take place: 
‘It’s clear that the only place that these leaders would serve a stiff sentence is in the 
US,’ since sentences would be close to 30 years in the US, as opposed to 8 years 
under JPL. The same official spoke about how the justice and peace process had not 
been taken seriously by paramilitary leaders:  
Mancuso used to come to the justice and peace process with his Gucci 
shoes and a nice suit, and completely control the process. Now you seem 
him in his prison outfit. This is an important change. 
 
The official felt that little discussion had taken place about how much information 
had been revealed in just a few years, after 30-40 years of conflict. He felt that US 
assistance had enabled the two countries to work together (DOJ official 1, interview, 
6 September 2010).  
According to a State Department human rights certification report, US and 
Colombian authorities began to identify legal procedures for ensuring that 
Colombian legal authorities would have access to the extraditees as needed. For 
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example, in order to facilitate JPU access to AUC leaders, they were moved to two 
locations: Miami, Florida and Great Neck, Virginia. JPU prosecutors were given 
access to leaders held in Miami for three days a week, 9-5, and five days a week, 9-5, 
to those in Virginia. In addition, DOJ paid for 10 JPU prosecutors to meet with DC 
prosecutors in April 2010 in order to inform them about JPL and the importance of 
paramilitary cooperation with the process (US State Department, 2009/2010). 
The issue of offering incentives for continued participation in the justice and 
peace process is complicated by protections in US law, which do not obligate the 
leaders to participate in the process. However, the Colombian government has told 
the extradited paramilitaries that if they participate, any sentence given under the 
justice and peace process will run concurrently with their sentence in the US so that 
after they complete their sentences in the US, they will not face additional jail time 
when they return to Colombia (US State Department, 2009: 37). A DOJ official 
referred to Rule 35 of the US Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and mentioned 
that leaders may be able to receive a reduced sentence if they cooperate with the 
justice and peace process (DOJ official 2, interview, 27 August 2010). However, this 
is at the discretion of the court, and because plea agreements are sealed, it will not be 
possible to know who cooperated with the process.  
According to the State Department, as of July 2009, all 15 extradited 
paramilitary members had elected to resume participation in the justice and peace 
process.128 On approximately 36 occasions, the DOJ facilitated the transmittal of 
approximately 10 voluntary confessions, and conducted interviews with about 12 
                                                
128 In March 2009, paramilitary leader Hebert Veloza Garcia, better known as ‘HH’, was extradited to 
the US on drug trafficking charges. Uribe postponed Veloza’s original extradition date by six months 
so he could have more time to confess his misdeeds. But prosecutors say he got only halfway through 
the list (Kraul, 2009).
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former paramilitary leaders, in cooperation with the relevant Colombian authority 
(US State Department, 2009: 37). 
However, a news article in August 2011 stated the JPU officials were 
travelling to the US to interview extradited paramilitary leaders in order to see if 
those who stopped participating in the justice and peace process would continue their 
participation. Among the prisoners to be interviewed was Salvatore Mancuso, who 
had previously refused to cooperate with the process until the security of his family 
was guaranteed. Diego Murillo Bejarano, alias ‘Don Berna’, and Ramiro Vanoy, 
alias ‘Cuco Vanoy’, also discontinued their cooperation with the process claiming 
their families were not receiving the security promised to them (Mannon, 2011).  
 A DOJ official believed that the extraditions were helping the justice and 
peace process and wanted them to contribute to revealing the truth. He said: ‘DOJ 
philosophy is that extraditions should be a vehicle of truth’ and added, ‘DOJ wants 
JPL to be a success. Our prosecution goal is transnational justice for human rights 
and drug cases’ (DOJ official 2, interview, 27 August 2010).  
Efforts that have been undertaken by DOJ are not well known and difficult to 
verify, and many remain disillusioned with the extraditions. Isacson said: ‘We’re all 
trying to figure this out. We’re in new legal ground here and it’s very hard to get 
information from DOJ’ (Adam Isacson, interview, 2 March 2010). 
One additional issue that arose from this situation was the banning of future 
extraditions of paramilitary leaders participating in the justice and peace process by 
Colombia’s Supreme Court in August 2009. The court found that the extraditions of 
AUC members adversely impacted ‘the rights of victims and the Colombian public’ 
by leaving them ‘without the possibility of knowing the truth and obtaining 
reparation for the crimes committed by paramilitary groups’ (Supreme Court, 2009: 
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44). The court further reasoned that extradition would ‘violate Colombia’s 
international obligations to combat impunity with regard to crimes against humanity’ 
and undermine victims’ rights. It found that ‘recent experience’ proves that 
extraditions ‘paralyze’ the justice and peace process because extradited leaders were 
unable to continue their confessions from the US (Ibid: 38). The Supreme Court 
concluded that individuals should complete their confessions in Colombia before 
being extradited to the US. When the US requested the extradition of additional AUC 
leaders participating in the justice and peace process, in accordance with the 
Supreme Court’s ruling, Colombia denied these requests. (Superseding indictment, 
2009a/2009b). A 2011 OAS study on the JPL, led by Judge Baltazar Garzon, 
recommended that extradited leaders serve the remainder of the sentences in 
Colombia (Mannon, 2011b).  
 
5.4 Explaining US Involvement  
This chapter examined US involvement in the negotiations of the Justice and Peace 
Law and its implementation between 2003 and 2011. The US supported President 
Uribe’s 2003 peace accord with the AUC and the demobilization of thousands of 
paramilitaries. Subsequent debate about a legal framework that would define the 
judicial treatment accorded to these paramilitaries stimulated significant debate 
within Colombia and abroad. This section provides an overview of findings and 
offers some explanation and assessment of US involvement in the justice and peace 
process. 
The US had assisted with the demobilization and supported efforts to 
strengthen the Justice and Peace Law (JPL) as it was debated in the Colombian 
Congress. The US followed the Colombian negotiations of the law, but adopted a 
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‘tricky position of modest support and strong criticism’ (Center for International 
Policy, 2004). However, at the same time, the State and Justice Departments were 
insistent that any law not infringe on the ability to extradite top drug traffickers (that 
were also AUC leaders) to the US. The extradition issue was set aside for a while, 
and the JPL was passed in 2005.  
The US was an early and important supporter of the law’s implementation. 
The two key institutions established by the Justice and Peace Law, the Justice and 
Peace Unit and the National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation, were 
strongly supported by the Department of Justice and USAID respectively. These US 
agencies have long-standing relationships in Colombia and took on the challenges 
posed by the Justice and Peace Law earlier than other foreign donors. US assistance 
mainly involved financial and technical support to the JPL institutions and was 
viewed positively by Colombian officials working in these offices.  
President Uribe’s decision to extradite 14 AUC leaders to the US in 2008 
threw a wrench in the process. Some claim he did so to stop sensitive information 
from being revealed by paramilitary leaders about the nexus between the 
paramilitaries and the state. The Colombian government claimed the extraditions 
relieved the justice and peace process of the negative influence of leaders who had 
contributed very little to the process and continued to commit crimes from jail. Once 
the AUC leaders were in the US, NGOs complained about the negative impact on the 
justice and peace process. The Justice Department eventually arranged access for 
JPU prosecutors to interview AUC leaders, however it is unclear the extent to which 
these leaders have been willing to participate, especially considering the lack of 
incentive for doing so.  
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The Colombian case study offers a third illustration of US involvement in 
transitional justice. The US paid some attention to the negotiations and 
implementation of the Justice and Peace Law, but it did not capture high-level 
attention within the US government. JPL negotiations did, however, highlight the 
tension in the US between geopolitical interests and concern for human rights. This 
tension was illustrated by the Justice and State Departments’ position that extradition 
agreements be maintained on the one hand, and Congress’ concerns about impunity 
as well as USAID’s support for the strengthening of the Justice and Peace Law on 
the other hand. This tension remained, even though the extradition issue was put 
aside for a few years as the Justice and Peace Law was operationalized.   
The US was an early and consistent supporter of the JPL institutions and 
‘opened the door’ for other international involvement and assistance. The active role 
of the Justice Department and USAID in this case is distinct from the other two cases, 
offering a different and broader understanding of the US approach to transitional 
justice. Although the Justice Department does not typically engage in transitional 
justice issues and the needs of victims, it is apparent that the requests made by the 
JPU (and perhaps pressure by Colombian civil society and international NGOs) may 
have impacted their decision to allow JPU access to extradited leaders. Ultimately, 
however, this case study shows that US interests regarding drug trafficking took 
precedence over other issues.  
It is not clear whether US aims were achieved with regard to transitional 
justice in Colombia. The US can claim that its involvement enhanced the justice and 
peace process and the JPP did not stop the extraditions of several top drug traffickers. 
However, in response to the negative impact of these extraditions on the JPP, the 
Colombian Supreme Court banned future extraditions of paramilitary leaders 
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participating in the justice and peace process. The effect of this decision remains to 
be seen.  
Within Colombia, views on the US role have been mixed. Colombian 
government officials who have worked with the US on the JPP were generally 
positive about the relationship and felt it was pragmatic and efficient. Civil society 
groups expressed the same sentiment. The controversy revolved around the 
extradition issue where many felt the US could have done more to support the Justice 
and Peace Law, either by refusing to accept the paramilitary leaders or doing more to 
provide access to the leaders in the US, incentives for their participation and greater 
transparency about the process.  
Excluding the extradition issue, US involvement has helped transitional 
justice aims in Colombia. Although there are many problems with the Justice and 
Peace Law and its implementation, it is a product of debate within Colombia, among 
government officials and civil society. It is a new approach to transitional justice that 
grapples with the thin line between amnesty and accountability. It also attempts to 
deal with justice issues in a situation where conflict continues. Although the process 
may ultimately negatively impact future discussions of accountability for other actors 
in the conflict, the Colombian case poses interesting questions for the field. US 
support of the effort (i.e., trying to strengthen the law during the negotiations and 
supporting the law’s implementation in practical ways) – without dictating the 
process – provides a different lens through which to view US involvement in 
transitional justice. This concludes the three case studies. The next chapter compares 
the cases in order to draw conclusions about US foreign policy on transitional justice.  
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Chapter 6 Comparing Cases of US Involvement in Transitional Justice 
 
The past three chapters examined the forces that shaped US foreign policy in three 
cases of transitional justice. The first case explored US involvement in the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), a court established in 
2004 to prosecute the crimes of senior Khmer Rouge leaders committed from 1975-
1979. The second case focused on US involvement in two measures involving 
Liberia: the trial of former Liberian President Charles Taylor by the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). 
The Special Court indicted Taylor on the first day of the 2003 peace talks for crimes 
committed in Sierra Leone since 1996. The TRC Act was passed in 2005 to 
investigate human rights violations committed in Liberia between 1979 and 2003. 
The third case looked at US involvement in the negotiations of the Colombian Justice 
and Peace Law (JPL), which when passed in 2005, established the Justice and Peace 
Unit (JPU) to investigate and prosecute paramilitary crimes, and the National 
Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation (CNRR) to support victims’ rights 
and reparation.  
The case studies provided a wealth of material about US foreign policy on 
transitional justice. Through systematic comparison of the cases, this chapter 
synthesizes the data in order to highlight key findings of the research and draw 
conclusions about what US involvement entails, why the US is involved and its 
impact. First, I establish that the US has provided critical financial, technical and 
political support throughout the lifespan of transitional justice measures. Second, I 
argue that individuals and interests are two crucial factors for understanding US 
involvement. Third, I assess the impact of US involvement, concluding that it has 
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been positive overall, but inconsistent and controlling, especially during the 
negotiations and establishment of measures.  
 
6.1 Establishing US Involvement  
This study establishes four categories of US involvement in transitional justice: 
financial, technical, political support (or opposition) and cooperation with other 
actors. Other forms of involvement may exist, but the case studies illustrate that the 
US is often involved in these ways. 
Figure 12: Four categories of US involvement in transitional justice 
Financial support Technical support Political support Cooperation 
Direct or indirect 
assistance 
Technical 
assistance, i.e., staff 
training 
Advocacy or 
opposition of a 
measure, i.e., 
legislation 
Level of 
collaboration with 
other actors, i.e., 
domestic, 
international or 
transnational 
 
Financial involvement can be understood as the level of assistance contributed either 
directly to a transitional justice measure or indirectly through another organization 
(i.e., UN agency, NGOs). Technical involvement can be understood as any assistance 
of a technical nature to a measure, i.e., assistance in drafting a measure’s statute, staff 
training, advice, etc. Political involvement can be understood as political support or 
opposition to a transitional justice measure. Some may view financial and technical 
involvement as ‘political’ as well, but this indicator is thought to focus on more overt 
forms of political support, i.e., legislation passed in favour of a measure, pressure for 
the measure to be carried out in a particular way, etc. Cooperation can be understood 
as the level of collaboration between the US and other actors involved in a 
transitional justice measure.  
196 
 
These four categories provide significant insight into how the US is involved 
in transitional justice. In this section, a number of indicators for each category are 
explored across the three cases in order to establish what US involvement in 
transitional justice entails. Preliminary analysis about reasons for US involvement is 
offered, but explored more thoroughly in the following section. 
 
Financial support  
The US provided financial support to all of the measures explored in this study. This 
support included direct and indirect assistance, and was often contributed early in a 
measure’s establishment and consistently throughout its operations. There was a case 
where funding was blocked, but then lifted. Criminal prosecutions also received 
higher levels of funding than non-judicial measures. The following table illustrates 
these indicators across the three cases with a subsequent discussion of examples from 
each case and preliminary analysis.  
Figure 13: US financial support of transitional justice 
 Cambodia Liberia Colombia 
 ECCC Taylor TRC JPP 
Direct assistance to transitional justice 
measure 
x x  x 
Indirect assistance (i.e., to NGOs) x  x x 
Early contribution   x x x 
Funding blocked  x    
Higher level of funding to criminal 
prosecutions over other measures   
n/a x  x 
 
In the Cambodia case, Senators Mitch McConnell and Patrick Leahy co-sponsored a 
bill that imposed restrictions on US support for the tribunal.129 In September 2008, 
the US pledged its first donation of $1.8 million to the UN side of the court. In April 
                                                
129 US Cambodia Democracy and Accountability Act, 2003. Japan donated almost 50 percent of all 
international contributions to the court, with other major donations coming from France, Germany, the 
United Kingdom and Australia. Japan and the European Union are the major donors to the Cambodian 
side of the budget (ECCC, ND). 
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2010, the US pledged an additional $5 million. The US indirectly supported the court 
by contributing over $7 million from 1997-2005 as well as a $2 million ‘Endowment 
Fund’ in 2006 to the to the Documentation Center of Cambodia, an NGO, which the 
US helped establish, involved in documenting Khmer Rouge crimes.130  
In the Liberia case, the US was the largest donor to the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, providing over $85 million to the court, surpassing donations from 
other governments (US State Department, 2010). Congress never blocked funds to 
the court, but did threaten to block funding to Nigeria if it did not work to transfer 
Taylor to the Special Court (US P.L. 109-102, 2005). The US contributed much less 
to the Liberian TRC, with indirect assistance to the Commission via funds for NGOs 
assisting the process (i.e., four grants totaling $224,000 from USAID’s Office of 
Transition Initiatives to local human rights groups that formed the Transitional 
Justice Working Group, and a State Department grant to Benetech for help with the 
coding of TRC statements). The US contributed funds early in the establishment of 
both measures.  
In the Colombia case, financial support to the justice and peace process was 
initially complicated by the fact that the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia 
(the paramilitary group known as the AUC that was the recipient of the law’s 
benefits) was on the US list of foreign terrorist organizations. However, the Bush 
administration said the OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process (MAPP-OEA) 
could receive US funds without infringing on terrorism-financing laws (Center for 
International Policy, 2004). The US became one of the first foreign state 
governments to contribute to the institutions created by the Justice and Peace Law. 
From 2006-2010, the Department of Justice (DOJ) contributed over $7 million to the 
                                                
130 Kyriakou, 2005. With State Department grants in the mid-1990s, the Yale Cambodian Genocide 
Program established the Documentation Center of Cambodia, which became an independent 
organization in 1997.  
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Justice and Peace Unit (JPU) and USAID contributed nearly $3 million to the 
National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation (CNRR).131 DOJ funds were 
contributed directly to the JPU, whereas USAID’s implementing partners, the 
International Organization of Migration and Management Sciences for Development, 
oversaw the disbursement of USAID funds.  
Thus, the US provided direct or indirect assistance to all the measures 
examined in this study, and was typically one of the first foreign state governments 
to contribute to a measure. The level of direct and indirect assistance varied across 
the three cases with the SCSL receiving by far the highest level of funding, the 
ECCC receiving the second highest, the JPP receiving the third highest and the TRC 
receiving the least funding.  
The SCSL received the most financial support because it garnered individual 
attention, provided an alternative model to the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
and stopped Taylor from contacting his network in the region. The Liberian TRC did 
not receive individual attention or affect US interests in a significant way, and 
therefore it received only minimal and indirect financial support. The refusal to fund 
the ECCC was about congressional distrust of Hun Sen, and less about the court. US 
funding of the Colombian JPP had more to do with long-term involvement in the 
country than particular interest in transitional justice.  
Differing levels of financial support also show a US preference for criminal 
prosecutions over non-judicial measures. Of course, criminal prosecutions are more 
expensive to carry out, but the contrast is still notable. Since it is familiar to the US 
system, US policymakers conceptually understand criminal processes and are 
                                                
131 DOJ data available from DOJ Justice and Peace Presentation, 15 April 2010. USAID data provided 
by Catalina Martínez Guzman, Executive Director, CNRR, 4 September 2010. 
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therefore more likely to approve funding requests.132  Other transitional justice 
measures are not as well understood and do not garner the same level of attention or 
funding.  
In addition, it is interesting to note where US funds were contributed. For 
example, US funds were contributed through the UN for the two tribunals, which 
reflects its willingness to participate via the route established for international donors. 
This may be because it was heavily involved in the establishment of the courts. The 
US contributed to NGOs supporting the TRC, as well as for the documentation of 
violations in Cambodia, which reflects insignificant interest with regard to the 
Liberian TRC, and initial opposition in Congress to support the Cambodia court. In 
Colombia, US support was given primarily to the government, and not through the 
UNDP, even though this was the body designated to coordinate international 
donations. US technical support for transitional justice measures is next explored.  
 
Technical support  
The US provided technical support to all of the measures explored in this study. This 
support included direct technical involvement in a measure’s establishment, 
operations and completion, as well as indirect technical involvement via financial 
support for certain organizations. The following table illustrates these indicators 
across the three case studies with a subsequent discussion of examples from each 
case and preliminary analysis.  
 
 
 
                                                
132 Chandra Sriram has noted that Western governments prefer legal accountability because it is 
familiar to Western court systems (Sriram, 2007: 589).  
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Figure 14: US technical support of transitional justice 
 Cambodia Liberia Colombia 
 ECCC Taylor TRC JPP 
Direct technical involvement in 
measure’s establishment, operations and 
completion 
x x x x 
Indirect technical involvement via 
financial support for certain 
organizations 
x  x x 
 
In the Cambodia case, before a tribunal was even requested by the Cambodian 
government, the State Department commissioned two attorneys to prepare a legal 
analysis of the potential culpability of members of the Khmer Rouge on charges of 
war crimes, genocide and other crimes against humanity. The US also supported the 
creation and operations of Yale University’s Cambodia Genocide Program and the 
Documentation Center of Cambodia, which carried out extensive documentation of 
Khmer Rouge violations that was then given to the court as evidence. War Crimes 
Ambassador David Scheffer and others were then involved in drafting various 
versions of the ECCC Law and suggested the hybrid structure of the court, as well as 
the ‘supermajority’ voting requirement.133 Scheffer also played a key role in limiting 
the court’s personal jurisdiction clauses to senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge 
responsible for serious violations, which excluded both lower-level officials regardless 
of the seriousness of their crimes and the highest leaders if their crimes were not serious 
(Heder, 2009: 190). Once the court was established, US officials were involved in 
several trainings for court officials, and advocated for international standards to be 
upheld. For example, in May 2006, Scheffer briefed the press and the Cambodian 
                                                
133 War Crimes Ambassador David Scheffer prepared a concept paper proposing a special trial 
chamber and special appeals chamber in the Cambodian courts with participation by international 
judges and prosecutors. He suggested that the Cambodians would be in majority but that there would 
be a need for a broad majority for decisions. The implication was that the international judges could 
not be ignored and at least one of them had to be behind a decision. For instance, for a decision at trial 
court there would be a need for support by four of the five judges, in the Appeals by five of the seven. 
This was called a ‘supermajority’ vote requirement. Senator John Kerry presented this proposal to 
Hun Sen.  
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national judges on international standards of due process applicable to the ECCC. He 
also helped resolve a dispute between the Cambodian and international judges over 
the court’s internal rules. The US was also involved in discussions about the court’s 
legacy.      
The US was a driving force behind the establishment of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone. The US played a key role in getting Taylor transferred to the court and 
followed his trial closely as a prominent member of the Court’s Management 
Committee. The US continually urged for the trial’s completion.  
With regard to the TRC, the State Department supported the inclusion of a 
TRC in the peace agreement and USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives financially 
supported civil society groups in their efforts to draft a TRC Act, however US 
officials were not involved in drafting the Act or determining the commission’s 
structure.134 Once the TRC was operational, the US Embassy was heavily involved in 
working with the TRC Commissioners as a member of the TRC-ICGL working 
group.135 The ICGL worked closely with the TRC for several months on detailed 
aspects of TRC operations such as interpreting their mandate, organizational 
structure, workplanning, planning for statement taking and public hearings and 
advocacy of international standards. The State Department indirectly supported the 
Commission through its support of Benetech, an organization that assisted the TRC 
                                                
134 USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives four grants contributed to the following activities: One 
grant for $90,000 for training and other capacity building for the Transitional Justice Working Group 
(TJWG);  One $65,000 grant to the same group for a perception survey and qualitative research in 
four counties on what people thought of justice at the time and what they wanted out of a TRC; One 
$36,000 grant to the same group for another quantitative survey in all 15 counties to complement the 
qualitative survey; One $33,000 grant to the same group to help them put together an advocacy 
campaign around justice issues, so their thoughts could reach the general public (John Gattorn, email 
communication, 21 July 2011). 
135 ICGL stands for the International Contact Group on Liberia - a coalition of donor and West 
African regional governments formed in September 2002 to coordinate a comprehensive, regionally-
focused resolution to the second civil war that burgeoned beginning in 2000, of which the US was a 
key founding member. Article XXXIII of the CPA called on ECOWAS, the UN, the African Union 
and the ICGL (Nigeria, Ghana, US and UK) ‘to ensure that the spirit and content of this Peace 
Agreement are implemented in good faith and with integrity by the Parties.’ 
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in coding its statements. As the deadline approached for the TRC to submit its final 
report, embassy officials pressured the TRC Chairman to submit the final report by a 
certain date.  
In the Colombia case, the US followed the negotiations of the justice and 
peace law, urged the Colombian government to ensure accountability for human 
rights violations and contributed funding to an organization that advised the drafting 
of legislation. US pressure during the negotiations influenced at least some changes 
to the law, including lengthening the investigation time frame and scope, and the loss 
of benefits if a participant failed to give information known about group structure, 
etc. (El Tiempo, 2005). The Justice and State Departments also came out strongly 
against discussions about prohibiting the extradition of paramilitary leaders to the US, 
and are therefore likely to have influenced the decision to exclude this prohibition 
from the law. Once the law was passed, the DOJ and USAID were directly and 
indirectly involved in training staff in the Justice and Peace Unit and National 
Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation, and advocated for international 
standards in both bodies.136  
It was surprising to see the technical involvement of US officials in detailed 
aspects of all of the measures, particularly in drafting their founding laws and 
influencing their structure. This level of involvement pointed to a pragmatism among 
US officials that wanted to get measures established, make sure they were 
operational and then close them down. This was linked to the fact that they were 
                                                
136 DOJ’s approach was to look at the law from the optics of the accusatory system and to focus on 
obtaining information. DOJ therefore focused its assistance on helping build JPU capacity 
to aid in the investigation and prosecution of crimes committed by former paramilitary members 
(State Department, 2009: 39). DOJ officials also arranged proffer sessions with prosecutors and 
investigators, helping them to ‘think’ like prosecutors, and was involved in training exhumation units 
and arranging closed-circuit sessions with paramilitaries (DOJ official 1, interview, 6 September 
2010). 
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significant donors and wanted their money used efficiently. It also had to do with the 
sheer number of officials with diverse areas of expertise that engaged with a measure 
at different points in its establishment and operations. In more abstract terms, US 
technical involvement also allowed the US to export its ideas about the rule of law 
and justice to a particular measure, and to ensure that measures were carried out in a 
way that fit with these views. US political support to transitional justice measures is 
explored next.  
 
Political support 
US political support fluctuated over the course of each measure’s establishment and 
operations. The US opposed early efforts to establish the measures explored in this 
study, but then changed course and advocated for their establishment. The US passed 
legislation, made statements and used financial assistance to support or oppose 
measures. Others garnered very little attention. In some cases, the US advocated for 
certain individuals to hold positions in the process. The following table illustrates 
these indicators across the three case studies with a subsequent discussion of 
examples from each case and preliminary analysis.  
Figure 15: US political support of transitional justice 
 Cambodia Liberia Colombia 
 ECCC Taylor TRC JPP 
Early opposition to and later pressure for 
a measure’s establishment  
x x  x 
Use of legislation, statements and/or 
financial assistance to support or oppose 
a measure  
x x x x 
Advocacy for certain individuals to hold 
a position in process   
x x   
 
With regard to the Cambodia case, one US official felt that the political intervention 
had been more important than a financial contribution: ‘The US hasn’t spent a dime, 
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but political backing has been essential in Cambodia’ (US official 3, interview, 23 
February 2010). The US opposed early efforts to indict the Khmer Rouge for 
genocide or other crimes against humanity (Stanton, ND). However, after a number 
of congressional debates, resolutions and petitions,137 Congress eventually passed the 
Cambodian Genocide Justice Act in 1994, which made it US policy to support efforts 
to bring to justice members of the Khmer Rouge, set up a new office that would be 
responsible for supporting investigations, and develop a proposal for the 
establishment of an international criminal tribunal. The US then applied pressure 
(which some felt had become political interference) 138  on the Cambodian 
government, and especially the UN, at several points during the many years that it 
took to negotiate the establishment of a tribunal.139 Once the ECCC was established, 
congressional support fluctuated with resolutions and bills that opposed and 
supported it. Americans did not hold high-level positions at the court, however, the 
US did advocate for former War Crimes Ambassador Clint Williamson to serve as 
UN Special Expert to provide support to the ECCC in 2010. Scheffer was 
subsequently appointed to this role.  
Although there was no discussion of accountability in the 1990s as Taylor 
committed widespread human rights violations in Liberia, there was discussion about 
                                                
137 US House of Representatives Joint Resolution 602 and US Senate Joint Resolution 347, 1988; US 
Public Law No. 100-502, 1988; US House of Representatives, 1991 
138 One critique of a UN draft agreement which offered several concessions based on UN and CPP 
demands stated that the trial would be subject not only to political interference by Hun Sen, but also by 
‘precisely those foreign powers that had been pressuring the UN all along,’ especially France and the US, 
which would not hesitate ‘to sabotage justice at every turn if there is any political reason to do so’ (UN 
Non-Paper, 2000: 34).   
139 For example, Under Secretary for Political Affairs Tom Pickering pressed Hun Sen to endorse a 
‘special chamber’ in the Cambodian courts which would have a majority of international judges 
(Scheffer, 2008: 229); Several US Senators urged Kofi Annan to send a negotiating team to Cambodia, 
and argued that the team ‘should be dominated by high-powered political deal-makers, not legal ‘purists’ 
(UN Non-Paper, 2000: 4); Congress adopted a concurrent resolution urging the President to encourage 
the National Assembly of Cambodia to ratify the agreement between the UN and Cambodia to 
establish the ECCC and to provide support for the establishment and financing of the tribunal, 
consistent with the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act (US House of Representatives Concurrent 
Resolution 399, 2004). 
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military intervention. However, this did not take place due to a lack of consensus 
among US agencies (Kansteiner, 1996). In 2000, some members of Congress wanted 
Taylor removed from power and support for the establishment of the Special Court 
was in part aimed at achieving this goal. David Crane’s appointment as Chief 
Prosecutor was strongly supported by the US. Once the Special Court was 
established and unsealed an indictment against Taylor, however, State Department 
officials opposed the decision since they had negotiated a deal with Nigeria to 
provide Taylor with asylum (Hayner, 2007: 10). Some members of Congress felt 
differently, and pressured the Nigerian government to transfer Taylor through a 
range of resolutions and threats to limit US assistance (i.e., US P.L. 108-199, 2004: 
206; US H.Con.Res. 127, 2005; US H.Amdt. 480, 2005; US P.L. 109-102, 2005: 67). 
Congress also pressed the Bush administration to act more urgently on the issue (i.e., 
US House of Representatives, 2006), which it eventually did in discussions with the 
Liberian and Nigerian governments (US State Department, 2005; Cook, 2005: 13). A 
leaked cable revealed that US officials were considering Taylor’s prosecution in the 
US after his trial finished at the Special Court to prevent his return and ability to 
destabilize Liberia or the region (Hirsch, 2010).  
During the Liberian peace talks, the US was opposed to amnesties for war 
crimes and a war crimes tribunal, but supported the establishment of a TRC. The US 
embassy did not apply pressure to establish the TRC, but did support its operations 
as a member of the TRC-ICGL working group. Once the TRC submitted all versions 
of the report, the US distanced itself from the report and its recommendations 
through an ICGL statement that said it was Liberia’s responsibility to take future 
steps in implementing report recommendations.  
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Initial versions of the Colombian justice and peace law provoked criticism 
from the US Congress who raised concerns about impunity for human rights 
violations committed by the AUC.140 The Justice Department did not want the law to 
affect the extradition of paramilitary leaders accused of drug trafficking to the US, 
and submitted a request for the extradition of several leaders.141 Despite concerns 
about the law, the US publicly expressed support for the justice and peace process 
and was an early donor to the process.  
This section illustrated that the US opposed early efforts to establish several 
measures, but then changed course and applied pressure for their establishment. The 
US passed legislation, made statements and used financial assistance as a way to 
support or oppose a measure. In some cases, the US advocated for certain individuals 
to hold positions in the process.  
Reasons for fluctuating political support are many. When a measure had clear 
political implications for the US, its support depended on whether the measure would 
help or hinder US interests. Sometimes the US had committed to a measure’s 
establishment and would focus on this, no matter the cost. In addition, US support or 
opposition was affected by the relationship with the country where the measure was 
being established. In many cases, political support or opposition depended on 
individuals who took an interest in a particular measure. US cooperation with other 
actors on transitional justice measures is next explored.  
 
 
 
                                                
140 For example, see Letter to President Uribe, Organized by Rep. Tom Lantos, 2003; Letter to 
President Uribe from Senator Lugar, 2005; Letter to President Uribe from several Democratic senators, 
2005; Juan Forero, 2005; El Tiempo, 2005.  
141 For example, see BBC News, 2004; El Tiempo, 2003/2004.  
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Cooperation with other actors  
US cooperation with the range of actors involved in transitional justice varied across 
the three cases. These actors include: the country establishing a measure (i.e., the 
government, civil society groups); other international actors (i.e., other foreign state 
governments, the UN, international NGOs); and US domestic actors (i.e., NGOs). 
The following table illustrates whether or not the US cooperated with these actors 
across the three case studies with a subsequent discussion of examples from each 
case and preliminary analysis.  
Figure 16: US cooperation with other actors on transitional justice 
 Cambodia Liberia Colombia 
 ECCC Taylor TRC JPP 
TJ country (i.e., the government, civil 
society groups) 
x x x x 
International actors (i.e., foreign state 
governments, UN, international 
NGOs) 
x x x  
US domestic actors (i.e., NGOs) x    
 
In the Cambodia case, the US refused to support early Australian government 
proposals (in 1986 and 1991) for an international tribunal to judge the crimes of the 
Khmer Rouge (Stanton, ND). When this position changed, however, the US 
cooperated extensively with the Cambodian government and the UN during the 
negotiations of the ECCC and saw itself as playing an intermediary role between the 
two in order to reach an agreement. Although War Crimes Ambassador Scheffer said 
that the US was not willing to step in as an alternative to the UN and could not 
support or take part in any trial which was not approved by the Secretary-General, 
the US put significant pressure on the UN to engage with Hun Sen and make 
concessions (South China Morning Post, 2000c; UN Press Briefing, 2000). The UN’s 
reduced demands ‘were further undercut’ by calls from the US and Japan to be ‘even 
more flexible and creative’ in defining minimum standards for judicial independence 
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and fairness.142 When the UN-Cambodia negotiations fell apart, the US participated in 
the ‘Group of Interested States’, which discussed possibilities for an international 
effort to revive them (UN GA Resolution 57/228, 2003). After the tribunal was 
established, some US and UN officials cooperated in order to break the gridlock on 
US funding of the court. US cooperation with Cambodian civil society typically 
involved meetings with Youk Chhang, the Director of DC-Cam. Some civil society 
groups expressed frustration that DC-Cam received the majority of US attention and 
funding. Embassy officials also met often with the international NGO, the Open 
Society Justice Initiative, on tribunal issues.  
In the Liberia case, the US worked with the Liberian and Nigerian 
governments as well as ECOWAS on Taylor’s arrest and transfer to the Special 
Court. The US also worked with the International Criminal Court and the 
Netherlands on his move to The Hague. During the trial, the US worked with other 
foreign state governments (primarily the UK and the Netherlands) on the Court’s 
Management Committee, and communicated regularly with senior court officials to 
determine how the US could support its efforts. The US did not work in any 
significant way with Liberian or American civil society on the Taylor issue, although 
several organizations pressured the US to transfer Taylor to the court.  
With regard to the Liberian TRC, the US worked primarily as a member of 
the ICGL, interacting with the TRC Commissioners and international NGOs like the 
International Center for Transitional Justice, Carter Center, Benetech and Advocates 
                                                
142 Associated Press, 2000c. Cambodia expert and former ECCC international staff Stephen Heder 
criticized US pressure on the process: ‘This was part of a larger pattern of pressure on the UN by the 
US and other governments with diplomatic interests to pursue vis-à-vis the Royal Government of 
Cambodia (RGC). Most importantly, after obtaining UN acquiescence to a severely limited personal 
jurisdiction, they also forced it to agree to involve itself in assisting with what the UN was certain 
would be much less than fair trials, as the CPP’s control over the Cambodian court system via its 
domination of the RGC was sufficient to ensure that the extraordinary chambers would not adhere to 
international standards of judicial independence and impartiality. They have further limited the court’s 
prosecutorial reach by insisting that the budget for investigations, trials and defense be kept low’ 
(Heder, 2009: 191).  
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for Human Rights. The US worked less with Liberian and American civil society, but 
did assist the Transitional Justice Working Group (a group of local Liberian human 
rights groups) in their efforts to improve the TRC Act. After the release of the TRC 
report, the ICGL statement and a visit by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made 
clear that the US would not be involved in TRC follow-up, and supported Liberian 
government decisions on the matter.   
In the Colombia case, the US cooperated primarily with the Colombian 
government agencies in charge of JPP institutions. The US chose not to work with 
UNDP, the designated agency to coordinate international support to the justice and 
peace process. Instead, the US worked bilaterally with the Colombian government. 
USAID assistance was directed to the Colombian government and civil society 
groups, and DOJ assistance was contributed directly to the JPU. The US did not 
collaborate with American civil society on the justice and peace process in a 
significant way.   
The US has cooperated with a range of actors on transitional justice measures, 
including the government and civil society actors within a country establishing a 
measure, international actors such as the UN and INGOs and to a much lesser extent, 
American organizations. Although the US cooperated significantly with TJ 
governments, in some cases, the emphasis on ensuring government agreement led its 
promotion of measures that were flawed. The US cooperated with international 
actors in some instances, but not in others. At times this was because the US was less 
interested in a measure (i.e., Liberian TRC), and at other times, it was because the 
US did not want to be slowed down by international cooperation (i.e., Cambodia and 
Colombia). However, the US did rely on some international NGOs for information 
about a measure or their technical expertise (i.e., Cambodia and Liberian TRC). 
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Cooperation with civil society groups, both within the country establishing a measure 
and within the US, was less prevalent. Primary attention was given to the 
government establishing a measure. That being said, the US did financially support 
some local civil society groups and would request their insight throughout the 
process.    
 
This section explored US involvement in three cases of transitional justice. US 
involvement was broken down by its financial, technical, political support and 
cooperation with other actors. A number of indicators were identified based on the 
case study research and then compared across the three cases in order to highlight 
trends in US involvement. The research establishes the following:  
 
1. Financial support: Although the amount varies and is at times blocked, the 
US typically provides early and consistent financial assistance to transitional justice 
measures. The US provides greater financial support to criminal prosecutions than 
other measures.  
 
2. Technical support: The US is involved in detailed, technical aspects of a 
measure’s establishment and operations.  
 
3. Political support: US political support fluctuates over the course of a 
measure’s establishment and operations. The US first opposes efforts to establish a 
measure, but then changes course and applies pressure so it is established. The US 
passes legislation, makes statements and/or uses financial assistance as a way to 
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express support or opposition to a measure. The US advocates for certain individuals 
to hold positions in the process.  
 
4. Cooperation: The US cooperates most strongly with the government that 
establishes a measure, and less so with local civil society groups. The US may or 
may not work with other international actors including foreign state governments, 
international organizations and NGOs. The US does not interact significantly with 
US domestic actors.  
 
Categorizing US involvement in this way helps to demonstrate the many different 
ways in which the US has engaged in the field. These findings also provide an 
empirical basis for the following discussion about why the US has been involved. 
 
6.2 Explaining US Involvement  
Several explanations for US involvement in transitional justice surfaced in this study, 
but two factors emerge as most important: individuals and interests. Specific 
individuals and the institutions they represent have been critical in shaping US 
foreign policy on transitional justice. In addition, the research sheds light on the role 
that interests play in explaining US involvement. This section draws upon theoretical 
approaches proposed by foreign policy scholars (which were briefly explored in 
chapter 1) since the highly complex cases examined in this study require a range of 
tools to adequately understand US foreign policy on transitional justice.  
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Individuals  
The importance of individuals is a key finding of this research, since even one 
individual who took an interest in a measure could have a significant impact on US 
foreign policy making on transitional justice. This explanation combines behavioural 
and bureaucratic models of explaining foreign policy in finding that the different 
views of various sectors of government matter, but that one must also consider the 
role, personality and values of individuals.  
Presidential administrations ‘set the tone’ for US policy on the field. 
Members of Congress determined financial support, but also political support or 
opposition in the form of statements, resolutions and conditions on funding, and even 
technical involvement. The State Department engaged in a range of different 
activities related to transitional justice, although the office or bureau varied from 
measure to measure. Depending on the measure and country, USAID and DOJ 
provided specialized expertise. Individuals within these agencies were crucial to 
defining US foreign policy on transitional justice.   
 Within the case studies, members of Congress and State Department officials 
played key roles in the Cambodia and Sierra Leone tribunals, whereas USAID and 
DOJ were central to the Colombian justice and peace process. The Liberian TRC 
failed to receive notable attention by individuals. The following table shows which 
case studies garnered individual interest by government agency.   
Figure 17: Individual interest in transitional justice by agency 
 Cambodia Liberia Colombia 
 ECCC Taylor TRC JPP 
Administration  x   
Congress  x x   
State Department x x   
USAID    x 
DOJ    x 
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Other US actors such as the National Security Council, Department of Defense, 
Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation have also been 
involved in transitional justice, but did not play a prominent role in the cases 
explored in this research. This discussion draws on examples from the case studies in 
order to illustrate how individuals help explain US foreign policy on transitional 
justice.  
 
Presidential administrations 
Presidential administrations have taken different approaches to transitional justice, 
which affected individual measures established or operating during their term. The 
Clinton administration was supportive of justice initiatives, and US support for 
criminal tribunals and the establishment of the war crimes office came from high 
levels in his administration, particularly Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who 
championed the issue and made it part of her legacy in office.  
The Bush administration was less interested in issues of international justice, 
but initiated the shift toward a focus on national systems. High levels within his 
administration, including President Bush himself, Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice and Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer were heavily engaged with the 
Taylor issue and played a key role in his transfer to the Special Court. This can be 
explained by their prioritization of African policy, and Liberia in particular. The 
Cambodia tribunal, Liberian TRC and Colombian JPP failed to attract noteworthy 
attention in the Bush administration.   
The Obama administration was seen to represent a shift from his predecessor 
on transitional justice-related issues. SCSL and ECCC support remained steady. 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton vocalized support for Liberian President Sirleaf, 
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avoiding mention of the TRC. The Colombian JPP did not garner the 
administration’s attention.  
There is continuity across the last three administrations’ approach to 
transitional justice. Although to differing degrees, each has maintained involvement 
in this area since the 1990s. Both the Bush and Obama administrations considered 
eliminating the war crimes office, but they ultimately decided to retain it.143 Each 
administration has provided greater attention to criminal prosecutions over other TJ 
measures. The approach of each administration has also been connected to, and 
arguably responsible for, at least in part, developments in the field (i.e., from support 
to ad-hoc tribunals in the 1990s to a focus on hybrid models, national systems and 
the ICC in the 2000s).  
 
Congress 
Due to its foreign policy oversight and appropriations responsibilities, Congress 
played an important role in transitional justice. However, many FPA scholars and 
even congressional staff overlook the role of Congress (and political parties).144 One 
staff member of the House Foreign Relations Committee thought that Congress was 
unimportant for this study (Congressional staff member, interview, 16 April 2010). 
Interestingly, however, Congress took strong positions on transitional justice 
measures. Even more surprising was the involvement of Congress members in 
detailed, technical aspects of a measure’s establishment. Congressional involvement 
showed how important the support or opposition of even one member of Congress 
could be.  
                                                
143 David Scheffer, interview, 12 March 2012. Regarding the ICC, Clinton did not recommend 
ratifying the ICC. Bush then advanced policies that opposed the court, but, by his second term, he 
reversed some of these policies and began to support the court. Obama continued a more active 
engagement policy with the ICC. For more information, see the ICC discussion in chapter 3.  
144 See, i.e., Freedman, 1976, Caldwell, 1977, Alden and Aran, 2012.  
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 Senator Chuck Robb sponsored the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act, which 
made it US policy to investigate Khmer Rouge crimes. During the many years it took 
to establish the Cambodia tribunal, Senator John Kerry (a Democrat from 
Massachusetts and member of the Foreign Relations Committee) was heavily 
involved in the negotiations, flying to Phnom Penh several times to talk with Hun 
Sen about specific technical issues regarding the tribunal’s establishment. When the 
tribunal was established, Senator Mitch McConnell (Republican from Kentucky and 
member of the Appropriations Committee) almost single-handedly blocked US 
funding of the court for several years.145  
In the Liberia case, Senator Judd Gregg expressed early interest in a Special 
Court as a way to remove Taylor from power. After the Special Court’s indictment, 
members of Congress (particularly from the Congressional Black Caucus and House 
Africa Subcommittee including Reps. Watson, Payne and Royce) applied pressure on 
the Bush administration and Nigeria for several years to transfer Taylor to the court.   
In the Colombian case, several members of Congress (i.e., Rep. Tom Lantos, 
a Democrat from California, and other members of the House International Relations 
Committee; Senator Richard Lugar, Republican from Indiana and then-Chair of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee; several senior Democrat Senators, including 
Patrick Leahy, Joe Biden, Chris Dodd, Edward Kennedy and Russ Feingold) 
opposed early drafts of the justice and peace law and urged President Uribe to ensure 
accountability for human rights violations. Once the justice and peace law was 
passed, Congress specifically earmarked funds for the Justice and Peace Unit.  
                                                
145 In 2001 McConnell announced his opposition to the tribunal and called on the Bush administration 
to reverse the US policy of support for genocide justice in Cambodia. According to several 
interviewees, his opposition stemmed from a 1997 grenade attack of a rally of an opposition party (the 
Sam Rainsy Party), in which 13 Cambodians were killed and an International Republican Institute 
(IRI) staff member, Ron Abney, was injured. IRI and Abney said they were "confident" that Hun Sen 
was responsible for the attack (Wells-Dang, 2004). McConnell's chief of staff, Paul Grove, was a 
former IRI representative in Cambodia and Asia director at IRI in Washington and convinced 
McConnell to block funding to the court unless Hun Sen no longer held power.  
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Bipartisan congressional involvement from members of the House and Senate 
Appropriations Committees and Foreign Relations Committees entailed financial and 
political support (or opposition) of transitional justice with a focus on criminal 
prosecutions. Congressional pressure influenced shifts in the position of the 
administration, State Department and other state governments. This pressure can be 
attributed in part to its oversight responsibilities as members of certain committees. 
However, individual members of Congress took particular interest in certain 
measures, even engaging in detailed technical aspects of their establishment. Often 
this was based on personal interest in the measure or country in question.   
 
State Department 
The State Department has an obvious role to play in transitional justice. A number of 
offices and bureaus in the agency have been involved including the embassies, 
regional bureaus, Office of War Crimes Issues, Office of the Legal Advisor and the 
US Mission to the UN (USUN).  
US embassies are the first point of contact between a country establishing a 
measure and other US government actors.146 Political and legal advisors and even US 
Ambassadors were involved in the establishment and operations of measures. For 
example, US Ambassador to Cambodia Kent Wiedemann spent a significant amount 
of time on tribunal negotiations. US Ambassador to Colombia William Wood met 
with proponents of the draft justice and peace law and insisted that the law not affect 
the extradition of paramilitary leaders accused of narcotrafficking. In Liberia, 
embassy officials participated in the TRC-ICGL working group, and monitored TRC 
operations closely. 
                                                
146 US embassies work to improve political, economic, and cultural relations between almost every 
country worldwide and the US. 
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Regional bureaus follow transitional justice developments.147 At times, high 
levels within a bureau became engaged. Otherwise, the country desk officer 
monitored the measure, staying up-to-date via reports from the US embassy. For 
example, Assistant Secretary of African Affairs Jendayi Frazer was a strong advocate 
for the US role in Liberia and eventually supported Taylor’s transfer to the Special 
Court. The Cambodian Genocide Justice Act established an Office of Cambodian 
Genocide Investigation within the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. This 
office provided grants to Yale University’s Cambodian Genocide Program (CGP) to 
conduct research, training and documentation relating to the Khmer Rouge regime.  
The War Crimes Office has a specific mandate related to TJ and each 
ambassador has been involved in various TJ activities. Steve Smith’s argument that 
the actual role assumed by individuals holding positions of authority comes into play 
here since the war crimes ambassadorship is directly responsible for US foreign 
policy on transitional justice (Hollis and Smith, 1986). Although Smith downplays 
the role of personality, this study finds that both role and personality are important.  
The first war crimes ambassador David Scheffer was a pivotal figure in 
transitional justice, aided by Albright’s high-level support. He said he was 
‘successful’ in building the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, ECCC and ICC during his term, but 
‘failed’ to establish tribunals in five other contexts in which he exerted significant 
effort. 148  He continued his engagement with the Cambodia court and other 
transitional justice measures after his term as Ambassador ended.149  
                                                
147 Regional bureaus advise and guide the operation of the US diplomatic missions within their 
regional jurisdiction. 
148 Scheffer said: ‘I spent an enormous amount of time in DRC, Burundi, Sudan, Chechnya and Iraq – 
all for the purpose of building war crimes tribunals in those five jurisdictions [for violations 
committed in the 1980s and 1990s], and I failed in each one of these. I was very involved in building 
five tribunals, and five others that never got built’ (David Scheffer, interview, 12 March 2012).   
149 Before working for Madeline Albright, David Scheffer received B.A.s from Harvard and Oxford 
University, and a LL.M. from Georgetown University Law Center. He began his legal career at the 
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The second ambassador, Pierre Prosper, was involved in the Special Court, 
but much of his time was spent on the ICC and Guantánamo detainees.150 Prosper 
said:  
My portfolio as war crimes ambassador changed dramatically [from the 
work that Scheffer had undertaken]. I was very busy on detainee issues. I 
met with the White House Council on 19 September 2011 and helped 
coordinate the inter-agency approach. It was all hands on deck. People 
forget that we were scrambling. It made sense that my office covered 
these issues (Pierre Prosper, interview, 22 April 2010).  
 
Although Prosper’s focus was dictated to a large extent by the changes that took 
place after 9/11, he also believed in the need to prioritize national processes and 
consider other measures as alternatives to criminal prosecutions.   
Punishment is up to discussion, debate and creativity. We conflated 
accountability and punishment. We ignored the South African model. We 
ignored the TRC … We started to push hybrid processes because you can 
tailor them to domestic needs … You must look at traditional approaches 
such as gacaca or TRCs because that is what communities will 
understand. There are too many perpetrators to jail everyone. The Clinton 
administration was focused on a judicial approach. But the Bush 
administration embraced other options, despite the reluctance of others 
who were focused on the ICC … We need to build more rule of law 
locally. I am an idealist in the other way. We should never have 
international tribunals (Ibid).  
 
The third ambassador, Clint Williamson, was in office during a transition period in 
US policy in this area, noting that he worked ‘under the radar’ and tried to return to 
                                                                                                                                     
international law firm Coudert Brothers, working for a time in their Singapore office. He also served 
as counsel to the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 
150 Prosper received his undergraduate degree from Boston College and his law degree from 
Pepperdine. Prosper was a Deputy District Attorney for Los Angeles County, California from 1989 to 
1994. From 1994 to 1996, he was an Assistant US Attorney for the Central District of California in 
Los Angeles. From 1996 to late 1998, Prosper served as a war crimes prosecutor for the ICTR. 
Appointed lead trial attorney, Prosper successfully prosecuted the matter of the Prosecutor against 
Jean-Paul Akayesu, the first-ever case of genocide under the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. In the 14-month trial, he won additional life-sentence 
convictions for crimes against humanity and broke new ground in international law by convincing the 
Tribunal to recognize rape committed in time of conflict as an act of genocide and a crime against 
humanity. Prosper served as a career prosecutor at the US Department of Justice where he was Special 
Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division in 1999. From 1999 to 2001, 
Prosper was detailed to the State Department where he served as the Special Counsel and Policy 
Adviser to the previous war crimes ambassador, David Scheffer. Prosper was nominated by President 
George W. Bush on 16 May 2001 to become the second war crimes ambassador. After being 
confirmed by the US Senate, he was sworn in on 13 July 2001. He served until October 2005. 
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more ‘traditional’ activities of the war crimes office (Clint Williamson, interview, 21 
April 2010). This statement seems to indicate his support for the reversal of some of 
the policies instituted during Bush’s first term. After his term ended, he was 
appointed as UN Special Expert to the Cambodia court (a position Scheffer was 
subsequently appointed to as well). In the Cambodia case, Williamson helped lift the 
congressional block on US funding to the tribunal.151  
The fourth ambassador, Stephen Rapp, has engaged with the tribunals, the 
creation of commissions of inquiry in Cote d’Ivoire, Kyrgyzstan, the ICC and other 
transitional justice measures. Rapp has also taken on the role of clarifying and 
explaining US positions to various transitional justice issues, particularly US support 
for the ICC.152  
                                                
151 Clint Williamson holds a bachelors degree from Louisiana Tech University and a law degree from 
Tulane University Law School in New Orleans. Williamson served as a Trial Attorney in the US 
Department of Justice Organized Crime Section and as an Assistant District Attorney in New Orleans, 
LA. From 1994 to 2001, he worked as a Trial Attorney at the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, Netherlands. While at the ICTY, he supervised 
investigations and field operations in the Balkans, compiled indictments, and prosecuted cases at trial. 
Among the cases handled by Ambassador Williamson were those against Slobodan Milosevic and the 
notorious paramilitary leader Zeljko Raznatovic, aka “Arkan,” as well as cases arising from the 
Yugoslav Army attacks on Vukovar and Dubrovnik, Croatia. From late-2001 through 2002, he served 
in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations as the Director of the Department of Justice in the 
UN Mission in Kosovo, overseeing the justice and prison systems. From 2003 to early-2006, he 
served as the Director for Stability Operations on the NSC staff. During his tenure at the White House, 
he was instrumental in developing the proposal for creation of a standing US Government post-
conflict response capability, which was realized with the establishment of the Office of the 
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in the State Department in mid-2004. While with the 
NSC, Ambassador Williamson served a rotation in Baghdad, Iraq in 2003 as the first Senior Adviser 
to the Iraqi Ministry of Justice. In this capacity, he was responsible for re-instituting judicial 
operations and ministry functions in the aftermath of the US invasion. Immediately prior to his 
appointment in the Department of State, Ambassador Williamson served as the Acting Special 
Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Relief, Stabilization, and Development at the NSC.  
Williamson was confirmed as the third war crimes ambassador in June 2006 and served until 
September 2009. 
152  Rapp received his B.A. degree with honors from Harvard University in government and 
international relations. He attended Columbia Law School and received his J.D. degree with honors 
from Drake University. Rapp was the US Attorney in the Northern District of Iowa from 1993 to 2001, 
where his office won historic convictions under the firearms provision of the Violence Against 
Women Act and the serious violent offender provision of the 1994 Crime Act. Prior to his tenure as 
US Attorney, he worked as an attorney in private practice and served as Staff Director of the US 
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency and as an elected member of the Iowa 
Legislature. From 2001 to 2007, Rapp served as Senior Trial Attorney and Chief of Prosecutions at 
the ICTR, personally heading the trial team that achieved convictions of the principals of RTLM radio 
and Kangura newspaper—the first in history for leaders of the mass media for the crime of direct and 
public incitement to commit genocide. In 2007, Rapp succeeded Desmond de Silva to become the 
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The war crimes ambassadors are therefore not career civil servants, but have 
come to the position with specialized, and often prosecutorial, experience in 
international criminal tribunals. They therefore have brought a different perspective 
to the position and a different network, since their former colleagues are tribunal 
staff. The following table illustrates the profiles of the war crimes ambassadors.    
Figure 18: War crimes ambassadors’ profiles 
Experience Scheffer Prosper Williamson Rapp 
Law degree LLM JD JD JD 
DOJ  x x x 
Congress x    x  
NSC x   x   
Private 
practice 
x x   x 
Academia x     
International 
tribunal 
 ICTR ICTY ICTR/SCSL 
UN UN Special 
Expert to 
Cambodia 
Tribunal 
UN Committee 
on the 
Elimination of 
Racial 
Discrimination 
DPKO/UNMIK;  
UN Special 
Expert to 
Cambodia 
Tribunal 
 
 
Past tribunal experience has brought the ambassadors credibility when interacting 
outside US government. For example, an ICTY advisor said that the war crimes 
ambassadors have been the ICTY’s first point of contact in the US and the ICTY’s 
strongest supporter. He said that other states should have a similar office because 
someone with ‘horizontal knowledge of war crimes issues is important.’ In addition, 
he added that the war crimes office has ‘convinced’ other countries and US 
government actors to support the tribunal. Since they are former colleagues, he said, 
‘we see each other as part of the same team. We have the same line of thinking. 
                                                                                                                                     
third Chief Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, where he directed the prosecution of 
former Liberian President Charles Taylor and others alleged to have violated international criminal 
law during the Sierra Leone Civil War. During his tenure in Sierra Leone, his office won the first 
convictions for recruitment and use of child soldiers and for sexual slavery and forced marriage as 
crimes under international humanitarian law. Rapp was appointed Ambassador-at-Large for War 
Crimes Issues by President Barack Obama, and confirmed by the US Senate in September 2009. 
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There is friendship and respect of one another. They are good advocates of our work’ 
(Frederick Swinnen, interview, 13 January 2012). Despite this specialized expertise, 
the war crimes office does not necessarily hold the same influence within the State 
Department as the regional bureaus or other agencies (David Scheffer, interview, 12 
March 2012).  
The Office of the Legal Advisor has also been involved in transitional justice 
measures when deemed necessary due to its role to advise on international law.153 
For example, Bush’s legal advisor, John B. Bellinger III, was involved in moving 
Taylor’s trial to The Hague. Obama’s legal advisor, Harold Koh, has followed the 
tribunals as well. The US Mission to the UN gets involved when transitional justice 
measures are supported by the UN. Several Court Management Committees (i.e., for 
the SCSL), for example, are based in New York with participation by USUN 
officials.  
This discussion illustrates that the State Department plays several roles in 
transitional justice because of the different mandates of various agency offices and 
bureaus. US embassies are typically the first point of contact since they are based at 
the location where a measure is established. They engage with measures in many 
different ways and monitor them closely. Some measures drew the attention of 
Ambassadors or officials from regional bureaus, but this occurrence had more to do 
with concerns about the measure’s impact on US interests than with their personal 
interest in a measure. War crimes ambassadors take the lead on criminal tribunals, 
providing technical support to measures and serving as an interlocutor between 
                                                
153 The Office of the Legal Adviser furnishes advice on all legal issues, domestic and international, 
arising in the course of the State Department's work. This includes assisting Department principals 
and policy officers in formulating and implementing US foreign policies, and promoting the 
development of international law and its institutions as a fundamental element of those policies. The 
Office is organized to provide direct legal support to the State Department’s various bureaus, 
including both regional, geographic and functional offices. 
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tribunals and other US government actors. Legal Advisors seem to project a 
viewpoint that lies between regional bureaus and the war crimes office. Individual 
attention within the USUN was less documented in this study but it is clear that these 
officials are knowledgeable and important to US involvement in transitional justice 
measures that involve the UN.  
 
USAID and DOJ 
USAID played a minor role in the Liberian TRC, and an important role in the 
Colombian case. USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) provided initial 
support to civil society efforts to establish a TRC. OTI has received significant 
attention at State as a successful model to facilitate transition and promote stability 
(QDDR, 2010). USAID’s Colombia office established an Office for Vulnerable 
Populations, which provided assistance for various aspects of the work of the 
National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation (CNRR). Ileana Baca heads 
this office and has worked in Colombia for over ten years. US involvement is 
impacted by her long-term relationships with Colombian government agencies.  
DOJ’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and 
Training (OPDAT) and the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance 
Program (ICITAP) have provided technical assistance to the Justice and Peace Unit 
responsible for investigating and prosecuting crimes committed by former 
paramilitary members under the Justice and Peace Law. These offices trained JPU 
prosecutors, helped with exhumations and provided supplies. A DOJ official said that 
because of the longstanding relationship between the DOJ and the Colombian 
Attorney General’s office, failure to support the newly created Justice and Peace Unit 
within this office would have been ‘irresponsible’ – especially considering JPU 
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responsibility for much of the law’s requirements (DOJ official 1, interview, 27 
August 2010). 
DOJ was also involved in the justice and peace process because of the 
extradition issue. DOJ made their concerns known to the Colombian government, 
and the US Deputy Attorney General submitted extradition requests for several 
paramilitary members during debates of the law. Several years later President Uribe 
decided to extradite 14 paramilitary leaders to the US that were participating in the 
JPP. Faced with JPU requests and NGO criticism (a situation unfamiliar for DOJ 
officials), the DOJ eventually undertook efforts to provide JPU access to AUC 
leaders, although the effect of these efforts remains unclear. Considering its legal 
focus, one would not have expected DOJ’s involvement in transitional justice or the 
interest in additional involvement in measures elsewhere.  
 
Transitional justice measures captured the attention of presidential administrations, 
Congress, the State Department, USAID, DOJ and other agencies. Bureaucratic 
politics explanations are useful in considering the role of all of these actors, with its 
attention on how different institutional settings influence the different prisms through 
which officials and politicians view foreign policy issues, which result in distinctly 
different views (Allison, 1971). It is also equally important to look at actors 
responsible for decision making (i.e., President and Congress) and those responsible 
for implementation (State, USAID, DOJ), as both groups play key roles in US 
foreign policy (i.e., Krasner, 1972; Lindblom, 1959).  
The cases illustrate that individual, and often personal, interest mattered in 
US foreign policy-making on transitional justice. US support or opposition for a 
measure could be determined by even one individual who made the issue a priority. 
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Behavioural approaches which focus on the psychological and cognitive factors, 
personality, perception, biases and role of individual decision makers are thus useful 
in explaining US foreign policy on transitional justice (i.e., Sprout, 1956, Jervis, 
1956, Boulding, 1959, Hollis and Smith, 1986). In addition, ‘policy entrepreneurs’ 
like Madeleine Albright and David Scheffer were crucial in initiating greater US 
involvement in transitional justice (Barnett, 1999).  
The level of individual interest in a measure impacted levels of support for 
transitional justice. For example, the Liberian TRC received the least individual and 
institutional attention, as well as the least financial, technical and political support. 
The criminal tribunals explored in this study received high-level congressional and 
State Department attention, and subsequently were the object of significant US 
support. This finding supports Rosati’s research which recognizes that different 
circumstances mean that different actors exert varying degrees of influence on 
foreign policy (Rosati, 1981). He argues that the executive will be involved in 
situations where a higher level of threat is involved (i.e., Taylor); the bureaucracy 
will dominate in foreign policy issues of moderate importance (i.e., Cambodia 
tribunal and Colombian extradition issue); and local dominance should be expected 
on low priority issues (i.e., Liberian TRC and Colombian JPP). 
 
Interests 
A second factor critical to understanding US involvement in transitional justice is the 
role that interests play. There is a tension within US foreign policy on issues like 
transitional justice between a notion of interests that focuses on narrow rational, 
material, strategic interests concerning security and the economy, and broader 
interests encompassing values and identity. US involvement in transitional justice is 
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best explained by a conception of US interests that encompass strategic concerns and 
values. This explanation draws on several notions of interests in the foreign policy 
literature.  
US involvement in transitional justice has provided a tool to pursue its 
rational, material, strategic interests. For example the US has used transitional justice 
as a way to support, oppose or remove the leadership of a country. It has been used 
as an alternative to the ICC. It has been used as way for the US to promote stability 
in a country or region or as an alternative to a military response. It has been used as a 
way to exert control. If a measure threatens to directly affect US interests, the US is 
quick to get involved.  
 The case studies provide examples. On the issue of a country’s leadership, in 
Cambodia, Senator McConnell blocked funding to the court due to his distrust of 
Hun Sen. In Liberia, Senator Gregg supported the creation of a Special Court as a 
way to remove Taylor from power. When the TRC recommended that President 
Sirleaf be sanctioned for her past support of Taylor, the US embassy and others 
distanced itself from the TRC due to its strong support of her presidency. In 
Colombia, the Bush administration assisted the justice and peace process in part 
because of its support of the Uribe administration.  
On the ICC issue, several interviewees stated that the US promoted the hybrid 
structure of the Special Court as an alternative model to the ICC (i.e., interviews with 
SCSL and ICC officials; also see Cerone, 2007: 305-306). The US needed to be seen 
as supporting some form of international justice, especially alongside such strong 
opposition to the ICC, and the hybrid model of the Special Court offered a way in 
which the US could claim continuing support for transitional justice efforts.  
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On the link made between transitional justice and stability, Rep. Diane 
Watson said that the US had a ‘duty’ to ensure Taylor’s transfer since he ‘remains a 
major source of instability’ in West Africa and said that ‘today's war criminals such 
as Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein are behind bars’ while ‘Taylor lives in 
freedom on a Nigerian estate’ (US House of Representatives, 2006: 33).   
 Two of the cases threatened to directly impact US interests. During the 
negotiations of the Justice and Peace Law in Colombia, the US insisted that the law 
not prohibit the extradition of paramilitary leaders that were also drug traffickers, and 
submitted extradition requests for several leaders to make this point clear. On the 
issue of a tribunal for Cambodia, the US Congress framed future discussions of the 
eventual measure by establishing that a court should prosecute those most 
responsible for crimes committed between 1975-79 (CGJA, 1994). War Crimes 
Ambassador Scheffer acknowledged that limiting the court’s focus in this way was at 
least in part due to the Nixon administration’s secret aerial bombings of Cambodia 
during the Vietnam War (Scheffer, 2002). These two examples show that US 
involvement was triggered by the possibility of a transitional justice measure 
affecting its interests.   
 US involvement in transitional justice has also promoted US values. 
Transitional justice clearly intersects with ideas about American identity, values and 
self-perception. The US has deeply rooted beliefs in justice and equality dating back 
to the country’s founding.154 It views itself as the bearer of these ideals. Also 
embedded within American identity is a legalistic culture that holds the rule of law in 
high esteem.155 Beth van Schack, who has recently taken a position in the US War 
                                                
154  For example, see Tocqueville, 1836; Bryce, 1888; Brogan, 1960/1972; Huntington, 1981; 
Slaughter 2007.  
155 For a critique of the dominance of legalism within the field of transitional justice, see McEvoy, 
2007.  
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Crimes Office, said: ‘We’re so proud of our legal system. It’s one of our biggest 
exports – legal ideas and laws and lawyers … It really is our contribution to the 
world … We see ourselves as being a place where justice happens’ (Beth van Schack, 
interview, 31 October 2009). John Ciorciari similarly said:  
The backdrop of US foreign policy is that America is promoting values. 
Trials are a good institutional mechanism for this—not only for 
advancing the cause of justice, but also because they are useful political 
processes.  A foreign power can come in and support them.  There are 
substantive merits (like reducing impunity), but trials also feel right.  US 
foreign policymakers usually view themselves as the good guys.  In 
criminal trials, there are winners and losers.  Fighting to be on the right 
side gives policymakers a sense of mission and connects to US founding 
myths and principles (John Ciorciari, interview, 10 March 2010).  
 
Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter, professor and former State Department official, 
said: ‘We take law seriously. We take it deeply seriously’ (Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
interview, 23 May 2012).  
The US prides itself in its promotion of justice, as well as the legal 
institutions it has created and the standards it abides by. The combination of these 
two notions made (and continues to make) transitional justice an attractive field to 
US policymakers. Accountability for human rights violations touches on firmly held 
American beliefs. The US has therefore been involved in transitional justice because 
it believes in it. When coupled with a sense of responsibility as a superpower, US 
involvement in transitional justice makes sense.  
 The case studies provide some examples. The idea of a Cambodia tribunal 
elicited such strong support that Congress created an office within the State 
Department just to investigate and support prosecution of Khmer Rouge crimes. 
Statements by War Crimes Ambassador Scheffer also illustrated a strong belief in the 
importance of accountability for the violations committed. Regarding Cambodia, he 
stated, ‘We have a supreme responsibility to those who perished in Cambodia to 
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bring the leading perpetrators to justice’ (Scheffer, ND). Prosecuting Taylor drew a 
similar reaction. Members of Congress pressed the Bush administration and Nigeria 
to act on the issue for several years. Although the US was unwilling to support 
another war crimes tribunal in Liberia, they were also not willing to support amnesty 
and agreed to a truth commission as a compromise. Members of Congress urged the 
Uribe administration in Colombia not to pass a law that would permit impunity. 
USAID and DOJ support also showed a commitment to the justice and peace process.  
 Interviewees also spoke about how the measures were very ‘American.’ Jaya 
Ramji-Nogales, a member of the Board of Advisors to DC-Cam said, ‘the ECCC was 
a very American response’ (Jaya Ramji-Nogales, interview, 2 November 2009). 
Thun Saray, the director of the Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee 
(CHRAC), said, ‘the idea for the ECCC came from the West’ (Thun Saray, interview, 
19 July 2010). Similar comments were made about the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone.  
Transitional justice may also be seen as a way to export US ideas about law 
and justice. One US official said, ‘There was a need in Cambodia for education about 
accountability and rehabilitation. Cambodians had esoteric notions of justice that 
were foreign to Northern Europe and the US’ (US official, interview, 4 August 2010). 
In the Colombia case, the US had been heavily involved in helping to shift 
Colombia’s legal system from an inquisitorial to an adversarial one.156 Some referred 
to this shift as the US ‘exporting’ its legal system, while others more critically called 
it a ‘colonization’ of the Colombian justice system (Crandall, 2002). A US official 
explained that US involvement in the justice and peace process was ‘fundamental to 
                                                
156 USAID’s Justice Program in Colombia was also involved in this work from 1995-2005. The 
USAID Justice Reform and Modernization Program (2006-2010) was established to train judicial 
operators in the new accusatory system and create ‘justice houses’, virtual hearing rooms in remote, 
conflict prone areas, Public Defender Offices and support civil society organizations to promote 
justice reform and expand justice services. See USAID, 2008.  
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the development of the Colombian justice system.’ Within Congress, there was a 
recognition that the past emphasis on drug eradication had failed and a more 
balanced mix between military and non-military spending was necessary. This shift 
involved an increase in aid to strengthen the justice sector in Colombia, which 
included aid for the justice and peace process. DOJ and USAID involvement in the 
JPP focused on the issues they cared about most. For example, the DOJ focused on 
prosecutorial and investigative capacities in the JPU and less on victims’ rights and 
truth-telling. USAID initially focused on the reintegration of demobilized ex-
combatants, but then shifted its focus to reparations and other activities for victims.  
 Material and non-material interests are thus both important to US foreign 
policy-making on transitional justice. However, policymakers have a difficult time 
reconciling the two. US involvement in TJ is typically framed as advancing US 
material interests, regardless of whether or not this argument is coherent. Scheffer 
said: 
There’s an instinct in Washington that you have to say it’s in the national 
interest. When we sent 100 soldiers to Uganda in October 2011 to track 
Joseph Kony, the White House statement was all about why sending 
these soldiers was in our national interests. It was not - ‘we’re doing this 
for the larger principle of international justice’. They just wouldn’t frame 
it that way. There’s a real instinct within the White House and the NSC 
to speak in the language of national interests all the time, and not sound 
goosey fruity with [talk about] international justice, which someone will 
misinterpret as the god forbidden global governance argument (David 
Scheffer, interview, 12 March 2012). 
 
Transitional justice advocates also use this argument in order to gain US support. 
The argument that transitional justice is in US national interests ‘plays really well to 
disarm the critics in Washington … Although this approach is seen cynically 
internationally, it’s a necessary statement to make in the Washington environment’ 
(Ibid). Scheffer reconciles material and non-material interests by talking about US 
‘global’ interests:   
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I think the US has to mature in its projection of these issues by saying: 
How do we meet our global interests in supporting international justice? 
Global interests can extend beyond narrow national interests, and 
include the projection of our values through the rule of law … I would 
like to think we have a broader perspective on the world, which can talk 
about our global interests that assist other countries and the values of 
accountability, which also indirectly benefit the US and its position in 
the world (Ibid). 
 
Professor Slaughter supports value-based arguments,157 but said, ‘you don’t have to 
since a straight interest-based calculus is so convincing.’ For her, accountability can 
change the domestic balance of power in ways that elevate voices and institutions 
that are much more in US interests than a military response. In addition, since these 
issues are ‘no longer between us and the third world’, but ‘south on south’, ‘there is 
no question that we’d rather be able to send somebody to a court than send in the 
troops.’ She added, ‘standing for accountability for genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing…is a huge source of our power in the 
world. It’s not the only source, but it is a huge source of power’. However, she does 
distinguish between the export of domestic and international law. ‘We export 
domestic law’, she said, but are ‘suspicious of international law, much more so than 
the Europeans. We are willing to take it seriously in some key areas’, but ‘political 
reasons’ for US interests in TJ are stronger than its interests in exporting law (Anne-
Marie Slaughter, interview, 23 May 2012).  
 Ultimately, the US should be able to embrace a nuanced notion of interests, 
which recognizes that both strategic considerations and values promote US interests. 
The foreign policy literature contains a wealth of material on this discussion. 
Rationalist conceptions of the national interest and the maximization of utility remain 
relevant; however, there have been efforts to reconcile this approach with non-
rational approaches (i.e., Simon, 1997; Mintz, 2004). The ethical foreign policy 
                                                
157 See Slaughter, 2007.  
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literature also attempts to conceptualize a broader notion of interests (i.e., Brown, 
2001; Chandler, 2007; Chang, 2011; Smith and Light, 2001; McElroy, 1992). In 
addition, the constructivist view that the ‘national interest’ must be seen through the 
prism of ideas also helps explain US interests in transitional justice (i.e., Weldes, 
1999). It provides a way to explain how the growing global norm of transitional 
justice, as well as American identity, shapes US interest (i.e., Hopf, 2002). It also 
helps explain US influence on the evolution of transitional justice (explored in 
chapter 2).  
 
Individuals and interests were recurring themes throughout the study that help 
explain US foreign policy on transitional justice. Sometimes these factors converged 
making US involvement in a measure more consistent. For example, the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone garnered support from a wide range of US officials – from 
President Bush to Secretary of State Rice and other high level State Department 
officials to several members of Congress. Part of the reason for individual interest 
was because the Court intersected with diverse US interests: It helped remove Taylor 
from power and promote regional stability, and it allowed the US to support a justice 
model that it preferred to the ICC. This convergence helps explain strong US backing 
of Taylor’s trial by the SCSL. Of course, US support still fluctuated even with this 
convergence. For example, for several years, the administration was not ready to 
support Taylor’s transfer to the court, after it had brokered a deal for his asylum in 
Nigeria.  
Other times individuals and interests were in tension with one another, 
resulting in more contradictory US involvement. For example, in Colombia, the 
justice and peace law elicited different views among members of Congress and the 
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Justice and State Departments. Congress urged President Uribe to ensure 
accountability for human rights violations in the Justice and Peace Law, while the 
Justice Department insisted that the law not affect extradition. When the process was 
under way, a DOJ official explained that US involvement in the justice and peace 
process was ‘fundamental to the development of the Colombian justice system’ – but 
did not see how the extradition issue was viewed by some as negatively affecting this 
same system.  
 In some cases, one factor was more important than the other. For example, 
US involvement in the Cambodia case was primarily driven by individual interest in 
seeing a tribunal for Cambodia established (i.e., Scheffer). Beth van Schack 
attributed this interest to timing. Since the genocide in Cambodia  
was the first post-Holocaust genocide, there was an idea that we need to 
close these historical loops … I think today, there is no way they would 
get an ECCC at all. Unfortunately, I don’t know if they would get a truth 
commission either … Now with the ICC, we have a more forward-
looking approach and [there is the sense that] we’re not going to waste 
our time with historical justice anymore (Beth van Schack, interview, 31 
October 2009).   
 
Once the tribunal was under way, it was primarily Sentator McConnell who blocked 
funds to the court, but was later convinced to permit US funding. War Crimes 
Ambassadors Scheffer and Williamson’s interest in the court remained even after 
their term as ambassador came to an end, as evidenced by their appointment by the 
UN as special experts to assist the court in recent years, and Scheffer’s ongoing 
assistance to the court.  
 When neither factor was at play, US involvement was minimal. For example, 
the Liberian truth commission received the least individual attention and did not 
intersect with US interests in a significant way. The US supported the establishment 
of the commission as a compromise between a war crimes tribunal and complete 
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amnesty. The embassy supported TRC operations, but when the report posed a 
possible threat to US support of President Sirleaf, the US distanced itself from the 
TRC.  
Of course, additional factors also play a role, such as the influence of the 
transitional justice trend, as well as the bilateral relationship between the US and the 
country establishing a measure. However, these factors were not as important as the 
role of individuals and interests. The case studies illustrate that a convergence of 
these two factors will elicit the strongest and most consistent support, while a 
disjuncture between the two will result in more contradictory involvement. 
Sometimes one factor will be more important than the other, and when neither factor 
is at play, minimal US involvement should be expected. We now turn to assess the 
impact of US involvement in transitional justice.   
 
6.3 Assessing US Involvement  
This study establishes what US involvement in transitional justice entails, 
categorizing it into four areas: financial, technical and political support and 
cooperation with other actors. The range and level of US involvement in detailed 
aspects of the measures explored in this study was surprising. Although the amount 
has varied and funding was sometimes blocked, the US contributed financial 
assistance to all of the transitional justice measures. The US also provided technical 
assistance to their establishment and operations. And it offered political support to all 
of the measures. The US also cooperated with a range of actors within and outside 
the country establishing a measure.  
Secondly, this study has detected two factors key to explaining US foreign 
policy on transitional justice: individuals and interests. Individuals have been critical 
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in defining the US approach. Transitional justice has also intersected with both 
strategic and value-based interests, which has made the field appealing to policy 
makers. When a measure receives individual support and offers a way to pursue US 
interests, US (financial, technical and political) support of transitional justice is likely 
to be strongest. When individuals oppose a measure and it clashes with American 
interests, US support will fluctuate and be more contradictory.  
Establishing and explaining US involvement in transitional justice provides 
an opportunity to comment on the impact of the US on the field as a whole. This 
exercise involves generalizations, but is still worthwhile after undertaking a close 
examination of US foreign policy. Overall, US involvement has had a positive 
impact. The US has been a strong advocate of individual measures and the field as a 
whole. The US is often one of the first donors to support a measure (which has 
encouraged additional donors to contribute) and typically provides vital funding for 
the functioning of a measure. The range of US actors involved and the expertise they 
bring to measures is valuable. The pragmatic approach taken by the US helps move 
processes along, from establishment through to completion. US officials tend to be 
knowledgeable of and cooperate with many of the actors involved in a measure, 
often facilitating communication between groups. Even if US involvement appears 
more hands-off, it typically will be playing a ‘behind-the-scenes’ role in major and 
minor decisions made about a measure. The US steps in at crucial moments when 
various challenges arise, and attempts to solve problems. Its political support of 
measures has a significant impact on a measure’s establishment and operations.  
That being said, the US wields inordinate control over measures, particularly 
in their establishment phase. Measures are established, at least in part, because the 
US ‘wants’ it and in the way the US wants it. Once they are established, however, 
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US support fluctuates. This fluctuation has to do with the range of individuals and 
interests that characterise US foreign policy in this field. Individual whims in 
combination with competing interests can result in contradictory policy. Measures 
that intersect with US interests or capture individual attention receive higher levels of 
funding and support (i.e., the removal of Taylor from office; the compromises made 
on the Cambodia court; and the general emphasis on criminal prosecutions over other 
measures). Measures that clash with individual, domestic, regional or international 
US interests receive support that is more inconsistent. For example, restrictions can 
be in response to problems within the measure, or to broader regional concerns or to 
distrust of a country’s leadership. Often US support or opposition is unrelated to a 
particular measure, having more to do with other interests.  
The difficulty with US involvement is that, although often well meaning, the 
US can disregard and overlook views because it is singularly focused on moving a 
process forward in the way it considers best. US officials cooperate with the actors it 
feels are most efficient and knowledgeable about a process, and may be antagonistic 
towards those they disagree with. Meticulous US involvement in a measure’s 
founding law, structure and jurisdiction can, at worst, result in flawed measures. US 
involvement can therefore be unreflective in its engagement and susceptible to tunnel 
vision.158 US pressure on transitional justice measures is a decisive factor with 
consequences that can strengthen or weaken transitional justice measures. When this 
political support or opposition is unrelated to a measure’s aim, US involvement is 
detrimental to the field.  
In response to a question about whether the US should not be so involved, 
David Scheffer said, ‘No. I always felt that we should be deeply involved.’ But he 
                                                
158 For more on ‘tunnel vision’, see, Janis and Mann, 1977. 
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then shared a thought that had occurred to him during his ambassadorship as he was 
flying between Kigali and Burundi:  
David, what are you doing? Are you the new colonial master? Are you 
colonizing the judiciary? Are you saying you must have a criminal 
tribunal to hold these people to account? … You’re not taking their 
territory or extracting minerals. But you are colonizing them with justice. 
Do you have the right to do that? That was the first time that [idea] had 
really struck me. I’ll never forget that because I wanted to keep that 
focus and be a little bit more humble about what I was doing … You 
have sovereign governments that have a stake in what you’re doing. You 
can’t just brush them aside … because we are intruding on their turf with 
this international concept of justice (David Scheffer, interview, 12 March 
2012).  
 
Nevertheless, Scheffer said he would not retreat from what he did in the 1990s, and 
wished he had pushed harder in some places. This comment reflects recognition of 
the power involved in the transitional justice enterprise.  
For an international actor to wield such control over transitional justice is 
problematic. Transitional justice has a range of aims, but excluded from this list 
should be the interests of foreign state governments. This is unrealistic, however, 
since donor governments will continue to assist policies that intersect with their 
strategic and value-based interests. It is possible, however, to better link transitional 
justice goals and American goals. The focus should therefore be on the purpose of 
establishing a transitional justice in the first place: to provide some form of 
accountability after widespread and systematic human rights violations have been 
committed. Unfortunately, this is not a short-term effort. Consistent support 
throughout a measure’s lifespan, and after, is needed if transitional justice aims are to 
be met. And even then, challenges remain. Top-down efforts ‘blinded by universality’ 
and bottom-up approaches ‘taken in by particularity’ may similarly be 
counterproductive and based on flawed assumptions. 159  Although the US has 
                                                
159 Meierhenrich, 2010: 326. See also, Golub, 2006; and Upham, 2006.  
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effectively promoted transitional justice for the most part, a better balance must be 
struck between constructive engagement and obstructive control. The next chapter 
concludes the study by reflecting on the wider implications of this research and areas 
for future study. 
Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 
This study has provided an empirical and systematic account of the forces that shape 
US foreign policy on transitional justice, offering an important contribution to 
scholarship, and feasibly, policy and practice. The research has found that US 
involvement entails financial, technical and political support and cooperation with 
other actors. It has highlighted the importance of individuals and interests, and 
concludes that the impact of the US on transitional justice has been generally positive 
but controlling and inconsistent.  
These findings have specific implications for US foreign policy on 
transitional justice, and more general relevance for the literature on foreign policy 
and the field of transitional justice. With regard to the US, although US involvement 
remains very reliant on individuals, it can be argued that these individuals have 
contributed to the mainstreaming of transitional justice throughout government. In 
addition to the institutional activity already explored in this study, there have been 
several recent developments which signal the field becoming more firmly rooted 
within government agencies. 
For example, within the Senate, Senator Dick Durbin chairs a Subcommittee 
on Human Rights and the Law, created in 2007, which considers the enforcement 
and implementation of human rights laws.160 Three laws, introduced by Senator 
Durbin, ensure that perpetrators of certain human rights violations cannot enter the 
US. They include the Genocide Accountability Act (2007), Child Soldiers 
Accountability Act (2008) and the Trafficking in Persons Accountability Act 
                                                
160 Since subcommittees can change fairly often, according to one official, Senator Durbin has tried to 
make the work non-partisan so the subcommittee remains when administrations change (US official, 
interview, 8 January 2010). 
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(2008).161 Senator Durbin has secured $3.3 million for the prosecution of human 
rights crimes in DOJ. 
Within DOJ, the Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section (HRSP) 
investigates and prosecutes human rights violators for genocide, torture, war crimes, 
and recruitment or use of child soldiers, and for immigration and naturalization fraud 
arising out of efforts to hide their involvement in such crimes. HRSP works closely 
with the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State, among 
other agencies, to identify such individuals and prevent them from entering the US. 
Within the State Department, the Office of War Crimes Issues was re-named 
the Office of Global Criminal Justice in 2012, and has a revised mandate: 
The Office of Global Criminal Justice (GCJ), formerly the Office of War 
Crimes Issues (WCI), led by Ambassador-At-Large Stephen Rapp, 
advises the Secretary of State and Under Secretary for Civilian Security, 
Democracy and Human Rights and formulates U.S. policy on prevention 
and accountability for mass atrocities. The office coordinates U.S. 
Government support for international and hybrid courts that are currently 
trying persons responsible for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 
and Cambodia. It also works closely with other governments, 
international institutions, and non-government organizations to establish 
and assist international and domestic commissions, courts and tribunals 
to investigate, judge, and deter atrocity crimes in every region of the 
globe. The Ambassador-at-Large coordinates the deployment of a range 
of diplomatic, legal, economic, military, and intelligence tools to help 
expose the truth, judge those responsible, protect and assist victims, 
enable reconciliation, and build the rule of law. 
 
Several changes were made to the office’s mandate. First, the global criminal justice 
ambassador now reports to an Under Secretary, instead of directly to the Secretary of 
State. Although this could appear as a demotion, Scheffer said that it further 
entrenches the issue within the State Department, and that it would be very difficult 
to eliminate the office in the future, as has been threatened in the past (David 
                                                
161 The Crimes Against Humanity Act (2009) was introduced, but not passed into law. A US official 
said that policymakers do not understand crimes against humanity, and war crimes are seen as too 
political, making these areas more difficult to address in Congress (US official, interview, 8 January 
2010).  
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Scheffer, interview, 12 March 2012). Secondly, the mandate has widened to include 
atrocity prevention and other transitional justice measures such as truth-seeking and 
reconciliation, in addition to prosecutions.  
 In April 2012, President Obama announced his ‘comprehensive strategy to 
prevent and respond to atrocities.’ This effort signals the highest level of the 
transitional justice institutionalization to date. A White House press release stated:  
President Obama recognizes that in order to counter atrocities more 
effectively, the U.S. government must prioritize this effort, strengthen 
and expand the tools available to us, and establish a level of organization 
that matches our commitment (US White House, 2012).   
 
In 2010, Obama created a White House position dedicated to preventing and 
addressing war crimes and atrocities. In August 2011, he issued Presidential Study 
Directive 10 (PSD-10), declaring the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide to 
be a ‘core national security interest and core moral responsibility’ of the US, 
ordering the creation of a whole-of-government Atrocities Prevention Board (APB), 
and directing the National Security Advisor to lead a comprehensive review to assess 
the US government’s anti-atrocity capabilities, and recommend reforms that would 
fill identified gaps in these capabilities (Ibid). 
The APB will include representatives of the Departments of State, Defense, 
Treasury, Justice, and Homeland Security, the Joint Staff, USAID, the US Mission to 
the United Nations, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central 
Intelligence Agency and the Office of the Vice President – all of whom are at the 
Assistant Secretary level or higher and have been appointed by name by their 
respective Principals. The APB will meet at least monthly to oversee the 
development and implementation of atrocity prevention and response policy, and 
additionally on an ad-hoc basis to deal with urgent situations as they arise.  The 
Chair of the APB will be the NSC Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and 
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Human Rights (who is currently Samantha Power).  To ensure senior-level visibility 
into the work and progress the APB is making, the Deputies will meet at least twice a 
year, and Principals once a year, to review the work of the APB, and the Chair will 
report on this work annually in a memorandum to the President.  After six months of 
operations, the Chair will begin preparation of a draft Executive Order for 
consideration by the President that will publicly set forth the structure, functions, 
priorities and objectives of the Board, provide further direction for its work, and 
include further measures for strengthening atrocity prevention and response 
capabilities as identified in the course of the Board’s work. 
In addition to the APB, President Obama directed his administration to take a 
range of steps to strengthen the US government’s ability to foresee, prevent and 
respond to genocide and mass atrocities. For example, the intelligence community 
will be required to conduct a ‘national intelligence estimate’, which estimates the 
global risk of mass atrocities and genocide, and increase their collection, analysis and 
sharing of information relating to atrocity threats and situations. Diplomatically, the 
US will update US training programs for UN peacekeepers to focus on enhanced 
techniques for civilian protection, including prevention of sexual and gender-based 
violence, and strengthen UN and regional capacities to prevent and respond to 
atrocities.  
The Defense Department will develop operational principles and planning 
techniques specifically tailored around atrocity prevention and response; incorporate 
mass atrocity prevention and response within geographic combatant commands; and 
organize exercises to test operational concepts. DOJ, Homeland Security and State 
are developing proposals to prosecute perpetrators of atrocities found in the US, and 
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permit the more effective use of immigration laws and immigration fraud penalties to 
hold accountable perpetrators of mass atrocities. 
President Obama signed an Executive Order that authorizes sanctions and 
visa bans against those who commit or facilitate grave human rights abuses via 
information technology (‘GHRAVITY sanctions’) related to Syrian and Iranian 
regime brutality.  The President’s visa ban on human rights abusers denies 
perpetrators of serious violations of human rights or humanitarian law, or other 
atrocities, entry to the US. New tools also include: A State and USAID rapid 
response deployment of civilians with specialized expertise in crisis situations; 
lessons learned reports; USAID awards for innovative technologies that strengthen 
US capacity for early warning, prevention and response with respect to mass 
atrocities; and Treasury Department blocking of money to abusive regimes.  
The creation of ‘alert channels’ within departments and agencies will allow 
individuals to share relevant unreported information about mass atrocities with the 
APB—including analysis or reporting that a superior may have blocked from being 
disseminated—without adverse professional consequences.  Comparable procedures 
within the National Security Staff is supposed to ensure that information about 
atrocity threats and situations, reaches the President. 
With specific relation to US foreign policy on transitional justice, the White 
House press release states that 
The US government will support national, hybrid, and international 
mechanisms (including, among other things, commissions of inquiry, fact 
finding missions, and tribunals) that seek to hold accountable 
perpetrators of atrocities when doing so advances US interests and values, 
consistent with the requirements of US law (Ibid).162   
                                                
162 The press release also makes specific mention of technical support to criminal prosecutions: 
State, DOJ, and Homeland Security will develop options for assisting with witness protection 
measures and providing technical assistance in connection with foreign and international 
prosecutions. The administration will also work with Congress to expand State’s authority to 
make reward payments for information that leads to the arrest of foreign nationals indicted for 
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This statement reflects the early discussion about a wider conception of interests, 
which recognizes strategic considerations and values. Obama’s 2012 initiative 
represents the most visible and high-level policymaking on transitional justice thus 
far. Efforts within Congress, DOJ, the State Department, intelligence agencies, 
Homeland Security, Defense Department, USAID and, significantly, a new 
interagency mechanism within the National Security Council – the Atrocity 
Prevention Board – represent the mainstreaming of the field throughout the US 
government.  
Whether or not these efforts will result in more effective US foreign policy, 
or will survive changes in administration, is yet to be seen. Professor Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, who led the QDDR at the State Department as the Director of Policy 
Planning, warns that this is still a new and fragile system:  
I don’t think [transitional justice] should be treated as a given. If we really 
want to institutionalize [it], we still have a ways to go. The most obvious 
[indication] is that the US is not a member of the ICC. But there are a lot of 
other counterattacks: they’re expensive; they don’t make sense; why should 
you go to all this trouble to try one person, etc.  
 
She argues that the efforts to institutionalize transitional justice are ‘not just because 
attitudes are changing toward transitional justice per se, but because transitional 
justice is one tool in a toolbox that we desperately need to address 21st century 
problems’ (Anne-Marie Slaughter, interview, 23 May 2012).  
There are interesting shifts and contradictions in the development of US 
foreign policy on transitional justice. On the one hand, the US has served as the 
field’s greatest advocate and has provided crucial support, but, on the other, it has 
served as a fierce opponent. This paradox is present in much of US foreign policy 
and is not unique to transitional justice policy. Nevertheless, these inconsistencies 
                                                                                                                                     
war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide by international, hybrid or mixed criminal 
tribunals (US White House, 2012). 
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affect transitional justice measures in many ways, as evidenced in this study.  From 
its championing of international criminal tribunals to its opposition toward the ICC, 
to recent efforts to mainstream the field, and everything in between, the US is 
coming to terms with a field it has done much to create. In many cases, transitional 
justice goals and US interests are easily compatible. Often, they clash. Tendencies to 
control the process coupled with conflicting interests can lead to an inconsistent 
approach. More effective and worthwhile involvement in transitional justice will 
result with greater attention to these contradictions and the consequences they 
produce.  
This study also has relevance for the literature on foreign policy. The 
complexity of the cases explored in this research illustrated that a range of theoretical 
tools are needed to explain the foreign policy of a state such as the US on a topic like 
transitional justice. A combination of behavioural and bureaucratic explanations of 
foreign policy supports the importance of individuals identified in this research as 
crucial to explaining US foreign policy on transitional justice. In addition, a mix of 
rational and constructivist approaches contributes to the study’s finding that US 
interests in transitional justice reflect strategic interests and values. The findings of 
this study therefore appear to coincide with scholars who offer explanations of 
foreign policy that are inclusive of a range of theoretical tools.163 
 This study also has relevance for the field of transitional justice. Most 
importantly, it has illustrated that the field has been and continues to be influenced 
by the US, regardless of the measure, the transition type or the region where it is 
established. Transitional justice scholars cannot therefore afford to overlook the role 
                                                
163 Ole Holsti, for example, points to the importance of examining bureaucratic constraints, domestic 
influences and the external environment (Holsti, 1970). Freedman and Caldwell argue that cognitive 
factors, values, the type of state in which bureaucrats operate (democratic/authoritarian), interest 
groups, congress and the public all impact foreign policy making (Freedman, 1976; Caldwell, 1977). 
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of the US in their research. Transitional justice advocates should also consider the 
US role when negotiating, establishing and implementing measures.  
 In addition, the diverse case selection of this study, which includes distinct 
measures, transition types and geographic regions, offers a novel way to think about 
transitional justice, which is inclusive of a range of measures, a wide conception of 
transition, and attention to region. The time frame of the research also explores a new 
phase of transitional justice, after the initial intrigue with international criminal 
tribunals in the 1990s. Transitional justice in the 2000s is a period where 
accountability for human rights violations is still very much on the global agenda, 
but shifted to include hybrid and domestic criminal prosecutions, as well as an 
increased focus on national systems and non-judicial measures.  
This study raises a number of possibilities for future research. For example, it 
would be interesting to study other cases of US involvement in transitional justice, 
and compare findings with the present research. Additional cases could include 
measures, transition types and geographic regions not examined in this study. Further 
case studies or a large-N study could help test the conclusions drawn here. A 
comprehensive impact assessment of US involvement would also be worthwhile in 
order to better evaluate the extent to which the US achieved its goals for transitional 
justice, its impact on various groups within a country that established a measure, or 
its impact on the short and long-term goals of the measure. Research on the impact of 
the war on terror on US involvement in transitional justice would be an additional 
area to explore. A study focusing on the impact of the Obama administration would 
also be interesting. 
This study only looked at US involvement in transitional justice. However, 
similar research carried out with international organizations, such as the UN, and 
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NGOs, like the International Center for Transitional Justice, could provide a broader 
account about the impact of international involvement in the field. Research on the 
evolution of transitional justice with a comprehensive examination of the range of 
international influences would also be worthwhile.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 Methods  
 
This appendix reviews key methods literature and its application in the design of my 
research. I first discuss and justify the use of comparative case studies, as well as 
case selection, process tracing and structured, focused comparison. Second, I discuss 
the use of semi-structured interviewing, including when to interview, interview 
sampling, how interviews were conducted and how they were used. I then look at 
research ethics, critical reflections on my experience as the researcher and specific 
challenges of fieldwork in transitional settings. This discussion thus provides insight 
into how the research was carried out.  
 
1. Comparative case studies 
Case data are authoritative; they record what happened, not what could or might have 
happened. Case studies vary from purely historical studies that seek to establish the 
relevant facts of the encounter to analytical studies chosen to illustrate specific 
theoretical propositions (Gerring, 2007: 3). Skocpol and Somers find that whatever 
the level of conceptual sophistication, a case study writer never stops being a diligent 
historian if he/she does a good job, and that feel for the case allows the writer to get 
behind the data to give it context and meaning and achieve a Weberian understanding 
of its dynamics (Skocpol and Somers, 1980/1994). If the theory fits the historical 
data, a presumptive explanation is provided; if not, an alternative explanation is 
needed. Although social scientists ‘can never be caught inescapably in theories, 
mechanisms and regularities’, general regularities in events, contexts and behavior 
do occur, to be expressed in concepts and illustrated through data (Zartman, 2005: 6). 
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The case study provides an intimacy of analysis that is almost never available to 
large-N analysis. It draws on—and indeed insists on—deep background knowledge 
of the cases being examined. And it facilitates what Brady and Collier call ‘causal-
process analysis,’ in contrast to the ‘data-set observations’ that are the basis of 
correlational and regression analysis (Brady & Collier, 2004: 277). John Gerring 
defines a case as ‘a spatially and temporally delimited phenomenon observed at a 
single point in time or over some period of time’ and a case study as ‘the intensive 
study of a single case for the purpose of understanding a larger class of similar units’. 
He notes that a case study research design may refer to a work that includes several 
case studies (Gerring, 2006: 211).  
 It then must be decided how many case studies to undertake, i.e., a single 
case, two cases or more. George and Bennett explain how several kinds of no-
variance research design can be useful in theory development and testing using 
multiple observations from a single case. These include the deviant, crucial, most-
likely and least-likely research designs, as well as single-case study tests of claims of 
necessity and sufficiency. Several influential works in comparative politics have used 
such single-case research designs to good effect.164  
However, for my purposes, a single case would have produced knowledge 
about US involvement in one type of transitional justice measure (i.e., criminal 
prosecutions or truth commissions), but would have been of limited utility in 
producing knowledge about the focus of this research, which was to understand US 
involvement in the field of transitional justice (i.e., across measures). Furthermore, 
things that happened once, however engrossing as a story, have no way of telling us 
whether they represent regularities or exceptions. The only way to test and reinforce 
                                                
164 George and Bennett, 2005: 32-33. See, Ronald Rogowski, 1995 who cites Arend Lijphart, William 
Sheridan Allen and Peter Alexis Gourevitvh.   
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concepts’ and theories’ claims to normal regularity rather than exceptionality is to 
look at a number of cases, not just one (knowing that the generality can never be 
proved or expected to be universal).  Comparative case studies exhibit the advantages 
of in-depth analysis of reality while overcoming the weaknesses of focusing on one 
case alone (Zartman, 2005: 7).  
Comparative case studies bridge idiosyncrasies and combine depth of 
understanding with the breadth of multiple instances. By focusing on the basic 
question of how outcomes are obtained, case studies can show causal links; they shed 
light on process and allow an exploration of the dynamic path from components to 
results, thus satisfying the need of both analysts and practitioners (Zartman, 2005: 4). 
Thus, this research employs multiple case accounts to allow for the development of a 
deeper understanding of the details and idiosyncrasies of the cases, so that the fit 
between the generalizations and the data could be explored, explained and 
understood.  
 Sidney Tarrow argues that comparing a few cases (two or three) has been 
under-theorized. He finds that most scholars either see paired comparison as a ‘case 
study plus one’ or as a degenerate version of large-N comparison. He first argues that 
paired comparison is distinct from single-case studies in several ways. Its 
distinctiveness can be understood through an analogy with experimental design. It is 
similar to experimentation in its ability to compare the impact of a single variable or 
mechanism on outcomes of interest. Paired comparison also eliminates the possibility 
that the dependent variable can have occurred even in the absence of the independent 
variable, thus significantly increasing the inferential power of the design over the 
single-case study. And by permitting dual (or triple) process tracing, it reduces the 
possibility that a supposed determining variable is as critical as it might seem from a 
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single-case study alone. Finally, as Becker (1968) argued, paired comparison can add 
confidence in a ‘building-block strategy’ that moves from a single-case to a 
multicase analysis. Paired comparison can also correct generalization from single 
cases (Tarrow, 2010: 232-244).  
 According to Tarrow, comparative case studies (or paired comparison) also 
differ from large-N comparisons. Proponents of large-N comparisons believe that use 
of large data sets can establish firm generalizations and regularities that combine 
case data in order to carry out statistical significance tests. This research uses 
aggregate data on the largest number of cases possible either to test deductive 
propositions or generate inductive findings through correlation or factoring. Despite 
careful coding, it needs to group large numbers of diverse cases together into types, 
and is more interested in showing statistically significant correlations than in finding 
causality or in explaining the category of exceptional cases (Ibid).   
However, there are a number of challenges to this approach. First, in seeking 
to compress events into statistics, the data moves far away from the subtleties of 
reality, as coders make sharp judgments on the nature or category of complex events, 
and many events do not lend themselves to binary or even plural statistics (Zartman, 
2005: 10). Such analysis can only handle data that are quantitatively, objectively 
measurable and explain only that for which it has data, and in the interest of 
precision it must make inflexibly quantitative definitions (Ibid: 11). Second, they 
hide the reasoning and details that support the choices made. Third, direct data are 
often not available, only indicators, or proxies, which are often far away from the 
effect they are proxying. Fourth, what cannot be measured or proxied, despite its 
explanatory power, is not analyzed. Fifth, data become no longer data but are 
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squeezed into generalizations. Finally, there is little process in this analysis, so the 
dynamic of the process is lost (Ibid: 11-12).  
Of course, there are challenges to comparative case study research as well. 
Case studies exchange feel for precision and thrive on it; their strength is an 
understanding of the situations they analyze. However, case study data can suffer 
from loose formalization, necessarily small number of cases, and deference to case 
idiosyncrasy (Zartman, 2005: 12). Additional challenges include insufficient degrees 
of freedom, nonrepresentativeness, atheoretical case selection, and ignoring scope 
conditions.165  
Yet the balance of advantages and weaknesses, inevitable in any method of 
analysis, as Zartman states, places case studies in the midst of a search for breadth 
and depth, for data and theory. He concludes: ‘Empirical soundness, including a feel 
for the subject, harnessed to a concern for usefulness through accurate 
generalizations and concepts, can be achieved – perhaps even best achieved – 
through comparative case studies (Zartman, 2005: 13). For these reasons, a 
comparative case study research design was selected for this research. This method 
provided a clear analytical strategy for working through complex empirical and 
historical materials using the leverage afforded by the differences and similarities of 
comparable cases. 
 
Case selection 
After deciding on comparative case studies as the method of this research, it was then 
necessary to select cases for analysis based on the type of data to be drawn from 
them. Zartman states that limited space and the need to establish an argument 
                                                
165 Tarrow, 2010: 246. For additional critique of the reasoning in comparative studies based on a small 
number of cases, see Lieberson, 1991. 
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signifies that cases are unlikely to be chosen at random, and instead chosen based on 
their saliency and relevance. Saliency involves importance in the general discourse 
of the topic. Relevance concerns applicability to the conceptual issues involved. The 
more cases can be chosen to focus on variations relevant to the conceptual issues and 
hold other features constant, the more explanatory factors can be isolated and 
identified, a condition termed structured, focused comparisons. Negative cases can 
be useful as a control, but comparing why something did not happen with why it 
happens significantly increases the difficulty in holding constant the elements to be 
analyzed (Zartman, 2005: 7-8).  
Patton defines purposeful case sampling as cases that are selected because 
they are ‘information rich’ and illuminative, that is, they offer useful manifestations 
of the phenomenon of interest. Case selection is then aimed at insight about the 
phenomenon, not empirical generalization from a sample to a population. The logic 
and power of purposeful sampling derive from the emphasis on in-depth 
understanding, as opposed to probability sampling, which derives its logic and power 
from generalization. Information rich cases are thus selected in order to learn a great 
deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the research (Patton, 2002: 
40, 46).  
One of the most common critiques of case study methods is that they are 
particularly prone to ‘selection bias’, but not, as George and Bennett argue, in the 
same way as in statistical research. Selection bias in statistical terminology is 
commonly understood as occurring when some form of the selection process in 
either the design of the study or the real-world phenomena under investigation results 
in inferences that suffer from systematic error. In statistical studies, selection bias 
always understates the strength of the relationship between the independent and 
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dependent variables (DVs), which is why statistical researchers are admonished not 
to select cases based on the DV (George and Bennett, 2005: 23).  
 In contrast, case study researchers sometimes deliberately choose cases that 
share a particular outcome. Cases selected on the DV can help identify which 
variables are not necessary or sufficient conditions for the selected outcome (Dion, 
2003: 95-112; Collier, 1995: 464). In addition, in the early stages of a research 
program, selection on the DV can serve the heuristic purpose of identifying the 
potential causal paths and variables leading to the DV of interest. Later, the resulting 
causal model can be tested against cases in which there is variation on the DV. 
Ideally, researchers would like to have the functional equivalent of a controlled 
experiment, with controlled variation in independent variables and resulting variation 
in DVs, but the requisite cases for such research designs seldom exist (George and 
Bennett, 2005: 23-24).  
 A related issue is whether the researchers’ foreknowledge of the values of 
variables in cases – and perhaps their cognitive biases in favor of particular 
hypotheses – necessarily bias the selection of case studies. According to George and 
Bennett, selection with some preliminary knowledge of cases, however, allows much 
stronger research designs (Ibid: 24).  
 The most damaging consequences arise from selecting only cases whose 
independent and dependent variables vary as the favored hypothesis suggests, 
ignoring cases that appear to contradict the theory, and overgeneralizing from these 
cases to wider populations. This selection bias can understate or overstate the 
relationship between independent and dependent variables. Case researchers may 
therefore bias their sample with regard to a wider set of cases about which they are 
trying to make inferences – unless they carefully limit the scope of their findings to a 
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well-specified population that shares the same key characteristics as the cases studied 
(Ibid: 24-25).   
  Zartman and Patton also provide guidance into understanding my case 
selection. The cases selected are both salient and relevant for considering US 
involvement in transitional justice since they vary in key dimensions to the field 
(distinct measures, transition types and regions). They are similar in the timeframe in 
which they were established, providing knowledge about a different time period than 
much of the transitional justice literature which has focused on the 1990s. This 
framework limited the choice of cases, and those ultimately chosen were thought to 
be able to provide ‘useful manifestations of the phenomenon of interest.’  
To a certain extent, the cases are meant to be ‘illustrative’ of a range of 
‘typical’ transitional justice measures. While considering case selection at the start of 
the research, I contemplated looking at the Iraqi Special Tribunal, for example, but 
decided that this was an atypical example that would be more difficult to relate to the 
field as a whole. I selected cases that were less controversial and more illustrative of 
the field, which varied on certain dimensions and were operational during a similar 
timeframe. They may or may not be the most relevant for explaining US foreign 
policy on transitional justice, but they do provide adequate variation and similarity to 
produce new knowledge about the topic.  
In addition, my past professional experience in the field of transitional justice 
helped me select cases. In 2003-2005, I was a research apprentice at UC Berkeley’s 
War Crimes Studies Center, where I conducted research for Professor David Cohen 
and travelled to East Timor to monitor war crimes trials for a key NGO. As a 
recipient of a Berkeley public service fellowship, I then worked at the International 
Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) for a year, which significantly strengthened my 
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knowledge of the field. Following this work, I was hired as a consultant at UNICEF 
to continue work on a joint ICTJ-UNICEF project. Part of this work involved a trip 
to Liberia in summer 2006 to pilot a handbook for children’s involvement in truth 
commissions at a TRC training for statement-takers. I returned to Liberia in 
November-December 2009 to carry out a preliminary impact assessment of the TRC 
for Benetech and the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and 
Labor. Some of the interview and focus group data obtained during this visit is used 
in the Liberia case study with authorization by interviewees and focus group 
participants.  
 
Process tracing and structured, focused comparison 
Once cases were selected, I then undertook a structured, focused study of each case, 
which was guided by process tracing. The study was ‘structured’, as George and 
Bennett recommend, in that I formulated general questions that reflected the research 
objective and asked these questions of each case under study to guide and 
standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation 
of the findings of the cases possible. These questions were carefully developed to 
reflect the research objective and theoretical focus of the inquiry. The use of a set of 
general questions was necessary to ensure the acquisition of comparable data across 
the three cases. The study was also ‘focused’ in that it dealt only with certain aspects 
of the cases examined: US involvement in the establishment and operations of 
measures. As a single researcher, I was better able to achieve structured and focused 
comparative case studies (George and Bennett, 2010: 67-69).  
 Within each case, process tracing was undertaken in order to understand how 
and why the US was involved in the establishment and operations of transitional 
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justice measures. With process tracing, causation is established through uncovering 
traces of a hypothesized causal mechanism within the confines of one or a few cases 
(Bennett and Elman, 2007: 183). Cases may provide a variety of evidence of the 
operation of causal mechanisms, none of which is directly comparable, some of 
which may be more important than other pieces, and all of which taken together may 
allow analysts to draw conclusions about the adequacy or inadequacy of an 
explanation (Bennett & Elman, 2006). Process tracing can involve both the inductive 
and deductive study of events and sequences within a case. Inductive examination 
may reveal potentially causal processes that the researcher had not theorized a priori. 
Deductively, theories can suggest which intervening events should have occurred 
within a case if the theory is an accurate explanation of the case. Depending on the 
theory under investigation, some of the hypothesized steps in the case may be tightly 
defined necessary conditions, and others may be defined more loosely as having 
several substitutable processes that could have taken place at a particular juncture 
(Bennett and Elman, 2007: 183).   
The ‘step-by-step’ approach to process tracing has been criticized as a form 
of story telling which does not necessarily aid in producing causal analysis. However, 
Bennett and Elman cite many examples of process tracing in IR research, which they 
find share a set of common features that constitute best practices in process tracing. 
These include: explicit attention to and process tracing on alternative explanations 
and on the hypothesis or explanation of most interest to the researcher; sustained 
focus on the question of ‘what else must be true’ of the process through which the 
outcome arose if a proposed hypothesis explains the outcome; and relentless 
empirical research on these hypothesized processes, using a wide variety of sources 
(often including archived documents, contemporary news accounts, secondary 
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histories, biographies or memoirs, and interviews) with due attention to the potential 
motivated and informational biases of each source (Bennett and Elman, 2007: 183). 
Process tracing and structured, focused comparison helped uncover what 
mechanisms explained US involvement in transitional justice. Causation was not 
established, but an inductive examination supported an exploratory research design 
that helped reveal potential explanations. Once individuals and interests surfaced as 
two important explanations for understanding US foreign policy on transitional 
justice, I was able to pay explicit attention to these variables and use a wide variety 
of sources to understand how they played out in each case.  
As discussed by George and Bennett, the first step in studying each case was 
to gather accessible academic literature. This preliminary step of immersing oneself 
in the case led to the construction of a chronological narrative that helped me 
understand the basic outlines of the case. I relied on chronological narrative as an 
organizing device for presenting the case study materials in order to enable readers 
not already familiar with the history of the case to comprehend the analysis. George 
and Bennett find that striking the right balance between a detailed historical 
description of the case and development of a theoretically focused explanation is a 
familiar challenge, which proved true for my research. However, it was deemed 
necessary to include this narrative since a significant portion of research time was 
spent trying to uncover what actually happened, since there were competing 
explanations or undocumented reasons for US involvement in my cases. Once the 
gaps in the existing historical accounts were identified, I went to original sources, 
including archival materials, newspapers, local daily media accounts, government, 
IGO and NGO documents, and importantly interviews. In this way, a level of 
‘triangulation’ - in which a systematic approach to evaluate data is integrated with 
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information from different types of sources - was achieved (Davies, 2001: 79). 
Information was then cross-referenced both between and within the data types 
employed (Ibid: 78). I faced the challenge of assessing the evidentiary value of these 
primary sources, which often required continually going back to fill gaps in the 
narrative. The fact that my research entailed recent and contemporary US foreign 
policy also meant that it was likely that important data was not available and could 
not be easily retrieved for research purposes, e.g., important discussions among 
policymakers that take place over the telephone or within internal e-mail and fax 
facilities-the results of which are not easily acquired by researchers. 
 
2. Semi-structured interviewing   
In addition to extensive background research of US government documents, UN and 
NGO reports, academic sources, and the media, my thesis drew on 187 semi-
structured interviews conducted with members of key stakeholder groups in the US 
and the case study countries.166 Interview lists and statistics are included in the 
following appendix, but the purpose for choosing this method of data collection, 
sampling, how and when interviews were conducted, and how the data collected was 
used are first described here.  
Interviewing was a key method of collecting qualitative data for this research. 
David Richards mentions some of the advantages of interviewing: 1) they can help in 
interpreting documents, particular if you gain access to the authors of a relevant 
document; 2) they can help interpreting the personalities involved in the relevant 
                                                
166 Fieldwork in Washington DC from January-April 2010 was possible because of financial support 
from the Marshall Commission. While in DC, I was accepted as a Visiting Researcher at Georgetown 
University. Fieldwork in Liberia was undertaken while carrying out an assessment of the TRC 
(described above). Fieldwork in Cambodia was possible due to funding from LSE’s International 
Relations Department. Fieldwork in Colombia was possible due to funding from the Abbey Santander 
Grant.   
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decisions and help explain the outcome of events; 3) they can provide information 
not recorded elsewhere, or not yet available (if ever) for public release; 4) they can 
help you establish networks or provide access to other individuals, through contact 
with a particular interviewee (the snowball effect); 5) they can help you understand 
the context, set the tone or establish the atmosphere of the area you are researching. 
Typical problems with interviews include issues of access and reliability (Richards, 
1996: 200-201). 
Dexter’s discussion of elite specialized interviews is particularly relevant for 
my study. He defines them as interviews with any interviewee who is given 
specialized, non-standardized treatment. This treatment includes: 1) stressing the 
interviewee’s definition of the situation; 2) encouraging the interviewee to structure 
the account of the situation; 3) letting the interview introduce to a considerable extent 
(an extent which will of course vary from project to project and interviewer to 
interviewer) his notions of what he regards as relevant, instead of relying upon the 
investigator’s notions of relevance (Dexter, 1970: 18). This approach contrasts with 
standardized interviewing, where the investigator defines the question and the 
problem and is only looking for answers within the bounds set by his presuppositions. 
In elite interviewing, the investigator is willing, and often eager to let the interviewee 
teach him what the problem, the question, the situation, is – to the limits of the 
interviewer’s ability to perceive relationships to his basic problems, whatever these 
may be (Dexter, 1970: 19).  
 This approach is typically adopted with the influential, the prominent and the 
well-informed more than with the rank-and-file of a population. Dexter offers several 
reasons for this. Firstly, he finds that the well-informed are unwilling to accept the 
assumptions with which the investigator starts; they insist on explaining to him how 
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they see the situation, what the real problems are as they view the matter (Ibid). 
Secondly, in an elite interview, an exception, deviation or unusual interpretation may 
suggest a revision, a reinterpretation, an extension or a new approach, as opposed to 
a statistical handling of a deviation in a standardized interview. Dexter shows how in 
interviewing members of a state legislature, most of the members may give this or 
that answer; but it may well be that only a few members give the insightful answers 
because they are the ones who both know and can articulate how things are actually 
done. Obviously some test is desirable in order to believe what they say rather than 
what the majority says. This test may simply be that of comprehensibility, 
plausibility and consistency (Ibid).  
  Interviewing was deemed a key technique for data collection in my research 
since it aided document and personality interpretation, provided information not 
available elsewhere, helped me establish networks and access to other individuals 
and helped me understand the context of US foreign policy in general and in the 
three case studies. Elite specialized interviews were necessary given most 
interviewees held specific positions in different key stakeholder groups, where the 
greatest benefit resulted from an open-ended ‘discussion’ about the topic in which 
the interviewee could explain how he or she viewed US involvement in transitional 
justice. Specialized, non-standardized treatment of interviewees allowed room for the 
interview to go in the direction the interviewee felt best and although I prepared 
extensively prior to each interview, I was able to then draw on this knowledge when 
needed, but focus on close listening to what the interviewee actually said.  
Limitations involve difficulty in gaining access to some individuals, and interviews 
conducted with those where information turned out not to be significantly relevant 
for the study.  
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When to interview  
Dexter states that interviewing is the preferred tactic of data collection when it 
appears likely that it will get better data or more data or data at less cost than other 
tactics. He thus encourages reflection as to what is the most promising and least 
costly technique for obtaining the desired information (Dexter, 1970: 23). In many 
cases, he finds, elite interviewing will turn out to be preferable, but should be 
undertaken when the following conditions are approached: 1) alternative techniques 
have been seriously considered in terms of the research issues; 2) the research issues 
have tended to determine the selection of techniques, rather than the reverse; and 3) 
the inferences drawn from the interviews can be subjected to some sort of 
independent criticism, or, preferably, vigorous test (Phillips, 1966). 
 Dexter argues that scholars who rely on interviews as their chief source of 
data typically have a good deal of independent knowledge about the topic. They 
spend their free time socially and professionally with people in the field, participate 
in events, read extensively on the topic, make observations during these encounters 
and, importantly, interviews with individuals with different views are checked and 
rechecked against each other – all factors which greatly affect the research. In topics 
where the researcher has less acquaintance with the relevant problems, it is more 
challenging to identify a pattern or framework with the data. For interviews to be 
valuable, the interviewer should have a good deal of relevant previous experience 
which enables him to interpret what he hears and ask meaningful supplementary 
questions, or the interviewer will be able to observe and/or take part in the group life 
of the object of study so that he comes to know what is meaningful to ask and to 
record (Dexter, 1970: 24-26).  
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 Dexter also discusses the utility of exploratory or trial interviews in order to 
find out how much one knows or can quickly pick up about the background and the 
situation. When it is apparent that the interviewer does not have enough background 
to make sense out of the interview, then one should quit or postpone the effort. The 
interviewer must have some capacity to catch the interviewee’s meanings, to 
perceive the framework within which he is talking, if he is to get much out of the 
interview. Otherwise, he is merely recording verbal behavior; he lacks the capacity to 
‘listen with the third ear’. Dexter thus stresses the importance of getting a good deal 
of background and listening carefully to the interviewee’s frame of reference. He 
states: ‘a large part of listening with a third ear is noting and adapting to a frame of 
reference different from one’s own.’ He concludes his first chapter by stating that 
‘the experienced person in any field knows that things happen in a subtle, confused, 
foggy, complex way, which cannot be stated or codified simply; the person without 
practical experience and without much contact wants to sharpen and simplify’ (Ibid: 
28-29).  
 Considering my previous professional experience, independent knowledge 
and range of contacts in the field of transitional justice, interviewing was the 
preferred tactic of data collection. This background proved essential in interpreting 
interviews and asking meaningful questions. Exploratory interviews were held in 
each case, which enabled knowledge gaps to be quickly identified and filled before 
further interviews were conducted. I was able to perceive underlying issues based on 
how an interviewee reacted and responded to certain questions, even if he or she did 
not directly respond to the question asked. The interviewee’s frame of reference was 
always considered, as evidenced by interview preparation and listening with an 
empathetic ‘third ear’.   
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 Although it was decided that interviews would be the most relevant data 
collection method, alternative techniques could have been considered for this 
research. In addition, although different interviewees were used to check and correct 
one another, the inferences drawn from the interviews could have been subjected to 
more extensive testing. However, some of these weaknesses may be overlooked 
given the length of time given to complete the thesis, and my independent knowledge 
of the topic, which allowed me to interpret what I heard and ask meaningful follow-
up questions.  
 
Interview sampling 
A combination of purposive, snowball, quota and opportunistic sampling techniques 
was used to find and select interviewees. In quota sampling, the researcher selects 
interviewees based on their membership in a particular group (Potter, 1996: 107). 
Because I wanted to obtain a variety of views on US involvement in transitional 
justice, I identified several key stakeholder groups relevant for my research, 
including the US government, case study governments, transitional justice measures, 
international organizations, NGOs, academia and the media. A cross-section of views 
from key stakeholder groups was taken in order to ensure a mix between case study 
country actors and international actors. A mix between government and non-
governmental actors was also achieved. Additionally, within each stakeholder group, 
a variation of views was sought. For example, within the US government, officials 
from the State Department, USAID and Congress were interviewed. Interviews with 
a range of national and international NGOs were conducted. In addition, different 
perspectives within these groups were sought. Across each case study, roughly equal 
numbers within each group were interviewed.   
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 Within these groups, purposive, maximum variation and snowball techniques 
were used. In purposive sampling, the researcher selects the sample on the basis of 
knowledge of a population, its elements and the purpose of a study (Babble, 2010: 
193). The people in purposive samples are chosen because they are relevant sources 
of evidence of the phenomenon (Potter, 1996: 107). The maximum variation 
approach signals analysis of the potential population in order to assess the maximum 
range of sites and people that constitute the population (Seidman, 2006: 52). My 
research aimed to collect data from a wide variation of sites and people within the 
limits of the study.   
A popular technique in generating a purposive sample is called snowball. In 
snowball sampling, you locate one or more individuals and ask them to name others 
who would be likely candidates for your research. Once you have a preliminary list, 
you show it to several people who are on the list and ask them to name others who 
they think should be on the list. The process continues until the list becomes 
‘saturated’ – that is, until no new names are offered (Bernard, 1999: 179).  
For my research, interviewees were initially identified through personal 
contacts knowledgeable about transitional justice. Each interviewee was asked if he 
or she could suggest other possible interviewees, which created the snowball effect. 
The same individuals would often be recommended numerous times, and served as a 
useful crosscheck to ensure that key persons were interviewed.  
Opportunistic sampling was also used in my research, where the researcher 
‘takes advantage of opportunities that present themselves’ (Vogt & Gardner, 2012: 
142). For example, while in Cambodia, I heard about a conference on US-Cambodia 
relations where several past US Ambassadors to the country and other important 
officials were present. I attended the event and approached several individuals for 
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interviews, which led to interviews with a former ambassador and two important 
Cambodia historians.  
 
How interviews were conducted  
An introductory email was sent, which included: the person who recommended I 
contact them (if such a person existed); my affiliation as a PhD Candidate at the LSE 
and Marshall Scholar; a brief description about my research and the benefit I hoped 
to gain by conducting the interview; and the issue of attribution. This approach 
follows the recommendations made by Richards (Richards, 1996: 201-202).  
 I prepared thoroughly for each interview. I was aware of the interviewee’s 
social background and career, and, if available, read any publications or documents 
they had written. I mainly relied on internet searches for this information and created 
an electronic file on each interviewee. I prepared a set of questions around certain 
themes in advance.   
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with an interview guide that I 
prepared beforehand that provided a framework for the interview. All interviewees 
were first explained the purpose of the project and asked if the interview could be 
recorded. They were also asked whether or not the interview could be attributed to 
the individual. Those interviews conducted on a non-attributable basis were 
attributed in the way the interviewee requested. Interviews lasted from one to two 
hours.  
Each interview covered similar topics, but left room for certain areas to be 
explored more thoroughly. Depending on the interviewee’s position and perspective, 
some issues were more relevant than others. Generally-speaking, however, each 
interview solicited views about US involvement in the development of transitional 
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justice more generally, and more specifically, the establishment and operations of the 
transitional justice processes explored in this study. After each interview, a thank you 
email was sent. I would transcribe or type of interview notes soon after each 
interview.  
 
How interviews were used 
Interviews were then analyzed in order to draw out trends and divergences within 
and across stakeholder groups. Interviews generated a wealth of material in terms of 
background information, confirmation of perceptions and views, and useable quotes. 
The quotations used in this thesis have been chosen to characterize or typify views or 
perceptions which have been commonly articulated by interviewees. Only a small 
proportion of the transcribed material from interviews is reproduced in quote format 
in this thesis. Nevertheless, the wealth and richness of material gathered through the 
many interviews and discussions underpins much of the analysis and conclusions 
reached in this research.  
Dexter states that no matter how objective an interviewee seems to be, the 
research point of view is: ‘The informant’s statement represents merely the 
perception of the informant, filtered and modified by his cognitive and emotional 
reactions and reported through his personal verbal usages’ (Dexter, 1970: 119). He 
suggests four ways to detect distortion of ‘facts’ from interviewees: implausibility; 
unreliability; knowledge of an informant’s mental set; and comparing an informant’s 
account with the accounts given by other informants (Ibid: 123-124). The researcher 
thus discovers what the informant’s statements reveal about his feelings and 
perceptions and what inferences can be made from them about the actual 
environment or events he has experienced (Ibid: 126).  
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 This approach was adopted in my research. It was understood that interview 
content was subjective and distortion was detected primarily through cross-checking 
interviewee contents. In this way, gaps in narrative were filled or competing 
explanations were described.  
 
3. Research ethics  
I was guided by the LSE Research Ethics Policy and Review Checklist, which helped 
ensure that research was conducted to high ethical standards and conformed to 
generally accepted ethical principles. Standards upheld include, but are not limited to, 
the following: Research was designed, reviewed and undertaken in a way that 
ensured its integrity and quality. Research subjects were informed fully about the 
purpose, methods and intended possible uses of the research and what their 
participation in the research entailed. The confidentiality of information supplied by 
research subjects and the anonymity of respondents was respected. Research 
participants participated in a voluntary way, free from any coercion. Harm to 
research participants was avoided. The independence and impartiality of the 
researcher was clear, and any conflicts of interest or partiality were explicit. Ethical 
and political issues relating to personal and national disparities in wealth, power, 
political interest and national political systems were considered, as were the 
differences between the civil and financial position of national and foreign subjects 
and/or participants. There was awareness that irresponsible actions could jeopardize 
access to a research setting or even a whole country for other researchers (LSE 
Research Ethics Policy, 2008). These standards comport with the American Political 
Science Association’s Principles of Professional Conduct (APSA, ND).  
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 Clark argues that while ethical codes and guidelines are valuable and offer a 
useful starting point, they lack the nuance and specificity that individual research 
environments require. In short, ‘[o]fficial guidelines and ethical codes of practice are 
insufficient to allow the researcher to navigate through the continually evolving 
course and context of research in a way that is morally responsive to the participant, 
while ensuring the integrity of the research’ (Hewitt, 2007: 1149. 1157). Clark finds 
that a more situational and contextual approach to ethics – what Cutcliffe and 
Ramcharan term an ‘ethics as-process approach’ – is needed (Cutcliffe and 
Ramcharan, 2002: 1000, 1006). Using this approach, ethical issues are addressed, 
discussed, and negotiated in a co-learning environment as the research progresses 
(Clark, 2012: 825). 
Similarly, my research set certain limits in order to ensure what was deemed 
ethically responsible. For example, interview sampling focused on key stakeholder 
groups, but tended to focus on elite members of these groups, i.e., those with specific 
knowledge of US involvement. Because of relatively limited time in each country, it 
was decided that victims and other vulnerable groups perhaps affected by US 
involvement were not interviewed, since adequate time was not available to ensure 
that re-traumatization would not take place. It was also not seen as directly necessary 
to respond to the research questions. Contextual issues were taken into account in 
each country visited.  
 
4. Critical reflections on the student as researcher  
Webb and Salancik explore how the interviewer must develop a self-consciousness 
about what is affecting the interviewee, including how he himself affects the 
interviewee. Dexter also examined the importance of ‘self-assessment in the 
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interview process’. He discusses how an assessment of interview responses and 
reactions is important since interviewees are not engaging in undirected monologues, 
but are, on the contrary, addressing themselves to specific conceptions of a specific 
audience. Ordinarily, conceptions of a specific audience are in part determined by 
the characteristics of the interviewer as perceived by the interviewee. Webb and 
Salancik brought together analytic and experimental evidence to support this finding, 
but Dexter says that an interviewer intuitively realizes that interviewees will not talk 
in the same way to those whom they regard as not really understanding it as they will 
to those who strike them as being sophisticated about it. In all elite interviewing, 
interviewers will come across many examples of the way in which the interviewer, 
because of what he is or appears to be, affects the content, the style, the tone of 
responses (Webb and Salancik, 1966; Dexter, 1970: 139).  
 According to Dexter, what this means is that interviewing is a social 
relationship and the interviewer is part of that relationship. The interviewee’s 
inarticulate and unexamined conception of the audience guides and determines what 
he says. Interviewees respond to cues given by the interviewer as cues of how to 
present themselves. Further, Dexter states that without any indication of viewpoint, 
the mere appearance of one interviewer may make him look like someone with a 
particular view. Or the name, the sponsorship, the letter of introduction may lead the 
interviewee to assign such interpretations. Interviewees are often shrewd about 
guessing how interviewers play their roles. But interviewers may have characteristics, 
which to some interviewees are misleading, or a particular institutional connection or 
project description may lead to systematic misinterpretation. In any case, the 
interviewer tends to affect what is said. In order to get around this situation, Dexter 
318 
 
places an emphasis on asking questions objectively, i.e., managing the impressions 
one creates that the interviewee has supposedly no cues to guide him (Ibid: 140). 
 Unfortunately, in most accounts of interviewing, the interviewer suppresses 
any account of his own role, and, except in extreme cases, of interviewee reactions to 
him. Interviewers do not normally discuss their role, however, since it appears 
egocentric or seems ‘to violate the canon of scholarly decency’ if he were to tell the 
reader about himself in at all the same way that he sometimes discusses his subjects. 
Dexter suggests that the researcher explain how the kind of person he is, how his 
characteristics may have affected what the interview said and how his biases may 
have impacted his interpretation of what he thought he heard, even though this is 
typically not done (Ibid: 142-143).  
 In this vein, Bentley and Dewey’s notion of ‘transaction’ is useful since the 
person ‘exists’ in a state of dynamic mutual interdependence with other persons and 
his ‘personality’ – what he says, realizes and perceives – is a function of this 
relationship. In the context of an interview, Dexter says that it is likely that the total-
situation-as-felt-and-perceived affects or chiefly determines how a respondent 
answers a set of questions. Interviewers must therefore try to determine how 
respondents see situations, bearing in mind that the interviewee’s perceptions may be 
functions of unanalyzed or unplanned aspects of interviewer behavior. As far as 
possible, the interviewer will try to control or modify his behavior so as to lead the 
interviewee to focus on the study – an effort termed ‘objectivity’ (Ibid: 143-145).  
It is important for the interviewer, during the interview, Dexter states, to realize what 
the interviewee is responding to, because on this basis, he can continuously modify 
his strategy, formulate his questions and plan his comments. He may even modify his 
own mannerisms to a limited extent. The skilled interviewer in an unstructured 
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interview, on the basis of such realizations just indicated can in a very primitive way 
‘test’ hypotheses on the run; if he feels the interviewee is defining the situation in a 
certain way, he asks questions or makes comments designed to get further responses 
which will test those impressions (Ibid: 146).  
Dexter also notes that physical characteristics can evoke different role 
conceptions in interviewees, which may affect their responses. A good interviewer is 
able to make relevant and applicable guesses, while the interview is going on, as to 
how he is regarded by the interviewee and to adapt his strategy accordingly. He is 
able, similarly, to make intelligent guesses about other factors which are affecting the 
interviewee’s choice of role and responses. And a good interviewer is also aware of 
his own reactions while the interview is going on and is able almost instantaneously 
to take account of them. After the interview is completed, when he is writing it up 
and analyzing it, the good interviewer will take account both of his own reactions 
and responses, and those, so far as he can guess, of the interviewee. Much of this has 
to be done intuitively and subconsciously and without explicit formulation (Ibid: 
148-150).  
 During fieldwork, I was very cognizant of my age, gender, nationality, ethnic 
background, language abilities and institutional affiliations. These issues impacted 
my access to interviewees and interview content, and had different implications 
depending on the country I was in and the person I was interviewing. Although not 
always clear, some individuals agreed to be interviewed because of my scholarship, 
my undergraduate and postgraduate universities, or my previous professional 
experience in the field of transitional justice. My nationality helped gain access to 
American government officials, as did my affiliation with Georgetown University as 
a visiting researcher in DC. Spanish fluency impacted access and quality of 
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interviews in Colombia. Prior work experience in Liberia helped gain access to 
interviewees there.   
 Once I arrived at an interview, being a young woman appeared to be less 
threatening than perhaps male or older researchers may have been. My professional 
dress, business card, recorder and notebook seemed to signal to the interviewee I was 
undertaking a serious research initiative. Many interviewees also became more 
comfortable and talkative after they realized I was knowledgeable and informed 
about the topic based on the questions I asked. Interviews often lasted much longer 
than initially agreed, and most interviewees suggested additional contacts. During the 
interview, I followed prepared themes, but modified questions based on interviewee 
responses. I went into most interviews with an open and exploratory format and 
frame of mind in order to discover new knowledge of the topic. In the case study 
countries, my efforts to be sensitive to cultural differences seemed to be appreciated. 
My use of language and jargon was modified depending on the interviewee.   
 One limitation to mention is the difference in the quality of interviews 
conducted at the beginning of the research, and those conducted toward the end of 
the research. Those conducted toward the end were more revealing and informative 
since my interview skills had improved, I held greater knowledge of the topic, and 
my questions were more targeted. In addition, I could have more critically taken into 
account how my reactions and responses impacted interviewees.  
 
5. Specific challenges of fieldwork in transitional settings  
The data for qualitative analysis typically come from fieldwork. During fieldwork, 
the researcher spends time in the setting under study, where situations of importance 
to the study can be observed, people interviewed and documents analyzed. As Patton 
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describes, physical proximity for a period of time to the people and circumstances 
under study allows the researcher to capture what is happening (Patton, 2002: 4, 48).  
Fieldwork in transitional, including conflict and post-conflict settings, involves a 
number of methodological, practical and ethical challenges. These contexts are often 
marked by unpredictable change, polarized perspectives, and a high density of 
external interventions which interact in various ways with strategies of local 
populations. It is therefore necessary to adequately prepare for these situations, and 
develop a responsible research attitude, which takes into account the implications of 
these factors for data gathering and how to deal with them.  
A Wageningen University course on fieldwork in conflict and post-conflict 
settings outlines key topics to consider: 1) the organization of access to and 
development of trust of research populations; 2) security considerations for the 
researcher as well as the research population; 3) issues of ethics; 4) positioning and 
strategic representation of the researcher and research subjects; 5) the effects of 
polarization on all stages of the research process; and 6) the nature and production of 
knowledge claims on conflict/post-conflict processes (Wageningen University, 
Fieldwork in conflict and post-conflict settings, ND).  
Fieldwork for this research raised some challenges. First, arranging fieldwork 
in five countries in very different contexts required a great deal of logistical 
organization. Funding, as well as secure accommodation and transport were all issues 
which took time to arrange. Second, gaining access to diverse stakeholder groups and 
elite interviewees necessitated a high level of patience and communication skills. 
Some interviewees were wary of speaking with me, and some proved impossible to 
gain access to in the time period afforded for the fieldwork (i.e., Cambodian 
government officials). As previously mentioned, it was decided not to interview 
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vulnerable groups in order not to trigger re-traumatization, or to exacerbate any 
power imbalances that might be perceived.  
To address some of these issues. I considered interactions between partiality, 
access, safety and trust in these environments. I attempted to understand the 
significance of my own and others’ positions in the research field; assessed the 
limitations of my own and others’ knowledge claims; and negotiated between 
stakeholders’ varied interests in the topic and understandings of research in the 
design, execution and reporting stages. I also applied a culturally sensitive approach 
to each fieldwork visit. I considered issues such as language differences and differing 
norms and values, and adjusted my use of language, tone and approach to connect as 
closely as I could with each context. I also attended as many events related to my 
topic in order to observe the conversation and identify additional interviewees.  
Some limitations involve different access to different groups in each setting. 
Although equal numbers of interviewees from each stakeholder group were sought, 
in some cases this was not possible. 
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Appendix 2 Interview List and Statistics 
Breakdown of different types of interviews conducted 
 No. 
TOTAL INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED 
 187 
TOTAL RELATED TO CASE STUDIES  147 
Cambodia (38)  
Liberia (51)  
Colombia (58)  
TOTAL OTHER/GENERAL  40 
US Government  55 
Cambodia (6)  
Liberia (15)  
Colombia (16)  
Other (18)  
Transitional Justice Measures  23 
Cambodia (4)  
Liberia (9)  
Colombia (4)  
Other (6)  
Case Study Governments  11 
Cambodia (0)  
Liberia (2)  
Colombia (9)  
International Organizations 16 
Cambodia (4)  
Liberia (7)  
Colombia (4)  
Other (1)  
International NGOs  34 
Cambodia (8)  
Liberia (11)  
Colombia (9)  
Other (6)  
Local NGOs  19 
Cambodia (6)  
Liberia (6)  
Colombia (7)  
Academia  20 
Cambodia (9)  
Liberia (0)  
Colombia (2)  
Other (9)  
Media  3 
Cambodia (1)  
Liberia (0)  
Colombia (2)  
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US Implementing Partners (Colombia) 5 
Foreign State Government 1 
 
Cambodia Interviews 
Breakdown of different types of interviews conducted for Cambodia case study 
 
 No. 
TOTAL INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED 
 38 
US Government 6 
State Department (6)  
Transitional Justice Measure 4 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia  
International Organizations 4 
United Nations (4)    
International NGOs 8 
Open Society Justice Initiative (3)   
Human Rights Watch (2)   
International Center for Transitional Justice (1)   
National Endowment Democracy (2)   
Cambodian NGOs 6 
Documentation Center of Cambodia (3)   
Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (1)  
Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee (1)   
Center for Justice and Reconciliation (1)   
Academia 9  
Media  1 
 
Cambodia Interview List (non-attributable interviews left blank) 
 
US Government 
Name Position Organization Date Attribute 
Kent 
Wiedemann 
Former US Ambassador 
to Cambodia 
State Department 21 July 2010 Y 
  State Department 4 August 
2010 
US 
official 1 
  State Department 23 February 
2010 
US 
official 3 
  State Department 18 March 
2010 
N 
  State Department 4 April 2010 US 
official 2 
  State Department 14 April and 
4 August 
2010 
N 
Transitional Justice Measure 
Craig Lead investigator, ECCC 20 July 2010 Y 
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Etcheson Office of Co-
Prosecution; Khmer 
Rouge scholar 
Bophal Keat Former head of Victims’ 
Unit (2008-2009) 
ECCC 23 July 2010 Y 
Richard 
Rogers 
Chief of Defence 
Support Section 
ECCC 8 August 
2010 
Y 
Steve Heder Investigator, ECCC; 
Lecturer, SOAS 
ECCC; SOAS 28 October 
2009 
Y 
International Organizations 
Ton Vong Legal Associate UN Office of the 
High 
Commissioner for 
Human Rights 
(OHCHR) 
14 July 2010 Y 
David 
Tolbert 
Former Special Expert 
to the UN Secretary-
General on UN 
Assistance to the Khmer 
Rouge Trials 
UN 10 May 2010 Y 
  UN 17 June 2010 UN 
official 
  UN Office of the 
High 
Commissioner for 
Human Rights 
(OHCHR) 
13 November 
2009 
N 
International NGOs 
Long 
Panhavuth 
Program Officer, 
Cambodia 
Open Society 
Justice Initiative 
(OSJI) 
19 July 2010 Y 
Heather 
Ryan 
Monitor, Khmer Rouge 
Tribunal 
Open Society 
Justice Initiative 
(OSJI) 
29 July 2010 Y 
James 
Goldston 
Executive Director Open Society 
Justice Initiative 
(OSJI) 
23 February 
2010 
Y 
   28 April 
2010 
Cambodi
a expert  
Sophie 
Richardson 
Asia Advocacy Director Human Rights 
Watch 
17 March 
2010 
Y 
Caitlin 
Reiger 
Director, International 
Policy Relations 
International 
Center for 
Transitional 
Justice 
3 November 
2009 
Y 
John Knaus Senior Program Officer 
for Asia 
National 
Endowment 
Democracy (NED) 
13 April 
2010 
Y 
Lynn Lee Program Officer for East 
Asia 
National 
Endowment 
13 April 
2010 
Y 
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Democracy (NED) 
Cambodian NGOs 
Youk 
Chhang 
Director DC-Cam 15 July 2010 Y 
Anne 
Heindel 
Legal Advisor DC-Cam 15 July 2010 Y 
John 
Ciorciari 
Legal Advisor, DC-
Cam; Assistant 
Professor, University of 
Michigan 
DC-Cam; 
University of 
Michigan 
10 March 
and 27 July 
2010 
Y 
Thun Saray President Cambodian 
Human Rights and 
Development 
Association 
(ADHOC) 
19 July 2010 Y 
Jeudy 
Oeung 
Program Officer Cambodian 
Human Rights 
Action Committee 
(CHRAC) 
20 July 2010 Y 
Theary Seng Founder and President Center for Justice 
and Reconciliation 
8 August 
2010 
Y 
Academics 
Fred Z. 
Brown 
Y Institute Fellow; 
Professorial Lecturer; 
former US foreign 
service officer 
Johns Hopkins 
University (SAIS) 
6 November 
2009 
 
Y 
Kenton 
Clymer 
Presidential Research 
Professor 
Northern Illinois 
University 
22 July 2010 Y 
David 
Chandler 
Professor  Monash University 24 July 2010 Y 
Ben Kiernan Professor and Director 
of the Genocide Studies 
Program 
Yale University 20 February 
2010 
Y 
Jaya Ramji-
Nogales 
Assistant Professor of 
Law 
 
Temple University 2 November 
2009 
 
Y 
Pamela 
Sodhy 
Visiting Associate 
Professor 
Georgetown 
University 
1 March 
2010 
Y 
David 
Steinberg 
Professor; former 
member of Senior 
Foreign Service, USAID 
Georgetown 
University 
18 February 
2010 
Y 
Robert 
Sutter 
Visiting Professor; 
former US government 
career 
Georgetown 
University 
18 February 
2010 
Y 
Beth Van 
Schaack 
Legal Advisor, DC-
Cam; Associate 
Professor of Law  
Santa Clara 
University 
31 October 
2009 
Y 
Media 
   17 July 2010 N 
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Liberia Interviews 
 
Breakdown of different types of interviews conducted for Liberia case study 
 
 No. 
TOTAL INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED  
 51 
US Government 15 
State Department (9)  
USAID (3)  
Congress  (2)   
Department of Justice (1)  
Transitional Justice Measures 9 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (3)  
TRC (6)  
Liberian Government  2 
Executive  
Legislature  
Foreign State Government 1 
International Contact Group on Liberia   
International Organizations 7 
UN Mission in Liberia (6)  
UNDP-Monrovia (1)   
International NGOs 11 
International Center for Transitional Justice (2)  
Carter Center (3)  
American Bar Association (1)  
Search for Common Ground (1)  
Open Society Initiative of West Africa (1)  
Human Rights Watch (1)  
US Institute of Peace (1)  
Benetech (1)  
Liberian NGOs 6 
Justice and Peace Commission (1)  
Liberian Council of Churches (1)  
PRS Tracking Network/ Transitional Justice Working Group (1)  
Rights and Rice Foundation/ Transitional Justice Wkg Group (1)  
Women NGO Secretariat of Liberia (1)  
Civil society coordinator for Grand Cape Mount (1)  
 
Liberia Interview List (non-attributable interviews left blank) 
 
US Government 
Name Position Organization Date Attribute 
Jendayi 
Frazer 
 
Assistant Secretary of 
State for African Affairs 
(2005-09) 
State Department  9 April 2010 Y 
Pamela 
Bridgewater  
Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for African 
State Department  21 April 
2010 
Y 
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 Affairs (2002-04) 
Chester 
Crocker 
 
Assistant Secretary of 
State for African Affairs 
(1981-89) 
State Department  16 February 
2010 
 
Y 
Michael 
Arietti 
Director, Office of West 
African Affairs (2001-
04) 
State Department  9 May 2011 Y 
 
 
 State Department  18 May 2010 N 
  State Department 10 December 
2009 
US 
official 1 
  State Department 10 December 
2009 
N 
  State Department 25 January 
2010 
US 
official 2 
  State Department 16 March 
2010 
US 
official 
  USAID 3 December 
2009 
 
N 
  Department of 
Justice 
8 December 
2009 
 
N 
 Office of Transition 
Initiatives 
USAID 7 April 2010 N 
  USAID 
 
13 April 
2010 
N 
  Senate 24 March 
2010 
N 
  House of 
Representatives 
12 April 
2010 
N 
Transitional Justice Measures 
David Crane Chief Prosecutor  SCSL 19 April 
2010 
Y 
Gregory 
Townsend 
Senior Legal Officer SCSL 12 January 
2012 
Y 
Chris 
Mahony 
Consultant SCSL and SL TRC 29 January 
2012 
Y 
Cllr. Jerome 
Verdier 
TRC Chairman TRC 9 December 
2009 
Y 
Rev. Gerald 
B. Coleman  
TRC Commissioner TRC 10 December 
2009 
Y 
Cllr. Pearl 
Brown Bull  
 
TRC Commissioner TRC 7 December 
2009 
Y 
Salif 
Massalay 
Statement coding TRC 23 November 
2009 
 
Y 
  TRC 26 January N 
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2010 
  TRC 3 December 
2009 
Senior 
TRC staff 
member 
Liberian Government 
Minister 
Natty Davis 
Minister of State 
Development and 
Reconstruction 
Office of the 
President 
2 December 
2009 
Y 
Rep. G. 
Wesseh 
Blamoh 
Chairman, Standing 
Committee on Peace and 
National Reconciliation 
Legislature of 
Liberia 
3 December 
2009 
Y 
Foreign State Government 
   28 November 
2009 
ICGL 
member 
International Organizations 
  UNMIL 8 December 
2009 
 
Internatio
nal rule 
of law 
advisor 
  UNMIL 30 November 
2009 
Internatio
nal 
observer 
1 
  UNMIL/OHCHR 28 November 
2009 
Internatio
nal 
observer 
2 
  UNMIL 26 November 
2009 
N 
  UNMIL 26 November 
2009 
N 
  UNDP, Monrovia 30 November 
2009 
N 
Macdonald  
Metzger 
Media Consultant for 
ICTJ/Radio Producer for 
UNMIL, Monrovia 
 
UNMIL  28 November 
2009 
Y 
International NGOs 
   9 December 
2010 
Internatio
nal NGO 
staff 
member 
  International 
Center for 
Transitional 
Justice 
2 December 
2009 
ICTJ staff 
member 
  American Bar 
Association 
7 December 
2009 
N 
  Search for 7 December TJWG 
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Common Ground/ 
Talking Drums 
2009 member 
  Open Society 
Initiative of West 
Africa 
27 November 
2009 
N 
Tom Crick  
 
Associate Director Carter Center  28 June 2009  
 
Y 
Sean 
MacLeay 
Project Officer Carter Center 8 December 
2009 
Y 
Pewee 
Flomoku 
Project Coordinator Carter Center 8 December 
2009 
Y 
Elise 
Keppler 
 
Senior counsel, 
International Justice 
Program 
Human Rights 
Watch 
23 February 
2010 
 
Y 
Abiodun 
Williams 
Vice President of the 
Centre for Conflict 
Analysis and Prevention 
US Institute of 
Peace 
26 February 
2010 
 
Y 
Kirsten 
Cibelli 
Program Manager Benetech 21 November 
2009 
Y 
Liberian NGOs 
Cllr. 
Augustine 
Toe  
National Director Justice and Peace 
Commission 
2 December 
2009 
Y 
Dr. 
Benjamin 
Lartey 
General Secretary Liberian Council 
of Churches 
3 December 
2009 
Y 
James 
Yarsiah 
Coordinator of  of the 
Transitional Justice 
Working Group and 
Executive Director of 
Rights and Rice Fdn.  
Rights and Rice 
Foundation  
28 November 
2009 
Y 
Kanio Gbala  
 
Coordinator of the 
Transitional Justice 
Working Group and 
Programme Manager of 
the PRS Tracking 
Network 
PRS Tracking 
Network  
27 November 
2009 
Y 
   27 November 
2009 
 
N 
Alex Ballo  
 
Civil society county 
focal point  
Sinje, Grand Cape 
Mount 
1 December 
2009 
Y 
Civil society 
leader 1 
Civil society leader  Focus group in 
Buchanan, Grand 
Bassa 
4 December 
2009 
Civil 
society 
leader 1 
Civil society 
leader 2 
 
 
Civil society leader  Focus group in 
Buchanan, Grand 
Bassa 
4 December 
2009 
Civil 
society 
leader 2 
Youth Youth leader Focus group in 26 November Youth 
331 
 
 
 
Colombia Interviews 
 
Breakdown of different types of interviews conducted for Colombia case study 
 
 No. 
TOTAL INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED  
 58 
US Government 16 
State Department (7)  
USAID (6)  
Drug Caucus (1)  
Department of Justice (2)  
US Implementing Partners 5 
International Organization of Migration (2)  
Management Sciences for Development (3)  
Transitional Justice Measures 4 
Justice and Peace Unit (2)  
National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation (2)  
Colombian Government 9 
Attorney-General (1)  
Acción Social (3)  
National Planning Department (2)  
Office of the High Commissioner for Reintegration (1)  
Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (1)  
Ministry of the Interior and Justice (1)  
International Organizations 4 
Organization of American States (1)   
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (1)   
UN Department of Political Affairs (1)  
World Bank (1)   
International NGOs 9 
International Center for Transitional Justice (3)   
Center for International Policy (1)  
Washington Office on Latin America (2)  
Human Rights First (1)  
Woodrow Wilson Center (1)   
US Institute of Peace (1)   
Colombian NGOs 7 
Colombia Commission of Jurists (1)   
Fundación Ideas para la paz (1)  
Arco Iris (1)  
Fundación Social (1)  
País Libre (1)   
Iniciativa de Mujeres Colombianas por la Paz (1)  
leader 1 Kakata, Margibi 2009 leader 1 
Youth 
leader 2 
Youth leader Focus group in 
Kakata, Margibi 
26 November 
2009 
Youth 
leader 2 
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Independent consultant (1)  
Academia 2 
Media  2 
 
 
Colombia Interview List (non-attributable interviews left blank) 
 
US Government 
Name Position Organization Date Attribute 
Ileana Baca Director, 
Demobilization and 
Reintegration Program 
USAID/Colombia 31 August 
2010 
Y 
Sandra 
Pabón  
Assistant Director, 
Demobilization and 
Reintegration Program 
USAID/Colombia 31 August 
2010 
Y 
  USAID/Colombia 18 August 
2010 
USAID 
official 1 
  USAID/Colombia 18 August 
2010 
N 
  USAID 9 March 
2010 
N 
  USAID 9 March 
2010 
N 
Myles 
Frechette 
 
US Ambassador to 
Colombia 
US Embassy in 
Colombia 
7 April 2010 Y 
  US Embassy in 
Colombia 
23 August 
2010 
N 
  State Department 23 March 
2010 
N 
 Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights and 
Labor 
State Department  12 March 
2010 
State 
Departme
nt official 
 Office of the 
Coordinator for 
Reconstruction and 
Stabilization 
State Department  12 April 
2010 
N 
 Office of the 
Coordinator for 
Reconstruction and 
Stabilization 
State Department  22 March 
2010 
N 
 Office of the 
Coordinator for 
Reconstruction and 
Stabilization 
State Department 22 March 
2010 
N 
Janet Drew  
 
Professional Staff Drug Caucus 24 March 
2010 
Y 
  Department of 
Justice 
6 September 
2010 
DOJ 
official 1 
333 
 
(interview); 
7-8 
September 
2010 (email 
communicati
on) 
  DOJ 27 August 
2010 
DOJ 
official 2  
US Implementing Partners 
  International 
Organization of 
Migration (IOM) 
9 September 
2010 
N 
  International 
Organization of 
Migration (IOM) 
7 September 
2010 
N 
  Management 
Sciences for 
Development 
(MSD) 
1 September 
2010 
N 
  Management 
Sciences for 
Development 
(MSD) 
1 September 
2010 
N 
  Management 
Sciences for 
Development 
(MSD) 
31 August 
2010 
N 
Transitional Justice Measures 
Luis 
González 
León 
Director,  Justice and 
Peace Unit 
Attorney General’s 
Office 
3 September 
2010 
Y 
Loreley 
Oviedo 
Staff member, 
International 
Cooperation, Justice and 
Peace Unit  
Attorney General’s 
Office 
3 September 
2010 
Y 
Eduardo 
Pizarro 
President National 
Commission of 
Reparations and 
Reconciliation 
(CNRR) 
7 September 
2010 
Y 
Catalina 
Martínez 
Executive Director National 
Commission of 
Reparations and 
Reconciliation 
(CNRR) 
26 August 
2010 
Y 
Colombian Government 
Patricia 
Linares 
Prieto  
 
Former delegate of the 
Procuradora to CNRR 
Procuradora 26 August 
2010 
Y 
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Sandra 
Alzate 
Director Acción Social 25 August 
2010 
Y 
Viviana 
Cañon 
Tamayo 
Assessor, Office of 
International 
Cooperation 
Acción Social 20 
September 
2010 
Y 
Gloria 
Gomez 
Assessor, Office of 
International 
Cooperation 
Acción Social 3 September 
2010 
 
Y 
Luis Carlos 
Restrepo 
High Commissioner for 
Peace  
Office of the High 
Commissioner for 
Peace 
21 
September 
2010 
Y 
Paola 
Buendia  
 
Director of the Justice 
and Security Unit 
National Planning 
Department (DNP) 
19 August 
2010 
Y 
Paula 
Aponte 
Staff member,  Justice 
and Security Unit 
National Planning 
Department (DNP) 
19 August 
2010 
Y 
Heidi 
Abuchaibe 
Director of Transitional 
Justice 
Ministry of the 
Interior and Justice 
(MIJ) 
1 September 
2010 
Y 
  Office of the High 
Commissioner for 
Reintegration 
(ACR) 
10 
September 
2010 
N 
International Organizations 
Daniel 
Millares 
 
Justice and Peace 
Manager, Mission to 
Support the Peace 
Process in Colombia 
(Mapp-OEA) 
Organization of 
American States  
23 August 
2010 
Y 
Veronica 
Hinestroza  
 
Consultant World Bank 20 August 
2010 
Y 
  UN Department of 
Peacekeeping 
Operations 
22 February 
2010 
N 
  UN Department of 
Political Affairs 
23 February 
2010 
N 
International NGOs 
Michael 
Reed 
Director, Colombia 
office 
International 
Center for 
Transitional 
Justice 
27 August 
2010 
Y 
Angelica 
Zamora, 
Bogota  
 
Staff member, Colombia 
office 
International 
Center for 
Transitional 
Justice 
19 March 
2010 
Y 
Cristina 
Rivera  
 
Communications 
associate, Colombia 
office 
International 
Center for 
Transitional 
Justice 
25 August 
2010 
Y 
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Adam 
Isacson  
Director Center for 
International 
Policy 
2 March 
2010 
Y 
Gimena 
Sanchez 
Senior Associate for the 
Andes 
Washington Office 
on Latin America 
18 March 
2010 
Y 
Anthony 
Dest 
 
Intern Washington Office 
on Latin America 
18 March 
2010 
Y 
Andrew 
Hudson 
 
Senior Associate Human Rights 
First 
8 September 
2009 
Y 
  Woodrow Wilson 
Center 
10 March 
2010 
N 
Virginia 
Bouvier 
 
Senior Program Officer 
for Latin America 
 
US Institute of 
Peace 
25 February 
2010 
Y 
Colombian NGOs 
Gustavo 
Gallón 
President Colombia 
Commission of 
Jurists (CCJ) 
10 
September 
2010 
Y 
Maria 
Victoria 
Llorente   
 
Director Fundación Ideas 
para la paz (FIP) 
24 August 
2010 
Y 
Lucho Celis Coordinator  Arco Iris 24 August 
2010 
Y 
Paula 
Gaviria 
Director of Impact in 
Public Policy 
Fundación Social 8 September 
2010 
Y 
Edgar 
Gomez 
Coordinator of Victims’ 
Attention Center 
País Libre 7 September 
2010 
Y 
Angela 
Cerón 
 
Director Iniciativa de 
Mujeres 
Colombianas por 
la Paz (IMP) 
1 September 
2010 
Y 
Alvaro 
Cordoba 
Consultant for UNDP/ 
USAID/ CNRR 
N/A  25 October 
2009 
Y 
Academics 
Florian 
Huber   
 
Doctoral candidate  
 
Georg-August-
Universität 
Göttingen 
16 October 
2009 
Y 
Lerber 
Lisandro   
Investigator (Former 
combatant) 
National 
University of 
Colombia 
6 September 
2010 
Y 
Media 
Marta Ruiz 
 
Editor, Security and 
Justice section  
Semana 24 August 
2010 
Y 
Toby Muse 
 
Independent media 
consultant 
N/A 28 August 
2010 
Y 
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General Interviews 
Breakdown of different types of general interviews 
 No. 
TOTAL INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED  
 40 
US Government 18 
Transitional Justice Measures 6 
International Organizations 1 
NGOs 6 
Academia 9 
 
 
List of general interviewees (non-attributable interviews left blank) 
 
US Government 
Name Position Organization Date Attribute 
David 
Scheffer 
Ambassador-at-large for 
War Crimes Issues 
State Department 12 March 
2012 
Y 
Pierre 
Prosper 
Ambassador-at-large for 
War Crimes Issues 
State Department 22 April 
2010 
Y 
Clint 
Williamson 
Ambassador-at-large for 
War Crimes Issues 
State Department 21 April 
2010 
Y 
Steven Rapp Ambassador-at-large for 
War Crimes Issues 
State Department 26 July 2010 Y 
Anne-Marie 
Slaughter 
Head of Policy 
Planning/ Professor 
State Department; 
Princeton 
University 
23 May 2012 Y 
Donald 
McHenry 
Former US Ambassador 
to the UN/ Professor 
USUN/ 
Georgetown 
University 
1 March 
2010 
 
Y 
Anthony 
Lake 
Former National 
Security Council 
Adviser/ Professor 
National Security 
Council/ 
Georgetown 
University 
18 February 
2010 
 
Y 
Victor Cha Former Asian Affairs 
Director/ Professor 
National Security 
Council/ 
Georgetown 
University 
1 March 
2010 
Y 
  National Security 
Council 
20 April 
2010 
N 
  Senate  8 January 
2010 
US 
official 
David 
Hodgkinson 
Director, Office of 
Human Rights and 
Transitional Justice, 
Coalition Provisional 
Authority 
State Department 8 April 2010 Y 
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Andy 
Loomis 
Senior Conflict 
Prevention Officer 
State Department 12 March 
2010 
Y 
Lisa 
Chandonnet-
Bedoya  
Program Analyst, Office 
of Conflict Management 
& Mitigation 
 
USAID 6 April 2010 Y 
Marie Pace Democracy Specialist, 
Office of Civilian 
Response 
USAID 
 
20 April 
2010 
Y 
Andrew 
Natsios 
Administrator USAID 22 March 
2010 
Y 
Grant Harris Senior Policy Advisor to 
Susan E. Rice, the U.S. 
Ambassador to the. 
United Nations 
USUN 24 February 
2010 
Y 
 Professional staff 
member 
House Foreign 
Affairs Committee 
16 April 
2010 
N 
  State Department 14 April 
2010 
N 
Transitional Justice Measures 
Frederick 
Swinnen  
Political Adviser International 
Criminal Tribunal 
for the former 
Yugoslavia 
13 January 
2012  
 
Y 
Matias 
Hellman 
External Relations 
Adviser, Office of the 
President 
International 
Criminal Court 
13 January 
2012  
 
Y 
Rod Rastan 
 
Legal Advisor, Office of 
the Prosecutor  
 
International 
Criminal Court 
13 January 
2012  
 
Y 
  Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon 
12 January 
2012 
N 
  Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon 
12 January 
2012 
N 
  International 
Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda 
13 January 
2012  
 
N 
International Organizations 
Kaoru 
Okuizumi 
Transitional justice focal 
point in the judicial 
section 
United Nations 
Department of 
Peacekeeping 
Operations 
4 March 
2010 
 
Y 
NGOs 
Tom Melia Senior Advisor Freedom House 9 March 
2010 
Y 
Tom 
Malinowski 
Washington Advocacy 
Director 
Human Rights 
Watch 
15 March 
2010 
Y 
Paige Arthur  
 
Deputy Director, 
Institutional 
International 
Center for 
22 February 
2010 
Y 
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Development Transitional 
Justice 
Juan 
Mendez 
Former President International 
Center for 
Transitional 
Justice 
9 April 2010 Y 
Morton 
Halperin 
Senior Advisor Open Society 
Foundations 
19 March 
2010 
Y 
Neil Kritz Senior Scholar in 
Residence 
US Institute of 
Peace 
16 March 
2010 
Y 
Academics 
Chet 
Crocker 
Professor Georgetown 
University 
16 February 
2010 
Y 
Charles 
Kupchan  
Professor Georgetown 
University 
16 February 
2010 
Y 
Lynn C. 
Ross 
Professor Georgetown 
University 
19 February 
10  
Y 
Pauline 
Baker 
Adjunct Professor/ 
Director of Fund for 
Peace 
Georgetown 
University 
4 November 
2009 
 
Y 
Erik Voeten Peter F. Krogh 
Associate Professor of 
Geopolitics and Justice 
in World Affairs 
Georgetown 
University 
17 March  
 2010 
Y 
Julie 
Shackford-
Bradley 
Lecturer UC Berkeley 2 November 
2009 
Y 
Richard 
Wilson 
Professor of Law/ 
Director of the 
International Human 
Rights Law Clinic  
American 
University 
4 November 
2009 
Y 
Victor 
Peskin 
Associate Professor Arizona State 
University  
30 June 2009 
 
Y 
Eric Stover Adjunct Professor of 
Law and Public Health; 
Faculty Director, 
Human Rights Center 
UC Berkeley 12 February 
2009 
Y 
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Appendix 3 List of Meetings Attended  
 
Cambodia 
Judgment of Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, ECCC, Phnom Penh, 26 July 2010 
OSJI Event after the Duch Judgement, Phnom Penh, 26 July 2010 
Academic Symposium on the 60th Anniversary of U.S.-Cambodia Diplomatic 
Relations 1950-2010, 21-22 July 2010  
Liberia 
President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Chatham House, 13 June 2011 
Colombia 
President Juan Manuel Santos, ‘Leading Colombia towards Prosperity for All’, LSE, 
22 November 2011  
‘In the Shadow of the ICC: Colombia and International Criminal Justice’, 
Conference at Senate House, University of London, 26-27 May 2011 
General 
Secretary of State MadeleineAlbright. ‘Global Political Challenges: Women 
Advancing Democracy’, LSE, 2 December 2011 
Geoffrey Robertson, ‘Ending Impunity: the struggle for global justice’, SOAS, 21 
November 2011 
Taking Stock of Transitional Justice, Oxford University, 26-28 June 2009  
‘Shaping the future of Transitional Justice: growing synergies between theory and 
practice’, Essex Transitional Justice Network international conference, 16-17 
September 2010 
Several meetings of the London Transitional Justice Network 
Transitional justice panels (participant and presenter) at CISS-ISA, Venice, July 
2010; ISA, Montreal, April 2011; ECPR, Reykjavik, August 2011; ISA, San Diego, 
April 2012 
David Scheffer lecture at SOAS on his book All the Missing Souls, 12 March 2012 
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Appendix 4 Cambodia Materials 
 
Abbreviations 
 
CGJA    Cambodian Genocide Justice Act 
CGDK  Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea         
(FUNCINPEC/PDK/KPNLF) 
CGP    Yale’s Cambodian Genocide Program 
CPP    Cambodian People's Party 
DC-Cam   Documentation Center of Cambodia 
ECCC    Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
FUNCINPEC  National United Front for an Independent, Neutral,             
Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia 
GA    United Nations General Assembly 
IRI    International Republican Institute  
OSJI    Open Society Justice Initiative  
KPLF    Khmer People's Liberation Front 
KPNLF   Khmer People’s National Liberation Front  
KR/ CPK/PDK/CGDK Khmer Rouge/ Communist Party of Kampuchea 
(1960s-1970s)/ Party of Democratic Kampuchea 
(1980s)/ Coalition Government of Democratic 
Kampuchea   
OLA    UN Office of Legal Affairs  
PRK (later SOC)  People's Republic of Kampuchea (State of Cambodia) 
RGC    Royal Government of Cambodia  
UN    United Nations 
UNDP    United Nations Development Programme 
UNSC    United Nations Security Council  
UNTAC   United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
USUN    US Mission to the United Nations  
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Cambodia Timeline  
 
1969-73 – President Nixon approves covert bombing of Cambodia  
 
1975-79 – Khmer Rouge in power 
 
1979-89 – Vietnamese control of Cambodia 
 
1991 – Paris Peace Accords and establishment of UNTAC  
 
1993 – Elections in Cambodia and UNTAC withdraws  
 
1994 – US passes Cambodian Genocide Justice Act 
 
1996 – Cambodian government provides amnesty to Ieng Sary 
 
1997 – Cambodian request to UN for assistance with a tribunal; Hun Sen stages coup  
 
1997-01 – David Scheffer serves as first US Ambassador for War Crimes Issues  
 
1998 – Hun Sen wins elections in Cambodia; US Mission to UN circulates ICTC 
draft; UN Group of Experts commissioned  
 
1999 – UN Group of Experts release their report; Cambodia rejects report; Mixed 
tribunal is proposed by the US  
 
2000 – US mediates between the UN and Cambodia  
 
2001 – Cambodia passes ECCC Law  
 
2002 – UN Secretary-General withdraws his good offices and stops negotiations 
 
2003 – UN Secretary-General resumes negotiations at behest of UN General 
Assembly and signs Agreement with Cambodia on ECCC’s establishment in June 
 
2004 – UN/Cambodia Agreement approved for ECCC 
 
2004-07 – Congress blocks US funding the court, but continues to fund DC-Cam  
 
2007 – OSJI and UNDP accuse ECCC of corruption  
 
2008 – US announces $1.8 million for the tribunal  
 
2009 – Case 001, that of Duch, begins 
 
2010 – Duch is convicted; Former US War Crimes Ambassador Clint Williamson 
appointed as UN Special Expert to ECCC 
 
2011 – Case 002 starts in November  
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Appendix 5 Liberia Materials   
 
Abbreviations 
 
ACS   American Colonization Society  
AFL   Armed Forces of Liberia 
CIA   Central Intelligence Agency   
CPA     Comprehensive Peace Agreement  
DOD   Department of Defense 
ECOMOG    Economic Community Military Observer Group  
ECOMIL  ECOWAS Military Mission to Liberia 
ECOWAS    Economic Community of West African States  
GOL   Government of Liberia 
ICC   International Criminal Court 
ICGL   International Contact Group on Liberia  
ICTJ   International Center for Transitional Justice  
LFF   Liberian Frontier Force 
LURD   Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy  
MODEL  Movement for Democracy in Liberia  
NGO     Nongovernmental organization  
NSC   National Security Council 
NTGL     National Transitional Government of Liberia  
OTI   USAID Office of Transition Initiatives 
RUF   Revolutionary United Front 
SCSL   Special Court for Sierra Leone  
TRC    Truth and Reconciliation Commission  
TJWG   Transitional Justice Working Group  
UN     United Nations  
UNSC   United Nations Security Council  
UNMIL    United Nations Mission in Liberia  
UNOMIL   United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia  
USAID   US Agency for International Development  
USG      US Government 
  
343 
 
Liberia Timeline 
 
1822 – Liberia is founded as an outpost for returning freed slaves from the Americas. 
 
1847 – Liberia achieves independence. 
 
1971 – William Tubman, Liberia’s president of 27 years, dies while in office. 
Tubman’s long-serving vice president, William Tolbert, assumes the presidency. 
 
1980-1989 – In April Samuel Doe leads a coup d’etat and assumes power. Doe wins 
elections in 1985 despite allegations of fraud. 
 
1989–1997 – Liberia’s first civil war between Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia (NPFL) and six other major factions. 
 
1997 – Charles Taylor wins the presidential election.  
 
1999-2003 – Liberia’s second civil war between NPFL, the armed forces and new 
opposition groups called the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy 
(LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). Taylor retains 
power.  
 
2001 – In March the UN Security Council imposes sanctions on Liberia because of 
Taylor’s support of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone’s civil 
war.  
 
2003 – ECOWAS-sponsors peace talks in Ghana. The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
unseals an indictment against Taylor. Taylor resigns and accepts asylum in Nigeria. 
A peace agreement is signed by the government, LURD, MODEL and political 
parties, which establishes a two-year transitional government. In October, the UN 
Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) takes over peacekeeping operations from ECOWAS. 
 
2003-2005 – The transitional government is headed by Charles Gyude Bryant 
 
2005 – The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Act becomes law in June. 
Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf wins the presidential election in November.   
 
2006 – Charles Taylor is arrested and transferred to the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone in March. He is transferred to The Hague in June. The TRC is officially 
launched in June. 
 
2007 – Taylor’s trial begins in April. 
 
2008 – Volume I of the TRC’s final report is released in December.  
 
2009 – An unedited version of Volume II of the TRC’s final report is released in July 
and the edited version is released in December.   
 
2011 – Johnson-Sirleaf is re-elected for a second term as President of Liberia.  
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Table 1: US Assistance to Liberia, FY1990 to FY2001 
($ millions) 
 
Year  
 
DA ESF  FY IMET Peace  
Corps 
Other 
Economic  
Assistance  
  
 
Annual  
Total  
 
1990 0  0 14.5 0.4 1.9 0.2 17 
1991 0  0 43.5 0 0 0 43.5 
1992 0  1.3 35.4 0 0 0 36.7 
1993 0  0 50.6 0 0 0 50.6 
1994 3.7  0 56.4 0 0 0 60.1 
1995 0  0 51.6 0 0 0 51.6 
1996 2.3 0 55.7 0 0 0 57.9 
1997 12.5  1.7 23.1 0 0 0 37.3 
1998 10.8   1.4 30.3 0 0 0 42.5 
1999 7.1  0.5 16.8 0 0 0 24.5 
2000 8.9  0 4.2 0 0 0 13.1 
2001 5.7  0 4 0 0 0 9.7 
Totals by 
function  
51 4.9 386.1 0.4 1.9 0.2 444.5 
 
Source: US Agency for International Development, US Overseas Loans & Grants 
Online [a.k.a. Greenbook], [http://qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/index.html]. Data as of 
December 19, 2003.  
Abbreviations:  DA: Development Assistance (USAID grants); ESF: Economic 
Support Fund; FY: Food for Peace — P.L.480 Title II - Food Aid and Section 416 
Program; IMET: International Military Education and Training.  
Note: For background on US assistance to Africa, see CRS Issue Brief IB95052, 
Africa: US Foreign Assistance Issues. USAID’s Greenbook is among the most 
comprehensive sources of historical data on US foreign assistance. It provides data 
on assistance by functional category, as obligated during a given year. Calculations 
of annual assistance figures from other sources, such as data on annual 
appropriations or recent actual expenditures in agencies’ annual budget requests, may  
differ from the figures listed above.  
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Table 2. U.S. Bilateral and Related Assistance to Liberia, FY2004-FY2011 
($ millions; actual, estimated, or requested levels; errors due to rounding) 
 
 
Sources: Cook, 25 May 2010: 73. State Department, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign 
Operations [CBJ] and Department of State Congressional Budget Justification for FY2011 and prior 
fiscal years, and information from USAID/OFDA, State/PRM, State/OGAC, and State/Political-
Military Affairs officials. 
Abbreviations: Account names: CSH: Child Survival and Health Program Fund Account; GHCS: 
Global Health and Child Survival Account; DA: Development Assistance Account; ESF: Economic 
Support Fund Account; FMF:Foreign Military Financing Account; GHAI: Global HIV/AIDS 
Initiative; IDA: International Disaster Assistance (former IDFA account; renamed IDA in FY 2008); 
IDFA: International Disaster & Famine Assistance Account (once known as the IDA account, which 
it was again renamed in FY 2008); INCLE:International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement ; 
IMET: International Military Education and Training Account; NADR-SALW: Nonproliferation, 
Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Projects-Small Arms and Light Weapons; PKO: Regional 
Peacekeeping Account; TI: Transition Initiatives Account; MRA: Migration and Refugee Assistance 
Account; and CIPA: Contributions for International Peacekeeping Account 
 
  
Account 
 
FY 
2004 
Actual 
FY 
2005 
Actual  
FY 
2006 
Actual 
FY 
2007 
Actual 
FY 
2008 
Actual 
FY 
2009 
Actual 
 
FY 
2010 
Estimate 
FY 
2011 
Request 
CSH 2.82   3.97 2.87 8.50 - - - - 
GHCS -  - - - 24.04 25.7 35.65 34.14 
DA - 6.85 23.73 30.5 29.86 32 - - 
ESF -  24.8 92.72 30 43.19 104.3 153 137.34 
FMF -  2.98 1.98 1.52 .30 1.5 6 9 
GHAI - .70 .70 .95 - - - - 
IDFA- 
Supplement-al 
200 
 
 
- - - - - - - 
IDFA/IDA .04  9.71 3.71 2.46 - - - - 
INCLE 0   5 0.99 1 4.10 4.13 6 17 
IMET 0  0 .13 .21 .38 .44 0.5 0.53 
NADR-
SALW 
0.16  - .22 5 - - - - 
PKO -  25 20 53.25 51.66 49.65 10 5 
P.L. 480, Title 
II/Food for 
Peace Title II 
21.53 22.55 26.97 16.47 9.41 6.3 15 15 
TI 3.072 2.58 6.39 5.6 .06 - -  
MRA  27.89 28.19 31.65 22.5 - - -  
Sub-Total: 
Bilateral 
and Emerg. 
Aid 
255.51 132.33 212.06 177.96 163.00 224.02 226.15 218.02 
 
UNMIL/CIPA 290.34 235.42 77.17 177.21 154.28 123.40 135.40 135.40 
 
Totals - All 
Funding 
 
545.85  
 
367.75 289.23 355.17 317.28 347.42 361.55 353.42 
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Table 3. US Assistance for the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
($ millions) 
 
Account 
 
Amount Fiscal Years  
by Appropriation  
and Obligation 
ESF 2 2000 
DFA 3 2001 
ESF 5 2002 
ESF 10 2003 
K Fund 2 2005 
ESF 13 2006 
ESF 13 2007 
ESF 12.4 2008 
ESF 9 2009 
ESF 7.5 2010 
Total 
through FY 
2008 
76.9  
ESF 5 Requested 2011 level 
   
Source: Cook, 25 May 2010: 54-55.  
Abbreviations: K Fund: Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Service; DFA: Development 
Fund for Africa; ESF: Economic Support Fund. 
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Appendix 6 Colombia Materials 
 
Abbreviations 
 
AUC   United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia 
CCJ   Colombian Commission of Jurists 
CNRR   National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation  
DNP   National Planning Department 
DOJ   US Department of Justice 
ELN   National Liberation Army  
FARC   Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
FIP   Fundación Ideas para la paz 
GAO   US Government Accountability Office 
ICITAP  DOJ International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance 
Program 
ICTJ   International Center for Transitional Justice 
IOM   International Organization of Migration 
JPL   Justice and Peace Law 
JPU   Justice and Peace Unit’ 
MAPP-OEA  OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process 
MIJ   Ministry of the Interior and Justice 
MSD   Management Sciences for Development 
OAS   Organization of American States  
OPDAT  DOJ Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development 
Assistance and Training 
OVP   USAID Office for Vulnerable Populations 
UNDP   UN Development Programme 
USAID  US Agency for International Development  
USIP   US Institute of Peace 
WOLA  Washington Office on Latin America 
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Colombia Timeline 
 
1948 – Riots in Bogota which give rise to a ten-year period of civil conflict. 
 
1960s – The emergence of several non-state armed groups in remote areas of the 
country, in particular, the ELN and FARC that ignite the current conflict. 
 
1980s – The emergence of paramilitary groups to provide private security for 
important economic and political sectors in Colombia. 
 
1997 – Various paramilitary groups consolidate in 1997 with the creation of an 
umbrella body – the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). 
 
1999 – Clinton administration announces Plan Colombia.  
 
2002 – Alvaro Uribe is elected as President of Colombia.  
 
2003 – The Colombian government and the AUC sign a framework peace accord 
committing paramilitaries to full demobilization by the end of 2005.  
 
2005 – The Justice and Peace Law is passed.  
 
2008 – 14 AUC leaders are extradited to the US in May.  
 
2010 – President Juan Manuel Santos is elected as President of Colombia 
  
349 
 
Table 1: Program Assistance Objectives in Colombia, 2000-2013167 
State and Defense 
 
Reduce Illicit 
Narcotics and 
Improve Security 
 
USAID and State 
 
Promote Social and 
Economic Justice 
Justice 
 
Promote Rule of Law 
1. Support to the 
Colombian Military 
Alternative 
Development 
Judicial Reform and 
Capacity Building 
Army Aviation  Internally Displaced 
Persons  
 
Army Ground Forces  Demobilization and 
Reintegration 
 
Infrastructure Security Democracy and 
Human Rights 
 
Air Interdiction Civilian Government 
Capacity Building 
 
Coastal, River 
Interdiction 
  
2. Support to the 
National Police 
  
Eradication   
Air Service   
Interdiction    
Police Presence in 
Conflict Zones 
  
 
  
                                                
167 GAO, ‘PLAN COLOMBIA: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but Security has 
Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance,’ Report to the 
Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 
October 2008, 12 [GAO report].  
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Table 2: US Assistance by Program Objectives, 2000-2008 (dollars in 
millions)168 
 
Program 
objective 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Reduce 
Illicit 
Narcotics 
and Improve 
Security 
$817.8 232.8 395.9 607.9 617.7 585.6 587.3 591.1 423.4 4,859.5 
Promote 
Social and 
Economic 
Justice 
80.0 0.5 109.9 125.7 126.5 124.7 130.4 139.7 194.4 1,031.8 
Promote 
Rule of Law 
121.1 0.9 15.8 27.0 9.0 7.3 10.5 7.8 39.4 238.7 
Total 1,018.9 234.2  521.6 760.6 753.2 717.6 728.2 738.6 657.2 6,130.0 
 
  
                                                
168 GAO report, 15: Beginning in 2008, funding for Justice and USAID rule of law programs was 
provided through INCLE, with other USAID programs funded through the Economic Support Fund 
(ESF). Defense receives the bulk of its funding through its own counternarcotics budget for Colombia 
and State-controlled FMF and IMET funds.  
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Table 3: US Nonmilitary Assistance, Fiscal Year Appropriations 2000-2008 
(dollars in millions)169 
 
Program 
category 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Promote 
Social and 
Economic 
Justice 
$80.0 $0.5 $109.9 $125.7 $126.
5 
$124.
7  
$130.
4 
$139.
8 
$194.
4  
$1,03
1.9 
Alternative 
Development 
  49.9 60.2 59.8 70.7 72.0 68.2 119.7 $500.5 
Internally 
Displaced 
Persons 
  34.0 41.5 42.6 32.0 30.7 31.1 35.3 $247.2 
Demobilizatio
n and 
Reintegration 
No 
program 
No 
program 
2.0 0 0 0 8.9 15.7 18.3 $44.9 
Democracy 
and Human 
Rights 
  24.0 24.0 24.0 22.0 18.8 24.8 21.1 $158.7 
Not allocated 80.0 0.5 0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0 $80.5 
Promote the 
Rule of Law, 
Judicial 
Reform and 
Capacity 
Building 
$121.1 $0.9 $15.8 $27.0 $9.0 $7.3 $10.5 $7.8 $39.4 $238.9 
Total 201.1 1.4 125.7 152.7 135.5 132.0 140.9 147.6 233.8 1,270.
7 
 
  
                                                
169 GAO report, 47: Funding sources include the State controlled Andean Counterdrug Initiative, 
Economic Support Funds, and Defense controlled counternarcotics funding. State officials noted 
funding data represents the amount allocated for the categories and does not reflect any budget 
reprogramming that occurred after allocations were made or holds placed by Congress on funds due 
to certification requirements relating to human rights or environmental concerns over the aerial spray 
program.  
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Table 4: Shift in US Assistance to Colombia, FY 2007-2009170 
Account 
($ in thousands) 
FY 2007  
Actual 
FY 2008 
Actual 
FY 2009  
Estimate 
Economic Support 
Fund (ESF) 
0 194,412 200,000 
International 
Narcotics Control 
and Law 
Enforcement 
(INCLE) 
0 41,907 45,000 
Andean 
Counterdrug 
Program (ACP) 
includes Critical 
Flight Safety 
Program (CFSP) 
and Air Bridge 
Denial 
465,000 
(and CFSP of  
37,313) 
 
Total 
502,313 
205,636 
(and CFSP of 
38,982) 
 
Total 
244.618  
199,500 
(and CFSP of 
43,000) 
 
Total 
242,500   
Nonproliferation, 
Antiterrorism & 
Demining (NADR) 
4,086  3,288  3,150 
International 
Military Education 
& Training (IMET) 
1,646 1,421 1,400 
Foreign Military 
Financing (FMF) 
85,500 52,570 53,000 
TOTAL  $593,545 
 
$538,216 $545,050 
 
CFSP was a separate line item within ACP in FY 2007.  For FY 2008 and FY2009, 
CFSP is funded out of the overall Colombia ACP program line item and we have 
indicated those amounts.  Also in FY 2007, ESF was included in the ACP 
appropriation, but was separate in FY 2008 or FY 2009.  Rule of Law programs, 
funded by ACP in FY 2007, are provided by INCLE in FY 2008 and FY 2009.  FY 
2008 does not include the $2.48M (includes rescission) transfer from ACP to FMF. 
 
Appropriations Act, 2009, (Division Y, P.L. 111-8).  Not included are several 
programs funded by global accounts, including, for FY 2007-FY 2009, P.L.480 ($7.7 
million), Migration and Refugee Assistance ($51.2 million) and Transition Initiatives 
($11.7 million). 
 
  
                                                
170 US State Department , Report on the Multiyear Strategy for US Assistance Programs in Colombia 
– No Date 
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Table 5: DOJ Donations to JPL, FY 2006-2010 
DOJ Donations to JPL, FY2006-2010171 
 
Training $3,300,309 
Equipment $3,379,528 
Operational Support $586,270 
TOTAL $7,266,107 
 
 
 
Table 6: USAID Contribution to CNRR, 2006-2009172 
Activities Total Total executed USD 
by 31 Dec 2009  
1. Reconciliation   
International experiences on 
reconciliation 
25,000 
 
392,581 
 
Database of victims 232,000 
 
43,589 
Workshops on reconciliation and 
reparations 
441,000 
 
275,589 
2. Reparations   
CNRR regional offices: Medellín, 
Bucaramanga, Bogotá 
1,100,000 
 
1,232,868 
 
3. Assistance to victims and 
collective reparations 
  
Questionnaire 41,000 
 
89,325 
Awareness workshops 155,000 6,453 
 
Pilot project on collective 
reparations 
1,000,000 
 
921,378 
TOTAL 2,994,000 2,961,783 
 
 
  
                                                
171 DOJ Justice and Peace Presentation, 15 April 2010. Numbers of training include ICITAP salaries 
of US$400,000 per year. Donations also include police stations which ICITAP donated US$33,000 
plus forensic donations were approx $100,000. ICITAP training 2009 and 2010 was $365,000. 
Estimate for 2006, 2007 and 2008 was $200,000 per year. 
172 Data provided by Catalina Martínez Guzman, Executive Director, CNRR, 4 September 2010.  
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Appendix 7 List of Transitional Justice Actors 
Note: This is an illustrative list, not a comprehensive one.  
International organizations 
Office for the High Commissioner of Human Rights  
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
UN Development Programme (UNDP) 
UNICEF 
World Bank  
International NGOs 
International Center for Transitional Justice  
Amnesty International 
Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL)  
Human Rights Watch  
Humanitarian Law Center 
Open Society Justice Initiative 
International Coalition of Sites of Conscience 
Local NGOs 
The Arab Institute for Human Rights 
The Association for Human Rights (APRODEH) 
The Association for Truth and Reconciliation 
B92 
The Burma Lawyers' Council (BLC) 
The Center for Human Rights Legal Action (CALDH) 
The Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) 
The Center for Legal and Social Studies (CELS) 
The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) 
The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 
The Commission on Involuntary Disappearances and Victims of Violence 
(KONTRAS) 
Conflict Management and Development Associates (CMDA) 
The Congolese Coalition for Transitional Justice (CCJT) 
Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) 
The East Timor Steering Committee on the Truth Commission 
Equitas 
The Ghana Center for Democratic Development 
The Greensboro Truth and Community Reconciliation Project 
Groupe Lotus 
Guatemalan Forensic Anthropology Foundation (FAFG) 
The Healing Through Remembering Project 
Human Rights Education Institute of Burma (HREIB) 
The Human Rights Information and Documentation Center (INDOK) 
The Human Rights Office of the Social Foundation 
The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) 
Iraq Memory Foundation 
The Foundation Ideas for Peace 
Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy (ELSAM) 
The International Centre for Ethnic Studies 
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The Judicial System Monitoring Programme (JSMP) 
The Kenya Human Rights Commission 
The Khulumani Support Group (KSG) 
The Kosovar Research and Documentation Institute (KODI) 
The Law & Society Trust 
The Liberia National Law Enforcement Association (LINLEA) 
The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies 
Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) 
The Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights 
(CMDPDH) 
The Moroccan Center for Documentation, Information and Training in Human 
Rights 
The National Forum for Human Rights, Sierra Leone 
The National Human Rights Coordinating Group (CNDDHH) 
The NGO Follow-up Committee, Morocco 
Peace Advocates for Truth and Healing (PATH) 
The Post-conflict Reintegration Initiative for Development and Empowerment 
(PRIDE) 
The Research and Documentation Center (Sarajevo) 
The Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Programme (SLCMP) 
The Sustainable Democracy Center (SDC), Lebanon 
The Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP) 
The Transitional Justice Working Group in Liberia (TJWG) 
The Transitional Justice Working Group in Sri Lanka (TJWG) 
UMAM Documentation & Research 
Universities 
The Centre for the Study of Human Rights (CSHR), University of Colombo, Sri 
Lanka 
The Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley, US 
The Human Rights Center of the University of Chile Law School, Chile 
The Human Rights Program of the Universidad Iberoamericana 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 
Transitional Justice Project at the Center for Civil and Human Rights, University of 
Notre Dame, US 
New York University Law School's Justice in Transition program, US 
Columbia Law School, US 
Transitional Justice Database Project, University of Wisconsin  
American University  
Foundations 
Ford Foundation  
MacArthur Foundation  
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Appendix 8 Attendees of Early Transitional Justice Conferences 
This chart is taken from Paige Arthur’s article titled ‘How “Transitions” Reshaped 
Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice’ (2009). She identifies 
the participants at three conferences that treated the issues of justice in transitional 
periods. The first part of the chart identifies those people who attended more than 
one of these conferences. In the second, all the other participants are listed.  
  
State Crimes: Punishment or 
Pardon? 
 
Aspen Institute 
Wye, Maryland 
November 4–6, 1988 
Funder: Ford Foundation 
Justice in Times of Transition 
Charter 77 Foundation 
Salzburg, Austria 
March 7–10, 1992 
Funders: German Marshall 
Fund of the United States, 
the Charles Stewart Mott 
Foundation, the National 
Endowment for Democracy, 
Open Society, the 
Rockefeller Family & 
Associates, the Rockefeller 
Foundation, and the Charter 
77 Foundation-New York 
Dealing with the Past 
Institute for a Democratic 
Alternative for South Africa 
Somerset West, Western 
Cape 
February 1994  
Funder: Open Society 
 
 
Henkin, Alice Y. 
The Aspen Institute, New 
York, USA 
Henkin, Alice Y. 
 
 
Malamud-Goti, Jaime 
Buenos Aires University, 
Argentina 
Malamud-Goti, Jaime 
 
 
Méndez, Juan E. 
Americas Watch, 
Washington, D.C., USA 
 Méndez, Juan E. 
 
 Michnik, Adam 
Editor-in-Chief of Wyborcza, 
Member of Parliament, 
Poland 
Michnik, Adam 
 
Neier, Aryeh 
HRW, New York, USA 
 Neier, Aryeh 
 
Orentlicher, Diane 
Columbia University, New 
York, USA 
Orentlicher, Diane 
 
 
 Sajo, Andras 
Legal Advisor to President 
Arpad Gönz, Hungary 
Sajo, Andras 
 
Weschler, Lawrence 
The New Yorker, New York, 
USA 
Weschler, Lawrence Weschler, Lawrence 
Zalaquett, José (Esq.) 
Santiago, Chile 
 Zalaquett, José 
 
Bajeux, Jean-Claude 
Ecumenical Center of 
Human Rights, Port-au-
Prince, Haiti 
Alfonsín, Raoul 
President of Argentina, 
1983–89 
Adam, Heribert 
South Africa 
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State Crimes: Punishment or 
Pardon? 
 
Aspen Institute 
Wye, Maryland 
November 4–6, 1988 
Funder: Ford Foundation 
Justice in Times of Transition 
Charter 77 Foundation 
Salzburg, Austria 
March 7–10, 1992 
Funders: German Marshall 
Fund of the United States, 
the Charles Stewart Mott 
Foundation, the National 
Endowment for Democracy, 
Open Society, the 
Rockefeller Family & 
Associates, the Rockefeller 
Foundation, and the Charter 
77 Foundation-New York 
Dealing with the Past 
Institute for a Democratic 
Alternative for South Africa 
Somerset West, Western 
Cape 
February 1994  
Funder: Open Society 
 
Crahan, Margaret 
Occidental College, Los 
Angeles 
Bence, Gyorgy 
Philosopher, Hungary 
Asmal, Kader 
South Africa 
Dworkin, Ronald 
New York University 
New York, USA 
Biedenkopf, Kurt 
Minister President of 
Saxony, Germany 
Boraine, Alex 
IDASA, South Africa 
Fitch, Samuel 
University of Colorado, 
Boulder, USA 
Bratinka, Pavel 
Member of Federal 
Assembly, Czechoslovakia 
Burton, Mary 
South Africa 
Fruhling, Hugo 
Academia de Humanismo 
Cristiano, Santiago, Chile 
Degutis, Arunas 
MP, Lithuania 
Calata, Nomonde 
South Africa 
Henkin, Louis 
Columbia University, New 
York, USA 
Errera, Roger 
Conseiller d’état, France 
Canas, Roberto 
El Salvador 
Herz, John Y. 
City University of New 
York, USA 
Garretón, Roberto 
Deputy Foreign Minister of 
Chile 
Du Plessis, Lourens 
South Africa 
Mamdani, Mahmood 
Makerere University, 
Kampala, Uganda 
Goldman, Robert 
American University Law 
School 
Washington, D.C., USA 
Du Toit, André 
South Africa 
Meron, Theodor 
NYU, New York, USA 
Grossman, Claudio 
American University Law 
School, USA 
Gauck, Joachim 
Germany 
Mulet, Edmond (Cong.) 
Guatemala City, Guatemala 
Güttler, Vojen 
Justice, Constitutional Court 
of Czechoslovakia 
Gcina, Paizoah 
South Africa 
Nagel, Thomas 
NYU, New York, USA 
Holmes, Stephen 
Professor of Political 
Science, University of 
Chicago, USA 
Goldstone, Richard 
South Africa 
Nakchung, Paik 
University of Seoul, Korea 
Huntington, Samuel 
Olin Institute 
Harvard University, USA 
James, Wilmot 
South Africa 
Pérez Aguirre, Luis (Father) 
Servicio Paz Y Justicia, 
Montevideo, Uruguay 
Laber, Jeri 
Executive Director, Helsinki 
Watch 
Lapsley, Michael 
South Africa 
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State Crimes: Punishment or 
Pardon? 
 
Aspen Institute 
Wye, Maryland 
November 4–6, 1988 
Funder: Ford Foundation 
Justice in Times of Transition 
Charter 77 Foundation 
Salzburg, Austria 
March 7–10, 1992 
Funders: German Marshall 
Fund of the United States, 
the Charles Stewart Mott 
Foundation, the National 
Endowment for Democracy, 
Open Society, the 
Rockefeller Family & 
Associates, the Rockefeller 
Foundation, and the Charter 
77 Foundation-New York 
Dealing with the Past 
Institute for a Democratic 
Alternative for South Africa 
Somerset West, Western 
Cape 
February 1994  
Funder: Open Society 
 
Picken, Margo 
Ford Foundation, New 
York, USA 
Luciani, Claudia 
Council of Europe 
Motlana, Nthato 
South Africa 
Pinheiro, Paulo Sergio 
Universidade de Sao Paulo, 
Brazil 
Michelini, Rafael 
Deputy in Chamber of 
Representatives, Uruguay 
Ntsebeza, Dumisa 
South Africa 
Posner, Michael 
Lawyers Committee for 
Human Rights, New York, 
USA 
Navasky, Victor 
Editor, The Nation 
USA 
Osiatynski, Wiktor 
Poland/USA 
Skweyiya, Lewis (Esq.) 
Durban, South Africa 
Offe, Claus 
Professor of Political 
Science, University of 
Bremen, Germany 
Petrova, Dimitrina 
Bulgaria  
 Osiatynski, Wiktor 
Advisor to Polish 
government on drafting a 
new constitution, Poland 
Rosenberg, Tina 
USA 
 Petovar, Tanja 
HR Lawyer, Belgrade, 
Yugoslavia 
Sachs, Albie 
South Africa 
 Phillips, Tim 
Charter 77 Foundation, New 
York, 
USA  
Schwarzenberg, Karel 
Czech Republic 
 Rodrigo, Fernando 
Fundacion Ortega Y Gasset, 
Madrid, Spain 
Slabbert, Frederik Van Zyl 
IDASA, South Africa 
 Roginsky, Arseny 
Board Member of Memorial, 
Russian Human Rights 
Organization 
 
 Rupnik, Jacques 
Advisor to Mitterrand, 
France 
 
 Schwartz, Herman 
American University Law 
School 
Co-chair, Project on Justice 
in Times of Transition, USA 
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Aspen Institute 
Wye, Maryland 
November 4–6, 1988 
Funder: Ford Foundation 
Justice in Times of Transition 
Charter 77 Foundation 
Salzburg, Austria 
March 7–10, 1992 
Funders: German Marshall 
Fund of the United States, 
the Charles Stewart Mott 
Foundation, the National 
Endowment for Democracy, 
Open Society, the 
Rockefeller Family & 
Associates, the Rockefeller 
Foundation, and the Charter 
77 Foundation-New York 
Dealing with the Past 
Institute for a Democratic 
Alternative for South Africa 
Somerset West, Western 
Cape 
February 1994  
Funder: Open Society 
 
 Steigenberger, Helmut 
Former Justice of the FRG 
Constitutional Court, 
Germany 
 
 Szajer, Jozef 
MP, Hungary 
 
 Teitel, Ruti 
New York Law School, USA 
 
 Urban, Jan 
Journalist for Livdove noviny, 
Czechoslovakia 
 
 
 
 
